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The Role of Air Force in U.S. Counternarcotics Policy
Joseph Zadarecky II

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Thomas K. Latimer; James W. Lucas; C. Norma Wood; Kenneth M. Duberstein; James Cassity, Jr.; Gordon Negus; W. O. Studeman; Joseph Zadarecky II

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The Role of the Air Force in U. S. Counternarcotics Policy

Joseph T. Zadareky II

Since August 1987, Colonel Zadareky has served as chief of the Tactical Command and Control Division, Directorate of Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, in Washington, D.C. During his career, he has served as a weapons director with the 35th Air Division; senior director with the 640th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; training officer with the 776th Radar Squadron; chief controller, HQ First Air Force; and training officer, 678th Air Defense Group. From 1974 to 1977 he served as chief, Instructional System Development and senior director, 23rd Air Division; he then assumed command of the 711 Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron. In 1978, he was assigned to HQ NORAD, Directorate of Operations, Combat Operations Division. Following his assignment to Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., Tactical Command and Control Division, Directorate of Operations, Colonel Zadareky served as special assistant to the Vice President on military support for drug interdiction.

Oettinger: It is my pleasure to introduce to you Colonel Zadareky. I won't go into the details of his biography because you've all had a chance to look at it. When I wrote to him inviting him to meet with us, I suggested that he draw on his experience, which covers almost all the things that we've dealt with — from tactical command and control in the field to worrying about command and control and intelligence for the U.S. Air Force and being embroiled more or less from the inception with command and control in the "drug war." He has experienced both jointness and separateness, and everything else from NATO to law enforcement agencies within the United States. So saying, I will just turn it over to Colonel Zadareky. Is it agreeable to you, sir, that questions come right along?

Zadareky: I'd like to entertain your questions as we proceed. Thank you, Tony. When Professor Oettinger invited me to speak, he told me that he would expect this to be a learning experience and I'm sure it will. It also brought to mind a story about a young man who was not very adept at learning experiences. He tried very hard all of his life and usually came up a bit short, but he decided that he wanted to get into parachuting and become a sky diver. In the process he did all his studies, he did the classes, and scheduled time for his first jump. They took him up to 7,000 feet; he jumped out of the airplane and when he got down to 5,000 feet, just as the book said, he pulled the rip cord. And nothing happened. So he figured, "Well, it's just another bummer of a day. I failed another test." And at about 2,000 feet he saw this object coming up from the ground, at an almost equal velocity, and it appeared to be another young man who was on his way up. So the sky diver yelled to him, "Do you know anything about parachuting?" The response was, "No, do you know anything about propane gas lighters?" Well, I hope today will be both a learning and an uprising experience.

I have a prepared text which is about 20 minutes or so, but I know it will go much longer than that because I do encourage you to ask questions. My talk is not focused on intelligence; it is not focused on communications; but I hope it is focused on command and control. So with that, let me begin.



Figure 1. Background: National Drug Control Strategy

The foundation for the Air Force's counternarcotics mission can be found in the national drug control strategy and the national military counternarcotic strategy. The national drug control strategy was prepared by the Office of the National Drug Control Policy, that's Mr. William Bennett, and approved by the President in October 1989. This strategy was later updated in January 1990 and I have a copy of these two, which I'll pass around to give you some insight as to what goes on in actually putting the strategy into writing. Let me digress from my script here to give you a little background. The strategy and the creation of Mr. Bennett's office is a direct result of Congress not having control over what the administration was doing previously. By that I mean that the Vice President was in charge of coordinating a counternarcotics effort known as the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System. This was a system that had no people assigned to it, it had no budget assigned to it; however, it was drawing on resources and budgets from other agencies.

Oettinger: Are we talking now about Bush when he was the Vice President?

Zadareky: That's correct, when Bush was Vice President in the Reagan Administration. Congress had little or no control or influence over that type of arrangement. Following the Reagan Administration, Congress created the drug czar office, which was going to have a cabinet equivalent position. And, so, in creating that organization, they created a way that they could influence, through the budgetary process, how that office was going to operate. The principal goal of the strategy is to reduce the level of illegal drugs used in America. Although the strategy encompasses the illegal use of all drugs, it targets three primary drugs to be fought on three different battlefields. And those battlefields, if you'll note, are domestic, at our borders, as well as in the foreign arena. I'd like to look at each one of those drugs separately for just a minute.

Oettinger: Colonel, can you say a little bit more about how Congress influences the new approach?

Zadareky: Under the Reagan Administration, with the control coming directly from the Vice President, there were certain executive privileges and exemptions that the White House had. For instance, when Congress asked staff members of the Vice President for information, they never went to testify, they went to brief, to discuss. It may seem a very small fact, but they tried to maintain they had special status with regards to Congress.

Oettinger: Yes, but as long as there was a small staff, they couldn't do a hell of a lot. Wouldn't the Congress be able to cast a fishy eye on the agencies contributing resources to some venture of the executive branch?

Zadareky: After the fact, that's correct. An agency that comes in with a budget says, "I need X number of dollars in order to support this organization, and this organization is going to do such and such." There was never a formal budget presented for the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System since it was not an agency. It was, rather, a small staff that was responsible for working with various federal agencies, coordinating their budgets that had already been approved by Congress.

Oettinger: So what you describe is a mechanism in which if the executive branch wants to do something rapidly and on a small scale, it can do it. It doesn't sound like a mechanism that's calculated to do anything effectively for a long period of time.

Zadareky: That's correct. The reason the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System was created was that the drug problem in the United States, particularly in Florida, had gotten so severe, it was basically out of control. The people in Miami had likened it to the Chicago prohibition gangland shootouts in the shopping malls at high noon. Corporate officers were moving, leaving south Florida. A group of citizens formed an organization called "Miami Citizens Against Crime," and sent a representative to Washington to talk to President Reagan. President Reagan made a commitment to them that he was going to do something about it. The initial step was to create the South Florida Task Force, which was basically a law enforcement prosecutorial investigative organization —bringing in more judges, more prosecutors. That seemed to work well; as a matter of fact, it was expanded to other parts of the country. But they were still lacking a coordination mechanism between other federal agencies, as well as the state and locals, as far as working together against a common problem. Actually, it was Ed Meese and Vice President Bush (Meese at that time, I think, was Chief of Staff for Reagan, part of the inner office of President Reagan).

Student: And Dan Murphy?

Zadareky: That's right. Dan Murphy was Bush's Chief of Staff at that time.

Oettinger: This was early Reagan?

Zadareky: Yes, about 1982 or 1983. Actually, it was those two gentlemen, Meese and Murphy, who came up with the idea of creating some kind of a small staff that would be able to use the influence and the good name of the office of the Vice President to try to get the federal agencies to cooperate and work together, as opposed to working as independent entities.

Now, the new organization that Mr. Bennett heads up is a policy office and Mr. Bennett has made it clear that his organization is not going to get involved in operations. He's not going to try to work with any of the law enforcement agencies or the Department of Defense as far as how they should execute their responsibilities and missions, but he'll identify those missions and responsibilities that each agency should have. Later on in my briefing, I'll show you how the Department of Defense is working to bring together defense resources to solve the problem.

In the strategy, cocaine is the number one priority for the allocation of counternarcotics resources. Two to three million Americans use cocaine on a daily basis. It's estimated that 1,200 tons of cocaine are produced annually and it's grown almost exclusively in Peru and Bolivia and Colombia. Most of it — 80 percent — is processed and shipped through Colombia.

Heroin is smaller in scope but receives a high priority due to the addictive properties of the drug. Traditionally grown in southern Asia, the opium poppy has recently been cultivated in Lebanon and Mexico. Primary processing and distribution centers remain in southeast Asia.

Marijuana is the third drug, targeted because of its widespread use. It's grown primarily in the United States and Mexico. Its large bulk and low cost make the drug less profitable for international drug dealers.

Our national strategy has two approaches for reducing the availability of drugs. It subscribes to the simple economic principle of supply and demand. If you can effectively reduce the demand, then the supply will also be reduced. The war on drugs begins on the domestic front. The criminal justice, education, and national health systems are responsible for demand reduction. The Air Force conducts prevention counseling, testing, and treatment programs for Air Force military and civilian personnel, and at the end of the briefing I'll talk specifically about those Air Force programs.

Student: Colonel, you made the point that Bennett's office is nothing more than a policy office. But now we've got all these players. Who is keeping all this together? Once you made the point that there are big turf situations where people were going off and not coordinating. Who's responsible for coordinating these activities?

Zadareky: Again, I'll ask if I can defer that question. If we can hold the discussion until a later point, I'd love to hear some other ideas on it.

Oettinger: While you're interrupted, is "battlefields" an official metaphor — does it show up in those documents?

Zadareky: It's not official. There are three zones, if you would like to use that term instead of battlefields. There are three different places where you can logically attack the problem: in the source countries themselves, in the transit zone, and at the borders into the United States or in the United States itself.



Figure 2. Battlefields: Border Interdiction

Oettinger: Is this like the "war on poverty"? Almost everything that had that metaphor attached to it has failed and I'm just wondering if it is an omen or what?

Zadareky: There are a lot of people in uniform who have that same concern — are we really prosecuting this as a war? Because this is a war far different from anything the military has ever been asked to do in the past. The military can go out and prosecute wars, but that's not what our nation is asking us to do in this case. So, from our perspective, war is probably not a proper term.

Student: We've had a couple of people come in and give briefings and touch on the drug issue. It seems like the Air Force people usually bring up the Air Force testing and treatment programs. I was just wondering if there is some reason they do that, because police officers don't typically, when they're talking about drugs, bring up how they test the police officers.

Zadareky: One of the reasons I'm bringing it up is because I think the Air Force has got a good program that has worked, and I guess by showing you the results of the Air Force program, I'm trying to plant the seeds that testing can be a deterrent. Later on I'll show you the results of that.

The supply reduction can begin on the domestic front. Along the U.S. border, interdicting illegal drugs is a team effort with DOD responsible for the detection and law enforcement agencies responsible for the interception. The primary method of smuggling includes small privately owned aircraft flying directly into the United States or northern Mexico, or air dropping the drugs to small boats, or to large mother ships that transfer drugs to small, fast boats. The drugs may be concealed in commercial cargo containers, in vehicles, or on individuals. As you can see, there are many ways for this stuff to enter the United States.

Oettinger: Implicit in the process is that information on what is detected by the military gets to the law enforcement agencies. We've seen the problems of passing information from one service to another and here we go passing information from the military to civilian law enforcement. It seems calculated not to be smooth.

Zadareky: Later, I will spend a little more time going into the command and control relationships. We in the military are used to working in a joint operation; we're doing it better than we used to but we still have a way to go. Because of our experience in working multiservice operations, it's easier for us to talk about working with the Air Force, Customs, Coast Guard, and DEA, and any of the other federal agencies who may want some of the information that we have access to.

You ask good questions and I'm encouraged because I've addressed most of them in my briefing outline, so hopefully I'm on the right track, and I'll just ask you to be patient. I owe you some answers. They're coming.

Reducing the foreign supply of illegal drugs is another aspect of supply reduction. Joint State and Defense Department missions require the coopera-

tion of the governments of those countries that produce and ship drugs. DOD support to this mission includes training of law enforcement and military personnel; reconnaissance of drug growing regions, production, and shipping facilities; and providing command and control systems, intelligence, and equipment to the host nations. The drug problem is very elastic. As you apply pressure in one area, you normally displace the operation to another area. For example, look at the Bahamas. Law enforcement successes in the southeastern part of the United States have forced smugglers to develop off-shore operations. The close proximity of the Bahamas has made them an ideal host for transshipping drugs into the United States. In the Bahamas you'll find, as frequently occurs, the smugglers are also drug users. Frequently, the smugglers will take the drugs as a method of payment, as opposed to cash, and this, in turn, leads to the domestic problem of drug use in the Bahamas. The Bahamians will be the first to point out that their problem is attributed to the United States' insatiable thirst for drugs.

I'd like to look now at the DOD strategy. The National Military Counter Narcotics Strategy is developed by the Department of Defense coordinator for drug control policy. This policy supports the President's national strategy. It defines the DOD mission to stem the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, while remaining within the legal framework of Congressional legislation. Since the Congressional legislation forms the doctrine of Air Force counternarcotics activity, we need to take a look at that federal law. The bottom line is that the DOD is the lead agency for detection and monitoring air and maritime smuggling of drugs into the United States. DOD did not replace any mission or responsibilities of any of the existing law enforcement agencies.

How does the military play in what is traditionally a law enforcement arena? Historically, the county sheriffs have had the authority to deputize the local residents to assist in law enforcement. It was a common practice in the Wild West, where *posse comitatus* was shortened to simply posse. However, after the Civil War, Congress prohibited the use of the Army in law enforcement due to abuses in the southern states where Army personnel were used to enforce election laws and collect taxes. Although the law was amended to include the Air Force, it is interesting to note that only service regulations and policy restricts Navy and Marine Corps personnel from enforcing civilian law. From 1980 to 1986, Congress passed a series of legislation designed to provide military assistance to law enforcement personnel combating illegal drugs. The law now allows the use of military information, equipment, and facilities; provides for military training of law enforcement personnel; and permits the assignment of Coast Guard personnel on Navy vessels. However, there are some restrictions. Military personnel are generally not permitted to participate in search, seizure, or arrest operations. Also, support to law enforcement agencies cannot adversely affect military preparedness, and the Secretary of Defense can require reimbursement of some costs for the requested support. This piece of legislation is absolutely critical for getting the United States military more involved in the drug war. We are able to take a Coast Guard detachment (five Coast Guard



Figure 3. National Military Counternarcotics Strategy



Figure 4. Congressional Legislation: 1981-86 Legislation

men), put them aboard a United States Navy ship of war, run up the Coast Guard flag at the appropriate time, and that ship is now under the operation and control of the Coast Guard and the Coast Guard can execute its law enforcement responsibilities. There have been many Navy ships that have stopped other ships on the high seas, gone through the appropriate legal notifications with the country of registration for that vessel, and boarded the ship. The Coast Guard personnel have boarded the ship and seized any contraband found on the ship. Then the Navy ship has towed it back to port or escorted it back into port.

Oettinger: What is the point of those niceties? Is there a practical point that the Coast Guard's men are trained and Navy people aren't? I'm trying to get a sense of what itch one is scratching with what you've just described — is it a legal one, a policy one, an appearance one, a substantive one?

Zadareky: I'm not a lawyer but I'll give you a layman's interpretation. As you remember, I said the military cannot participate in search, seizure, or arrest without being in violation of the *posse comitatus* act. If we were to put Navy seamen on board a maritime vessel and start searching for narcotics, you could say that we are in violation of the *posse comitatus* act. Coast Guard personnel, as law enforcement officers, have the authority and the legal right to do that under the international law of the sea treaties. The Navy is merely transporting the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard officer and his crew are executing their legally-assigned responsibilities.

Student: They've also been doing it for years.

Zadareky: Yes. In 1988, the defense appropriation acts designated DOD as a lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime smuggling of illegal drugs. Pending legislation will add overland smuggling to the detection mission. This is the legislation that had a major impact on the U.S. Air Force's participation in the counternarcotics effort, and later in the briefing I'll show you how the Air Force is participating and what contribution we are making. I'd like to look now at some of our current activities.

Direct support to the law enforcement agencies includes the loan of equipment such as radars, radios, and weapons; the assignment of personnel to law enforcement centers to provide technical assistance; the use of military working dogs for drug detection; and the transportation of federal agents and prisoners. We also provide training to law enforcement personnel on the use and maintenance of military equipment and the conduct of special operations. The Air Force facilities are also used to support U.S. Customs air branches and operations, and to provide transit housing for federal prisoners. The authority and procedures for the Air Force support of these law enforcement agencies are found in Air Force Regulation 55-35. That's just our way of keeping our field commanders out of trouble.

Student: Customs air branches? There's something about that language that I don't understand.

Zadareky: At Homestead Air Force Base, there's a Customs air branch that's located on the base and flies off our Air Force airfields. We're the host for that operation.

Student: O.K.

Zadareky: Another is located at March Air Force Base in California. Customs has two command, control, communications, and information centers — C^3I East, which is near Miami at Richmond Heights, and C^3I West, which is collocated at March Air Force Base with our air defense operations center.

Student: I've also noticed the loan of the F-16 and F-15 radars installed in Customs aircraft, like Lear jets, so instead of their conventional radar system, they've got a fire control system. The radar portion of that will allow them much more capability.

Zadareky: And, of course, the Customs air branches are also operating the UH-60, which is the Army Black Hawk Helicopter, off these Air Force bases. It's strictly a good-neighbor policy where they're using our airfields for operations. At times it can be very tenuous, a conflict of missions, you might say.

Student: Just a question on backup arrangements. They're really using a fire-control radar?

Student: They've got the full F-16 APG-65 radar on that aircraft. You bet.

Zadareky: Next I'd like to look at how we begin to pull all these strategies and concepts together. In the 1988 Appropriation Acts, the U.S. Congress designated the Department of Defense as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of both aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Soon after that, Congress passed the omnibus antidrug bill, which created the drug czar



Figure 5. Overall Coordination

position — again, that's Mr. Bennett's office — to coordinate all aspects of counternarcotics policy and strategy. Under the direction of Mr. Bennett, this office is known as the Office of National Drug Control Policy, or ONDCP. The overall national policy and strategy guidelines were released by ONDCP and approved by the President in September 1989 and then refined in January 1990. Those are the documents required by Congress for its review. In February of 1989, the role of DOD involvement in counternarcotics transferred from that of a service responsibility to a Joint Chiefs of Staff, or JCS mission, conducted by four unified commands. This number has grown now to five CINCs (Commanders in Chief). They are NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), the Atlantic Command, the Pacific Command, Southern Command, and Forces Command. The JCS director of operations has been tasked to coordinate all counternarcotics military operations for maritime and land with law enforcement agencies. Tony, I think that explains how we're trying to bring this all together, but you have to remember that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has direction and control over all the DOD assets, but not over the law enforcement agencies. So Customs and DEA still operate independently and we try to coordinate, with their cooperation, their planned operations in conjunction with what the Air Force or the Navy or the Army is doing.

Oettinger: Customs and DEA are both under Treasury? Is that right?

Zadareky: No, DEA is under the Justice Department. The Coast Guard comes under Transportation. So we've got lots of players.

I mentioned some military terms. I know I've got some military people here today, but for those of you who may not be familiar with them, let me show you what I'm talking about as it pertains to the CINCs' areas of responsibility. The CINCNORAD's area of responsibility is the air space over the North American continent. Using his air sovereignty defense forces, CINCNORAD is tasked



Figure 6. Counternarcotics Supported CINCs

to provide detection and monitoring of drug trafficking aircraft penetrating the sovereign air space of Canada and the United States. The CINCLANT area of responsibility includes the international waters of the Atlantic, Caribbean, and a small portion of the Pacific off the west coast of Central and South America. The specific command area of responsibility is huge. Due to the size of the Pacific Ocean and the number of vessels which cross it routinely, much of the CINCPAC effort will be dependent upon intelligence queuing and data collection for sorting drug trafficking vessels. The Commander in Chief of FORCECOM has been given the responsibility for coordinating all DOD operational support to counternarcotics activities on the ground inside the U.S. borders, particularly along the southwest border of the United States. The Commander in Chief of SOUTHCOM will provide training and operational support, material, advice, and technological and maintenance support to the counternarcotics organizations of cooperating nations in Central and South America. This is one of the few times in U.S. history that we are trying to fight a war involving more than one CINC. So we have the problem of coordinating all of our efforts in the Department of Defense within this huge area. What has happened is that DOD resources are being tasked by five different commanders in chief who need those resources. Now the services are having to go back to the Joint Staff to ask them for help in prioritizing where the Air Force should provide those resources. Who gets them? Everybody is asking for them. The requests far outnumber our capabilities to satisfy them. That's where the coordination process comes in.

Student: Colonel, while it was before the designation of unified, specified commands, nevertheless the second World War had two "CINCs," who, in fact, had to do a certain amount of sharing of resources. Mechanisms were established for that sort of thing.

Zadareky: And the way we did that was through a Supreme Commander. We don't have a Supreme Commander in this war, consequently, each commander is vying for the resources that he needs. JCS, the chairman, is aware of that problem and his solution is to appoint a general officer on his staff as that Supreme Commander. He won't have a title as such, but he will have a job description saying his responsibility will be to coordinate among the CINCs, to prioritize the resources, and to move the resources between the CINCs. He'll also govern a swing force: if you need them in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, we're going to take them from the Atlantic and Pacific and put them into SOUTHCOM for a 90-day period. Then perhaps he'll reassign everything to the Atlantic.

Oettinger: There was a Supreme Commander in Europe but there was still a great deal of contention between resources deployed in Europe. There was perennial contention for that.

Zadareky: It may have been a bad example. The point I was trying to make was we have multiple commanders in chief vying for the same resources.

I'd say we are not on a wartime footing. Our utilization rate for our airplanes is at the peacetime rate. In other words, when we spend the taxpayers' dollars to buy military hardware it's supposed to last for many years. That's based upon so many flying hours on each airplane each year; if we get into a war, obviously we can accelerate the use of that airplane, which means it's going to wear out and have to be replaced that much quicker. We're still on a peacetime footing trying to satisfy five different CINCs who are working a wartime contingency.

Student: How do FORCECOM and SOUTHCOM talk to each other administratively?

Zadareky: Mexico is not in any CINC's area of responsibility, so there's a little bit of a buffer between SOUTHCOM and FORCECOM. SOUTHCOM has the land mass in Central America south of Mexico and down into South America for an area of responsibility. SOUTHCOM has few resources directly assigned to him because he cannot operate in any part of his area without the host government inviting him to come and participate. So, what SOUTHCOM is attempting to do now is to build a surveillance system, or an information system, that can tell a host country that there is some smuggling traffic in its area. You've got to remember that smuggling operates in both directions. It's not just the smuggling of narcotics out of South America, it's also the smuggling of arms and other items back into South America. They want to know about the airplanes that are coming back or the ships that are coming back with supplies for guerrilla movements or "narcotraffickers." So SOUTHCOM is trying to provide an indications and warning system that will advise a host country. At the same time, SOUTHCOM, working through the Department of Defense and with the State Department, is trying to give those nations a capability to respond to that threat so that the resources that will

actually be conducting the "war" will be Colombian resources, or Venezuelan, or Peruvian. Those are the resources that they can commit. The United States is there to provide technical assistance and advice. In some cases, hardware is being loaned, sold, or given to them.

FORCECOM is drastically different because now all the continental U.S. armies come under the FORCECOM commander. He owns those resources. He can employ them as he sees fit. His problem is inside the U.S. border, and the area that he's focusing on right now is along the Mexican border. He's attempting to build some sort of working relationship with the Mexican government that will allow the crossflow or overflight of Mexican airspace by Customs airplanes when they're in hot pursuit. Because right now, you hit the Mexican border and it's like hitting a wall. We're not allowed to cross the boundary, and by the time you get a Mexican on the other end of a telephone line, the bad guy's landed and disappeared and vice versa. They're trying to sort that problem out. They communicate with one another in a variety of ways, like we do in the military. They can pick up a telephone — they've got secure communications available to them; they have facsimile communications; they can use satellite; they can use HF. Communications is not a limitation as far as the Department of Defense is concerned. Communications or the lack of communications is definitely a limiting factor for the law enforcement agencies concerned. However, that's one area in which DOD has been asked to provide assistance. We can loan secure radios, HF radios, and provide night vision goggles (which are very expensive), so their pilots can fly in the dark. Did I answer your question?

Student: I have one, though. It strikes me as irresponsible that Mexico is not included early on. You know, you talk in terms of a buffer. I don't understand that when you look at EUCOM versus CENTCOM and the dividing up of territories, all the other areas are adjacent to one another. What was the reason, seeing there is enormous amount of drug traffic from Mexico, why wouldn't we have someone responsible to cover that area?

Zadareky: When you get to the NSC (National Security Council), you can tell me the answer. I don't know. It never has been a part of any CINC's area of responsibility. I don't know what the historical precedence for that is.

Student: I think it's in deference to Mexican feelings.

Oettinger: The implications of it being in some command's area won't sit well with Mexico. We can get away with that in Canada.

Student: Well, can you get away with that with the rest of the world? Europe is in somebody's area of responsibility. I don't see any Russians or Soviets in somebody's area of responsibility.

Zadareky: And along the Canadian border, of course, you have a binational command where the Canadians and the U.S. are participating directly in one command that's responsible for all of North America.

Student: Sir, I was going to ask you to talk about swapping forces among commanders in chiefs and how it can't hamper wartime preparedness.

Zadareky: You obviously have a vested interest because I'm talking about systems that are near and dear to you that are in high demand. Those are our airborne surveillance capabilities. Without boring the rest of the class, the resources are being redirected. In other words, we're going to fly fewer exercises than we used to fly. We have given up other training exercises and said that we can get our training accomplished in a surveillance mode. We flew in Saudi Arabia for how many years — eight and a half? We're now providing support in the Caribbean, in a very similar type of operational concept and, quite honestly, I see that going on for a long time. We may have to look at things like changing crew concepts. We may have to look at reallocation of forces. CINCLANT has AWACS sitting up in Iceland. Does he need all those AWACS in Iceland or would they be of better use to him somewhere down in Puerto Rico or in some other area of the Caribbean? Those are the types of decisions that he needs to address when the Air Force says, "I can't provide anymore." Those are the types of tough decisions that have to be made.

Oettinger: Let me try to address your point from a different view. You seem to expect stability in definitions. When the air traffic system needs better on-time departures, you can either keep the present definition and change performance or you can keep the present performance and change the definition, but I can guarantee you on-time departure. In these areas, as in the telecommunications industry, which we've studied a great deal, when you need to justify changing prices in terms of costs, you change the definition of costs, so the prices are always justified in terms of costs.

Zadareky: The Field Commander is still the guy who's going to have to step up and say, "I can't do it." In other words, if I have to go on one more deployment and send five airplanes off to Timbuktu, when those crews come back they're no longer going to be mission-qualified because they did not complete the training that was required of them. Now, given that statement, some very senior officers are going to have to make a decision. "We're going to do it anyway," or, as the Professor was saying, "We're going to have to change our definitions," because the law says we can't do this if it's going to impact on readiness. I can't see any senior officer saying, "Well, I'm going to directly and deliberately violate a federal law."

Student: Sir, I was kind of curious as to what's going on in Eastern Europe. Some of the figures I've seen quote 40 percent of AWACS missions going down to Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, which is deferring a big percentage from here, compared to Saudi Arabia.

Zadareky: I've not seen a major alteration in our current wartime plans because of the recent events in Europe. Obviously that's going to have to happen and I know the planners are up there busily drafting new documents, but that's in the future. What you're talking about has already occurred. You're right, and in my opinion it's probably going to increase even more and it's going to be up to our senior planners to figure out how they're going to get that much more out of the pot. I don't know the answer to that, but I suspect we're going to provide more and it will be done in such a way that we're not going to violate the law in doing it.

McLaughlin: I think there's nothing exotic in the equations. General Robert C. Kingston,* a couple of years ago, was here being asked about the topic. He said if he was still in charge of some of his forces he'd be just as happy having a drug enforcement mission because it was something real that put an edge back on things after European exercises for 25 years. It's real training. You might as well put the training to use.

Zadareky: Well, I can tell you about the morale of the young folks who are manning our ground tactical radars out in the hinterland. If you say, "The Caribbean," people think, "Oh, wow, paradise." Where I'm putting radars, it's not paradise. You're on some rock coral and after five days in the baking sun, it begins to feel like a desert. But those guys and ladies believe in what they're doing because they're seeing a "real enemy" that somebody is trying to stop. It's not just another training mission where, "Yeah, if we see him, fine; if we don't see him, we'll get our wrists slapped." We're making a definite contribution and most of these folks who have kids of their own or have brothers and sisters realize that, "Hey, if I can stop one airplane, one load, from coming into the United States, that's going to help somebody." They believe in what they're doing.

We talked a little earlier about defense in depth, the different borders, battlefields, if you will. Our military commanders apply as much pressure as they can in the source countries and then on the routes for departing the source countries. You're better off attacking at the spoke rather than waiting for them to get outside of the circle, because there are so many different ways they can go. How do you limit their departure routes? Well, if you can take them out of the airfields, let's say the Colombians went in and shut down a clandestine airfield, that's five or six flights that we don't have to worry about the next day. Between 1985 and 1987, we used to see a lot of flights that came right into south Florida. Customs and DEA tell me that there are very few flights flying into the southeastern states now. Instead, their preferred operation is to go someplace like the Bahamas, make an airdrop, land on a sandy beach, off load, and then have a sailboat or one of these fast cigarette boats pick it up and run the drugs into a small inlet on the U.S. side. We've increased pressure in the transit zones and I'll show you how we're doing that. We've seen a change. It's like Jello, as I said earlier, you push on one place and it pops up someplace else.

As you can see, the shortest route will be from here up to the southeastern United States. Because of the effort the United States has put into it with law enforcement agencies and military support, we've displaced that now. We're now seeing more coming up the west coast through the Pacific. It's a much longer route, which means that they've got to use bigger airplanes, which are easier to find. They've got to find larger airfields to operate out of, which are easier for us to find. However, instead of coming all the way up into the United States, we see them go into Mexico, and once they get into Mexico, it seems that one of the preferred means of transshipment now is donkeys. We've also had

*General Robert C. Kingston, "The Special Operations Command: Structure and Responsibilities," in *Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence: Guest Presentations, Spring 1988.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge. MA: 1989.

motorcycles and tractor-trailer trucks coming across — huge tractor trailers coming across dirt roads in the middle of the night. That's where the United States Forces Command and their sophisticated surveillance techniques come in. You don't normally find a truck out there at two o'clock in the morning moving across that prairie or that field. You notify the Mexican authorities, and that's something we're doing a lot more of — working through the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. The Mexican government appears to be much more proactive in trying to wage a counternarcotics effort. That's what we mean when I talk about defense in depth.

Student: A lot of the focus is on cocaine and, therefore, South America where it's grown. The number two drug is heroin, and once you made the point that you thought that the desired drug, or the yuppie drug of the future, will more likely be heroin than cocaine. What's going on in the Golden Triangle? What are we doing that is similar here to looking at that side of the world?

Zadareky: The level of effort, from my perspective, isn't even close. The effort that we're making in this region of the world is with the cooperation of the host countries. I think we have a lot more work to do in developing that kind of cooperative spirit in the Eastern part of the world that you're talking about, in order to allow us to provide the assistance to those people that we're providing to the folks here. If they don't want that kind of help, it's not going to happen. And you know the stories about the corrupt border guards. They're getting paid. The Customs inspector on the border is getting paid a commission fee on the amount of drugs that he stops. So all you have to do is beat that commission fee and you're going to get through. So where's the incentive for him to do his job? That's kind of an accepted practice. We've got a long way to go in that area. We don't have near the military commitment, nor do I think we have the national resources to commit to that target area.

Student: So, in this case, it's pretty much a front effort.

Zadareky: Yes, it's a front effort because cocaine is the "now" problem, and they're trying to do something to slow it down. As I said earlier, demand reduction is the only thing that is going to solve the problem. Supply reduction and interdiction will slow down the problem, but it's not going to solve the problem by itself. That's going to take a long time through the education process. I think it's going to be a whole generation before we have educated our nation to wean it off drugs.

Student: One of the organizations that you mentioned is in charge of policy. Is it investigating the positive and negative drawbacks of legalizing drugs? Do you have any feelings on that? If it's not being sold illegally, what would that do to demand?

Zadareky: I can't answer the second part of your question, but let me try to answer the first part. Mr. Bennett's office, the ONDCP, is, to the best of my knowledge, not working on any kind of effort to legalize it. Nor have I heard of Congress drafting any kind of bill that would legalize it. I know that President Bush has said, on several occasions, that during his term, "It's not going to happen."

Student: Didn't that proposal come from somewhere? It didn't just drop out of the sky.

Zadareky: With regards to the legalization of drugs, I'm not sure of the proposal you're referring to. I know there are things like National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORMAL), which is an organization that's trying to legitimize the use of marijuana, but that is a private effort. It is not a government agency. I have not heard of any government proposal to legalize the use of drugs.

Student: I think the best known of those proposals came from William F. Buckley a couple of years back.

Student: Mr. Bennett said categorically and emphatically — in this very building, at the beginning of this semester — that it would not happen. He rejected that whole idea.

Student: You also have former Secretary of State George Schultz and Kurt Schmoke, the mayor of Baltimore, and some other people who are for legalization. Today some 67 percent of the federal court cases are drug cases.

Student: Mr. Bennett said that even debate on that subject is immoral.

Student: It was interesting that he said that, although it's not particularly amusing. If, in fact, you say it's immoral because drugs kill, then you look at the statistics for alcohol versus any of these drugs that Colonel Zadareky is talking about, and it appears that the preponderance of death occurs with alcohol use or abuse, not even factoring in car accidents. We asked Bennett point blank, "Why, then, would you not include alcohol?" and his

argument was, "There's a vested interest in this country. We've gone through the agony of establishing it because the mechanism exists, and the factories are there, then that is America's drug of choice." I don't think he quite used "drug of choice," but something very close to that. It was quite interesting how it went from a moral dilemma to a practical thing.

Oettinger: Just a brief reminder that Colonel Zadareky is describing the military's discharge of its responsibilities under the orders given by the existing administration. You're talking about a policy choice which is perfectly debatable in this classroom, but I would imagine that a serving officer of the United States military doesn't have much choice. Let's keep in mind what the context of this discussion is.

Zadareky: With my next slide, I will attempt to give you a radar surveillance 101 course in one minute. These are some of the assets that are used by the Department of Defense in providing surveillance support in the drug effort. A ground-based radar is limited. It works on a line-of-sight premise. And as you can see, because it's angled up, it's possible to fly under this radar coverage, unless you have a series of radars that are adjacent to one another where the coverage would overlap. The other airborne sensor is an aerostat; these are much like the Goodyear blimp but are probably two times larger than a Goodyear blimp. It takes this little radar site and it suspends it from an altitude of about 10,000 feet and you now have a look-down capability, which is very difficult to fly under. And as you can see, at the higher altitudes, it is easy to fly around it. So these two complement one another; then there are the more sophisticated platforms such as the E-3, which is an AWACS, the Air Force's version of the Airborne Warning and Control System. An E-2 is the Navy version in a smaller airplane. The P-3 has the capability for looking for maritime targets principally, but also has some aircraft detection capabilities. So it's that kind of an array of resources that the Department of Defense uses to detect and monitor. Remember, that's the mission that the Department of Defense has — detect and monitor. On the next slide I'll show you what we're going to do with that detection and monitoring.

Once we see the guy, you've got to be able to do something with him, and hopefully we've got the support of the law enforcement agencies. The two law enforcement agencies that principally support the air problem are the U.S. Customs Service and the United States Coast Guard. Once we've detected the suspect, Customs aircraft will launch, try to get into close proximity, and I do mean close. I mean, they'll be up there with their lights out at night. Of course, the aircraft they're intercepting also has its lights out, so you're in a totally pitch-black room. If I turned all the lights out in here, except for a match, and told you there was a fly in the room, and gave you a straw to look through and told you to go find it, that's probably not too far off from what these pilots are trying to do. They're very good pilots. They go up and find the target and then track him to the point where he begins to land; then they will bring in a helicopter as part of the chase team. As the suspect's aircraft lands, the helicopter will land right behind it, or preferably in front of it so he can't take off again. The helicopter carries what they call the "bust crew." The "bust crew" jumps out, runs up to the airplane, seizes the pilot and copilot, ground crew, and whomever else is in the area. These things can get kind of hairy. The suspects are not going to land, most times, on a controlled airfield. They'll be landing on a clandestine airfield or a road. I've watched the tapes from a Customs airplane that was chasing a suspect. He landed on an interstate with cars coming right at him because he was low on fuel and he didn't have time to wait around. You can see the cars that are diving off the road. As soon as he stops, out of the woods comes a truck and the guy's airborne again in a matter of minutes. That's how quick it can happen. So Customs has become very proficient at what they do and, of course, the Coast Guard operates in a similar manner.

Student: I'd like to ask how that detection monitor is transmitted to the folks who are on the job?

Zadareky: Do you remember that I mentioned that we had the CINCs who were providing the direction for the employment of military forces? CINCLANT is responsible for the Atlantic, and SOUTHCOM, at Howard Air Force Base in Panama, is responsible for Central America and North America. CINCLANT has an operational center that they call Joint Task Force (JTF) IV in Key West, Florida. FORCECOM has created his headquarters in El Paso at Fort Bliss. SOUTHCOM has his headquarters at Howard. Information is received via a military asset — we have radars that are either being built or are operating at these locations that I've shown you here. When we see a target, the first thing we try to do is identify it. We do that by reporting the target back to our control center. If it

happens to be in the Caribbean, it's reported back to Key West; if it's over the land mass, we report it back to Howard Air Force Base, where they are correlated with flight plan information. However, if this guy is a bad guy, he's probably not on a flight plan, so we use any other intelligence resources that are made available to try to positively identify the guy, or we may find out that we can't identify the guy. If he's not flying on a flight path and all those other little factors are making us say that, "Hey, this guy is a probable suspect." We then share our information with the law enforcement agencies. As I mentioned earlier, the C³I Customs operation center is located in Richmond Heights, which is not very far from Key West. Information is passed to them; SOUTHCOM will also pass information directly to the C³I. It goes from SOUTHCOM back up to JTF IV and then the Joint Task Force would relay the information back to the law enforcement agency. At times, Customs or the Coast Guard will forward deploy their interdiction assets — Citations, King Airs, and Navajos — their air arm, into the Caribbean region. Then they'll respond to that information. Now if I happened to have an AWACS or an E-2 in the region, we can assist the law enforcement agencies by vectoring them onto the target. Once we have got the target, we'll follow it as far as we can. Sometimes, as a matter of fact, we have followed a guy all the way from Colombia to upstate New York. When I say, "we," I don't mean the DOD. I mean he has had a shadow within 50 feet of his airplane from almost the time he crosses over the coast all the way up to New York, and when he lands he's surprised to find he's got a reception party with him.

Student: When you talk about this, are you talking in terms of composite recognizable air pictures shared by all these agencies? Or are you talking about a message or a telephone call saying, "Hey, we've got a guy. He's a possible suspect. He's in this position. We recommend that you launch your airplanes at this time," then possibly hand him over to the E-3.



Figure 7. Planned CBRN Sites

Zadareky: Let me give you the long answer to that question. Currently we are in the process of deploying a network of radars known as the Caribbean Basin Radar Network, or CBRN. The idea is that at each of these marked locations there will be a ground-based radar. Those ground-based radars obviously are in non-U.S. territory. The radars can only be placed there with the permission of the host government. The host government has agreed to participate in this network in the spirit of regional cooperation. In other words, "What do I get out of it in Colombia? What do I get out of it in Venezuela?" The United States government, the United States Air Force specifically, is going to build the radar and pay for its operational maintenance. There are no military personnel associated at any sites, it's all civilian contract (it happens to be Westinghouse right now), with about eight civilians working at these sites. The data from that radar will automatically be sent to the Venezuelan air defense center, for the radars in Venezuela, or to the Colombian air surveillance center in Colombia, etc. At the same time, the radar data flows to one of two locations, either to Howard or to Key West. The data that comes to Howard is also relayed to Key West and then is made available to the law enforcement agencies. So the law enforcement agency has a composite picture of tracks of interest.

Student: Is it real time, or data link?

Zadareky: Near real time. We're talking seconds.

Student: There's no such thing as a data link that's a second.

Zadareky: You want to be the perfectionist at all times. You want to be the purist. You want to look at a radar scope that's going around so you can see raw radar, but you want to have it processed. You can't have both.

So the data does flow back to an operational center where some command decisions can be made about the deployment of assets. Now on a day-to-day basis, the commanders are not just waiting for a target to appear and then respond to it. They have what we call a daily frag, a flying schedule for each day, that also includes ship schedules. They try to cover the region within their area as comprehensively as they can with the resources that have been given to them by JCS, or that have been pledged to them by Customs, the Coast Guard, or DEA. So you've got, in addition to these ground radars, other sensors and other resources that are out there. When they see something, the data flows in the same way I just described.

Student: If you'll just bear with me for a second. Here you have one of those radar sites. Pick one, I don't care which, one of those down south. It picks up a target and he says, "Fine, that's the one," and he relays the information to the center. It also flows to Howard. Howard flows the information to Key West. You have assets, government assets, Coast Guard assets, Customs assets sitting at various locations. Who determines when to launch those chase aircraft to make the interception? Who has the authority? Who is the real command authority that has the capability to declare launch/not launch, as opposed to just providing information. What you've told me about is shippers, guys who provide information, but you didn't talk to me about commanders. Who is the real commander who says, "Launch against that guy," and where does he sit?

Zadareky: You've got two gorillas, and you can decide who is the bigger one. One guy wears four stars, General Maxwell R. Thurman, and he sits at Howard Air Force Base; the other guy is Admiral Frank B. Kelso (CINCLANT), and he's at JTF IV.

Student: Both are military guys, and according to what you told me before, they have no authority to launch.

Zadareky: For detection and monitoring, absolutely.

Student: That's what they call that — monitoring?

Zadareky: That's right. And we'll monitor that guy back to Puerto Rico or back to Miami.

Student: Who dispatches the Black Hawk that has the bust crew? Who has that authority?

Zadareky: The law enforcement agency. In other words, you'd go back to the air branch at Homestead Air Force Base. That decision is going to come out of the C^3I facility at Homestead, which is jointly operated by Coast Guard and Customs. It is so "joint" that every six months they change commanders. They alternate between Customs and Coast Guard, but the guy who is in charge is the one who is going to decide, "I want to use one of my Black Hawk helicopters to intercept this guy who is just coming off the coast of Colombia and looks like he's on a route that's going to take him up to Guantanamo Bay. So I want to fly out of Homestead, refuel at Guantanamo Bay, and meet this guy somewhere down around Jamaica."

Student: The real gorilla, I would say, is not the two military guys that you gave me a choice of. The Customs or Coast Guard guy is the real gorilla,

because he's the guy who can catch these people. The gorilla, as far as surveillance, I would agree, could be either one of those two guys, but the person who is really the commander is the guy who can do something with the target.

Zadareky: That's about the closest that you and I have to come to agreeing on anything.

Student: So, now my question is that there are these two gorillas, the Customs and the Coast Guard guys. They must be there 24 hours a day because they've got to make a decision that fast. What capacity are these guys? Are they colonels; are they civilians; are they sheriffs? Who are these men?

Oettinger: He's trying to prove that all the resources aren't in what you'd call intelligence.

Student: I just want to know who they are. What do they look like and are they 24 hours a day and what level would they be in?

Zadareky: There's a duty center, just like at any air defense center. It's manned 24 hours a day. Not only are they manning the air picture but they're also maintaining a maritime picture at the C^3I facility. They have a hot line down to the commander of JTF IV so that they can follow up with any information that's being provided to them by a data link. The one problem that has not been resolved is that there is no single operational commander. This Supreme Commander we were talking about in Europe is not a single commander who says, "I'm going to launch the Black Hawk helicopter," or "I'm going to launch the Citation." That's a law enforcement agency's decision, just like the Admiral at Key West cannot tell Customs, "You *will have* two Black Hawks at Miami," or "You *will have* two Black Hawks in Puerto Rico."

Student: So, conceivably, the military side could follow that guy from Colombia all the way to upstate New York, be 50 feet behind him, break off as he lands, and we have nobody there. It probably never would happen but. . . .

Zadareky: Don't bet on that, it's absolutely a true statement. You've got to remember, that the military mission is detection and monitoring; and the law enforcement agencies are responsible for the interdiction and apprehension. At the end of this year, when we go back to Congress, we have to testify. And you've got a Commissioner of Customs, and a Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs sitting at the witness table and a Congressman asks the question: "How did we do, guys? How many targets did you detect?" And General Powell says, "We saw 2,000 targets, Mr. Senator." "That's great," says the Senator; he turns around to the Coast Guard and says, "And how many did you intercept?" "Two hundred." "And how many busts did you make?" "Twenty." "What happened to the other 1,980?" "Well, we don't have the assets to respond to those." "Well, who does?" Hello, Mr. JCS. Somebody is going to have to pick up the slack. Right now, we are inundating the law enforcement agencies with the number of targets that we're seeing.

Student: Just how many assets do they really have? That was my last question. How many Black Hawks are really on strict alert in that area that you just showed us, 24 hours a day?

Zadareky: I don't know off the top of my head. It varies.

Student: Is it 100?

Zadareky: No.

Student: Less than 50?

Zadareky: I don't know. They vary between the air wings. The Customs Air Wing moves its assets. They're not assigned as a squadron as we know it, in the military, with a main operating base. They go where they're needed.

Student: If I were your enemy, a narcotics guy, I could then say, "You've got a great detection system, but you have no fangs. And without fangs I could press you."

Zadareky: Rules of Engagement — that was one of the limitations I mentioned earlier when I said that the military is doing a job. We're not out there trying to win the war. We're not out there trying to knock air smugglers down out of the sky. We're not out there trying to sink ships that are involved in smuggling. Our job is to go out and find them, detect them, keep an eye on them, and report them to the law enforcement agencies. And that's what we're attempting to do. A lot of laws would have to change before we go beyond that.

McLaughlin: I wonder what linkage there is from all this detection and monitoring to the FAA's air traffic control centers. I heard your story about the 30 blacked-out, unidentified targets flying up the Mississippi Delta on any given night, and if I was a pilot flying into New Orleans commercially, I'd sure like to be under some advisory from the FAA.

Student: I guess they have no requirement to do that.

Zadareky: Yes, that's right, as long as they're below 18,000 feet, they're going to fly where they want to. But, to get back to your question, there is some effort underway. The surveillance radars surrounding the United States are part of what we call, "the Joint Surveillance System," shared by the FAA and the military. In addition to that, the military also has the capabilities to link other sensors, whether they be an AWACS or a Navy ship, so that we can form a composite picture of what we're looking at in a region. The FAA does not have that capability, nor are they really interested in it, because their job is to provide a service to legal aviation and that comes very expensively. Things like the Aerostat radars that are being built along the southwest border of the United States are there to look at low-flying airplanes, airplanes that are not under the control of FAA, flying across the border. We're going to continue to monitor that information and those targets and report them to the law enforcement agencies, so it's the law enforcement agency that's got to sort out what's available. For instance, this C^3I facility in Miami has access not only to the JCS radars, but to all of the other radars that are tied into the FAA simply by dialing them up on a telephone modem. That's a pretty neat system. As far as meeting our military requirements, we are not interested in an air threat in the middle of the United States. We're assuming that any airplane that takes off from Kansas is friendly. We're looking at the border for airplanes that may be entering or approaching the coast.

Student: What keeps the drug smugglers from filing a flight plan in Colombia for Miami, flying to Miami, dropping 50 bales out to a mother ship in the ocean, and landing with an empty airplane. They can say "We didn't bring anything this trip," refuel, and turn around.

Zadareky: They do it quite frequently. That's why we have to depend on our friends in the intelligence community who can come up and tell us that there's an airplane taking off from Riohacha, Colombia, at 1500 hours this afternoon and he's heading for Miami. And what's to stop the guy from using Eastern Airline flights, or any other regularly scheduled airline? Look at the airplane that crashed in New York not too long ago; how many people on there had ingested large amounts of cocaine only to regurgitate it when they arrived at their destination? How are you ever going to stop that?

Student: I might ask you the same question, sir.

Zadareky: O.K, we're going to go out there and stop the other guys. There's a certain clientele that doesn't believe in giving up control of a very expensive commodity. In other words, he's not interested in shipping 100 pounds of cocaine, or 100 grams of cocaine; he's going to ship a ton of cocaine and it's going to be his pilot who's going to take it all the way and deliver it to his accountant, or whoever is going to receive it at the other end. And that's the guy who is exposed to the greatest risk and the one that we're hoping to find.

Student: Colonel, I think we've gone against the principle that you've stated, that no amount of interdiction is going to stop it. There are all these other ways of doing it, but you can only slow down what you can slow down.

Zadareky: That's right, absolutely.

Student: I think the only tragedy, from what you've explained, is who's the gorilla. If this is really a kind of war that we're engaged in, then from the way you've just described it, there is no one source that can put the weight and effort where it needs to be. If that guy at the DEA or at Customs, or at the Coast Guard, says, "I have intelligence that says it's going to be off of Cuba at 300 feet and I want every available resource to highlight that and I'm going to launch assets there and I want it to all move." But since everybody is, essentially, equal in those two things, you've got the surveillance on one side and the enforcement on the other. It seems that's difficult, if not impossible.

Zadareky: You're absolutely right, and we recognize the problem. I'm not in charge, the DOD's not in charge, nobody has made us king and we have to contend with that very real problem. We know how to control the military assets that are committed but we can't execute operational control over assets that belong to agencies that are not a part of the Department of Defense. It is a joint mission — I'm using joint as a very large term — nationally joint. A drug czar who had operational control as well as policy might be the answer, but, as I say, that is not part of Mr. Bennett's charter. He is a policymaker and not the operational kingpin.

Oettinger: You know, there's a fairly specific and narrow legal meaning to joint. For the new joint, we don't have a term. Joint is one thing, combined has a specific meaning, but there isn't even any word for what is going on between the military and the law

enforcement agencies. It seems to me that using the word joint there grossly understates the extent of the problem that exists because it implies that it is addressed at least as well as the interservice problems. It seems to me that from what you said, it's far from being joint.

McLaughlin: And we know how well joint works.

Zadareky: The best I could describe it is that there is an occasional cooperative effort. We have had occasions. For instance, Aerostat radars, that are Customs owned and operated, are being put up on the southwest border of the United States. The Air Force has a series of radars interspersed among them. When our radar has to go down for maintenance, we take it off the air. When Customs' radar has to go down for maintenance, they take it off the air. We've just opened a 300-mile hole in a radar fence. Now, does anybody have a way of predicting that? Perhaps they know how inefficient the government may be and they might want to take a chance. That's not a smart way for us to operate. We know we have that problem and we're trying to solve it by getting the two agencies to agree on a combined or coordinated maintenance schedule. You're absolutely right. If memory serves me right, there are about 33 agencies, just federal agencies, involved in this drug war. Is there a supreme organization that coordinates all those activities and those efforts? I think you might want to look at OMB (Office of Management and Budget). That's probably the closest you'll find to somebody that has oversight. Then if you go beyond the federal government and start bringing in the states and locals . . . we had a county sheriff conducting an undercover operation in the Bahamas. That really made the Bahamians happy. When those types of things get out of control, there are all kinds of repercussions.

McLaughlin: Let me ask you a question. Taking your example of the two radars coming down for maintenance at the same time, are we dealing with a sufficiently sophisticated adversary to know when those emitters are off the air, when the hole opens up?

Zadareky: Absolutely. The question is, does he know how long they're going to be down for maintenance? For instance, an Aerostat is very susceptible to weather. When Ben Franklin put a key on the end of a kite, he attracted some electricity; now, if you hang a 5,000-pound hunk of metal up there, a radar on the end of a 10,000-foot cable, it attracts a lot of electricity. So, when you secure that Aerostat because there are storms in the area, does he know they're down? Sure, he's going to know they're down. But can he get there before you have that Aerostat up, or before the radar comes back up on the air? I'm sure there are people in the Bahamas who do nothing but occasionally look up to see if there's a big white blob in the blue sky, and when they can't see the aerostat, they pick up a phone and call somebody down south and say, "Hey, the time for fishing is right." You don't have to be very sophisticated to do that. But is there an AWACS in the area? That's another part of the equation he doesn't know.

Student: You mentioned at lunch the price of an AWACS flying schedule. Maybe people aren't coordinating both of them.

Zadareky: There is certainly a counterintelligence capability on the part of these narcotics smugglers. We're dealing with people who have no limitations as far as resources. They have all the money they need. They'll go out and buy an airplane for one flight — fly it north, drop the load, and bail out of the airplane. We've seen cases where they just put it on autopilot and let it fly until it runs out of gas. They don't care about that. They'll buy another plane for the next load. They'll go out and try to buy, if they can't steal, as much intelligence as they can. There have been people caught spying on Customs at Opa Locka Airport — after a morning out on surveillance, the Customs pilot goes and gets a cup of coffee, refuels his airplane, and goes out on patrol again. There have been folks who have been apprehended at the airport sticking their heads in the cockpit and writing down all the frequencies that the Customs pilots use. So they know which frequencies the cops are going to be operating on. They'll try to get hold of a flying schedule — when is the AWACS going to be airborne? When is the carrier going to be out flying? When is the E-2 going to be up? Some of you guys who are pilots know if you're going to fly you're not supposed to drink within 12 hours of flying. You've got to be sober before you fly your mission. I was in Puerto Rico a couple of weeks ago. The night before a mission, all the crews on the AWACS are sitting in a club and nobody is having a drink, so the waitress says, "What time are you guys launching tomorrow?" And that's on a military base!

The smugglers are out there and they're looking for ways to beat us. They've got the money. They've got the technology. You don't have to be very sophisticated. You can go out to Radio Shack

and buy a fuzz buster and it will tell you when the radar's pinging on you. Can you fly around that radar? Well, you just keep going further and further out until you find out you're not being pinged. Does that mean we should just give up and give these guys an open sky policy and let them fly through? We're making life tough for these guys. We're catching some. There's a lot of cocaine and marijuana that's coming in; also, we're growing marijuana domestically. It's a big problem, but certainly it's one that is worthy of attention. Congress says it's time for the military to get involved and the military is heavily involved. We are constrained by federal law, and *posse comitatus* is one of the laws that prohibits us from getting involved in search, seizure, and arrest. And the other law that is restrictive upon the military is the Economy Act. The military cannot engage in unfair competition against private enterprise. I'll give you an example that may sound ridiculous, but it's a true case. A hurricane hit Connecticut several years ago and a town was out of water. The Air National Guard had what we call water buffaloes — a little trailer that has a water tank — so the adjutant general says, "The water tanks are filled. Take them down to city park. If anybody needs water, let them come down and fill up their buckets." There was a lawsuit against him because there was a water company in town that said they could have sold water if it wasn't made available to the people by the federal government. Under the Economy Act, the general was guilty of unfair competition against private enterprise, so that's why I said earlier that under certain circumstances, the Secretary of Defense can waive reimbursement or require reimbursement. It's principally because of the Economy Act.

Oettinger: Could I interject a couple of remarks? It seems the range that Colonel Zadareky has covered here is magnificent. On the one hand we have these elementary lessons about operational security — the waitress — which, amazingly enough, always gets forgotten. So there's considerable concern in making operational security a discipline of its own because people keep forgetting these elementary rules. You have that problem at one end, and at the other end you've got the spectrum of, "Does the policy make sense in the first place?"

Zadareky: Thank you. I also wanted to mention the connectivity of equipment. It is a complex task. Grenada was a perfect example, you know. You've all heard the story about the captain who had to coordinate fire support for a ship, but his Army radio couldn't talk to the ship. He had to use his telephone charge card and call from Grenada back to his post in the States and ask them to call to say, "Hey, elevate your fire two degrees." That was a true story, and that's the type of the problem we're working on together. Every time we think we have a problem solved, we find another one.

Oettinger: There's an element of good news in that story, which is A: that he thought of it, and B: that he did it. It also says something about — if you don't mind communicating in the clear — about the difference between situations where you can rely on the civilian infrastructure being there, and situations where you cannot.

Zadareky: Communicating in the clear is another part of the story. This particular officer had gone out to the ship before the engagement and been briefed on all the procedures. So he thought he had covered all of the aspects and, if memory serves me right, it wasn't that he couldn't talk. When he called up the guy said, "Authenticate," and the Army officer did not have the Navy authentication tables. Because of that, the Navy refused to accept the message. And the law enforcement agencies in the United States just do not have the sophisticated communications equipment to do encryption — and communicate with the military folks trying to work with them. So, in almost every case where we go into a joint, or a combined operation, we have to lend them radios so they can talk to us or we can talk to them.

As I said earlier, this is a very different war because we're operating under peacetime rules of engagement, which means we will not fire unless we're fired upon. Ships at sea — whether it's a Navy ship with a Coast Guard detachment on board, or a Coast Guard ship — have the authority to use lethal force if they order a vessel to stop and it doesn't. They put a "disabling fire" shot across the bow, and then start firing 50 yards astern and just keep marching it up until they're on the stern of the ship, and they just keep blasting away until the ship stops or the back end of the ship falls off. In most of the cases, they can do it in such a way that there are no fatalities involved. It's the same thing as stopping a fleeing felon on land. A police officer says, "Halt," the guy doesn't, so he can use lethal force under certain circumstances. You can't do that in the air. It's kind of hard to fire a missile across his nose or to shoot him in the wing to get his attention. We can't do those things unless we're fired upon, and, as far as I know, none of these drug smugglers

wants to up the ante to the point where he's going to start carrying missiles in case he gets intercepted. I don't think anything will take on these F-15s, F-16s, F-18s. But we are looking at some other nonlethal ways of getting their attention. In terms of ground patrol, you may have heard the story of a couple of army folks who were helping the border patrol along the Mexican border and they did return hostile fire. There were no injuries, but I think that's the only occasion that I've ever heard of where the Department of Defense actually fired a weapon in this drug war.

Student: Wasn't there the case of that Cuban ship in the Gulf — where the Navy opened fire on them?

Zadareky: It was the Coast Guard. That pretty well wraps up what I wanted to talk to you about on the counternarcotics policy side, but I would like to talk a little about the Air Force's drug policy. I had a question about that earlier.

While supporting the CINCs, the Air Force has been fighting a war against drugs on its own front, that is, against Air Force members who use drugs. We're striving to make the Air Force a drug-free environment. The policy is one of prevention and education. Drug abuse is not tolerated in the Air Force and is a serious breach of discipline. Actions taken against an individual include discharge and criminal prosecution. Very few individuals are rehabilitated and retained in the Air Force, therefore, a transitional counseling program is provided for those individuals being discharged.

This will stimulate some discussion, I'm sure. The alcohol policy is the same as the drug policy — prevention and education. But the limitation that faces the Air Force is that alcohol is a legal substance. Consequently, alcohol abuse is the largest substance abuse problem in the Air Force. However, since alcoholism is a treatable disease, the Air Force strives to return the individual to full duty status. If that fails, the Air Force provides transitional counseling to individuals before separating.

The Air Force has two types of drug testing programs (for controlled substances). First, is the pre-accession program. It screens all recruits prior to service entry. On this first test, a positive result is sufficient grounds for denying enlistment. The second program is for active duty personnel. Testing is conducted during scheduled inspections and also can be conducted when a commander directs. If there is probable cause, an individual may also be tested. In addition, drug testing can be ordered during a medical evaluation. We're testing for marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines, barbiturates, opiates, and LSD. My wife listened to this briefing last night and told me we had selected the appropriate colors for these charts. The nickname for the program in the Air Force is "Golden Flow." This chart shows the Air Force testing program and the number of specimens tested for 1984–1989. The total number of specimens taken has remained nearly constant during the past few years. When you consider there are less than 600,000 people in the Air Force, you can see that this is a fairly intense program. I can assure you this is a program where rank has no privilege. Everyone is subject to random testing.



Figure 8.
Air Force Testing Program: Number of Specimens



Figure 9.
Air Force Testing Program: Percent Positive

Student: We know. We had one last week. Everybody in our Air Force facility had one.

Student: Did you have advanced warning?

Zadareky: Twenty-four hours. This chart is impressive. A drastic decline in positive tests are the result of testing and education.

Student: What do those figures stand for? What is 7.3? Seven percent of the total tested were positive?

Zadareky: No, of the specimens. In other words, of the 200,000 or so specimens that were taken, less than .7 of one percent were positive. That was down from 7.3 percent six years ago. Now we'll get back to the doctor's comment about the substance abuse trends. Drug and alcohol data from 1983–1989 shows a steady decline in drug abuse, but alcohol abuse problems remain about the same.



Figure 10.
Substance Abuse Trends: Rehabilitation

Oettinger: I'm a little puzzled by the legal/illegal distinction in this context because it would seem to me to be an administrative matter. Given that alcohol abuse, let's say among pilots, is such a problem, why is it not enforceable to have similar rules for alcohol as for illegal substances?

McLaughlin: There are for pilots.

Oettinger: Yes, but I mean, why not for everybody?

Zadareky: What the Air Force is attempting to do is rehabilitate an alcohol abuser and it will spend an extensive amount of time trying to turn him into a functioning member of his duty section. There is less tolerance for the drug abuser and that's a message that's understood, so consequently, the drug abuser knows that if he's caught one time, he's probably going to be separated from the Air Force. The alcohol abuser, on the other hand, feels that he will be given a chance for rehabilitation and he tries to work on it.

Student: First of all, you said that alcohol is a legal drug, but more importantly, there's been a determination that says that limited recreational use of alcohol is not bad. It's a legal, social thing. It's very difficult to enforce a policy when you have stores all over the world in which you can legally buy a recreational drug named alcohol.

Student: As a matter of fact, you can order a soldier not to drink, if a soldier is in a counseling program.

Student: I understand that. That's different. But you haven't picked this guy up by the drug test. What you picked him up by was alcohol on his breath during duty.

Zadareky: The services have made an effort to deglamorize alcohol. Excessive drinking is frowned upon, but recreational drinking is not a violation of military conduct.

Zadareky: The leaders of today's military recognize that the counternarcotics mission is one of the most demanding, and our military involvement has continued to escalate since February 1989. With national policy and strategy guidelines that were released in January 1990, we can expect to see further increases in DOD involvement in the drug war. I think that, unfortunately, this problem will be with us for quite some time.

That concludes my prepared statements. I'll be happy to answer any questions.

Student: I have a question with regard to the radar installations throughout the Caribbean area, specifically with their vulnerability to terrorists.

Zadareky: Well, with the exception of those in Puerto Rico and Florida, all the radars are located in foreign countries. The radars are there with the host nation's agreement. They, the host nations, are responsible for the security of the site. There are no U.S. military personnel there. From five to eight civilian technicians are operating the radars. As we

have negotiated the agreement with the Cayman Islands, we agreed the radar is going to sit at the airport. It has no more protection than the weather radar. It's there because there's no threat. Putting a radar into Colombia is a real serious concern to Westinghouse and they're about to sock the Air Force for an additional $3 million for their incurred cost to provide security, not at the site, but for their technicians. That's what it's costing them to buy additional insurance to have their technicians operate overseas in that environment. The Colombian government, on the other hand, says, "If we're going to be responsible for the security of these radars, we're not going to put them up here on this mountain top where they're going to get the maximum radar coverage, we're going to put them right down here on this army post where I have a battalion of infantry surrounding that radar." So those very concerns that you bring up were factors in deciding the locations of the radars.

Oettinger: It's a pity we're at the end of the semester, as well as at the end of this session, because there's a fascinating topic here for lots of term papers. The first time I became aware of this ingenious use of civilians was during a lecture we had here from one of the people responsible for building the monitoring systems in the Sinai. He used civilian contractors in lieu of either U.S. or U.N. people, and there is an enormous correlation to what Colonel Zadareky is telling us. They're using the whole gamut from the fully military to the fully civilian, with even more ingenious gradations involving our military forces. It seems to me that while I may have made a couple of remarks earlier about the effectiveness of these strange arrangements, my guess is these things are the wave of the future.

Zadareky: And each host nation has a different motivator. In the Cayman Islands, for instance, they agreed to the radar as a weather advisory. They want to be able to track severe weather phenomena and that radar will be able to do it for them. They want to be able to see the hurricane coming. They don't want to have to depend on the national weather service. Costa Rica doesn't have a military. They want it as an air traffic control radar. The Colombians want it to track smugglers. In Venezuela, where they have a more sophisticated military as far as state-of-the-art technology, they want it as part of their air defense system. Each nation has a different view as to what it's going to do for them. Also, in every nation it has always been important, "Whose flag is going to fly over this radar?" And we've said in every case, "It's your base, your installation, whatever you want to call it. Fly any flag you want on it. All you're doing is giving us permission to operate it." They're giving us permission to pay the bill in order to provide them with the radar and the service that they expect. This is not the first time we've done it. For instance, all of the joint-use radars in the United States shared between the FAA and the military are under civilian contract maintenance. As we get into things like over-the-horizon radar, which is a new state-of-the-art technology, it is being contracted out for civilian maintenance.

Oettinger: Sir, we want to thank you very, very much.