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Richard G. Stilwell

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POLICY AND NATIONAL COMMAND

Richard G. Stilwell
Deputy Under Secretary of
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General Stilwell retired in 1976 as Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, Commander of US Forces, Korea, and Commanding General, Eighth Army. In three turbulent years he made a decisive contribution to the honing of US-Korean military teamwork. Previously he had commanded an infantry regiment in Korea, then moved to SHAPE in Europe as Chief of Strategic Planning and served as General Westmoreland’s chief of staff in Vietnam, headed the Military Assistance Command in Thailand, commanded the XXIV US Army Corps in Vietnam, and found time to serve as an instructor at the Army War College and Commandant of Cadets at West Point. As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, he gained important experience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was a member of the military staff of the US delegation to the United Nations; he then commanded the Sixth Army. Out of this wealth of experience, he tells us what command and control (that complex abstraction) means when it is applied to cases — including the famous “tree-cutting incident” in Korea in 1976.

Stilwell. I’m well aware that a series of very distinguished individuals has talked to this class. For the most part, though by no means exclusively, there has been a focus on systems for command, control, communications and intelligence. But I’m not a systems man. By the vagaries of assignment, I’ve been in the planning and operational business for the most part, when my assignments were not in command.

I therefore thought it might be appropriate — at least it fits better with my predilections — to talk about the larger dimensions of command and control. The systems, obviously, are of enormous importance as the means of funneling inputs into the decision-making process. They are also the means of facilitating decision-making, and ensuring effective exercise of command once the decisions to implement, to execute, are made. Nonetheless it is important to re-emphasize the other — and larger — dimensions: basic strategic concepts, organization for combat, procedures, operational plans, rules of engagement — and, above all, the development of a cadre of people dedicated, competent, exercised in their profession to the point of almost automaticity of reaction in crisis. All that is the matrix for command and control.

I’ll start by reviewing the National Military Command System (figure 1). It derives from the Constitution, first of all, which gave our president his three roles, most notable of which, from a military standpoint, is that of commander-in-chief. But its specifics derive from the National Security Act of 1947, which was stimulated by our experience in World War II. That act created a National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. It established a “unified” Department of Defense. It institutionalized a role for the military in U.S. foreign policy by creating the Joint Chiefs of Staff and giving them certain very important functions.

The JCS organization was a compromise, reflecting
Figure 1. National Military Command System
the value system of the United States. The enabling act underscored the primacy of civil control of the military instrument. It weighed very strongly, particularly in the negotiating history, against a single general staff — against the possibility of a “man on a white horse.” And that, by the way, created the overall limitations within which the subsequently-to-be-repeatedly-malignant Joint Chiefs of Staff would carry out their respective duties.

There have been several modifications of that initial national security legislation, primarily related to the internal functioning and allocation of responsibility among the various components of the Department of Defense itself.

When the JCS were first organized, there were three members: Army, Navy, and Air Force. (The act, as you recall, had also brought the Air Force into being as a separate, autonomous, co-equal service.) There was no provision for a chairman in the first iteration of the legislation, the assumption being, perhaps, that the secretary of defense himself could carry out the function that had been so well performed during World War II by Admiral Leahy, acting as the president’s personal representative. Later, a chairman — initially non-voting — was provided for; Omar Bradley was first appointed in 1949. In the meantime, whenever matters of Marine interest were under discussion, the commandant of the Marine Corps was authorized to participate; before long, that individual was a full-time and important contributing member to the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations.

The initial legislation prescribed that the chiefs would be the principal military advisors to the president and the secretary of defense. It charged them with development of strategic plans, development of requirements for manpower, logistics, R&D — the whole gamut of requirements that would derive from those strategic plans. In a word, one could say that Congress at that point in time certainly looked to the chiefs, together with the Central Intelligence Agency and the rest of the intelligence community, for pains-taking analysis of the principal threats to the national interest; determination of the military requirements to counter, deter, or deal with those threats; and development of the overall allied and US plans for application of those resources. It also charged them with strategic direction of the armed forces.

“Strategic direction” does not appear in our joint military lexicon, but you can divine what it means. It has, clearly, a wartime connotation. It deals with the responsibilities of the military at the national level, and has to do with implementation of strategy. Significantly, the chiefs were never given straightforward command responsibility in connection with such an event. They were advisors in the broadest sense of the word.

Command of the deployed forces, through the late 1950s, was exercised by the individual services as executive agents for the field commands. For example, the Korean War involved the Army as the executive agent for MacArthur, Ridgway and the rest — the Far East Command. The Navy was responsible for fleet operations based out of Hawaii, and so on.

It was the revision of 1958 — a very significant revision — that changed the organization to its present form. It defined the chain of command to run from the president through the secretary of defense to the eight unified and specified commanders (figure 2). (There’ll be nine very shortly, when Bob Kingston’s Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force comes onstream towards the end of this year.) That revision retained the chiefs in the channel of communications, and indeed they are.

Oetinger. But that appears, not in the legislation, but in the DoD directives. Can you clarify for us what the political and organizational background of that particular language — “‘through’ the joint chiefs” — was?

Stilwell. Yes. It involves very practical matters, of course. The secretary of defense does not have a military staff as such. Most of the broad decisions made at his level have to be translated into specific instructions which are not subject to misinterpretation, and which are properly formatted, explicated and elaborated to ensure that the decision takes cognizance of all the derivative and peripheral things that are set in train by it. The National Military Command Center, the communications nexus, is geared to do all of this. So it’s both implicit and explicit that the way these decisions get translated to the field is through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1972 the chairman’s role increased, in recognition of the realities of the world situation — the growing importance of what and who is in the channel of communication, the Soviet Union’s development of a capability for devastating attack on the United States, and the understanding that we were in an area where crisis can come up very suddenly. It was determined that, for time-sensitive operations — an emergency action message involving a nuclear explosion or something; a one-shot, limited situation — the chairman would act for the chiefs. Dave Jones, as we’ll see, would like to
expand that a little further, and there are, of course, a whole variety of contrary views.

That is where we stand right now. Over the years, the secretary of defense has acquired considerable power. There has been a decrease in the overall responsibilities and prestige of the service secretaries, at least until very recently. It has been clarified that the unified and specified commanders are the ones who are going to fight our nation's wars, and that they're really the key to our response in the last analysis. And the chiefs' advisory role, in all instances, demands all of their expertise.

How have the chiefs done in performing their several missions? In strategic direction, the results have been mixed. We haven't had that many wars, of course. They were not significant players in the Korean conflict, for a number of reasons. They weren't capable of taking on MacArthur. They did not encourage him, though they supported him, in the most brilliant turning operation in modern history. They were not able to check him before he launched off on what was probably one of the greatest tactical disasters in our history; an uncoordinated, ill-conceived march to the Yalu. They were unable to constrain him in the actions that led to his relief. Thereafter we were, as you know, in a holding action in Korea in which the military strategy was secondary to termination of hostilities on conditions acceptable to us.

In the Vietnam conflict, the chiefs made a strong pitch in 1965 and were rebuffed. Thereafter they were pretty much relegated to support the recommendations of the field commanders, Westmoreland followed by Abrams.

As to the development of strategic plans — well, we had no strategic planning in either Korea or Vietnam. In my parochial view, they have done better in this area, though there is a whole menu of plans which need to be better tested, validated, and so forth, to make sure they are politically realistic, that their assumptions are correct, and the like.

In the matter of advice, again they have shown us very mixed performance. When the chiefs can sit down with the president eyeball to eyeball, they come across pretty well. Their written responses to queries for recommendations are sometimes less than persuasive, by the nature of a system that attempts to seek a consensus on many issues.

Where the chiefs are primarily faulted is in their role in programming and budgeting, and that area is the genesis of some of the suggestions for reform. There are two schools of thought. One says that you can't ask a service chief, as the number one military professional in his department, to fight hard for the resources that he and all his like-minded subordinates consider absolutely essential for modernization, sustenance, or readiness, and then expect him to put on his other hat as part of a corporate body which looks at the total available defense resources, and to participate in a process which arrives at a different recommendation as to how the shares should be allocated.

The other group, to which I am a party, says, "Why the hell can't they?" We have all kinds of comparable experience in the corporate world, where chief operating officers of vertical divisions of corporations are also members of the board of directors, look at the large problem from a wide perspective and say, "Okay, I'll have to take my lumps with my guys when I get back, but you're right; there may be a better, more cost-effective way to do it."

One important item sometimes gets eclipsed. The 1958 amendment to the National Security Act, recognizing the pull and tear involved in how a chief divides his time, upgraded his vice-chief to four-star rank, so that the vice-chiefs could run the services and the service chiefs could be freed to spend the bulk of their time on joint matters, because joint matters are most important. The name of the game is to produce the most effective multi-service organization that can apply violence in the most efficient way, or combine most effectively with forces of other nations. We can't be sure how well that has succeeded, because it hasn't been put to the test yet.

**Student.** Are you saying that when the joint chiefs get to the commander-in-chief they can really present a very effective picture? Do the joint chiefs get together to present a unanimous picture often? When they are addressing the commander-in-chief are they generally in unanimity, or is there some degree of disagreement among themselves? Is there any way you can generalize?

**Stilwell.** Oh, those five gentlemen never look at the world through exactly the same prisms, and you wouldn't expect them to. When they've had their sessions with the president (and that happens all too rarely), some are more effective in presenting their point of view than others. In July 1965, to go back to the real turning point in what then appeared to be a minor sequence of events, two of the chiefs said, "We're not for massive intervention in Vietnam unless you mobilize the country, call up the reserves, and deal
with this problem, if it is internationally significant, in a way that marshals the power of the United States.’’ That outspoken view was not accepted. It was not a unanimous view. It would have been my view. Maybe those two guys should have tried to bring a couple more over to their side, or should have resigned right there to dramatize the point they were making, but they didn’t. And from there we went on to gradualism, incrementalism, the whole works.

I do think that different points of view, whether they are the president’s, the secretary of defense’s, or Congress’, are at least as important in the whole decision-making framework as unanimity — perhaps even more so. From time to time the chiefs have worried about “split papers,” as we call them, recommendations going forward underscoring, “This is three to two,” or “This is four to one.” “There’s one dissenter, two dissenters” — they worried that that could be used against them to whipsaw their positions. From time to time that has driven them to strive for unanimity, but at the cost of substance in many instances. And the chiefs are properly criticized for that.

**Student.** Since the system was established, has a service chief resigned in a policy protest?

**Stilwell.** Ridgway didn’t serve out his full term. But that’s very rare. Resigning is a nonrecurring option that you can only exercise once. I guess the conventional wisdom has been, by and large, that it’s better to try to turn the situation around than to resign.

**Oettinger.** Let me put a question related to your point about the four-star vice-chiefs handling the service end while the joint chiefs handle joint matters. A parallel situation, also created in 1947, is the dual role of the DCI as Director of Central Intelligence, responsible for the community, and as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, essentially responsible for one of the organs. Now what you expressed about the joint chiefs in relation to the military departments, translated into the intelligence organization, creates exactly the same kinds of problems: a lot of agony. If he is strictly DCI and not director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then he’s kind of a eunuch, and has no base. But if he’s also director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then he’s an axe grinder among axe grinders. That has oscillated back and forth in somewhat the way you’ve described. Are we doomed to eternal oscillation there, or do schemes suggest themselves that might resolve that conflict in allegiance, balancing overall responsibility with a budgetary base?

**Stilwell.** Those two hats, those two functions that Bill Casey right now performs, are less competitive, simply from a resource standpoint, than the joint chiefs. In the national budget, the assets of the national foreign intelligence program are “fenced” assets. To a degree, I suppose, the CIA’s resources compete with other big programs, but essentially they do not.

**Oettinger.** Then you don’t see it as quite the same thing?

**Stilwell.** It’s a hell of a competition for his time. As you know, except for major events, the national intelligence community has been Admiral Inman’s bag,* and that was almost his exclusive concentration. Mr. Casey was also involved, of course, but he spends most of his intelligence community time on refurbishing what needed to be refurbished in certain of the operations — particularly on the clandestine side — of the CIA, and on a number of new initiatives ongoing in the community which can only be mentioned in passing.

Now let’s talk about the joint chiefs in their very significant command and control role. General Jones, who had four years as chief of staff of the Air Force and now is just winding up his four years as chairman, has been thinking for the last year or so about how to come up with some improvements. He harnessed a group of four-star retirees to help him think through this problem, and the essence of what he recommended was to strengthen the role of the chairman. In the Washington world, the chairman bears responsibilities of an order of magnitude almost beyond comparison with the days of Omar Bradley, as a result of the intense activity at the NSC level and the proliferation of our national responsibilities around the world. The architects of the National Security Act in 1947 didn’t really foresee the extent to which the United States would be operative on the world scene, nor did they foresee a day when almost everything of any moment that happens has a military component or a military implication. So the chairman has to operate by himself to a degree. I have

an approximate curve (figure 3) of how I think efficiency varies with the number of people participating in an action. Anybody want to guess where that maximum ordinate is?

**Student.** One.

**Stilwell.** No. Eight-tenths of one. (Which says that, if you can suppress certain inhibitions of man and woman, they’d be more efficient.) So General Jones says, “I’ve got to have a little more authority on this one.” Committees don’t work (figure 4). The dilemma of the service chiefs having double-hat positions is the problem. Jones is saying, “We need a more efficient system. The joint staff should do the creative thinking, the basic analyses, the answers to the tough problems. Then, when they’ve done their best, the chiefs should look at it, rather than have it emerge as a watered-down consensus to begin with. Next, we need better people on the joint staff, and they’ve got to be working for me. We need the cream of the crop. And to do that, the chairman ought to have a certain latitude in promotion in getting the right guys and ensuring a somewhat longer tenure.”

Those are Dave Jones’ views. Some of them have been voiced many times. He suggests that there be a deputy chairman, a new four-star, assigned to ensure continuity when the chairman is out in the field, in more direct and continuing contact with the field commanders, the unified and specified commanders, than is now possible. Now the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Meyer, has come up with a more sweeping suggestion (figure 5). In essence he’s saying, “Okay, Jones, as far as you’ve gone, but you haven’t gone far enough. What you really should do is take the service chiefs of staff completely out of the JCS ring. Let them concentrate exclusively on administering, motivating, equipping, training, supporting their individual services, and create a body of military advisors, a council chaired by the chairman, which would deal with all the joint matters in resource allocation, and would advise the secretary of defense and the president on military posture. There’s your strategic direction; there’s the advice; no change, of course, in the chain of command as such.”

Now, of course Jones and Meyer are significantly modifying the channel of communication. They are making the chairman the key guy in strategic direction of the armed services, rather than the chiefs. My own view is this: clearly for the small, time-urgent crisis the chairman has to act quickly, because you can’t get the whole corporate body together. But if you’re fighting a war of any size, you had better be able to bring to bear the total competence and expertise that’s available.

Incidentally, it’s remarkable how closely the British chiefs of staff organization, and indeed the Ministry of Defence’s functions, parallel our own. They date back to about 1923, we date from 1947. Just a few months ago their chief of defence staff was given this function, to be in effect the key military advisor and spokesman for the chiefs as a corporate body, to be the man who would reflect the prime minister’s and the minister of defence’s views and orders to the field. (It may just be happenstance that the incumbent, Admiral Sir Terrence Luthen, is a sailor; I’m not sure a ground plodder like myself would have handled the Falkland Islands crisis as knowledgeable as he has.)

Now, what are the problems with Meyer’s solution? One comes immediately to mind: you then begin to really develop two power centers, two foci of advice. Certainly this is true from the standpoint of Congress, because in the budgetary process the service chiefs are defending their programs in ways which could be in disagreement with the advice coming from the council of military advisors.

**Oettinger.** Whom does General Meyer see as being on that military council? What sort of people? Where do they come from?

**Stilwell.** They would be four-star generals who somehow would be able to put together all their skills, all that they’ve learned in 30-plus years, divest service motivations — and become total purple-suiters. Those gentlemen would never return to their service — they wouldn’t be wanted. They would be in the twilight of their careers.

**Oettinger.** As Dick DeLauer explained — their terminal assignment.

**Stilwell.** But it isn’t a foregone conclusion that a sailor, a pilot and a soldier of this rank would agree with any more alacrity than is the case now.

**Student.** Was that the version that Steadman came up with?

**Stilwell.** Dick Steadman, who did the study in 1978, said in essence that we ought to be able to make the current system work better than it does now. If that’s impossible, we might look at this concept of a group of
Figure 3. Efficiencies, Individual vs. Group
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Figure 4. General Jones' Proposals for Improving the Joint Chiefs of Staff
RECOMMENDATIONS

- STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN, JCS
- LIMIT SERVICE STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN THE JOINT PROCESS
- BROADEN THE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE, AND REWARDS FOR JOINT DUTY

PROBLEMS

- MANY AREAS CANNOT BE ADDRESSED EFFECTIVELY BY COMMITTEE ACTION
  - COMMITTEES ARE POOR AGENTS FOR RUNNING ANYTHING—LET ALONE EVERYTHING
- UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT SERVICE CHIEFS TO TAKE ONE POSITION IN SERVICE CHANNELS AND ANOTHER IN THE JCS
- EACH SERVICE HAS A DE FACTO VETO ON EVERY ISSUE AT EVERY STAGE OF THE ROUTINE STAFFING PROCESS
  - SERVICE CHIEFS RECEIVE ADVICE ON JOINT MATTERS FROM SERVICE STAFFS
  - MUCH TIME AND EFFORT INVESTED IN ACCOMODATING DIFFERING VIEWS
- INADEQUATE CROSS-SERVICE AND JOINT EXPERIENCE
  - INCENTIVES AND REWARDS VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT
  - HIGH DEGREE OF TURBULENCE IN KEY POSITIONS

Figure 5. Military Advice in the National Military Command System
advisors, whether recently retired or still active.

The other difficulty here, you know, is accountability and responsibility. The council of advisors wouldn’t have any responsibility. The service chiefs do, because although they don’t command the forces, they’re producing the forces, and supporting and supplying them in the exigencies of combat.

Well, everybody’s had a crack at this. Bob Ellsworth has a very dramatic solution: he wants to create a single joint staff. He wants to really merge the three services, as he says, so that the service staffs are nothing more than a secretariat. Lew Allen’s function might justify two stars, but in Ellsworth’s view all the guys on Air, Army and Navy staffs are bureaucrats in uniform. He’s also suggesting we opt for a five-year budget rather than an annual one, provided that it can be amended and supplemented each year as required by the changing situation.

All that is part of the decision-making matrix. It isn’t easy when you stop and think about the parameters that have been put out. Congress does not want a single general staff, that’s point one. Point two, the possibility of the joint staff becoming the secretary of defense’s staff is probably not in the cards, though something approaching the parliamentary system would be welcome to many of us. The staff changes color dramatically in the office of the secretary of defense every time a new president is elected; all the senior people go and you don’t have the continuity. So there’s an area where greater efficiency and continuity in institutions could be developed. The great thing about the parliamentary system is that you just change the minister; everything else stays the same.

**Student.** What does Congress have against a single council of chiefs?

**Stilwell.** I don’t think they want a very powerful instrumentality. Actually I guess people have never thought it through in all its implications. One would think that if everybody continued to swear allegiance to the primacy of civil control, as I’ve always felt the US military has, it would be a more efficient organization. It’s a question of consistency with the checks and balances in our system. Another piece of legislation, still pending, would lift limits on how long anybody can serve on that staff — currently, a four-year maximum. Meanwhile, we have to do as well as we can within the present parameters.

**Student.** What was the rationale for splitting the Middle East Command and elevating it to a separate unified command?

**Stilwell.** There are two aspects to it. One is how it was done, the other is the objective. Certainly the overwhelming opinion is that the importance of that area — and God saw fit to put it in about the worst part of the globe he could — justifies a command embracing in its area of operation all the immediate approaches to the Persian Gulf and its surroundings. It’s now hopelessly split between the European Command and the Pacific Command. Bob Long’s area stops at the waterline; he owns the naval forces and the Marines, but once they’re committed they pass to somebody else. So you need a command there to, among other things, take over responsibility for developing the “infrastructure”: facilities, bases, transit rights, stockpiles, communications, the security assistance programs to ensure the interoperability of equipment going to regional states, and the intelligence mechanisms.

You may recall that until 1972 we did have a strike command for the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara. (You can make a good case that today we ought to have something in Africa as well.) I don’t know that I agree with breaking the new command away from its parent, Readiness Command, several months ago, while it was still in the formative stage, and while it depends on Readiness Command for planning support for joint deployment. It may have been done for political reasons as much as anything else, to signal that we were serious about doing it; but from the standpoint of efficiency this old soldier said it wasn’t the best way to do it. The end objective, however, I certainly totally endorse.

**Student.** Will JDA still maintain its responsibility to deploy forces?

**Stilwell.** Oh, JDA has worldwide responsibility. The Joint Deployment Agency came into being in the wake of our first mobilization exercise in many years, which uncovered all the problems we instinctively knew existed, given our inattention to mobilization for nearly twenty years. It was pretty formidable, though, to see them all lined up on several sheets of paper. We’ve been working hard on them ever since.

I would underscore one thing: the unified commanders really command only the infrastructure. They fight with whatever forces are allocated, but their priceless assets institutionally are their mechanisms for exercising command and control and their intelligence.
framework. Their interrelationships with the countries in this area are their other key assets. What we haven’t done yet, but we’re gradually inching toward, is to do for them what we have long since done for the national intelligence program: fence it off, free it from service proclivity so theater intelligence capabilities don’t have to compete with service priorities.

We’ve begun to give money directly to the CINCs for experimentation, for innovations in command and control. Eventually we hope to fence off more funds for those commanders. Each area’s going to be different; in contrast to strategic activity, there isn’t all that much commonality.

A couple of additional words on the large dimensions of command and control. The Defense Resources Board (figure 6) is not new of itself; it was an instrumentality of the previous secretary. What is new with the Reagan administration is that it is now a DoD-wide organization. It now includes the chairman of the JCS. It now has the service secretaries; they were not on it before. And it now has — with malice aforethought — the deputy director of OMB, Bill Schneider, who looks after our defense program.

That is the overall board. It doesn’t vote; at least, it doesn’t count votes. It is advisory; the secretary of defense can make any decision he wants to. But it is a very broadly based organization which overlooks the entire revised planning, programming and budgeting process (figure 7), which ultimately determines how you’re going to spend what resources were provided to meet the twin requirements: deterrence, or if deterrence fails, fighting effectively. The first year of the DRB’s existence was spent by the members getting to know one another, in large measure. John Lehman, a very articulate young man, sort of dominated the secretarial participation, but Vern Orr and John Marsh are coming on strong, and of course DeLauer and all the assistant secretaries except those for public and legislative affairs are there. The general counsel’s not a member.

The process itself is fairly straightforward. What we have done — and we’re kind of proud of it — is put the first P, planning, back into the process. We now produce an overall defense guidance (DG) document, which we initiate in September and try to get out by the end of January. (It was the 21st of March before we got the secretary of defense to put his John Hancock on it, but it was served up to him the first week in February.) It lays out defense policy; strategy, which is the chiefs’ business, based on their joint strategic planning document; a resource planning guide; and the fiscal bogie, which the services have to face. This is a participatory process; we invite the comments of the unified and specified commanders, so for the first time they are formally part of the process. They come in by August 31 with their views on what we ought to put in the DG; and later they’ll appear in person during the program review process.

So the defense guidance document is true to what we envisage as overall national security policy; and we hope very soon the administration will promulgate a national security policy document. The DG triggers the development of the services’ programs for the next five years, concentrating on the upcoming year. This summer we’ll be working on fiscal year 1984, which starts on 1 October 1983. The agony will come in the fall with the final numbers from the White House, which are related not to military requirements, but basically to what the political traffic will bear.

The defense guidance is based on the concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution, except in areas that have cross-service implications — mobility forces, tactical intelligence, international programs, communications systems and the like. We recognize that there will probably always be a gap between what the military professionals say we need to defend our country and the resources that are going to be available to assure it. So what we have done, in each instance, is take the JCS’ and services’ lists of desiderata and come up with intermediate objectives in which we try to postulate something that’s on the same minimum-risk vector.

We are, of course, being castigated all over the United States for throwing money at problems, for being profligate in our requests. I guess it depends on where you sit. We are castigated for not having a strategy. I must say strategy for deterrence is not as easily articulated as the strategy you will pursue in case of war. It would be a lot simpler, God forbid the implication, to develop a strategy and a requisite force structure if somebody were to tell us that in 1990 we’re going on an offensive — there are a lot of things you could do more easily.

But unhappily we’re in an era where the Soviet Union is getting larger, more mischievous, more prone to adventures, as it feels the strength of its military. We’re confronting, for the first time, the possibility of facing multiple concurrent crises, perhaps in widely separated areas of the world, where the threat of escalation to use of nuclear weapons is no longer really credible except in very few instances. It is therefore likely that conventional combat is going to be indeterminate.
ROLE: HELP THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MANAGE THE ENTIRE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PROCESS

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CHAIRMAN, JCS
SEC ARMY
SEC NAVY
SEC AIR FORCE
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OMB

Figure 6. Defense Resources Board
Figure 7. How a Plan Becomes a Budget: the Defense Department's Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
in length, scope and intensity. It isn’t easy to fashion a military structure that, together with the other instrumentality of national power, is adequate to deter, to channel competition to the non-violent fields on the one hand; or to carry out our mission to prevail, which the electorate would want us to do in the case of war. It costs money. And of course one needs all the efficiencies one can get. Well, enough for a survey.

Oettinger. This is one place where we have a useful linkage. At the beginning you talked about some areas where we don’t have systems. The systems folks have appealed for things that would have been interesting five, ten or twenty years ago but are not necessarily interesting by the time they receive them. Are there a number of other places where systems people’s perceptions and the national perceptions (which we touched on in the first year but less so this year) are somewhat at odds?

Stilwell. I don’t know which of two considerations you’re talking about. Both are valid. One is the inordinate time it takes to develop and field systems. The other is the disparity between the priority needs of the user and what system is being developed. Both criticisms are advanced from time to time.

Oettinger. Well, the first one comes more from the systems people, and the other one comes more from the field commanders. If you don’t mind, address both.

Stilwell. As for the first, nothing is more frustrating to those of us in command of forces than the inordinate length of time a system takes to go from concept to mission capability. It just drives you up the wall. There are many reasons for it, but I submit that the basic reason is inadequate funding of the system to begin with, underestimating the costs, which drives you back to Congress a year later to say, “We missed our estimate by X million dollars and we need more money.” You get in trouble with the top level too because they say, “The military doesn’t know what it’s doing.” And so the system becomes suspect for not front-loading and getting really good estimates, not being realistic. I’ll take my licks along with the rest. Moreover, there is an unfortunate tendency in the military to say, “That looks good, but it could be better. Just change this, this, and this.” And you begin to get change orders, which cost money and slow the process. And a number of people at the top level do change their minds, whether they want to admit it or not.

The most horrible example of all is the Patriot, the much-lauded new surface-to-air missile system. Phased array radars, multiple target engagement capability, effective from zero altitude up to a hundred thousand feet— it’s great. It needs minimal maintenance, and can be manned by a small crew. It’s tremendous, except that it was conceived in 1963 and we’ll field it in 1983. At the time it was really pushing the state of the art, but still we should have bettered that initial fielding date by years. It was delayed by problems of funding, change orders, differences over operational concepts, disputes as to the logistic support system it would need, whether to give it a nuclear capability or not, whether to give it an anti-tactical ballistic missile capability or not. (This is out of my field; we ought to send some of the Patriot project managers here to talk to you.)

So we develop this great concept — the Air Force and Navy have done better on new systems than the Army has on Patriot, by the way — and it goes through development, engineering, testing, We get the bright and rising stars and put them in charge — “You field the system, it’s your baby.” But having put him in charge, there has been a terrible tendency to put a pyramid of review on top of him, to the point where he is almost suffocated. We could correct a lot of that.

Oettinger. Your sense is that the process itself is to blame?

Stilwell. Yes. It takes two years to plan the program in enough detail to get justification from Congress to get money.

So where’s the real problem? It may be more difficult in the Army than in the Navy and Air Force, because we have a far greater multiplicity of systems than the major weapons systems in the other two services. But the problem is the lack of proper feedback and interface between the user and the developers, mainly on issues of functional utility. Once we’ve done the human engineering, we need to ask: “Is this the right way to do this thing, is it what we really need?”

Oettinger. And that goes back to the other discussions about the role of the CINCs as users.

Stilwell. Yes, that’s right. Again, I’m not sure we’ve talked to the operators. We’ve had in mind, for example, enormous intelligence fusion systems that are going to be handling buckets of information, millions and millions of bits’ worth of information, but I don’t
think we’ve ever sorted out just how much the guy on the firing line needs. He needs the wheat, not the chaff.

I want to talk a little bit now about crisis management. We’ll wind up with a few insights on August 1976.

There’s a whole range of crises (figure 8) — some more military, some more politically charged, some very transient in nature. Our military command structure is designed for major campaigns in terms of its vertical organization, its planning structure and the like; but, of course, crises have been more in vogue. We have a minor crisis action center in being right now in the Pentagon as a direct outgrowth, as you might expect, of the Falkland Islands. This administration has a very embryonic crisis management organization at the White House level, headed up by the vice president. It doesn’t have much sinew at the moment. There is a national counter-terrorist cross-management structure, also, without sinew. The JCS has a crisis action setup, again tempered to the large operation rather than the smaller one, although they’re working on the latter. OSD doesn’t have any real capability, being a policy, planning, review and analysis organization for the most part. It’s not adapted to operational responses, although it has enormous contingent responsibilities in a military crisis.

Crises involve requirements which are for the most part superimposed on everyday activity. And they have these essential characteristics (figure 9) depending on their intensity and duration. Usually a crisis does involve the President of the United States. Decisions have to be made without the benefit of long review and analysis in many instances, a factor which points up the importance of preplanning, exercise activity, staff folders, earmarking players and the like. We usually don’t have all the information we would like to have, and decisions once made aren’t recallable. There are time constraints; from the DoD standpoint, of course, this is very important.

**Student.** Why are decisions irreversible? Why can’t you make changes as you get new information?

**Stillwell.** If you issue the frag orders for an Air Force squadron to go and bomb something, you had better be sure the target is right. If you put in motion a decision to reinforce Europe, of course, that can ultimately be turned around. But when you get into movement of troops, issuance of operational orders and approval of that kind of action, you can’t all of a sudden turn it around. Even if you could do it practically, there may well be political constraints — for example, you may have announced that that is what you’re going to do, and now it may be too late to switch signals.

This is the crisis management process (figure 10) — I’m talking about the future now, not specific examples from the past. A crisis translates to decisions, and action is taken that puts forces in motion. This is very hard to turn around, particularly if you have made the concurrent announcement for psychological purposes. Sure, in the last analysis there can be recall. But you had better be operating at top proficiency, and know your job and what you’re supposed to be doing, if you’re called upon to be a member of a crisis action team.

**Oettinger.** I think what you’ve said about OSD and the vice president is certainly in line with comments we’ve seen underscoring that the direct knowledgeable input in a crisis will be made at more junior levels. The more critical a crisis, the more you have passive unknowing at most upper levels. There is filtering, and it affects your set of options. Is that a fair inference?

**Stillwell.** Yes, that’s correct. To begin to correct some of those deficiencies, we’re setting up an OSD crisis management organization in another month. We’re considering the idea of testing it in our next big exercise.

The basic criteria of aggression which put major forces in motion in a major campaign to deal with a direct attack are fairly unambiguous. A crisis situation (figure 11) is a little different. Its origin may be ambiguous. The enemy’s objectives are not clear, not predetermined. We’re looking for many options, probably most of all a non-military option, because we’re looking to the US forces as a last resort. We’re trying to drill parts of the OSD staff in how to man battle stations for a crisis, to develop a cadre of people from the assistant secretariats and so forth who would be marshaled at the appropriate time. They would be known to one another, would have specific assignments, would be furnished with the requisite data bases with decision packages of major actions likely to be required, including the implications of any of those actions; with our legal authorities and our constraints; the priority aims, and data on all the other government agencies involved. Next to dealing with an actual crisis, nothing is more important in developing professionalism and knowhow than exercise, whether it be tabletop or sophisticated. That’s basic.

Another phenomenon of crisis: because the information is sketchy, because of the time and sensitivity,
- BEGINNING OF MAJOR CONFLICT
- SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATIONS
- SOVIET MILITARY INCURSIONS
- SOVIET "SPONSORED" CONFLICTS
- THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS
- HOSTILE INCIDENTS
- TERRORIST INCIDENTS
- DAMAGING ECONOMIC MOVES
  - AS IN EUROPE (POSTULATED)
  - AS IN CUBA '62
  - AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (POSTULATED)
  - AS IN ETHIOPIA
  - AS IN YOM KIPPUR WAR
  - AS IN MAYAGUEZ
  - AS IN HIJACKINGS
  - AS IN OIL EMBARGO

Figure 8. Kinds of Crises
• GREATER PRESSURE ON EXECUTIVES AND STAFFS
• U.S. SECURITY AND PRESTIGE ON THE LINE
• DECISIONS
  • MORE TIME-SENSITIVE
  • OFTEN REQUIRED IN FACE OF UNCERTAINTY
  • USUALLY IRREVERSIBLE
• COORDINATION MORE COMPLEX
  • TIME CONSTRAINTS
  • EXTENSIVE CIVIL AGENCY INVOLVEMENT
• GREATER NEED FOR DECISIVENESS AND CONSISTENCY---TO MAINTAIN CONTROL AND AVOID CONFUSION
• EACH CRISIS DIFFERENT

Figure 9. Crisis Characteristics in Contrast to Normal Activity
Figure 10. The Crisis Management Process
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR CAMPAIGNS</th>
<th>CRISSES</th>
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<tr>
<td>INITIATION CLEAR</td>
<td>INITIATING EVENT MAY BE AMBIGUOUS OR UNCERTAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENEMY OBJECTIVES CLEAR</td>
<td>ENEMY OBJECTIVES MAY BE UNCLEAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. OBJECTIVE NORMALLY PREDETERMINED</td>
<td>NCA DEFINES U.S. OBJECTIVE AT THE TIME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY PREDETERMINED</td>
<td>NCA EXPLORES MANY OPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOME PRE-EVALUATION IRRELEVANT</td>
<td>NCA REQUIRES PRE-EVALUATION OF OPTIONS REQUIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISE NCA CONTROL OF OPERATIONS IMPOSSIBLE</td>
<td>NCA DEMANDS PRECISE CONTROL OF OPERATIONS DESIRED</td>
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because of the nature of the initial report, which may come from elsewhere than our embassy or a military command, there’s a tremendous impetus at the national level to search in all directions for more information, to flesh out the issue as a basis for developing the plan. Usually the plans that are on the shelves are not applicable to the situation. And so the NCA has a tendency to violate the chain of command (figure 12). That’s okay from the standpoint of information request, but it could be pretty disastrous if combat is involved.

Oettinger. You are the first one in all the discussions we’ve had here who has explicitly stressed the distinction between searching for information and the downward flow of orders. Could you comment on why the distinction seems so hard for the rest?

Stillwell. I don’t know. If I’m a full commander and the president or the national security advisor or the secretary of defense makes a legitimate request for information that skips my echelon, and goes direct to subordinates to get what information he can, I have no problem (figure 13). If I have any evidence that suggests he’d better not depend too much on that initial report, or if it should be modified, though, I’m going to tell him. I have a responsibility to correct him. We’ve provided all these command, control and communication systems; we should exploit them. Information is intelligence, it’s germane to the decision-making process. But I don’t want seniors bypassing the chain of command when it comes to application of force unless it’s been prearranged for good and sufficient reasons.

Let me move on to discuss Korea (figure 14) and the tree-cutting incident. I’m going to Korea on May 19, by the way, as part of a presidential delegation. May 22 is the one-hundredth anniversary of the initiation of US diplomatic relations with the then kingdom of Korea. Ten years after that agreement, in 1892, we had a pretty good scrap with those fellows at the Han River estuary. They made us mad so we put a Marine and Navy raiding party ashore and just raised hell. Came away with fifteen Congressional Medals of Honor.

Korea has done very well over the past twenty-five years or more. Right now Korea ranks twenty-fourth among the one hundred and sixty-seven countries in the comity of nations, as measured by the standards of national power — demographic, economic, military and so forth.

Anyhow, I was winding down my tour in August 1976, when we were confronted with the axe murders in Panmunjom. It has been alleged that I should have been alert to the ambiguous warnings preceding the event itself. People have reviewed the records and said, “You know, you should have known that something was going to happen.” I suppose that’s right. The non-aligned nations were in conference at Sri Lanka; Kim Il Sung had spent the preceding six months delivering a series of diatribes that we were finalizing preparations to invade North Korea. In retrospect, it’s clear that he would have liked to create a situation which would be cloaked in obscurity as to “who shot John,” fueling propaganda that the US presence was the principal cause of tension. The North Koreans had some pictures prepared later of soldiers with bandages around their heads. Hardly competitive with the photographs we had of the actual fight.

Well, we had a crisis, as I guess Jack Cushman told you. Two of our people had been wantonly murdered. We had not been able to complete the work the tree-cutting party had set out to do — nothing but a damn tree, but it was very symbolic. We had moved back from our positions in the joint security area, which by the armistice agreement was a joint security responsibility, so the problem was what to do now.

On the night of the 18th we set several things in train. We requested that the Military Armistice Commission convene immediately, though the rules of the game were such that there was no reason why the North Koreans would accept the meeting and come to it; they’d delayed them in the past. We had alerted our forces, and in Washington the decision was made to ready some reinforcements for a demonstration of power. But the critical question was what to do on the ground.

In the early hours of 19 August, I developed a plan called Paul Bunyan, because it had to do with trees (figure 15), that would take us back into the joint security area to finish our job. The plan had two options: either notify the North Koreans that we were coming, in which case we’d do it one way; or just try to surprise them, get out without advising them first. As a soldier I opted for the second. That plan was approved for execution even before it was written; as a matter of fact I had just sketched it out. And we went ahead and executed it.

Oettinger. Approved at what level?

Figure 12. How the National Command Authority has Functioned in Crises
• Is action necessary?
• Is military action (or inaction) politically acceptable?
• Is deterrence or coercion possible?
• Can the problem be passed to the opponent?
• Will military action be a clear signal?
Figure 14. Korea at the Time of the Tree-Cutting Incident
TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

CUT THE TREE DOWN
REMOVE TWO ILLEGAL KPA ROAD
BARRIERS FROM THE VICINITY OF KPA 5 AND 6

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

DEMONSTRATE UNC RESOLVE THAT EROSION OR DENIAL OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS IN THE JSA AND DMZ WILL NOT BE TOLERATED

Figure 15. Operation Paul Bunyan
Stilwell. The president. Of course, I didn’t know what was happening back here. One of the problems in Korea is that you’re 13 hours off, so day there is night here, and we lost a lot of time. We also had a problem because President Ford was in Kansas City; it was the time of the Republican national convention, and Kissinger was with him. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft, was in Washington, Jim Holloway was acting for George Brown as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I got reinforcements for a demonstration of force. One remarkable reinforcement was a squadron of F-111s alerted from base in Mountain Home, Idaho and flown nonstop to Korea with six consecutive air refuelings. They got there 24 hours from launch; we had them rearmed and refueled; and in an hour and a half they were ready to go. We diverted the carrier Midway from its exercises and positioned it off the South Korean coast; and brought in reinforcements of tactical air, F-4s principally, from Okinawa and from Clark Field.

And of course we were as one with the South Koreans. I was practically in Park Chung Hee’s hip pocket for a couple of days. I said, “We want this to be a joint effort.” I thought that was very important because the murdered men were Americans, but it was an attack against the UN in fact. President Park graciously offered me 50 of his double black belt karate-qualified Special Forces. And I believed that the North Koreans would not retaliate with fire. We hoped that they might meet us around the base of the tree and we would perhaps bash in a few skulls with karate chops, club, and whatnot. There was considerable doubt in Washington about the accuracy of our analysis of the situation, and there were lots of conflicting views, but we decided simply to go in there quickly. Our keen cutting edge, literally and figuratively, was engineers with chainsaws. We reckoned it would take 45 minutes to cut down the tree; it took 42. They burned out six saws in the process because it was tough wood.

Now, I want to show you where my version differs from Jack Cushman’s (figure 16). He shows the chain of command going directly to me from the NMCC and not through Pacific Command. Correct. However, he forgot to whom, in my capacity as commander-in-chief of the United Nations command, I reported. So that was not a bypass. I have a much better chart (figure 17) that shows what we were dealing with there. The guy on the ground wears three hats. He has an Army hat as commanding general, 8th Army; a UN hat as the United Nations commander; and a US forces joint hat. Today, he also has another hat: combined forces commander. That doesn’t replace the United Nations command totally, because the UN still has the overall responsibility for the armistice.

Student. Did he also report to the Pentagon in that capacity?

Stilwell. Certainly. But he had all the ROK forces under him: the ROK fleet; the ROK combat air command, which was under his US Air Force component command; the 1st ROK Army, the equivalent of the three-corps army Jack Cushman had. Jack also had operational command of the 2nd Division.

In consultation with Jack, I said, “Okay, General Morry Brady commands the 2nd Division. It is not in combat, it doesn’t have a D-Day mission. Let’s take that commander and devote him entirely to this operation.” I gave Brady a US/ROK task force that had, among other elements, a company from the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the 1st ROK Corps; those Special Forces karate experts; and units of a US brigade (figure 18). The understanding was that if there were a battle, this task force would immediately revert to the command of Cushman, whom I had at high alert (Defcon 1) with all his artillery deployed. That posture was as visible to the other side as we could make it. This permitted Cushman to focus his entire attention on command of an army, while we detached another leader, with requisite command and control capabilities, to a very simple, short operation that was only going to last an hour, with the understanding that all our SOPs would go into effect in case anything happened.

Nothing untoward happened. It was a reasonably well-organized operation (figure 19). We put the work force in quickly, deploying 30 minutes before any activity normally occurs in the area, and we got in without any problems. We surrounded the tree and began to cut it down. We had the various task force elements in position — with both lethal and non-lethal armament — to deal with any reaction from NK forces adjacent to the Bridge of No Return. We got the job done and got out.

As an example of crisis management the operation was better than most of its predecessors, for a couple of reasons for which I take virtually no credit. In the first place, we had a command and control mechanism in place; we knew the ground, we knew the players, and we had a combined force. Secondly, I was able to get in with a plan and get my paper on the table before any-
Figure 16. The National Military Command System in the Tree-Cutting Incident: Cushman's Version
Figure 17. The National Military Command System in the Tree-Cutting Incident: Stillwell’s Version
body else's, and that's helpful; there was no better solution. It was surgical and quick. Thirdly, my deputy, an Air Force three-star general, J. J. Burns (now a vice-president for advanced development at McDonnell Douglas), had been the nominal on-site commander for the Mayaguez operation; and, during that crisis, watched the NCA, the theater commander and everybody else try to talk to the little guy on the ground. He told me that this confused everyone. So I informed Admiral Gayler and JCS that I had looked over all the commo assets, and there was just no way we could arrange communications below my headquarters. We had a remarkable secure teleconference that morning that linked everybody who was anybody in Washington and the Pacific with my headquarters, so that they could ask questions, and give advice, which no one elected to do. So it worked all right.

There was one glitch. When you go to a higher alert status in Korea, the US forces, which are not under UN command normally, chop to the UN command. So at midnight before we kicked off this operation I sent out a pro forma request: "These US forces have to come under my UN hat." CINCPAC agreed and sent the message on to the JCS. So I ran the operation as it was designed to be run, with me in command of both US and Korean forces. But later on we found out that the JCS never acted on my message. Thus, in effect, I exercised improper authority; and Admiral Gayler (CINCPAC), who is prone to intervene from time to time, was in a very valid position to have given me orders that totally conflicted with what I had underway. However, he assumed, as I did, that the forces had been passed to the UN command. In retrospect, the JCS determined that they didn't have the authority to make that transfer, though we had been exercising it for twenty years. When push came to shove, the JCS said, "No, we've got to get that to the president." Well, I think we have now corrected that.