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The U.S. Sinai Support Mission
Charles L. Stiles

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C. Kenneth Allard; David Y. McManis; John H. Cushman; Carnes Lord; Charles L. Stiles; John M. Ruddy; Joseph S. Toma; Duane P. Andrews; Eugene B. Lotochinski; Paul R. Schwartz

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The U.S. Sinai Support Mission

Charles L. Stiles

Mr. Stiles is president of Technology and Planning Associates, Inc., a Washington, D.C., based consulting firm focusing on communications, intelligence, avionics, space systems, and information security. From 1986 to 1989, he was Vice President of C^3I Systems for Fairchild Communications and Electronics Company. From 1981 to 1986, he was Director of Business Development at the Western Development Laboratories, Aerospace and Communications Company. From 1977 to 1980, he was a Program Manager at the General Electric Company. From 1970 to 1976, he was the Assistant for Intelligence Research and Development, Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense. In this position, Stiles was the principal staff advisor to the Director, responsible for formulation of policies on intelligence research and development, reconnaissance and surveillance, tactical intelligence fusion and support systems, and inter-agency coordination of intelligence science and technology matters. On a special assignment in 1975, he was appointed Director, Program Office, U.S. Sinai Support Mission, Department of State. He was responsible for the construction and for establishing operation of the U.S. Manned Early Warning System in the Buffer Zone, Sinai Desert, between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Previously, he was Deputy Chief, Office of Engineering, National Security Agency; Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Air Force, Space Systems; and Division Chief, EW Systems, National Security Agency. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and Naval Post-Graduate School.

Oettinger: Let me open up by expressing my gratitude both to the class for showing up at this unscheduled time, and to our first speaker for having the graciousness and flexibility to accommodate my screw-up. It's a real pleasure to introduce Chuck. Details of his career are in the biography that you all have seen so I will not recap that; I'll just say that I'm awfully happy to have him here. Having met him years ago I have had the privilege of collaborating with him in some matters, and learning of his feats in Sinai. I'll just turn it over to him.

Stiles: Well, Tony, it's always a pleasure to see you. Our association over the years has always been a fine one, both professionally and socially, for which I am grateful. I'm also delighted to be resurrected, so to speak, to what turns out to be a rather germane area of the world, and talk about the Sinai support mission during the mid 1970s.

I noticed the weather here is beautiful and I'm a golfer, of sorts, and I try my best to sneak out to play golf whenever I can. I'm reminded of a retired couple who decided upon retirement that they'd play the 100 best golf courses in the country. Now, Golf Digest lists the 100 best golf courses in the country, and so they played. They started in Atlantic City, crossed the country and got to the mecca of Pebble Beach. Just as they teed off on the first hole, a bolt

of lightning came down and struck both of them. As they proceeded on up they're met by St. Peter at the Gate, and the fellow said to St. Peter, "You know, you could have waited until we finished the 18 holes." St. Peter said, "Not to worry. Look, you're in heaven, we have all those things up here, we've got golf courses and everything. Just report in and get your equipment, golf shoes, golf bags, and everything." So they did, and the couple proceeded to get settled and then played a round of golf. On the first hole, the fellow was playing well and hit a reasonably good drive down the center, put his next ball on the green and two-putted for a par, and the next hole, which was a par three, he landed on it, knocked in for a birdie, and darned if he didn't birdie the next hole. Well, to go on, he just had a fantastic round of golf, and, afterwards, the wife said to him, "You know you're in heaven, why are you looking so glum? You just don't look as if you're really enjoying this." He said, "Look woman, if you hadn't fed me All Bran I would have been here scoring like this five years earlier."

Perhaps my talk is a little bit like that in that if the U.S. had worried more about the Mid East earlier, the situation would be different today. I call the Sinai Support a peaceful commitment of the United States to the Middle East enigma and an acceptance by the U.S. that Mid East stability is important to the world. The Sinai Support Mission between 1975 and 1982 was the result of a bunch of agreements between Israel and the United States. As a friend of mine, the Deputy Director of the CIA said the other night at a meeting, "It's one of the few successful things the State Department did." One might note from this remark that the antipathy between those two organizations lives on.

Now, as we talk about the Middle East, I will admit that CNN and 10 million other people are reporting on that, and I'm only one among the 10 million, so any of my comments will be on my own personal observations and what I have derived from my experiences in the Middle East over the years.

My dates are reasonably accurate. You may be better historians than I, but as best my memory can tell, I have tried to treat this subject chronologically. What we're talking about is the Sinai Desert area, which looks very tranquil, very peaceful, if one looks at it from the serene position of hundreds of miles up. It looks like there's hardly anything going on there at all. But, as it turns out it's been an area of conflict for thousands of years, long before Christ was born. I had the good fortune to head the team that went into this desert in the mid 1970s. This is a photo of an Israeli defense officer who was pressed into service to escort me through the desert. He was a reserve officer and he was also manager of an Oldsmobile agency in Tel Aviv. I said to him, "Do you have any mines in this area? In the 1967 war you mined the desert rather well, as the Egyptians came to discover." He said, "No, we removed them all," and I said, "Well, let me tell you how we're going to do the survey. You put your foot in the sand and where you put your foot I'll put mine, and that's the way we'll proceed north to the Sinai Desert."

I'd like to talk a little bit about the Middle East legacy over the years for it relates to any political action in the area. I think some of the attitude in the Middle East revolves around the phrase, "Inshallah — as God wills." The feeling is: it happens, I can't do anything about it, I accept it, and therefore there's no reason for me to change my way of thinking. There's hardly a sentence that goes by that doesn't contain, "Inshallah." The Middle East is also the crossroads of the world. It was the trade route over land that brought the baubles and the riches from China during the Ottoman Empire. Good fortune, yes, because it created a new trade route and brought the East and West together. The misfortune was it got people into competition for that trade, and antagonisms grew out of it. So, on one hand, society was growing; on the other hand, it was rife with problems.

The Middle East is the birth place of the world's major religions, certainly Christianity, certainly Judaism, and certainly Islam. Moslem thing. All of us here are aware of the many, many wars that have been fought in the name of religion. It is not sacrosant to this area. The Irish are still fighting in Ireland. Secondly, the Mid East is the principal source of the world's energy and that probably has molded the politico-economic characteristics we see today more than anything.

There's a sharp contrast between rich and poor. Dictatorships and democracies, theocracies. We here, particularly, have extreme difficulty in understanding how poor it is. We see our own tenements our own slums. You need to go to Cairo, to the home of the living dead, where people live in the graveyards and have opened up the catacombs and the graves and they live there, or to see a young boy with only one leg playing soccer with 12 other fellows with only a rag in the mud or the sand. We really don't understand the differences between the rich and the poor in that society. The reason I mention that is because the "haves" and the "have

nots" are going to be some of the problems we have to face in the rebuilding of the Middle East after Desert Storm. It's a serious thing for all of us to think about. And, of course, there's the Palestinian issue. Since the beginning of time they have been among the nomads and the wanderers throughout the Middle East, and today, some 2,000 years later, it's still a problem. Tony, you stop me any time you think I'm getting too deep into this.

Just take a look at the history. How did we get to a Sinai II? How did we get to a peace agreement, and then what happened out of that peace agreement? There were certainly a lot of problems before ancient Babylon, but let's start with the era zero zero, which most mathematicians think is a pretty good place to start. At this time, the Romans departed Palestine and dispersed the Jewish race who were to wander for many hundreds of years. When they did, they destroyed Jerusalem for the second time. That was the beginning, if you will, of the history that became the legacy of this area. Following this, about the year 600, Mohammed founded Islam. This spread through North Africa and became the religion of North Africa. It is today, and, by the way, the more intrepid of them conquered even Southern Spain. You see the Alhambra. You still see influence of the Moors and the Saracens in Spain today. You see Arabic root words, and they even reached the gates of Vienna. Then, the Christian world awakened and said, "They're taking away Palestine, the holiest place," and so the crusade started and the great Emir Saladin defeated the Christians. It was the first indication probably in history that the Arabs were beginning to get a persecution mentality that they were besieged from other parts of the world. About the year 1300, the Ottoman Turkish Empire became a reality, and that, too, was to spread to the gates of Vienna, as I mentioned earlier, and through Northern Africa. It was a major influence upon this Middle East area. We will see implications of this influence between Turkey and some of the Soviet Republics in the years to come. . . .

Student: One other thing that you didn't mention on this chart or the one before is that in the early A.D.s, say A.D. 500, A.D. 1200, Islamic civilization was the center of education in the learning world, even in algebra, for instance. About the time the Ottoman Empire arose that's when you saw the sharp drop in Arab and Islamic influence in learning — it became more static; whereas today it's almost retroactive in a lot of these countries.

Stiles: You're absolutely right, it was the center of culture in the years of the Pharaohs; we still marvel at the pyramids and the Sphinx. And that culture was, like the ancient Aztecs, a very advanced culture. What I'm trying to do is stress the influence of this particular area on the rest of the world. I brought this map because I was trying to figure some way to get it on a vugraph, then I said no, it's too big. When I took this road map I got from *National Geographic*, I looked at this one point on the earth, and I said, "Look at that one little point in this vast world. It has been a center of conflict, and so influenced many lives. By the way, some 300 million people live in the Middle East today.

Continuing on as we trace a little bit of the history, the Crimean war happened, which was Britain's first major entrance into that area. Despite the terrible experiences of Gallipoli and everything else, Britain came out somewhat of a power in that era. Then there was the joint French and British effort to build the Suez Canal and improve the trade route, which concentrated interest in the Middle East. The British and German efforts to build a Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad didn't help the British as much as it helped the Germans; and, in fact, Turkey became an ally of Germany in the World War. Interestingly, when we view Desert Storm happenings on television today and one looks at history, the British fought in Basra to protect the oil fields in 1922 because their Navy ships were shifting from coal to oil, and that became a very, very vital resource. Also during this period, the British began their Machiavellian game of playing the Arabs against the Turks and the Ottoman Empire.

Then probably one of the more basic issues that caused some of the happenings of today was the Sykes-Picot Agreement between the French and British. It was started in 1916 and finally completed in finite detail in 1922, beginning the break up of the area. It divided Syria and Iraq and guaranteed the Kuwaiti borders. It was followed quickly by the Balfour Declaration. That was viewed by the Arabs as mostly a sellout to Britain. An interesting part about the Balfour Declaration was that it was a response to a Chaim Weizmann, who invented caseless ammunition, a technological breakthrough for the British. They repaid their debt to him with the declaration, which said that the Israelis, the Jewish race, should have a homeland. That was really the fundamental beginning of Zionism. By 1948, 50 percent of the land within the limits of Palestine was owned by Jews abroad. The Zionists started buying parcels of land, and the Arabs found

out by 1948 that most of the land was sold. It wasn't even owned by people living right in the area.

Student: That relates back to an earlier chart. When the Jews were asked to leave, the folks who called themselves Palestinians came in and were accepted by the Romans, so after nearly 2,000 years the Palestinians do have a rather interesting historical right to the area.

Stiles: Absolutely. By the way, if you talk to a learned Palestinian, he'll mention that very quickly, the fact that they originally were there, by the way. When the Romans drove them out, that was their land, Palestine.

The League of Nations ordered a mandate by the French and the British over Syria, Lebanon, and then Palestine. In 1922, to secure the oil fields definitely for British use, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty took place. By this time, the British had themselves fairly well-established. Kuwait was under British protection; Iraq was under British protection, under the 1922 agreement, and Jordan which had been created by Britain, and Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine were jointly shared under French and British control. The philosophy was that the British would control the oil and the cities, and leave the deserts to the Sheikh. To that extent, they contributed to the nomadism and the warlordism that we still see today in a lot of their thinking, particularly in the Saudis.

In 1948, Britain abandoned Palestine. By this time, as I said, much of the land was owned by Jewish people living in Britain and the United States, external to the Palestine. The British were about to move into Israel when some people asked a friend of Harry Truman's (he was Truman's partner in the haberdashery, and was of Israeli descent) to ask Harry Truman to talk to the British and ask them not to enter Palestine. Truman did, saying, "If you move, the U.S. will definitely be upset." The British didn't move into Palestine, and Israel declared its independence. Then, of course, Egypt quickly attacked and Israel won the conflict over Egypt. Right after that the United States recognized Israel. So, now you have an Israeli state in the middle of the Mid East. Arab nationalism, as we witness it yet today, started to emerge because many of the Egyptian officers were still so upset about losing to the Israelis in 1948 that they overthrew the decadent rule of King Farouk, and replaced him with a chap named Nasser, who became quite an Arab hero. Along the way, we still were learning, it appears, to play in the international ball game. You know, Wilson was very upset that we didn't join the League of Nations and one can look back in history and there probably were a lot of scholars who would say that we should have. Both Britain and the United States refused to back the Aswan Dam which was an attempt by Nasser to better the life of the average Egyptian. Then the United States began to politically support a southern tier of the nations of Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran to contain communism. Now this very much upset the Iraqis because they saw their Iranian neighbor growing in stature, which was not acceptable to them.

If I can convey some sense of the emotionalism in that world. The day that they hung Mossadegh, two Germans in a Mercedes Benz were driving peripherally to the crowd. The crowd saw them, thought they were two Americans, and before the police could get to them they were pulled out of the Mercedes sedan — it was an embassy vehicle — and every bit of flesh was torn off their bodies. This might help you understand the range of emotions that rises and why a single leader can rise among them.

Continuing on to the Eisenhower doctrine. Again the U.S. continued to attempt to establish ourselves in that world, intending to contain communism. This is the U.S. awakening to the fact that we had vested interests there too, more so than before, and because we saw a threat to the status-quo there and the possibility of communist rule in Lebanon, the U.S. Marines landed in Beirut in 1958.

In 1967, Israel attacked Egypt which had persuaded the U.N. to remove their forces from the Sinai. Israel saw this as a threat to its southern border. Israel also attacked Syria and captured the Golan Heights. Then Nasser closed the Suez Canal in retaliation; but, overall, it was a major win for Israel. Leon Uris has written many novels about it, particularly his one about the Giddi and Mitla Passes; we'll talk a little bit about that later on.

In 1973, Egypt attacked Israel. They crossed the Suez Canal, which is a significant crossing. Militarily, the Egyptians succeeded because of their ability to jam Israeli communications (command and control). The Israelis very quickly came up with new communications plans and obviated this, and started to drive the Egyptians back. These two passes in the center of the Sinai were vital to their success, and that's where the Israeli airborne troops surrounded and cut off the Egyptians in the Mitla Pass, and then annihilated the Egyptian Army in that pass. These areas are always seen as a key part of the Sinai Desert. Kissinger was able to get them to agree to a cease-fire, although by that time Israel

occupied most of the Sinai Desert, other than a little piece right down by kilometer 104 across from Ismailia. The final cease-fire occurred when the United Nations expeditionary force was positioned between the two armies. They agreed to talk in January 1974 after this initial final cease-fire, but they stopped talking very shortly after, by April. The diplomats started to work between the two embassies, with the U.S. holding most of the meetings, and finally Sadat agreed to reopen the Suez, and that was the first breakthrough, and they started to talk again. What began then was what Kissinger would later call "shuttle diplomacy." By August of 1975, after 16 days of shuttle diplomacy back and forth between Egypt and Israel, Kissinger got them to sign a peace treaty on September 1. Actually, the final signature of the President was attached on September 4. In that agreement, Israel, long worried about the fact that in 1967 the Egyptians had persuaded the UN to abandon that area, then said, "Look, we'll agree to peace, but there's an area that's very critical to both of us."

The Egyptians recognized the significance of the Giddi and Mitla Passes and this particular area of the Sinai. The Egyptians wanted the border north of it, and the Israelis wanted to retain it. The Israelis had a reconnaissance station, a listening post, here for a number of years watching the Egyptians. Hence, the Egyptians interest in areas north of Gidda. The Israelis were not about to give it up so they said, "We'll only agree to give it up if the U.S. will build us a tactical early warning station in the Sinai."

Oettinger: Before you go on, there's something that's not very clear to me. Going back to your aerial map, it seems to me that south of the Sinai you had massive mountains, to the east is a sandy area toward the sea. Why in contemporary terms wouldn't the kind of drive that the U.S. used in end-running the Iraqis be possible here, avoiding the mountains? Explain to me as a layman why the Giddi and Mitla Passes are so vital?

Stiles: Well, in the first place, none of them were equipped to move very fast in the sand. Fundamentally, the Israelis are not equipped well to move in the sand. The roads and the passes through there were the most passable, other than just moving across the desert.

Oettinger: Is that still true today, or is that changing?

Stiles: No, that is still a very significant area through here for passage north and south through the Sinai. Those are where the roads are today, where, by the way, both the Israelis and the Egyptians have built roads through there north to Tel Aviv from Ismailia to Tel Aviv, and one can drive there today.

Student: Was that part of the historic trade route?

Stiles: The passes were. The nomads came through those areas on their way to the sea, where it later became Haifa, Tel Aviv and so forth.

McLaughlin: You have to understand that VII core, XVIII corps could make that wide left sweep into Iraq because of the quality of the earth. Norman Schwarzkopf's major concern was that they send special forces out there in August to start taking earth samples, so that they knew the tanks and, more importantly, the wheeled vehicles could transit the area.

Stiles: About this time, the United States passed Public Law 91-110, which said you're authorized to go ahead with supporting the treaty and build an early warning station in the Sinai. I had been Deputy Chief of Engineering of the National Security Agency, the office of SIGINT (signals intelligence) engineering, and at that time I was working for a chap named Bill Colby of the intelligence community staff. Very loosely in that law was written that no person with intelligence background or any military background can participate in maintaining peace in the Sinai. So I got a call the day before Thanksgiving, in 1975, from a chap named Clay MacManaway, who had been with Bill Colby in Vietnam and worked for him awhile in the intelligence community staff who by then was down working for Larry Eagleberger. He said, "Hey, we've got ourselves a problem down here, would you come on down?" I agreed, and on December 2nd I left for the Sinai Desert. From the 25th of November till the day I left for the Sinai, I had to pick a team of people from around the government. Fortunately, we were able to take some of the good Army technology that had been developed down in Fort Belvoir that had grown out of the DPG involvement in Vietnam, where the sensors had been placed along the Ho Chi Minh trail.

DPG, is Defense Program Group, a group that formed in Vietnam to stop the passage of vehicles down Ho Chi Minh trail. This was a seismic sensor, which grew out of that, they called the minisid. We left for the desert. We had two groups: a political



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Figure 1

U.S. Sinai Support Mission

group that was to talk to the policy aspect, and a technical group to do the survey. Interestingly enough, we arrived in Cairo on the 3rd of December, and that night we were bundled into U.N. vehicles and moved down to Ismailia where we were to be guests of the commanding general of the 3rd Army. We were to cross the canal on pontoon bridges. The Egyptian general was late in meeting our group, so the reception didn't start until 2:00 in the morning, but since the pontoon bridges were only there from 4:00 to 6:00, we got up at 3:00 a.m. We had an hour's sleep and we were met at sunrise at Checkpoint Alpha by the Israelis. The Israelis pulled up, with all the chutzpah you can imagine, in their vehicles, in their uniforms, and their hard hats, and all that. Here we were, a bunch of bedraggled fellows with no sleep, in some U.N. vehicles, and they said they'd take care of us. We left, and the first thing we did was to get our cars stuck in the sand — that's why I'm so familiar with sand on the road. We stayed in the Sinai some four days performing the survey.

I'll talk a little bit to some of the aspects of the Sinai, and I can read to you from the Sinai II agreement where it tells all the things we must do. Basically, in that area, we would report on intrusions and violations; weaponry was not allowed in that area. One of the things that I felt adamant about, and probably contributed to our success, was equality. I spent my day on the hill, before I went over, describing how we would try to adjudicate it fairly to both parties, both the Israelis and the Egyptians. We tried to set it up so we'd share all purchases. We got our water from the Sea of Galilee, bringing it down by a 4-inch pipeline into the desert. The Israelis charged us per cubic foot, and they got a good price for it. The oil we bought from the Egyptians, sharing equally. We could not proceed showing one having an advantage over the other; we showed no favoritism and it was our policy throughout, and it turned out to be fairly successful.

Now, I was particularly interested that nothing would stall the operation. Now you may or may not recall that under the Sinai II agreement the Israelis were to vacate the area on 22 February 1976; that was in the agreement. That meant that the U.S. was to have a tactical early warning station in the desert. Nobody had surveyed the desert. We said we'd survey the desert. I set up a team back in Washington through a contract officer; we brought in NASA, Larry Pendleton, and he was to remain in Washington and write the RFP while we were trying to feed technical information back to him from the desert. We were definitely concerned about money and costs. We were worried the press would see us failing. The U.S., Kissinger, and the Nixon administration were under major political challenge and we didn't want to be the instrument of delay, so we were particularly conscious that no hiccups could evolve. The one thing that made it happen was that we had absolute authority all the way to the President of the United States, direct to that office.

Oettinger: Can you figure out how you got that?

Stiles: Because it was the way Kissinger set up that organization. Sinai Support Mission reported to the President through the Director. The Director was Clay MacManaway, who got me there in the first place, so I, being the engineer, had absolute authority to make a technical decision — where to put the communications, when to move people, and so forth.

Student: Can you talk to the no-military presence as opposed to the Marine and the chap from Fort Belvoir?

Stiles: No U.S. military people were involved in the early warning station in the Sinai. It was in the Public Law 94-110, and it said anybody who retired after October 13, 1975, would not be allowed to participate in this effort, and, also, you couldn't have an intelligence background. I had to be waived because I'd been in engineering at NSA, so staff had to go up to Congress and get me waived from the public law so I could participate in this. The Marine lieutenant colonel had a waiver also to participate in the survey. But he could never go back to the desert after the end of the survey.

Student: What was the underlying reason for doing that?

Stiles: I guess it was Congress keeping the military out of the game, keeping the Department of Defense out of it; State Department antipathy. Didn't want the military in. In fact I will tell you one of the teams that came in, one of the competing teams, brought in their line-up, and we had orals. I ran a very fast schedule. When we got back, we had orals. They brought in five retired Army generals, and I said, "You guys aren't going to play Lawrence of Arabia in this competition on me." That's the essence ofwhat the Congress wanted, and here's one company that proposed to give us five retired generals and put them out in the desert. We really didn't see that as a very good thing to do.

Oettinger: My impression is that it's not only the Congress, but Congress and Kissinger essentially, hand in glove with that notion that given the prior history of itchiness on the part of U.N. forces, the only way this was going to be acceptable was by having it scrupulously neutral, that no military presence would be in there.

Stiles: I had it made clear to me by Eagleberger, very clear. Our reporting authority was very, very clear — hence, we could obviate military presence.

Oettinger: The attention to detail out of Kissinger and Eagleberger was sort of unbelievable — the personal direction. Anyway, I got a call one day from Eagleberger saying that they had one of the Egyptians interested in being admitted to the Harvard Business School. I talked to these guys so the old man wouldn't get upset. I mean, they were on the phone. This was not Congress cramming something down inside the Executive. Kissinger and Eagleberger were working their tails off every minute.

Student: What was Eagleberger's position?

Stiles: He was Undersecretary for Management.

Oettinger: He was Kissinger's man.

Stiles: He quit several times while in this post, and the story is told that Mr. Kissinger would call him up in the middle of the night, "Larry, you've got to come back to work," really in tears, and Eagleberger stayed with Kissinger throughout that whole period. They were a great team.

You realize this is all happening very rapidly, particularly in the bureaucracy. I had little time to devise a plan of action. I had to make sure we would be able to evacuate people. Our setup plans included putting in underground tanks filled with 10,000 gallons of water so that if they squeezed us from both sides the Americans wouldn't die of starvation or thirst before evacuation. We worked closely with our forces in Europe to make sure we had an evacuation plan so we'd get those people out if hostilities broke out. Remember, these are unarmed civilians, absoutely unarmed civilians. So, we had a lot of meetings on airplanes, meetings while traveling, and so forth, to make this all happen. But the reason it happened was the absolute authority vested in the people and the trust by the people above. I think our President, the way he's treated General Schwarzkopf, is the same: he let him run the war, and I think all of us know that's not a bad philosophy of management. We all like it.

Now, another thing to worry about was retaining people in a harsh environment. Now, at that time (it's probably better today), the rations allowance was $1.65 a day per man. We took a lesson from the people up on the Dew Line, and I made $11 a day allowance for meals. We flew steaks in from Kansas City, so a fellow had steaks three days a week. After six weeks on-station, we'd give personnel a week off all the way north to Frankfurt, free (we paid for hotel and so forth). They couldn't stay at the best hotel in town, but there was enough money to take care of a reasonable lodging and their airfare there. It was a happy operation. We didn't have dissidents out in the field talking to the press.

These are some photos I wanted to show you. This is a type of terrain out in the desert, between the two pass areas; you can see one of the watch stations up on the hill. This is the type of area where we made the decision to locate the camp. By the way, we did this without any surveyors. We did it by having built bases before, with some understanding of where we could actually put in a foundation and not have to dig it 20 feet down. We could just put in some footings and have a base there. We knew we had to build a temporary camp, too, to house the people while they built the thing. This is a diagram of what we finally agreed on (figure 2).

When I came through the desert on the 8th of December, we got to Jerusalem and I sent messages to my team back in the State Department on the various grids and coordinates, UTMs, and other pertinent technical details, where one would locate all these facilities so they could include those details in the RFP. We needed to have some finite way of costing what we were going to get from the contractors. Interestingly enough, the RFP was issued on the 17th of December, to 46 firms. The bids were received on the 5th of January. We awarded a contract on the 13th of January for $16 million and we had one million pounds of cargo in the desert by the 1st of February, in the center of the Sinai desert.

Oettinger: Let me underscore the direct connection, if it isn't obvious, between that kind of speed and the kind of authority you described earlier.

Student: That's an important issue. Did you have waivers of any contractual procedures?

Stiles: Yes we did. We got to waive them all. I copied the Air Force procurement that they used for highly classified areas, and that's the way I was able to get a contract very quickly. But I had a team who knew what it was to write an RFP. We actually had a source selection and we reported to the



Figure 2

Layout of Early Warning System, Including Egyptian and Israeli Surveillance Stations (E–1, J–1)

interagency board, to the President of the United States on who we selected as that contractor. So it had to be a very pristine, honest selection.

Now, how to build this base camp in the desert? We learned that the Hilton Hotel in San Antonio, Texas, was built in modules, one stacked on another. Hilton just bought a whole bunch of concrete hotel rooms, stacked them, and it became a hotel. We went to Zachary Contracting Company in Houston, Texas, and bought 160 Hilton Hotel rooms.

Student: Is it Zachary that did that?

Stiles: Yeah, that's H. B. Zachary. Here is a photo of the modules being loaded at the plant in Galveston. A shipment weighed 30 tons by the way. Now, the interesting part about this was the shipping. The law said 50 percent of any shipment overseas has to be in the U.S. bottom. I couldn't find the capacity. Prices were so high that I asked to have that waived. So I found a firm in England; but the British couldn't handle it because of the Arab boycott, i.e., Arab league in Damascus. So then I had to go all the way to Peres, the Minister of Israel, to get them to waiver and allow the ship carrying these modules overseas to unload in Haifa. The Israelis gave us a tank carrier, which they used for the M-48, or whatever existed at that time, and that's how we transported this from Haifa. We originally considered sending them into Alexandria to keep the symmetry equal, but it turned out when we got there there were about 85 ships lined up in the harbor and all the cranes were broken down. We never would have been able to unload those. We moved those down in four days, and off-loaded those into the middle of the Sinai Desert.

Oettinger: What committee was helping you with those waivers?

Stiles: Foreign Relations.

Now, these are photos of the vehicles being loaded into a TWA aircraft in Greenville, Texas. This is about the 25th of January of 1976. Now you can see them lining up to go aboard; they're going to be landing in Tel Aviv, discharging this cargo, or moving down into Cairo, discharging the other cargo to be brought across the Canal. We had to maintain the symmetry, which made it difficult.

This was the base camp, these are Kelly closures. This is what the people lived in — a rather cold and severe climate. I'm down there in one of these shelters explaining the installation to Israeli Defense Minister Peres. I'll show you finally what the base camp looked like in its finality. We sold these closures to the U.N. They cost us $450,000 and we got $185,000 from the U.N. after we had used them for five or six months. So we were reasonably cost-conscious people.

Here's a picture of Anwar Sadat visiting the Sinai field mission with his general there at a briefing. Later, of course, he was assassinated.

Here's what the camp started to look like as some of the modules were moved into place. This is the bridge and roads layout. We bought half of the macadam from Israel and half from Egypt. The Egyptians were slow because they had a longer distance to bring it, and their manufacturing wasn't quite that good. You notice we put a basketball court in and a tennis court. I was asked at the bidders briefing back at the State Department on the 17th of December, "Are you going to put a pool in the desert?" I thought at the price the Israelis were charging us for water we probably wouldn't do that, and so we didn't. But that was a typical question from the media, "Are you going to put a swimming pool in for your people out there in the desert?"

This is what the base camp actually looked like when all the modules were in place. The operation center, the communication center, and all the living quarters, these are the living quarters over here, and these are the various storage buildings, and so forth.

We also had to worry about power and oil, keeping a 30-day supply on hand in case any hostilities broke out and we were not able to get fuel from normal sources.

Student: I hate to ask a stupid question, but what's the point of the fence around the area?

Stiles: Primarily because, remember, there were fellows who wanted to throw bombs over. There were terrorists in that area and they rode camels sometimes. Sometimes they'd sneak in over a hill, and these fences all had seismic detectors around them. Now you get the old argument, how far out are you protected? We got ourselves probably out of hand grenade range.

The fundamental area of communications, of course, was my background. We had to note any violation or any intrusion, and there were intrusions by the way. Sometimes it was just a guy on a camel who shouldn't be there, and there were people with arms in jeeps. Sometimes they'd lost their way in the desert. We had to have secure communications for our own protection, and to report back to the State Department. When we had an intrusion violation we had to immediately notify the governments of Egypt and Israel of this, and also the United Nations. We had walkie-talkies to our vehicles, our commercial telephone exchange, and we had contact into Jerusalem. We had liaison officers which procured our food and vegetables, and oil, and water, stuff like that, both in Cairo and Tel Aviv. Then we had the various watch stations, and we had the Egyptian SIGINT station at E-1, and the Israeli SIGINT station at J-1. We inspected these fellows every other day to make sure there were no unauthorized arms in that area, noweapons.

The communications setup brought some grief, it was not easy. We had two-channel VHF to Tel Aviv and two-channel VHF to Cairo. We had a relay at Ismailia coming across the Canal, two-channel VHF. We had diesel generators keeping the batteries charged, and the Egyptians agreed to provide an infantry platoon there to keep the generators going, all that was required was to put the oil in the diesel generator. They couldn't do that. The next thing was the Egyptian generals couldn't talk; they started complaining. A message got back to our U.S. Ambassador in Washington that we weren't being fair — we were denying the Egyptians communications. So we solved that problem — dealing with the fact that the Arab world was not quite sophisticated enough to be able to put oil into a diesel generator. We went to Australia and got ourselves a windmill, and put a 2-kW windmill up there and kept our batteries charged that way. It was a reasonably complex network. Anytime we felt we were in danger, we had to be able to send an emergency message out of there: "Come get us fellows." So those types of communications, and they were covert communications, are another subject. But we did protect the people. This is basically the way the thing operated: the watch personnel would see some

intrusion — whether it's a camel, a truck, a pickup, an individual — and analyze the material.

Now, we had the DIRID, which is an IR device; we had the strain sensitive cables that we laid across the road, which had been used in Vietnam, and we had the MINISID, with their intrusion detection devices which are Army and siesmic in nature. That was a perfect area for them to operate, the desert environment. If I had to design a sensor field for an area like here, I would tell you they wouldn't work very well; it's only about a 3-foot range, where in that area you have hundreds of feet range of your seismic device. Back to base camp and then the report would go out to the United Nations, government of Egypt, and the U.S. government, back to the State Department back in Washington, of course.

Now, this is just to give you some picture of the terrain. This one is of the entrance to the Giddi Pass; it's rather rugged terrain. Roads are in. This is looking southeast in Giddi and then this is the escarpment you see up there.

Student: If I could interrupt you for two seconds. A VHF radio was battery operated, you floated the batteries and charged them off the windmill. You wouldn't happen to remember what the average winds were?

Stiles: Fourteen knots at 242 degrees. That was enough.

Student: That's outstanding.

Stiles: I remember that because it was crisis. You always remember crises.

This is a photo of the watch station we finally built there. See the module, up on the hill, and another escarpment overlooking the pass. I have pictures of people in the watch station; one's sitting on the printout that will give the IR detection, and here's a fellow sitting at the communications, back to the main camp.

McLaughlin: For the record again, Chuck. IR is infrared?

Stiles: Infrared, yes sir. DIRID: directional infrared intrusion detection. Intrusion detection.

This photo is another look at Mitla, which is the famous pass that Leon Uris wrote about, where the Israelis surrounded the Egyptians, and you can see our watch station up on the hill. This is the lead station. The story behind this particular station is that Jim Wallen and I stood there on the highway, looking up and there's a hill right up behind us, it was up about 800 feet. We said we can communicate back to base camp — about 30 kilometers — which would mean running a line all the way up to the top of that hill. Then I said, "No, Jim, let's get lucky. Let's bounce that VHF signal, put in enough power, bounce it off the hill, and bounce it back to camp." It worked. I wouldn't try it anyplace else in the world, but it was experience that allowed us to do that.

Well, what happened after Sinai II? Actually it continued to 1982 and I'll get into some of the involvement in a moment.

October 1978 provided an interesting twist, as I think about today's events. In 1978, the French came to the United Nations and said, "The United States and the Soviet Union should give up their reconnaissance assets and use them for peaceful means, and all nations should have availability to the reconnaissance data of their classified satellite program." There came some immediate hysteria in Washington. People saw this as an effort by the Soviets to penetrate our classified world. I was working at General Electric at the time, and I was called out, and I chaired a panel for the U.N. on the use of technology for peacekeeping. We had some very august people involved — from both government and industry.

Oettinger: Was this the period when Fritz Mondale was advocating . . . ?

Stiles: Eyes and Ears for Peace. Yes.

So, the French were the proponents of the Americans giving up their reconnaissance data for peaceful purposes. Our studies looked at this, and one said, "You know, it's a pretty good deal, because out of the Sinai II agreement we had U-2 flights every 30 days. Both countries, both Egypt and Israel, got the output of the U-2 every 30 days and that was part of the Sinai II treaty — that they would be provided that data by the U.S. flights maintained over the Sinai. It turned out, if you can watch what your neighbor is doing, he's not prone to move troops up on the border. So we said, "You can use aerial flights, tethered balloons, and other technology to watch what your neighbor is doing, and, by the way, he can't move forces. You, at least, understand his intentions and you'll be able to talk diplomatically before actual aggression takes place." So that was one of the conclusions of this panel I chaired for the U.N. The French did that, and I'm going to come back to that in a minute, at the end of my briefing, but they proposed to use this for peacekeeping.

Finally, in 1979, the peace treaty ratification was agreed to with Egypt and Israel. (I have a copy of the treaty with me.) The cost of this whole operation was $100 million. According to the treaty, the U.S. would monitor the Sinai mission in a slightly different configuration, monitor the withdrawal of Israel back to its original borders before the 1967 war, and Egypt would be able to move back in and own the Sinai. It took place over a period of three years, actually April of 1982. At that time, the Sinai would go out. Well, in the language of the peace treaty, the U.N. forces would then be maintained in this zone after the peace, to maintain peace in that area. Carter thought he had Brezhnev in the bag, because he had gotten the Israelis to agree to it, and he thought he had it wired. It turned out the Soviets said, "No." So here's the U.S. committed to doing something after the withdrawal — supporting the U.N. and so forth — and Israel is saying, "Come help us." They formed a multinational force: a 1,000 man effort, two brigades, two Army battalions are over there in the desert, still today. It costs $120 million a year: $40 million to be paid by Israeli, $40 million by Egypt, $40 million by the U.S. It turns out we end up paying most of $120 million. Television didn't tell you that while Desert Storm was going on there were 1,000 people out in the desert, maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel, It's been maintained since 1973.

Student: You mentioned the cost was supposed to have been picked up three ways . . .

Stiles: There was the U.S. cost to keep the Sinai Mission in the desert from 1976 to 1982. Then the multinational force took over and the cost became $120 million a year to keep those troops in the desert, and it still exists today.

The Sinai Mission was a little different configuration. They've got helicopters and some light aircraft to be able to watch the actual withdrawal as it proceeded through 1982, until the mission ended. Now, the difficulty the U.S. had was nobody wanted to take headquarters. Egypt wouldn't let it be in Israel, and Israel wouldn't let it be in Egypt; nobody wanted it in the desert. So the headquarters ended up in Rome.

Oettinger: You may be interested in more of the official documents, and also in the Chemiavsky piece that we've listed in the readings for today. What's missing, of course, out of those public and official documents is the kind of personal direct insight to how all this happened, but if you need scholarly and official document backup, that will provide you with a lead-in for the record.

Stiles: Well, I guess what I've tried to propose is over the thousands of years, it's been a tumultuous area; it hasn't changed. Could you take that concept and apply it to Desert Storm? Well, you've got some very interesting sociological problems, you've got an area where you're not ever going to create industry.

Also in the area is Africa, which is headed for some very severe times. It's more than AIDS, it's more than what you see in the press. Twenty years ago, Africa had enough food to feed every single human being. They made a decision to start grazing, and raising herds. A lot of people didn't pay any attention to this. No economist said, "I'd worry about that." The wars in Africa today are over grazing lands and, as a result, they only feed a third of their people because there's no ground to plant, it's being used to feed cattle. That was fundamentally an economic decision to raise cattle instead of planting land, and so we didn't think about that. Today you need to think of the environment you're working in, the industrial revolution, as we know it, never happened in the Middle East. The infrastructure was never built. Turkey has probably strived the most; it's probably the most advanced country of those with a Moslem history. Israel brought the smarts with them from other countries — they already knew how to build an infrastructure. The African nations have yet to build that. They strive in modest efforts, but usually it's in imported things; they aren't creating products for their own selves or their own environment, other than bananas, apples, and pineapples.

Could we use this peaceful monitoring? Well, it's geography-dependent. You'd probably want it in the Golan Heights; that's basically an unoccupied area. And, if Syria and Iran don't make any maneuvers to take over a vanquished Iraq or move on Israel, a field mission station between the Golan Heights would probably be an applicable thing to do, to give security to Israel. There's the likelihood of major hostility; somebody will probably try to step into this vacuum. I don't think we can rule that out 100 percent. Maybe today there's less probability than there was yesterday, but still there's some probability.

Will Kuwait become another Beirut? You really have to ask yourself that. Beirut saw the clash of the Shiite and the Sunni Moslems and the fundamentalists, and the Christians. You don't have that in

Kuwait but you have the resistance forces that stayed there and now the wealthy landowners are coming back and saying, "Let's have things the way they were, baby." In the Philippines the Japaneses parceled out the land to the people, the Huks, and when the wealthy Filipino landowners came back, the Huks went into the jungle and became a communist threat. They are still there today, fighting that resistance fight. While you don't have the religious issue in Kuwait, you have the haves and have nots, possibly another Beirut. Then you have the fundamental problems in Iraq where there is fighting between the Kurds, the Shiites, and the Sunni Moslems, who are in control. That war continues to go on.

McLaughlin: Chuck, I've got to stop you for a second on the Kuwait situation. We're talking about a country where you may have a difference between those who stayed and those who fled. But it's not a have/have nots kind of division, at least if you're talking about the Kuwaitis. I mean we're talking about a country where, pre-invasion, dissenters were driving BMWs.

Stiles: Oh, that was the fundamental difference between Iraq and Kuwait, the $600 versus $13,000 a year standard of living, I understand that. But those resistant fighters are still there who had control, enjoyed being seen on television, and all that. I say there's a fundamental urge there to revolt against the Emir. You have women's rights and, by the way, you've seen this today more and more on television, the Arab woman had a chance to emerge during the war. So that fundamental arguments are there. It's still a very contentious environment; it could very well be another Beirut, with fighting in the streets.

Student: I think that there's a side issue happening and that is the argument as to democratization being supported by the Koran. Some folks are saying, "Nope, the Koran of course, supports exactly what I had." I see that happening in Kuwait. I would appreciate your opinion on the United Nation's ability to use either technical or military peacekeeping all by itself, not in the Sinai, but let's pick it up and move it a little bit in that direction.

Stiles: A few hundred thousand kilometers.

Student: To Cambodia where there is this minor water-crossing problem of a similar nature, different vegetation, and the U.S. and the USSR have both said, "Not my problem. Looks like another genocide for the second time in Cambodia; I don't want to get involved."

Stiles: There's no property to be worried about in Cambodia, and the issue in the Middle East is still oil, not property. That is a fundamental issue there, there's no property in Cambodia.

I will talk a little bit to the U.N. I'm out of this, I'm not State Department or government anymore, I just read the newspaper and watch CNN like you do. I think the the Arabs need to try to do that themselves. I really do.

Student: I just have a problem with that idea of just giving Arabs responsibility. If anything, the last 70 years in the Middle East would indicate that maybe there is a need for paternalism there to encourage development before we can say, "Well, here, shake hands and make everything all right." The whole history of the Middle East in the 20th century is one of conflict and strife and not one that would suggest that democracies are going to flourish there.

Stiles: I don't believe that either. But they have to be seen to be in charge.

Student: I have to agree with you, and I happen to still be a government employee, by the way.

Stiles: Well, I enjoyed my years in government — though I'm only 73 and I look a lot older.

Student: Interestingly, there was a briefing at the Pentagon which verifed one half of the things you said. I won't say which half, but they were verified by three different independent sources. The issue of making a person feel that they're in charge is half of the battle of peacekeeping. Confidence building doesn't work if you only build one side's confidence.

Stiles: Absolutely. I think that's what the Sinai mission did; it kept the communications and, however symbolic, the feeling that the communications were there and existed and that people could talk about it before they went to war. I think that was the fundamental gift that the Sinai mission was responsible for. I agree with you on the point of the difficulty. Somebody has to rise out of the Arab world; Nasser arose, Sadat arose, Hussein arose this time. They're always in search of a leader. The Saudis, hopefully, ill-structured as they are, could take over the leadership role. First of all, they control the purse strings, and, by the way, they have ruled behind the scenes. I've spent my years in retirement in Cairo and I can tell you that Egypt's economy today is highly dependent upon the Saudis, and will be for the future. Fifteen million people live

in Cairo where 5 million should live. There's just no hope of them coming out of it unless there's some fundamental sharing of the resources in the Arab world. The Sudanese are starving in Sudan, just starving to death. One Arab brother forgetting the other Arab brother. Somebody has to take the lead, and it has to be with U.S. and coalition help. Somehow it has to be that. Somehow they have to find a place for the Palestinians. Some encouragement for them to come to the table and perhaps share more with their Arab brother. As I say, Africa is going to have terrible difficulties over the years; the expression for the economy is "going down the toilet." Egypt is marginal.

Before when I was over there . . . let me explain to you the poverty. I saw the Minister of Industry, General Sayed, a long-time friend, in Egypt. I was there last August, and we were talking about the embargo. He said, "Chuck, the embargo won't work." I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "Ninety-five percent of the people have mud and water for breakfast, you're not denying them anything. An embargo doesn't deny them a thing in that world. They don't even know what it is. Three percent of the people will be able to get it in the Black Market and the other 2 percent already have it. So the embargo will only affect about 5 percent of the people," he said, "Ninety-five percent of the people have mud and water for breakfast." I thought that was a very prophetic statement and one needs to think about that. There's 300 million people living in that Middle East, and most of them in poverty, poverty beyond all description.

I don't think military presence is going to influence oil prices. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States gave a talk here eight days ago, right after my return from the Middle East. It was very profuse and flowery. Arabic language is very flowery by the way, everything is wonderful. He told how wonderful the U.S. was and the great sacrifice it made, but he forgot to say that the day before the Kuwaitis voted to raise the price of oil a barrel, and that by the way is suffering on our part. So life does go on over there and will go on.

Let me get off the bandstand with a couple of concluding remarks. One year, Mondale said the Sinai Mission was that peacekeeping treaty margin. I think we're going to look for other places. Cambodia may not be it but there are other places. You could argue that Cambodia would be a good place. There's genocide there, by God yes.

Student: There are four large bunches of people who care about the Cambodians.

Stiles: Here's where I really think the world has changed. Open skies are here. The French satellite, Spot, today can look down on you and tell you what's happening. The United States Air Force used Spot for mission planning for their system. They had about 280 systems with which they have supported the F-16s, F-18s, FB-111s, which are used to do their mission flight planning into the Sinai. They have 85 of them over there in the Sinai using Spot satellite data. The Air Force has a terminal where they get Spot satellite data down at TAC Headquarters. You can see your brother. You can see what he is doing. So, the world has changed. We have CNN and we have the French satellite. So the French have stolen the imaging market. I talked on the subject in Ankara with cartographic people in the Turkish Defense Agency two weeks ago Thursday. So, I think open skies are here and we need to think in that vein; we have to use that. I think part of any peacekeeping treaty force can have, very easily, a Spot satellite terminal. Much cheaper than a lot of airplanes, a lot of people, and so forth. That's one way of monitoring what your neighbor is doing, and certainly is a major input.

Oettinger: A footnote on that — some of you may have noted in the last couple of weeks or so the obituary of Edwin H. Land, whose initiatives began this era and were instrumental in the last 40 years of maintaining the stable, more or less, peace between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. What Chuck is saying is that regime, which began as a bilateral one, is now expanding worldwide, and I think that's the good news. The bad news is that sooner or later there are countermeasures. I mentioned once before the accounts of the U.S. training for the Son Tay raid where they took careful precautions to hide the stuff so that Soviet satellites couldn't see it. You can hide it from visual observation; you have sensors, a good deal of infrared operates without daylight. So, unfortunately I think the cycle of measures and countermeasures continues, but still I tend to agree with Chuck about the ability to do visual observation (and there's a lot of things you simply cannot hide).

Stiles: Well, as I say I've trotted through a lot of history. As I say, I told the Turks in my talk in Ankara that I was old and couldn't remember the language, and here I've certainly missed some of the dates and some of the important happenings. But it was a very great experience to be given the authority, to be allowed to pick the team I wanted to go with me, and then when I got there, to make my

own decisions without being subject to anybody saying, "Hey, that was dumb." I suspect that if we made some bad ones we would have been told that.

So in closing, all I can say is you can get opinions from CNN, you get them from anywhere; these were my opinions. That's my closing remark.

Student: Just a side comment. The French, less than 20 years later, have agreed with the Italians and the Spanish to put a satellite in the air for surveillance purposes with a 1-meter resolution, they call it the Spot resolution.

Stiles: That's right, they have. By the way, it's hard to determine why you need 1-meter resolution for peaceful purposes. But on the other hand, the technology's here to do that. I think the game is — it's a new world, it is open skies — and all of us are going to be subjects of CNN or the Spot satellite.

Student: One thing about sending imagery — the commanders that came out of Desert Storm are convinced that they must have battlefield imagery. That is fundamental to military planning from now on. The technical problem with that is it takes an awful lot of T-1s on INTELSAT, and the military would prefer not to send over INELSAT. So, there's a lot of companies working on image compression. The Sarnoff Research Center is studying how to take information out of an image, and that's really what you want to do.

Oettinger: Let me just say, if I may close the parentheses, that's an awful lot of data, but compression techniques that are being developed and that are advancing very rapidly commercially, are enabling people to extract information out of that so that much less can be transmitted. It's like dehydrating and then adding water at the other end, reconstituting it, shipping the extract instead of shipping the Coca Cola, and reconstituting it at the other end. It's a hell of lot cheaper than shipping all that water, and that is making extremely rapid strides in another incarnation of our research program — tracking the race between high-end, high-capacity information processing and low-end compressed capacity is a critical commercial element. I think we'll hear more about that sort of thing from our next speaker; that is a vital kind of development. Let me also add a caution there, in keeping with some of the things that we discussed earlier, in the measures/countermeasures thing, and then part of what worries me more is what you just said, Chuck, is that they learned the wrong lesson. It was wonderful in this situation, which is relatively benign, but we were already beginning to see, before the Soviet evil empire disintegrated, that part of the arms race between U.S. and the Soviet Union was leaving weaponry where there's overkill anyway. But you then move from killing to blinding and a good deal of U.S./Soviet military thinking then begins, starting with decapitation, or you take your eyes out, and so the kinds of assets that enable all this viewing in peacekeeping are then the prime targets. If you look at the asymmetry of what happened in Iraq — in a sense precisely at what enabled this, from the U.S. point of view, to be such a successful war, the mirror image is: lost your eyes and ears and it doesn't take more than 100 hours to take you out. Fortunately, in this situation we were on the right side, but it is conceivable that in a U.S./Soviet global exchange, or in some less benign circumstances like (what General Gray would have called an expeditionary adventure), the situation could be reversed and cause a good deal of vulnerability because of the reliance on imagery. It is not a unmixed blessing

Stiles: There's a third factor. The Soviet Union no longer holds a negative vote in the Security Council, and that changes the way the world is going to be run. That's why you have a 32-coalition nation, which would not have been feasible pre-Glasnost. As late as 1979, they put the United Nations forces between Egypt and Israel, and subsequently the multinational force was born. That wasn't there between Iraq and Kuwait when we went to Desert Storm. So a whole different kettle of fish, i.e., political workings, has evolved, and God Bless the peacekeepers.

Student: Why are you making that generalization in terms of Security Council? Don't you think that the votes will still be in terms of national interest?

Stiles: I think it's got a different drive than simple Hegelianism, the end justifies the means. I think now the votes will be different toward restoring an economy, and so forth. For that reason I don't see the type of vote in the United Nations that you have seen before. Otherwise, there was no reason in the world in making life easy for the United States on Iraq, because the Soviets had supplied arms to them, were still supplying their technicians, and everything else. There was no reason for them to do that.

Oettinger: The Koreans over the last year or two have supplied over $300 million dollars worth of credits to the Soviet Union; this is the South Korean . . .

Student: But if I may add the counterpoint to that. The Saudis paid the Soviet Union $4 billion dollars before a particular U.N. vote. Now I am not saying that they bought the vote; I am saying that I don't know very much, amount of traffic that goes on between Saudi Arabia.

Oettinger: But there's a lot of payments going to the Soviet Union. As I say through the Koreans and the Saudis, every little bit adds up.

Student: First, another possibility for technology. The Spratleys in the South China Sea where you've got troops from five different companies facing each other on tiny little islands; but there may be oil there, and there does seem to be some remote possibility of developing a regime for exploiting the oil resources provided you can get the countries between to set aside some of the issues. Is there scope there for technology in trying to maintain the peace in that sort of situation?

Stiles: Possibly, but a remote chance in that part of the world. I guess that the presence of a disinterested party (it's hard to call it an uninterested party in the Middle East), but a third party or the fact that you can observe what your neighbor is doing and you communicate; this is important in maintaining the status quo.

Student: But you need something to act upon if you do see something.

Stiles: You need somebody to be there: the moderator, such as a U.S. contingent.

Oettinger: Communication between Pakistan and India is not at the heart of the problem, and it would seem to me they could communicate from now until doomsday and it would not necessarily alter that equation. So, you have to have, as you pointed out, some other incentive as well.

Stiles: Yes — however, as long as two nations are communicating, the chance of going to war is considerably less.

Oettinger: Ladies and gentlemen, let us reconvene to listen to Mr. Ruddy at 2:00.

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