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**Structure and Mechanisms for Command and Control**
**Richard Stilwell**

**Guest Presentations, Spring 1985**
Samuel P. Huntington; Lincoln Faurer; Richard Stilwell; Archibald Barrett; Richard DeLauer; Donald Latham; Robert Herres; Robert Hilton

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# Structure and Mechanisms for Command and Control

**Richard G. Stilwell**

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I first put on a cadet uniform 51 years ago. When you've been in government service as long as I have, your perspective does not change very readily. The name of the game is the enhancement of national security and the furtherance of our objectives as a nation. My remarks will be, as they were three years ago, somewhat kaleidoscopic in nature, but I hope we'll set the stage for the more interesting part of the seminar — the very penetrating questions posed by its members — which I hope to be able to field with at least conviction if not enlightenment.

I'm going to run through the structure very briefly, because the very first imperative in command and control is the organization for combat or performance of a mission. We talk about the National Command Authority (figure 1), and that consists of the President of the United States in one of his three capacities, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and the Secretary of Defense; and thence through the NCA, according to the National Security Act as modified in 1958, direct command of the war-fighting commanders: the individuals on whom the fortunes of our nation would depend in time of war or crisis to fight, and short of war, to position the forces to ensure deterrence of aggression. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are not in the direct chain of command, but, as we'll discuss a little later, they are in the channel of communication with a very important function of strategic direction, because orders go through them. And we'll talk briefly about the interface between the channel of communications and strategic direction.

The military departments are responsible for raising, training, equipping, and supporting the forces. They're not in the operational chain.

The only other item on the chart that's important is the National Security Council. Although you can show on a chart the President in his discrete role as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, in the discharge of that role he can never disassociate himself from his other hats, as the chief executive of the United States, on the one hand, and as the head of state on the other. In the latter capacity, of course, he has responsibility — primarily through the State Department — for all the negotiations, consultation,




**The National Military Command System of the U.S.**

**Figure 1**

etc., with our allies whose views, on many occasions, can determine our particular posture with respect to any given incident, crisis, or evolving new policy. So much for that.

The National Security Council (NSC) is a very small body of four statutory members, endowed by law (see figure 2). When it meets, it invariably also includes the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, currently Bud (Robert C.) McFarlane; the Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On many occasions you will also find the Attorney General of the United States, the President's senior legal officer, because so many matters have implications in terms of international law, and sometimes of domestic law. On certain occasions you'll find the Secretary of the Treasury there as well as various members of the White House staff. Jim Baker, as White House Chief of Staff, for example, attended most National Security meetings, as did Mike Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff. The NSC is the highest advisory body. It meets on military as well as economic and political matters.

As an annex to that, I will go over the instrumentalities of the National Security Council. The way the Reagan presidency has lined it up, the instrumentalities are what we call Senior Interagency Groups or SIGs (figure 3). One is for foreign affairs under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State, with a lot of Interagency Groups (IGs) under it. Arms control falls in this area — all the aspects of arms control. The Senior Interagency Group for Defense was never activated. Several administrations have had this kind of an interagency forum for looking at the defense budget and so forth, and somehow it's never worked. There is a Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence, chaired by Casey, with which I have been very closely associated for the past four years. Linc Faurer* was a member; among other things it is concerned with both positive intelligence — that is, foreign intelligence — and counterintelligence. So it handles a lot of things.

In addition, we have a Senior Interagency Group for technology transfer, one on terrorism, one on space, and one with a different name called the Special Planning Group, having to do with public diplomacy; that is to say, how we market our policy abroad. The area of information policy has been handled with indifferent success by this and most prior administrations. We're not all that good as propagandists. We know our values are sound, but we still have difficulty in selling them abroad. Then we have a group called the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (again, the same kind of interagency forum with a different name), which had to do with the development of planning, after a long hiatus, for the very difficult job of mobilizing this country in the event of a major crisis.

Now that's a steady-state snapshot of how you do business in the cabinet form of government. Parallel to those everyday functions, there are the crisis mechanisms, the quick reacting ones. Starting down at my level, there is a group called the Crisis Preplanning Group, which is involved in incipient problems, looking at plans and options. They get things ready for the Special Situation Group, which is chaired by the Vice President, and which has been pulled together on a number of occasions. And then separate and distinct from this is the National Security Planning Group, which has dealt with special types of actions. This is the forum in which crises are handled and, by mandate of Congress, presidential findings are determined. This is the group, for example, that dealt with Grenada. This is the group that determines new initiatives for the Central Intelligence Agency in the covert action field. This is the group, therefore, that's looked at the problem of support for the "Contras."

**Oettinger:** The NSC itself, of course, exists by statutory mandate. Is it correct, though, that most of the substructures exist by presidential directive? You suggested a moment ago that one of them may be statutorily mandated.

**Stilwell:** The NSC is the only one whose membership is specifically mandated.

**Oettinger:** I see, everything else is presidential.

**Stilwell:** Everything else I've mentioned is presidential. It's Reagan's decision-making system. Carter had a different group, Ford had a different group, and Nixon had a different group. There was an evolution at the very outset of the Reagan administration. The President had said at first, "I'm going to stick to the cabinet form of government; I'm not going to have a powerful NSC staff. Foreign affairs? The

*Lt. General Lincoln Faurer, former Director of the National Security Agency. See General Faurer's presentation earlier in this volume.

**Members (National Security Act of 1947, as amended)**

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

**Advisors (when required)**

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Director of Central Intelligence

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Others as appropriate

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**National Security Council**

**Figure 2**

**National Security Planning Group**
(NSPG)

**Special Situation Group**
(SSG)

**Crisis Pre – Planning Group**
(CPPG)

**National Security Council**
(NSC)

**Senior Interagency Group**
(SIG)

**Interagency Group**
(IG)

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**Decision Making in the Reagan Presidency**
**Figure 3**

guru's going to be Al Haig. I'm going to depend on my seniors and give them the lead." (These seniors would be the other cabinet ministers in the area of their specific charters.) So there wasn't very much in the way of leadership from the NSC staff.

That doesn't work in our form of government. One of the convictions I have is that, in our form of government, for the handling of major issues that are interagency by nature, we must have a strong NSC staff to crack the whip, because strong heads of departments don't believe in "primus inter pares." So you need an enforcing mechanism. And that's what brought these into being. Most SIGs are chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and not by department heads. The only operative SIGs that are chaired by the department heads are intelligence and foreign affairs.

**Student:** Robert McFarlane has an image as being a relatively soft-spoken individual. We have very strong figures in the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence. How is he able to achieve — or to what extent does he achieve — that coordination in such an arena?

**Stilwell:** By the fact that there's enough discipline in the executive branch, so that when something comes out over a White House letterhead, it has the force of law, even if it's signed by a fairly junior corpsman. That's one reason. And the other thing is that he has successively gained more and more confidence on the part of the President. He has also grown in stature. He was the key figure in an NSC meeting yesterday, framing the instructions to Kampelman* and company. Also, I must say that his deputy, Rear Admiral John Poindexter, wields a great deal of clout. A lot of meetings chaired by Poindexter have included the head of the United States Intelligence Agency (USIA), Charles Z. Wick; the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mike Armacost; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred C. Ikle; and the like. But both McFarlane and Poindexter speak in the name of and with the authority of the President, and that goes a very long way.

**Oettinger:** Isn't it fair to say, though, that there is some dependence on personality that always gets tested? That the departments may try to see whether there's any follow-up, and if they take a man's measure and find that there's no follow-up, he might get rolled over?

**Stilwell:** McFarlane can't say, "Mr. Weinberger, this is what I want you to do, because I, McFarlane, say it." He's got to speak to the President. And knowing my Secretary, if it's a White House directive, it's done. It's done, no matter how hard and painful it is, as long as he knows that it represents the policy of the President. But bureaucracies move slowly — in all things. I advocate a strong NSC staff, even when it treads on the toes of my department, because I know it's in the best interests of the nation.

Now, let's talk briefly about the JCS. The functions of the JCS were writ large in the National Security Act, and really haven't been changed (figure 4). The advice function is clear. Another very key one is to prepare strategic plans for the employment of force and provide strategic direction for the armed forces. Now, you can say, if they're not in the chain of command, but just in the channel of communications, then how do they provide "strategic direction?" Well, what that really means is that when the President makes a decision, it's obviously a very broad decision in which he's saying he approves such and such a recommendation. That has to be translated by somebody — some competent military body — into a full-fledged instruction for the people in the field. Sometimes that requires concurrent compensating or supporting action by many elements of the armed forces, because if you say to one organization, "Go do this," you may need to bring to bear more assets. Moreover, if that commander is going to carry out that action, he may need help; there are people on his flanks who may have to do something also.

There are a host of things that are the province of the military that have got to be done either by the National Military Command Center itself, or by the very competent Joint Staff. These are very basic functions: They make recommendations on force structure, unified command plans, doctrine, education, and other matters.

Now, one thing not included in those JCS functions -- except to the extent that it may be subsumed under the fourth function listed (in figure 4) — is any charge to the Joint Chiefs to advise the Secretary of Defense, or the President, on how the budget should be divided, or how resources should be allocated among the services. Although many times the Chiefs are castigated for that failing, that's not written into their charter.

*Mr. Max Kampelman, head of the Arms Control Negotiating Team in Geneva.

- Principal military advisors to President, NSC, and Secretary of Defense
- Prepare strategic plans and provide strategic direction of the Armed Forces
- Prepare joint logistic plans
- Recommend establishment and force structure for unified & specified commands
- Establish doctrine for unified operations and training
- Formulate policies for coordinating the military education of members of the Armed Forces
- Provide representative to Military Staff Committee of U.S. mission to U.N.
- Perform other duties as prescribed by the President or SECDEF

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Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Figure 4

Frequently they are also castigated for tabling in the Joint Strategic Planning Document (which is at the apex of the planning cycle of the Department of Defense) mission requirements that exceed, by quite a margin, what is likely to be available in the way of resources for defense. Now, I maintain that they shouldn't be castigated for that. I maintain that it is explicit in the charter that the military advisors have a cardinal responsibility to inform the civilian leadership of this nation, through the Congress, of what would really be required to defend our territory, our people, and our value system, with prudent risk, if we were attacked. Recognizing that they're not going to get those resources in steady state, the JCS is at least keeping that mark on the wall so that if we got into a period of increased tension, if we were attacked, those stipulated requirements would become the blueprint against which additional resources would be applied to equip and flesh out the armed forces for defense. If they didn't do that, if we did all our planning on the basis of the resources we thought might be available, we would soon lose that mark on the wall showing what was required, and we would have no real basis for the immediate commitment and utilization of additional resources — be they manpower, equipment, or anything else — in the instance of aggression. Those are the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I believe they are discharging them quite well.

The other area for which the Chiefs are castigated is on the timeliness or the precision of advice to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense in times of crisis, or in meeting unexpected situations. That's a fair criticism. In the past, they have not done all that well in telling their superiors what they wanted to hear in many instances, such as on arms control. But there again, it was very hard for the Chiefs to modify their views, to take full account of political realities, because that's really not their job. They're supposed to come at things from a military perspective. They have done, in my view, far better under General Vessey's* leadership than they did under Dave Jones, Vessey's predecessor. I have been extremely pleased by the ability of the Chiefs to coalesce and to present a united front on most current issues. I believe that a lot of that has to do with the exemplary leadership of that fine Chairman, Jack Vessey.

*General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Student:** General, based on that last comment, I would take it that you might not be in favor of giving the Chairman more power to rule the Joint Staff. Or would you, perhaps, based on your comparison of the last two Chiefs, want to give the Chairman a little more power over the recommendations that come out of the Joint Chiefs?

**Stilwell:** Well, I support the thrust of the latest legislative change to formalize the Chairman's position as spokesman for the unified and specified commanders.* The law also gave him some authority with respect to the individual composition of the Joint Staff. It said, in effect, that he had at least nominal authority to reject or accept candidates for the Joint Staff. I also support the idea that the Joint Staff ought to have a freer hand in the development of the basic drafts put forward for consideration by the Ops Deps** and the Chiefs themselves. I think you can simplify that procedure a little bit. I don't believe in making the Chairman the sole military advisor to the President. That's fine for some minor crisis, but for a major crisis you need the expertise represented by all five Chiefs.

**Student:** So, you would really advocate giving the Chairman a bit more power to organize the Chiefs a little bit better.

**Stilwell:** Not organize the Chiefs. No, you don't organize the Chiefs. But I would give the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff. We have just created for General Vessey, by the way, an analytical capability so that he can have more of an independent backup for the deliberations of the Defense Resources Board during the programmatic and budget review process. An organization called SPRAA, Strategic Plans Research and Analysis Agency, now has the capability of analyzing the data of the several services on cross-cutting, cross-mission areas, and there are many of those. The two-star who heads SPRAA also prepares the Chairman for his role on the Defense Review Board (DRB).

The Chairman is, in my view, the individual who is most listened to on a contentious issue by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. And the Chairman's view usually prevails. The Chairman's view is mainly in support of what's in the service Program Objective

*U.S. Code 10 124(c), as amended PL 98-525, Title XIII, 1301(a), October 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2611.

**Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations.

Memorandum (POM), and mainly in opposition to any of the advocates on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff who want to change the POM. But on certain issues, he will disagree with what's in the POM and recommend a modification, particularly when it's something that can be translated into an output and related to mission accomplishment. So, in short, it's important to make the Chairman the spokesman for the unified and specified commands, because as we'll see in a moment, while I believe that it is an area in which we have done a lot, we've got to do a lot more to give visibility and influence to the unified and specified commanders. They are the guys on whom the whole responsibility rests in time of crisis and war.

We should also give the Chairman a little more control over the work of the Joint Staff; give him tacit authority to reject candidates for the Joint Staff, in the interests of getting the best possible quality. Additionally, we should support him analytically so that he can carry the battles of the unified and specified commanders against the other members of the Defense Resources Board when there is a major issue on resource allocation.

Now, what else? You want to make him the chief of staff for the Secretary of Defense? That's something else again. I believe we've got too many people in OSD. I'm not sure that there aren't functions that are now handled by both the JCS and the OSD that can't be amalgamated. But I don't think Congress would like that.

Next, we have organizations reporting through the JCS (see figure 5). This gives you some idea of the immensity of the Defense Department. Forget that this looks like a line diagram of command. It isn't. We do have nine major commands. The Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), European (EUCOM), Pacific (PACOM), Central (CENTCOM), and Southern (SOUTHCOM) are the five geographic commands embracing just about the whole world, less the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. We have everything in Africa south of the Sahara thrown into the European Command, which may not be a good thing. Then we have a Readiness Command (REDCOM), which has several missions, as I think some of you know. For one, it's charged with the continental land defense of the United States (God forbid we should ever come to that). For another, it's responsible for readying for deployment, and monitoring the deployment of, the central reserves of our country by way of reinforcement of any of the external commands. It also has the function of joint exercises, development of joint doctrine, and joint testing.

And then we have three so-called specified commands: SAC, the Strategic Air Command; MAC, the Military Air Lift Command; and growing in importance now, ADCOM, the Aerospace Defense Command. All three of those, as you can tell by their titles, are essentially Air Force elements. In addition to being specified commands, they're also major Air Force commands. So while General Bennie Davis, who's the Commander in Chief of SAC, has a specified command reporting to the Secretary of Defense, he's also commander of Strategic Air Forces Command, a major command reporting to General Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of Staff. And similarly for General Ryan, CINC MAC, and General Herres,* CINC NORAD.

In addition, an element out at Offutt Field, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, does the targeting not only for the Strategic Air Command but for our submarine forces, and eventually for our surface-based cruise missile forces in the strategic role. And then we have the Joint Special Operations Agency, which looks after our special operations forces in the several services. These include SEALS in the Navy, the Special Operations Wing of the Air Force, and the Special Operations Command (SOPCOM) of the Army.

So that is essentially the organization for combat. Look at where those all are (figure 6). REDCOM and the specified commands are headquartered in the United States. SOUTHCOM is our smallest command, and yet it covers an enormous area in Central and South America. And EUCOM covers a tremendous area, from Scandinavia to the Cape of Good Hope, including the Mediterranean littoral of the Middle East — Lebanon and Israel. It doesn't make any real sense to have General Rogers,** who wears two hats, as you know, also wear three hats, and be responsible for all of that area, primarily for security assistance. And PACOM stretches to an even greater degree. Then you have CENTCOM which was brought into being by the Reagan administration, with responsibility for southwest Asia, which

*See General Herres' presentation later in this volume.

**General Bernard W. Rogers, USA, SACEUR, CINC EUCOM.




Organizations Reporting Through the JCS

Figure 5




**Figure 6. Commanders' Area of Responsibility**

includes the Horn of Africa, the Sudan, and Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and over into Afghanistan but excludes Israel, Syria and Lebanon. This has always been an anomaly. It shows, among other things, that Lebanon was really in the area of operations of CENTCOM, but it was specifically not so assigned. So that's the worldwide deployment.

The command headquarters and deployment of forces is one thing, but the location of forces in steady state is a different picture. The bulk of our forces, the central reserves, are in the continental United States (see figure 7). They include the majority of our divisions, and indeed the majority of our tactical air forces, and, of course, all of our strategic air forces, as well. Navy forces, for the most part, are deployed one up and two back in the two oceans, with the exception of at least one carrier battle group which we've kept on station in the Arabian Sea. Minor forces, but very important forces, are stationed in Northeast Asia — Japan, Korea. And very modest forces under SOUTHCOM are in Panama, and a few in Honduras. In the event of crisis, all of the forward-deployed forces would need reinforcement from the continental base. And so one lesson for all of us in an era where we have a very modest force structure, and where we increasingly face the possibility, if not the probability, of multiple concurrent crises, is that we need all the mobility we can get.

In terms of command and control, it's important to understand the structure of the unified and specified commands (figure 8). All of those commands have service components. For example, in Europe, under the joint headquarters commanded by General Rogers, there is an Army component, a very minor Navy component, and an Air Force component. They report back to their parent services for everything except operations. Their services then determine, in the last analysis, how many troops and what type of equipment they'll have, and the rate at which they get that equipment. So, you have a certain duality there; the whole resource development process is done on a departmental basis as opposed to a joint basis. And that's the way it's defined in the Congress. It takes a bit of doing to ensure that the joint and the service things are properly intermeshed. And that's really where most of our problems lie.

Another important point about command and control: It is always well to remind ourselves — and NATO is an example — that while Rogers reports through the Chiefs to Weinberger and Reagan, his main operational hat as the Supreme Allied Commander is in a reporting channel in which the United States has only one vote among many (figure 9). And there is no way in which the Secretary of Defense can send an instruction to Rogers in his NATO hat. The same thing is true in Korea. I have the distinction of having devised the current command structure in Korea, which is kind of a miniaturized NATO, where the commander of U.S. forces, Korea, is in this direct command channel from the Secretary of Defense, except that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (CINC PAC) is in between them. But he is also Commander in Chief of the Combined Forces Command, and he reports to a military committee in which we have one of two votes. There's no way the U.S. can send a direct order to that commander (currently General Livsey) in his second hat.

So, part of the complexities of command and control arise from the fact that wherever we fight in the future, in any big contest, we're likely to be involved in coalition warfare, with serious implications for command and control and for exchange of intelligence.

**Oettinger:** One could regard that double hatting from one point of view as kind of a funny way of doing business. Another way of looking at it is to say that it's the savior of an otherwise creaky system, in that what one person can accomplish, say in Korea, or in Europe, he can accomplish because he can talk to himself under several different hats and then get agreement inside one head. That, in principle, looking just at the organization chart would be impossible. Is that a reasonable viewpoint? If it is, is that the best we can do, or are there other ways one might go at it, or is multiple hatting far from an unreasonable way of living with the world?

**Stilwell:** It's not an unreasonable way of living with the world at all, particularly in Korea. But you've got a very simple equation there, just two parties. And you have a remarkable confluence of views on how the war would be fought and the requirements of forward defense and deterrence. And so the impact of our commander on the Korean government, and, of course, on our very loyal allies, the Koreans, is enormous. We also know that the Koreans are very, very dependent on the United States' guarantee. So, we have a very happy arrangement in Korea.




**Figure 7. U.S. Forces for Theater Warfare**




**Unified and Specified Command Organization**
**Figure 8**




- USCINCEUR may be from Army or Air Force

Command Relationships: US European Command

Figure 9

Now, NATO is something different. Most of Rogers' job is salesmanship because you have an alliance of 13 nations, 12 of which are providing forces. And they have different views on how the war would be fought — military and political views. So, it's very hard except on very basic things like MC14-3, the basic planning concept of conventional forward defense of Europe, with subsequent stages of deliberate escalation and ultimate sanction of strategic nuclear forces. Everybody understands that and is happy with that as a declaratory policy for deterrence.

When it comes to how the war would be fought, it's quite different. Rogers, for example, has had a terrible time getting any kind of concurrence, although he has it now, I think — from the several nations, from the Military Committee level on up — on his concept of deep interdiction, which makes so much sense to us. Deep interdiction is the business of not only fighting the forward battle, but — to the extent possible — concurrently hitting the deep reserves before they can be brought to bear en masse and overrun your forward defenses; reducing those reinforcements, as Jack Vessey is wont to say, to "digestible bites." It's a tough problem, but the point is that we can't go it alone; we need our allies. Collective security has never been more essential to the defense of the free world, but there's a price tag on it. It's a very realistic price tag. And from a purely military standpoint, in terms of interoperability, it's tough, but it is a challenge that we must continuously face up to in a whole range of things from logistics, to procedures, to intelligence, to communication, to concepts for fighting a battle.

**Student:** Is ADCOM — right now our specified aerospace command — is that the same hat as the NORAD commander, or is there a separate commander now for NORAD?

**Stilwell:** Well, General Herres is an Air Force major commander, he is a specified U.S. commander, and he is the combined commander of the North American Defense Command. He wears all three hats, and that's always been the case. Now his horizons are expanding but we haven't sorted out whether he's going to have the space command in addition or not. But we're about to bring another command on line, or else amalgamate it with the Aerospace Defense Command.

In talking about command and control, it's useful to remind ourselves of the principles of command arrangements (figure 10). First, responsibility and authority to the extent possible should be commensurate with each other. If you give someone a mission, you ought to give him the necessary authority to discharge it. Second, we have a basic concept that the higher echelon makes the decision. That is, decision-making is centralized. However, once the decision has been made, we give subordinates the maximum latitude to execute it, recognizing that we must always be in a position to support them with additional resources. So execution of decisions is decentralized. Third, operational control involves operational planning: if someone is going to carry out the mission, he ought to have a major hand in planning it. Fourth, in controlling the operation, stick to the chain of command. Don't bypass or skip echelons. We'll get into this in discussing crisis. It's one thing to bypass in a request for information down below, but it is something else again to try to bypass channels in order to give instructions to people two or three echelons below, because that's a recipe for disaster. Fifth, the more people operate on common doctrine and standard procedures, the more you're likely to get a disciplined, automatic reaction — even under great stress — on the part of everyone. Procedures, in my view, are more important than sophisticated hardware. Finally, command arrangements should be structured for major campaign contingencies.

**Oettinger:** If I may interject a linkage to what you heard from General Faurer, he commented toward the end of his presentation that what is desirable under stress is not necessarily hardening all the "Coms," but reducing the requirements. This remark is intimately linked to our discussion here because the flip side of communicating is standard procedures and doctrine, where the communication has been done well beforehand. And these trade-offs that we're discussing, such as between hardware or means, contain ideas in training and so on that are tradeable for communications. And that's a point that's so often lost from sight that I wanted to make sure that linkage is made here today.

**Student:** These principles of command would appear to work much better within a single service, but how would you relate them to Beirut, our loss of our 246 Marines? How would you assess what went wrong in Beirut? Or was that just unexpected?

**Stilwell:** Well, you've got an old soldier's view, that when you're in an area of incipient danger, you don't

- Authority with responsibility
- Centralized decision making/ decentralized execution
- Operational control involves operational planning
- Control through chain of command
- Common doctrine and standard procedures
- Structured for major campaign contingencies

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Military Command Structure Characteristics
Figure 10

put a lot of people in a single building. That's the first thing I would say.

**Student:** Whose responsibility was it then not to do that? Whose responsibility was it, up that chain of command, all the way up to the CINC Europe, to have noticed they were in the wrong place?

**Stilwell:** Yes, someone should have known. I know we've got a number of Naval officers here, but the Sixth Fleet hadn't given a lot of thought — and understandably so — to the support of a ground force contingent in a fairly extended deployment under unusual circumstances. Now, the naval commands are just not basically structured for that sort of thing. I guess you could charge a lot of people with that. I think it was a mistake. I think it was fine to put the Marines in there to begin with, to assist in the evacuation of the PLO. When it was a question of redeploying for the new type of mission they had, I think that one should have questioned whether it was the right contingent to put in there.

For example, a Marine battalion landing team, or even a regimental landing team, does not have the structured intelligence mechanisms that the Army has to handle all the functions of intelligence, such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the counterintelligence responsibilities, the estimates function, and the collection management. They weren't there. That's my view of the mistake. Actually, by the time we decided how to re-rig that intelligence structure, we were ready to pull out. So, as far as I'm concerned the less we say about Lebanon and the whole thing — the terrible loss of precious lives — the better.

As to procedures — we still have more to do in the armed services. We're doing quite a bit, of course, with terrorism rife as it is. And we also need to work on the basic ABCs of passive protection against contingent terrorist attack, which involves not only physical protection, but also the interface with the local authorities. And I might add that that was another deficiency, in my view, shared by the entire intelligence community: The interface with the Lebanese intelligence community, as well as with some of the other nations in the area, was poor. That's an area in which our people on the ground are not all that expert. All of this is designed for a big show. While it has application for everything, we are prepared and trained essentially for major combat.

We've talked, up to now, only about command and control. The whole purpose of command arrangements is to ensure the requisite connectivity and understanding between echelons, up, down, and laterally, for the uninterrupted flow of information in all directions, and for the transmission downward, in unambiguous, unmistakable terms, of direction, guidance, and coordinating instructions, under all conditions, and particularly under stress. That's what it's all about, and that's a function of organization. It's a function of common doctrine, procedures, rules of engagement, and, of course, of the hardware that makes possible exercise of command.

Now, what is the function of intelligence? The basic function of intelligence is to support; to provide the requisite support for timely, sound decisions of all sorts, both in and out of conflict. And from a purely military standpoint, it's to ensure the flow of facts, analysis, and estimates to optimize the effectiveness of our armed forces. The national intelligence community, presided over by the Director of Central Intelligence, Bill Casey, has many components of various sizes. The CIA and the National Security Agency, headed by General Lincoln Faurer, are big components. So are the two components of the United States Air Force, including the one that's kept pretty much under cover, which has to do with our overhead systems. Then you have major elements of the Army, Navy Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the FBI in its counterintelligence role. And then the smaller elements: the Defense Department's own foreign counterintelligence program, of which I am (or was) sort of the program manager, and other programs under the Departments of State, Energy, and Treasury.

All of those national and foreign intelligence programs support the executive branch throughout, and they support the President in all three of his hats. Their functions are manifold. Much of the work — the collection, analytical, processing, and dissemination efforts of our national intelligence community — is targeted on indications and warning. They provide a tremendous amount of support in the fields of science and technology, so that we may have the best possible information on what the enemy is doing in the development of new systems, which is important, of course, for countermeasures and everything else. They also put an enormous amount of effort into the verification area, which has application to arms control or arms reduction support. They're

paying increasing attention to narcotics, terrorism, international finance and economics.

One of the things the national programs don't have primary responsibility for is the development of intelligence that has unique application to war fighting. And, therefore, you have outside the national foreign intelligence program, the capabilities of the several services, which we call "tactical intelligence and related activities." These represent the military assets that have unique application to the military instrument itself, for example, the reconnaissance aircraft, the SR-71s, TR-1s, and the RECCE birds of the tactical Air Force, the P-3s of the Navy; the major intelligence centers of the unified and specified commands; the tactical units of the Army, principally, and to a limited degree of the Navy and the Air Force; certain satellites under our Defense Reconnaissance Support Program that are uniquely designed for warning purposes — and the list goes on. It's quite a lot. Now, that's a separate program, and those are unique military assets whose priority of collection is determined solely by the Department of Defense. The priorities of collection for the national systems are determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, although they can be changed on Secretary of Defense recommendations. We'll get into some of those things later on.

Now, let me just run through a few things, having given you some structure. How well have we done in the Reagan administration over the last four years in improving command and control arrangements on the one hand, and in improving intelligence support for the National Command Authority and the military on the other? We are, in my view, in a better position to deal with crises than we were at the outset of the Reagan administration. I showed you some of the major mechanisms in place. It doesn't mean better decisions, but at least the forum and the procedures are there. They have greatly expanded the Situation Room in the White House and its ability to collect and collate information from all quarters. We have improved the linkage among the various elements of the national security command system. We have created in OSD our own crisis management capability, plugging a gap that was underscored in most of the mobilization exercises in 1978, 1980, and 1982.

The OSD staff is just not equipped to take off its normal hat of policy formulation and review and so forth, and get with handling of major emergency requirements. The Secretary of Defense does wear a hat in the military chain of command, next to the President's. But he also has very, very important functions as the head of an executive department, because the ability of our armed forces to mobilize, to marshal, to deploy, and to be supported and sustained is a function of the ability to get the nondefense elements of the executive branch and the industrial base coalesced to support the military instrument (figure 11).

So, if a major crisis arises, the Secretary of Defense has to look outward as well as perform his function in the command chain between the White House and the unified and specified commands. He has a major role in explicating requirements to the Departments of Transportation, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, to all the other major departments in the executive branch, and to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (which is a coordinating group) in order to develop a surge capability in industry. Of course, he also has an important function in getting his budget to, and approved by, the Congress. So, he has a tremendous number of functions in addition to pure war fighting. That's his big role.

For the crisis management role, we designed, and I'm proud to say finally had approved, our own crisis management support system to plug the gap at DOD (figure 12). It is a procedural mechanism that neither increases nor derogates anyone's authority in the OSD or in the OJCS, but is a means for doing very, very quickly what it now takes, steady state, an inordinate amount of time to do. And we do it. We try to get everything done in a matter of 24 hours instead of two weeks, complementing the military staff — that's the OJCS — and providing a focal point for activities (figure 13).

The crisis coordination group consists of an operations center, if you will (figure 14). It is manned by OSD staff people detailed to deal with particular problems and get issues served up very quickly to the Secretary of Defense, in areas that have to be dealt with very, very quickly (figure 15): Allies may need a lot in a hurry because they're under siege; we're mobilizing, and we're trying to surge industry, we're asking for a much increased share of the manpower capability; we're expanding installations, we're readying civilian hospitals — all of these things have to be superimposed upon what is normally done by a headquarters short of war.




**Crisis Management**

**Figure 11**




Design of the OSD CMSS
Figure 12

- Existing staff organization & relationships
- Do not usurp or abridge current responsibilities or authorities
- Decisions made at lowest practicable levels
- Complement SECDEF's military staff
- Provide focal point for OSD's activities

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OSD CMS Principles
Figure 13




**OSD Crisis Management System**
**Figure 14**

**Boards**

- Acquisition
- Health Affairs
- Installations & Logistics
- Manpower
- Political – Military

**Committees**

- Acquisition Management
- Allied Support
- Civilian Manpower
- Energy Management
- Force Expansion
- Installations
- Medical Mobilization & Deployment Steering
- Military Manpower
- Policy Guidance
- Security Assistance
- Supply & Maintenance Management
- Transportation Management

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**OSD CMS Boards and Committees**

**Figure 15**

This is all done under circumstances, by the way — I think this is important to underscore — that really test command and control and intelligence capabilities. When you get in a crisis, you have a terrible compression of time; large events are occurring in a very constrained time frame. You're dealing with a tremendous number of concurrent issues which become all the more difficult to prioritize, and we'll come back to this. You've got incomplete information and you have to make big decisions, and you'd better be right because decisions are irreversible. Therefore, you'd better have a lean, well-schooled organization that can handle that type of crisis. We've made a lot of progress in my view, both at the national level and in OSD, in readying ourselves for that. Fortunately we haven't been put to the test. I think that's one of Reagan's great lucks over the past four years.

**Student:** Sir, from where does the OSD crisis management system function? Where is their command cell?

**Stilwell:** We've been using elements of the JCS arena for that. We're in part of the JCS message center. We just started to build a permanent facility between the eighth and ninth floors and between the C and D rings, so that it's 30 seconds from Mr. Weinberger's office.

**Student:** But if we were vulnerable and had to deploy to the Alternate Military Command Center (Mt. Weather, VA) or the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), then would the OSD cell go right within the National Military Command System? Are we tying them directly together, or are they separate?

**Stilwell:** If we had to deploy to the NEACP, we'd have an element of the OSD staff on the NEACP. Even before we deployed the NEACP, we would bring this cell, which is partially manned now, into being in the OJCS crisis center, as well as probably deploy the OSD team up to the Alternate Military Command.

**Student:** So they're really parallel but colocated.

**Stilwell:** They don't have to be all that colocated. We exchange representatives, but we're dealing with different pieces of information. There's no reason for the OSD crisis management center to have all the details on troop deployments; they don't need that. What the Secretary of Defense needs to know is not how many people were mobilized yesterday, but how many were supposed to have been mobilized. And whether we are over or behind that, and if we're behind it — why? What's the bottom line? He wants to know the status of the development of the emergency budget; he wants to know whether the Department of Transportation has emergency plans with respect to rail, ship or whatever mobilization. And none of those exist today.

**Student:** I think OSD activation is super, but I guess my hang-up is we're going through this right now with the Joint Chiefs of Staff...

**Stilwell:** The Chiefs don't even bother with those functions outside actual troop deployments — all of that coordination with the civilian structure. They don't deal with that.

**Student:** But the Joint Staff in itself is what the Secretary of Defense works through to the CINCs.

**Stilwell:** That's right. He works through two staffs.

**Student:** So now we're adding another that they're working through — they're working outside the military commands but to the other agencies, and so forth.

**Stilwell:** That's right. What's the problem?

**Student:** It seems to me that, if we get into a crisis, putting them together with the command center right in that area would be functional, and would prevent us from going in different directions now, you know, with what we're doing. I see a lot of interoperability between the two staffs.

**Stilwell:** Well, yes, you do have a certain amount of interoperability, of course. But the JCS is very wary about letting most of those OSD staff guys into the sanctum sanctorum, where you've got data on nuclear posture and readiness, and force generation and all that sort of thing. It's no business of the OSD staff. And we have our little computers in everybody's homes right now, and if you're cleared for a piece of information you can pull it up. But the idea of having OSD logisticians and so forth mucking around in the emergency command room doesn't excite me a bit. It's a different function. And why shouldn't we have a certain amount of redundancy anyhow? So, what we've got is this little facility (CCF) where Weinberger can be briefed on his external responsibilities, and then we've got the NMCC with its crisis management cell (CAC) (figure 16). The two staffs are linked by both liaison officers and communications




**Crisis Management in Wartime**
**Figure 16**

and automated information systems, and one is fighting a war, and one is getting the tools for them.

**Oettinger:** To look at the problem from a different perspective, you have staffs that deal with a crisis, but what are they doing between crises? Well, one of the things they do is prepare themselves to deal with a crisis, and in so doing they inform themselves, and they try things out, one thing and another. And if they keep themselves unbusy, then they're not effective. If they keep themselves busy, they start looking more and more like folks who are in the intelligence business or the command business, and then they become competitors or pains to some of the folks who are supposed to be doing some of these jobs on a daily basis. Is that a sound observation and, if so, what does one do about it?

**Stilwell:** I'm not sure I follow you completely, Tony. First let me say this: The military has traditionally kept in existence a certain number of battle staffs. I think you're aware of that. Are you, or not?

**Oettinger:** I'm not.

**Stilwell:** Okay. There is the contingent complement for the NEACP, for one thing. The CINCs have those, too. CINC PAC has a couple of battle staffs — the Blue Eagle, right? And they rotate them. They're drilled on all the procedures. They can't be on the job too long because it's not the most sought-after job, but it's a very important one. Okay. So the JCS has a corps of battle staffs for that purpose. It also has designated people who would deploy elsewhere than to the NEACP. I can't go into details. But there are one, two, or three different places — partially designated places — and there are more coming down the pike. Personnel cadres are the critical part of the whole business. Now, OSD has the contingent requirement, Tony, not of keeping people at the ready without any other job, but of designating people on the OSD staff who would go to the Alternate Military Command Authority, to the NEACP, and elsewhere.

**Oettinger:** So, they're not full-time something or others. They are busy with whatever their normal job is.

**Stilwell:** One of the problems is keeping the designated person, who has this emergency deployment, as the same individual for a fairly extended period so you can get him briefly trained and occasionally exercised. It's a very tough problem. It's tougher in the civilian world, in any of these civilian staffs, than it is in the military because you simply don't have the same sanctions to make him do it. Similarly, all these people who constitute those boards and committees that I showed you (figure 15) are people who do something else right now. But in the event of a major crisis, they'd put away some of the things they do day-to-day, because it would no longer be a priority, and do something else. Or, new duties would get superimposed on their otherwise full plate, and we expect, in a major crisis, that the average Department of the Army civilian would be on call 24 hours a day, just like the military. And, of course, we have to augment the staff. So the only full-time people are five people who run CCF — the operations center, if you will — where we have the display; where we have the crisis action packages; where we have the decision and option evaluation procedures. As I say, I maintain that if you get people who are reasonably competent, who have some initiative, and who understand in detail who to talk to, who to call, what number for what problem, and know all the players, then that's the most important thing, better than having the brilliant decisions.

**Student:** Sir, as long as we're on organizational pursuits, I wonder if you'd care to comment on two particular initiatives: the first is a CSIS study* that was just released last week, and the second is the proposal for reorganization of the Joint Staff with respect to centralizing, the so-called Prussian General Staff concept.

**Stilwell:** All right, I'll deal with that quickly. I don't know enough about the Odeen-Huntington study** (I guess that's the one you're referring to) to comment much on it. As I recall, he's got an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Nuclear Forces, and he's got another Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO. That's two. Dick Perle*** does both jobs now, so why would he need two? It's going the wrong way, it's proliferating the OSD staff and I'm all for cutting it back. So, I don't know enough about it.

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* *Toward a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project.* Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, February 1985.

** Philip A. Odeen, Chairman of the CSIS Defense Organization Project, and Professor Samuel P. Huntington, Director of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Also see Professor Huntington's presentation earlier in this volume.

*** Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy.

Mr. Weinberger has just reorganized, in any case, and he's gone in a slightly different direction. He is moving away, really, from the original concept of Harold Brown of two fairly powerful Under Secretaries, and he has just taken about half of the functions from DeLauer;* you'd better ask Mr. DeLauer about that. He stripped out from DeLauer's old domain the whole acquisition responsibility, as he stripped Larry Korb, who had been once the Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Installations and Logistics. Korb lost reserve affairs a year ago; now Weinberger has taken logistics away from him and created a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions. So, I don't think there's going to be any re-reorganization very quickly. I believe this reorganization was pretty much prompted by the tremendous amount of heat that the Defense Department was taking on the way we procured spare parts. And maybe this isn't the way to go. It's going to create lots of problems in my view because there's no clean break anymore between research and development and acquisition.

The other thing Weinberger has done is to take the Assistant Secretary of Defense $C^3I$, who was under DeLauer, and have him now report directly to the Secretary of Defense. Don Latham's got that job now.** And he has taken from the Under Secretary for Policy the policy functions of intelligence, command, and control, put them under Latham. I maintain that that was not the way to go. I strongly recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I believe that command and control is a function primarily of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and if you want to have an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, that's all right with me. But to put command, control, communications, and intelligence all together in one assistant secretary slot is a loser. It doesn't make any sense. I know in the Navy, Army, Air Force, or Marines you won't ever find a signal officer who is also the intelligence officer. At no echelon do these come together. Nor does the Congress look at them jointly. And you will probably wind up having someone like Don Latham nominated, who's primarily oriented in the $C^3$ area, and you'll have two independent baronies except for title.

Now, as for the Joint Staff reorganization, well, I think I covered that already. I think there is room for ensuring that the Joint Staff can develop papers and positions on its own initiative, or at the request of the Chairman. I do think the Joint Staff has to service this whole mechanism. The JCS represents all the knowledge and capability of the armed forces — ground, air, and Navy. One cannot totally isolate the JCS as such and say that it is not needed. That almost gets back to Meyer's* concept of having a group of advisors, ex-the JCS, who would rally with the Chairman.

I believe the current JCS system, consistent with the mandate of Congress (which we haven't changed), along with more authority for the Chairman, as we discussed, is the way to go. And we have moved a little closer to that, I think, over time. But you've got to remember that any organization, and how good or how bad it is, is a function of the personalities you put in it. I don't want a structure that puts too much authority in one man's hand, because if you get a loser, a guy who doesn't measure up, it's pretty hard to get rid of him. We've operated on consensus pretty much in the past, and reasonably effectively.

Well, I've talked a little bit about what we've accomplished in the past four years. I've talked about mechanisms. We created the Central Command; it's important to give some sinew to the Carter Doctrine of defense of the Persian Gulf. We've been fairly slow to equip that command with the mechanisms for exercise of command, in terms of deployable joint communications and support elements that permit CINC CENTCOM to communicate in all nodes, upwards, laterally, and downwards. We have also been slow in providing him with the kind of intelligence report that he needs. I think we took another major step, although the services — I mean, the marbles — haven't been picked up yet. When we issued the plan and procedures for developing the Defense Guidance back in '81, we charged the JCS and the DIA, respectively, with the development of longer-range requirements for command and control on the one hand, and for intelligence on the other. In other words, the mandate for master planning, presumably based on the desiderata of the unified and specified commanders, was specifically given to the

*Dr. Richard DeLauer, Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. See Dr. DeLauer's presentation later in this volume.

**See Mr. Latham's presentation later in this volume.

*General Edward C. ("Shy") Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff.

people who should have it. We've had the first iteration of the $C^3$ master plan that's come up from General Herres' shop — now General McKnight's shop* — on the Joint Staff. The Defense Intelligence Agency has not yet come up with its master plan of long-range requirements in the intelligence field, but that is its responsibility.

The other thing that is heartening, in my view, is the increasing visibility given to the needs of the unified and specified commanders. They now provide, and they have for the last several years, their input in Defense Guidance, which is the strategic plan for the Defense Department, published every year. They brief the Defense Review Board twice annually on their views both on the Defense Guidance and on the implementing service programs (that is the Program Objective Memoranda). They now provide, direct to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman, their priorities as they see them for their particular area of operations. And the latest instruction is that the POMs, which are produced annually and will be due on the 15th of May as always, must include an annex specifying the extent to which the priority requirements of the unified and specified commands are, or are not, addressed in the POM.

Relatedly, we are beginning to change the way the Defense Review Board does its business, and to focus increasingly on mission areas. Instead of dealing as we have in the past with intelligence here, and command and communication here, and forces here, and so forth, we started something last year that I think was reasonably successful. We began by looking at deep interdiction as an entity. In one special book we put together sensors, airborne platforms for the sensors, communications, fusion, and weapons systems so that we look at, as an entity, what you would need to provide a commander on the ground: the capability to detect targets, acquire targets, make the decisions on targets, and engage targets out to various ranges beyond the line of contact, for various amounts of investment. I believe that's a good way; at least an old soldier feels that's the way one ought to look at the programming business in terms of output — accretions, additions to capabilities.

**Oettinger:** In one respect, you know, that viewpoint seems so sane and so obvious that one wonders, why not before? Is that a foolish question? Is there an answer for a question like this?

**Stilwell:** I think it's a very pertinent question, Tony. But, after all, the traditional roles and missions of the service are to provide the forces, equip the forces and so on. The CINCs have largely gotten their input for requirements from their major service commands: Army, Navy, Air Force, whatever. You have the fortunate situation, I think, in the Air Force, where the specified commanders have a much better link to their service in the joint hat, because they're also MACOM commander in the unilateral hat, than the others do.

Also, the defense in the Congress is by the service, and by the service program. But we have increasingly found with the new Congress, with more attention being given by the Congress to the last budget, with sharper questions being asked, that a lot of the questions are ones that the service representatives cannot answer as well. They can answer from a programmatic and technical standpoint everything about System A, B, C, or D, but they can't answer as well as the operational commander why you need that system, and what it will do for you if you have it. In other words, they can answer the what and the how of the system at the service level, but it takes the operational commander to tell the why for it. So it's been evolutionary. We've always done our business that way. We've always had the theater commanders lamenting the fact that they had very little influence on the cross-cutting issues.

The other thing that's happening is that more and more programs are being initiated for weapons systems that involve more than one service; particularly in this whole command, control, and communications area where the black box that the Air Force needs is essentially what Marine Air and Naval Air need: IFF*, tactical fusion, so on and so forth. So, we learn slowly in a democracy, Dr. Oettinger. There's more attention, though not enough, being paid to the complexities of coalition warfare. We've done quite a bit on that.

I might say in the intelligence area that Don Latham and I co-chaired for the past two years what we call the NATO Intelligence Support Steering Committee. We have busied ourselves with ways

*Director, J-$C^3$S (Command, Control and Communications Systems) on the Joint Staff. The post is now held by General Clarence McKnight (USA), and was formerly held by General Robert T. Herres (USAF).

*Identification Friend or Foe.

and means in which we could help Rogers with his problem of ensuring that we could provide the units on the left and right with the kind of intelligence that would be needed in time of war. We've also been planning for the exigency when "the scopes go blank," as we say, just before the outset of conflict when we shift from one mode to another.

Now, under Mr. Casey, we've gone a long way to refurbish the national intelligence community. They've had very good funding, very good support. Mr. Casey has, in my view, done a remarkable job of building a collegial spirit and internal cohesion into the national intelligence community, in sharp contrast to his predecessor. And in my view, it's working very, very well in terms of teamwork, mutual cooperation, and agreement on priorities.

**Oettinger:** You know, that in itself is a remarkable phenomenon. Again, the structure hasn't changed much, so you'd ascribe that essentially to the personality or the times or the squeeze on the budget.

**Stilwell:** Well, they have changed the structure somewhat. They've eliminated the so-called tasking center; it was a loser. And they're using committees for the determination of tasking in the imagery and SIGINT area, that's point one. And the other point, of course, is that there has been very much of an increase in funding. You always do a little better in times of affluence, as opposed to belt tightening. But the requirements continue to soar out of proportion to resources. We are getting to the point where there has to be a very rigorous establishment of priorities throughout the intelligence community, throughout the executive branch, making a clear distinction between what's nice to have and what's essential. And I think the only way you're going to get it is simply to stop delivering reports to a lot of the customers, and then wait for a month to see if they even notice they're not getting any. And you probably will get very little reaction.

There has to be a better interface between the policy maker and the intelligence community, which again underscores a point with regard to this prioritization: we have improved our collection capability somewhat out of proportion to our ability to analyze, process and disseminate finished products. We collect with big buckets, as General Faurer may have indicated to you.

Now, having patted ourselves on the back, where are the areas where we most need improvement?

Well, I'll get back to the role of the unified and specified commanders. In the last analysis, these theater commanders, the gentlemen who are going to be charged with fighting wars, only have a few assets that they can call their own. One is their mechanisms for the exercise of command and control, another is the intelligence assets that are in place in their area, and the third one is the communications that link and make possible both the command and the intelligence process. And we've got to do a better job of giving them what they need. We've done very well at the national level, in my view — except for the exigency of nuclear war — in building a fairly robust communications system.

But that's not true at the theater level. Each theater is different, has different requirements, and in my view, the theater commander should be given the necessary assets to contract or otherwise to design the architecture he needs out there for his theater — PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, whatever — and then we ought to break our necks to ensure that he's provided with that. So, that's point one. As I said, Bob Kingston, three years after the activation of CENTCOM, still doesn't have the minimum essential communications capabilities he needs as CINC CENTCOM.

The second most important thing has to do with the matter of intelligence support in war. As I mentioned earlier, most of our collection is devoted to indications and warning, and understandably so. We know that fellow's out there; we photograph him; we document him by one means or another. We've got everything alerted to detect change, and our data banks are full of information on his current posture. As we approach H-hour, and as we move through H-hour, we have an entirely different ball game, because we are now interested in massive movements on the other side of the chessboard. We have an adversary who is changing all his methods of operation, communication frequencies, and emission frequencies. He's practicing communications deception; he's doing a lot of things, and the commander needs to know what he's doing, where his main effort is, and so on and so forth. The commander has an intelligence annex in which he has established a number of essential elements of information, and these have to be satisfied under a great constraint of time.

We have done all too little planning on this matter of transition from peace to war in the intelligence community, particularly with respect to those national

systems. The national systems do not belong to the theater commander; they may be allocated to him, depending upon what the priorities are back here. He cannot count on that totally. But regardless, there needs to be much more attention given to planning today for the new utilization of those national systems in support of CINC PAC, EUCOM, or the others. It is very hard, a tough business that we have done very little about up to this stage of the game.

**Oettinger:** Is the strategic concept behind that, that we become so mesmerized with escalation to total nuclear war that — I mean, it seems what you're saying sounds as if, we have forgotten about more conventional type of transitions —

**Stilwell:** In nuclear war or not, the same thing applies.

**Oettinger:** Well, except that the rapidity of the transition to a full blown nuclear war, you know, when it's all vaporized...

**Stilwell:** If you just have a nuclear war when everything is standing still, Tony, and you have a bolt out of the blue, that is something at the very end of the scale, and we have to practice for it, obviously. It's the relatively easy part. But in order for some of the major national systems to be focused from this target to that target, quite a bit has to be done on the ground in the way of planning until you get the instructions out that you redirect the antenna, the SIGINT bird, or cameras or whatever, and so that you have in a deck, in a machine some place, probably a card that you press a button for and that does something in terms of focusing collection on a particular element.

**Oettinger:** So, you're assuming there are transitions that are long enough to make that worth doing.

**Stilwell:** It's stated in a very homey way that the formulation of a plan represents two percent of the total required effort. The other 98 percent required is in carrying out that plan. So, the fact that somebody says, "Well, I've got a plan on my desk, an operations plan," isn't enough. I want to see the annexes, the appendices to the annexes, and I want to see the amount of coordination that is done outside the command with the JCS, with these other external elements that are required to support the theater commander. So, it's very hard, tough work. And maybe I'm asking for too much.

As I say, the whole business of ensuring that the national systems are geared to support the theater commander in times of conflict is work that we still have to do, and in conjunction with that we have to be very rigorous in the establishment of priorities. We're collecting a lot of intelligence today that is somewhat meaningless in time of a crisis. You will find, if you've been through war games (and most of us have), that when the crisis comes, a lot of things are happening very quickly, and your interest is not in your data bank behind you, except very peripherally. Your interest is in what is happening currently. And the search for that information, the precision of that information, the prioritization, and the reduction to the real essential concerns are very important.

**Student:** It seems to me that a lot of your comments have focused on large-scale crisis. I was interested in what kind of problems you see in small-scale crisis or terrorist activities, religious fanaticisms — things like that. The Long Commission* came up with a lot of problems in Beirut, and it seems to me that that's a more ongoing problem all the time. What kind of structures have been set up to deal with urban warfare, sniper-type things, for intelligence dealing with those situations?

**Stilwell:** Well, you don't need a command or control structure for that. You need good disciplined soldiering, and good small unit leadership, primarily. I agree with you that the most likely employment of the United States armed forces over the next few years is going to be down in what we call low intensity conflict (figure 17). I hope! But I would strongly disagree with any suggestion that because this is the more likely, we should be any less assiduous in making our preparations for effective discharge of our responsibilities in a major crisis. We've got to do them all.

**Student:** Yes, that's what I was getting at — I wasn't saying that you shouldn't concentrate on the right end here. I'm saying that because we seem to concentrate so much on the right end, the left end seems to be forgotten sometimes.

**Stilwell:** Well, I hope we've learned a lot of lessons from Lebanon. You know, the important thing is not to cry over spilt milk in Lebanon, but to make sure that we've learned the proper lessons from that.

*U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Ret.), Chairman, *Report of December 20, 1983.*




Spectrum of Conflict
Figure 17

We have learned quite a bit in dealing with the situation in Central America over the last several years under the innovative leadership of General Gorman, CINC SOUTH. And we can bring together imaginative ways of supporting an ally, El Salvador, consistent with the restrictions of the War Powers Act, and providing an increasingly effective supply of near real-time intelligence when dealing with the very sophisticated insurgency that El Salvador has represented for these last several years.

But how are we going to deal with terrorism? Well, we said earlier there has to be (and there is) ongoing education of the troops as to the nature, the capabilities of terrorist attack; the essential local security means that must be rigorously established and enforced around the clock; the most effective interface possible between our local command and the host government's law enforcement, police, and intelligence capabilities, because they know much more about that external environment than we do. We need plans — assuming that the National Command Authority would permit it — for us to take preemptive action against terrorists if we have reasonably unambiguous intelligence that they're about to strike us.

I don't know what else you can do against terrorism. You can't become an armadillo and withdraw totally into your shell, because wherever we have troop deployments overseas, one of the implicit functions of troop presence is to be kind of an ambassador from the United States where intellectual and political interaction levels with the local community are part and parcel of our mission. So, there's got to be some compromise. Mainly, you've got to make sure that you have a quartering and billeting arrangement where no single element of your force presents an unusually lucrative target to a terrorist. Now, those are matters of education, of additional training for troop units at all levels.

The terrorism units, as such, do constitute a very, very difficult intelligence target, because they don't use the normal means of communication to the same extent as anybody else. They're not on the air waves, they don't provide General Faurer's people with the same relatively easy things. When they are on the air, it's very low-level and short-range. Our tactical intercept capabilities are probably best adapted to that, but we've had indifferent success with them in Lebanon. What else can I say?

It is true that the military establishment — if it's going to live up to its responsibilities — has got to do the best job possible with the resources made available to it to ensure the continued deterrence of war, and particularly nuclear war. But it must be prepared for the latter eventuality, if it occurs. The same is true for conventional war. And although they are the least likely events, they also represent the highest risk. And you therefore simply cannot ignore them. You've got to put most of your effort on that. I maintain that if you've done that, you don't have any resource implications here, but you have put a premium on innovation, training, procedures, and all of that. What is most interesting here is that, in most instances, the commitments on the lower end of the conflict spectrum will have to be ad hoc. Lebanon was one such case, Grenada was another. Something arises that becomes — in the eyes of the President, and we hope also of the Congress — a vital, national interest that has to be dealt with. Then our ability to put together a task force and staff it properly becomes of great moment.

And when we do create the new element, the efficacy of the command and control arrangements on the one hand, and our ability to focus intelligence support on the other, are keys to the success of the mission. There's no question that we have the flexibility in our intelligence resources to focus quickly and effectively on a single crisis. We've been watching Poland, watching Afghanistan, supporting Grenada, supporting the British in the Falklands. The problem always becomes what to do if you have multiple concurrent crises.

I guess the last thing I would leave with you is that command and control involves a good many things that you don't normally think about: an organization for decision-making; a structure that you hold inviolate for the transmission of instructions downward — although you can skip echelons on the way up for information purposes; and people who understand the mission, who are drilled in the doctrine and the procedures that constitute teamwork. In the last analysis, these people are especially important to the exercise of command and control. Then, of course, you do need the systems — the hardware, if you will, that makes all of those things more efficient.