

***INCIDENTAL PAPER***

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**Seminar on Command, Control,  
Communications, and Intelligence**

**Congress and C<sup>3</sup>I  
Charles Rose**

**Guest Presentations, Spring 1981**

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## CONGRESS AND C<sup>3</sup>I

Charles Rose

US Representative (D-NC)

**Representative Rose enlarges our understanding of the Congressional viewpoint from the perspective of a Congressman interested in information technologies. He is Chairman of the Policy Group on Information and Computers, active in computer and television service to the House as a member of the House Administration Committee, and of special interest to us, he is Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He covers aspects of the intelligence community's use of automatic data processing, the C<sup>3</sup>I interface and its relationship to organizational arrangements within the Defense Department, and the role of Congressional oversight of intelligence.**

**Rose.** I've been in Congress since 1973 and found myself on the Intelligence Committee mainly because the Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neill, felt that I knew something about computers and that the intelligence community had a lot of them. This was a very fortunate occurrence for me. I hadn't really sought the position on the Committee, but found it very enlightening and probably the most enjoyable work I've done in the House.

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C<sup>3</sup>I) has become the buzzword of the late 1970s and early 80s. Back in 1977 a strange thing happened in the Pentagon: somebody decided "C" and the "I" went together. A shotgun marriage at best, perhaps. I understand that if the Reagan administration ever hits the ground with its feet running — something it was supposed to do on the 20th of January but as far as I'm concerned

hasn't done yet — it may annul the marriage and divorce Intelligence from C<sup>3</sup>. I haven't seen anything from my perspective of the last three years that dictates that they should necessarily always go together, but for the purposes of this discussion today we will assume that they do.

If there's anything that I have developed great sensitivity to in my years in the House, it's communications. Clearly it governs the way we think, act and deal with others. Any politician worth his salt maintains good communications with his district, lest he not be reelected every two years. Obviously we Congressmen are also very sensitive to intelligence. We have to have a good intelligence network in our own congressional districts. We do reconnaissance missions and very often run covert actions. We have to have our own sophisticated ways for measuring the pulse of the voter, just as the intelligence community has to keep its finger on the pulse of what is going on around the world. I got into the intelligence business as I just mentioned because of the Speaker's belief that the intelligence community had great interest in computers, and that was extremely fortunate for me. There are a number of well-known and sometimes well-worn clichés about intelligence that I can't help but repeat for you now, many of which you've already heard. I'm confronted with them daily as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation. Cliché Number One: collection outstrips analysis. Number Two: current intelligence takes precedence over long range studies. Number Three: money for hardware but not for people. I want to try to weave them into my presentation today, which will consider collection, people vs. technology, analysis, organization and committee activities.

First let me talk about the technological revolution. In this world of hardened antennas, counter-countermeasures, satellite relay and increasing silicon chip sophistication, we have, due to our great technical achievements in pushing the state of the art, been able to produce intelligence collection systems which can provide data in virtually near-real time, not only to decisionmakers in Washington but to tactical commanders almost anywhere in the world. This is the great technological feat. However, it's diminished by the fact that we are sorely wanting in our ability to take timely advantage of the information which the systems provide. What I mean by this is the old cliché of the inverted pyramid with collection at the top funneling down to one sometimes (I won't say all the time) overworked analyst at the bottom. The intelligence community has done a marvelous job of being able to relay information about electronic signals, communications and imagery in this mode. But although we've geared up collection systems to do this, we haven't structured the analytical community to cope with it.

So while in many areas we're obtaining data in near-real time, we're not always working it in near-real time. In fact, as the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence peruse intelligence publications on a daily basis, they often find that data that was collected and in hand in September may not have been analyzed until March. In other areas data is stored on tape but not looked at. However, because we have the technical capability and the knowhow, the intelligence users insist that we collect

all we can, since it might have future utility. In some cases this is true — but we pay a high price for this intelligence through enormous increases in automatic data processing and communications costs.

**Oettinger.** You said “users insist.” Do you really mean that the collectors collect out of bureaucratic inertia, but that the pressure comes from the users?

**Rose.** I think we see a great deal of pressure in many instances from the user community to just go and get everything you can on a particular area. I have heard the thought, “The collection boys will always be out there collecting more and more,” but from our perspective the great pressure comes from the users.

**Student.** Who do you mean by “the users?”

**Rose.** A user is any person within the government structure who has need for, and the right to request, intelligence data. He is the person who uses the product that the intelligence community produces, which is an intelligence product from an analyst, usually, rather than raw data. One user is the battlefield commander, who would say to the community, “I need this information,” and the collectors collect it and the analysts analyze it and the finished product is put in his hands. Maybe I shouldn’t have picked the battlefield commander because, as I said when I started, we are getting into more and more systems in which the battlefield commanders are getting information in near-real time, as compared to the situation where an analyst comes between the collection of the data and its ultimate dissemination.

In some of our nuclear monitoring activities, for example, the data is looked at in near-real time. In other areas users have complained that they need data quickly but don’t have the personnel to take advantage of it. On the other hand, because we have the technology we often use it to overwhelm the consumer. The pressure can come on that point as well. In the middle of January I visited the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at McDill Air Force Base. While there I talked with the intelligence staffs of both the Readiness Command of the RDJTF and the Commanders, General Volney Warner and General P. X. Kelly. During those discussions I inquired about a near-real time intelligence capability that could be made available to the RDJTF in the field, to ask whether they felt they needed it. They indicated that in their professional judgment it was something they could do without.

Last month, during a hearing on the intelligence community budget in Washington, a visual appeared on the screen identifying a few million dollars in support to provide that same capability to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. When I inquired of the general who was testifying why this item was in the budget when the people down at McDill had indicated to me only a few weeks earlier that they didn’t need it, the general responded, “They may not think they need it, but we feel they do.” In other words, “They don’t know what they need.” One would expect in an ideal world that requirements would start from the bottom and work up, but in Washington there’s a syndrome

that drives requirements from the top. "We've got it, and by God somebody is going to use it," is sometimes the attitude — and we could also talk about vendor-generated needs that crop up.

Some cynics jokingly maintain that if some of the technical reconnaissance programs that are being developed by the Army, Navy and Air Force continue at their present pace, the battlefield of the 1990s will be filled with nothing but vans and parabolic dish antennas, and we won't have any money left to buy weapons. In addition the sophistication of the computer equipment in this environment will be far beyond the capacity of the average GI to operate it.

That's a bit of an oversimplification, but I'm seriously concerned about this problem. We are rapidly getting to the point where our technical capability is outstripping the human potential of the individuals who are going to operate the equipment. I don't see much hope for slowing down the great technology race — nor would I want it slowed down. What I would like is a more realistic appreciation by decisionmakers of just what is necessary in near-real time, as opposed to what would be nice to have. Because our technology has the capability to provide miracles, everybody feels that we have to have them. When we look this situation over several years from now, we may realize — and I hope I'm wrong — that furnishing information in near-real time has focused too much attention on what is happening on a day-to-day basis. As a result we have forgotten about the long-term trends and scholarly research that ought to have been done on particular issues and/or regions. Instead we have been mesmerized by the latest take or the latest traffic.

To give you an example of the people problem I alluded to before, I have been interested in the issue of communications security — COMSEC. As a result I have spent considerable time at the National Security Agency discussing how we develop our cryptographic systems, their longevity and so forth. I was shocked to learn that while some cryptosystems are considered to have a life of say ten to fifteen years, the manuals which were written for some of those systems five or six years ago are now having to be rewritten, because the average GI who has to work on them cannot read them. They are taking crypto manuals and putting them in comic book form. I tell you if we are at that stage, it bodes ill for the future.

**Student.** Those crypto systems are being pushed farther down the line into the trenches, where you don't find the quality of people who traditionally dealt with them.

**Rose.** That's a good counter point, but the comic books have blown me away.

**Student.** The Army has done that for virtually every maintenance and operating system they have.

**Oettinger.** You might just give him your background.

**Rose.** Did you write comic books in the Army?

**Student.** I had my people read them.

**Rose.** Well, at Fort Bragg, which is in my district, the comic book for a communications device was showing that if it's cold you may have to take the batteries out and put them inside your shirt to get them warm. One female GI was putting her batteries inside her shirt and the GI was saying "Hey I'm in your battery, can I get inside your shirt?" That comic book might have gone great in the trenches, but it had some other things wrong with it. That's a cheap shot at your rebuttal, but the comic book training material is still a problem. You are right, we are moving the stuff further into the trenches, and there is a tradeoff there.

**Student.** Well, I'm not sure that it's only that they are being moved further down into the trenches. In Defense a couple of years ago a problem that was being brought up was that in the volunteer defense forces there was a lower level of literacy generally.

**Student.** I was just going to say that the problem seems to be not comic books but people's ability to learn. There are good pedagogical reasons for using comic books and images in a learning process like that. People do tend to attach ideas to pictures that they recognize. Even if you have an IQ of 160, a comic book type of presentation may be very effective.

**Rose.** Three cheers for the comic book. Now, as to the language problem: the COMSEC example I used is not much different from the equivalent among intelligence analysts or watchstanders in the military. There is a great outcry all over Washington about the inability of the intelligence community to find trained, able linguists or people who have enough familiarity with foreign languages to use it as a research tool. I recognize the difference between the skills a linguist requires and the skills needed for just simple reading knowledge of a subject. It's easy to find fault with the continuing cuts in the Defense Language Institute budget, and with the fact that President Nixon in one of his weaker moments did away with the National Defense Education Act program. But far more important is the fact that the draft is no longer in existence. Hence college-educated individuals who might have a language proficiency are not entering the military ranks. So we are having to train some people with less of an aptitude for languages. If that was the only problem it wouldn't be half so bad — but our educational institutions, and I'm talking about high schools now, are often turning out individuals with elementary school reading skills. It's difficult to believe that we are going to be able to develop linguists who are expert in foreign tongues if their command of the English language is poor. How many analysts working for our government can clearly understand what two excited Iranians speaking to one another in Farsi are saying? It's on an order of magnitude so small you wouldn't believe it.

Now that I have touched on some issues that have bothered me over the last couple of years and which are not going away, I would like to address what I consider one of the major problems concerning our defense establishment and our intelligence community: the need for good analysis. All too often the policymaker and defense planner alike would like to hear the tune played back the way they have composed it — like editorial writers who send out reporters to make their editorials come true. Unfortunately the world doesn't always work that way. There is a need for considerable improvement in the academic rigor of studies, analyses and estimates in the intelligence and defense communities. This is not to say that a lot of good work doesn't get done, but all too often there is a tendency for school solutions to appear with directed endings. The more we continue to have school solutions, the more we feel free to pick and choose the evidence that supports a particular case, the longer we will continue to pay the price and make mistakes, which means we will keep on making major landmark decisions for defense planning and policy formulation in a cavalier manner.

There are some brighter spots. The Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, which for many years was the weak sister of the intelligence community, has made some significant strides in the last couple of years. I'm not sure I know all the reasons why, but I've been very impressed with the caliber of some of the DIA people and with the quality of specific study areas that we in the House Intelligence Committee have examined. I have found some DIA personnel to be as good as, and often better than, personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency — I don't mean in any way to slight the CIA, just to point out that the DIA has come a long way. I think it's a credit to the DIA people because they made it on their own. They have certainly had no great leadership or help from the Secretary of Defense in getting there. I'm not sure how the present Secretary of Defense stands on the issue, but clearly some of the previous Secretaries could have cared less whether the DIA lived or died.

One thing we can thank the Carter administration for: it left the DIA alone. There was no great cry for reorganization, abolishment or what-have-you. Sometimes by not messing with organizations we can get them to operate a great deal more efficiently and effectively than with the constant reorganizations and changes that have been typical in the past.

I think Mr. Casey saw this very clearly when he became Director of the CIA. There was a tremendous amount of lobbying and scurrying around in Washington during the transition period to bring about reorganizations and wholesale firings of supposed political unworthies within the intelligence community. Fortunately calmer heads prevailed, and Mr. Casey has set out to work with the current setup, to refine organizational and management changes as he goes along, but not to make any major changes until he gets his finger on the pulse of the organization. All too often in the past this was not the case.

C<sup>3</sup> has been paid a lot of lip service. I would like to believe that people are serious about it, but sometimes I'm still skeptical. We hear a lot of talk about the need to harden our satellite systems, to provide for redundancy in our communication systems, but the progress seems to be awfully slow. It has been so tedious that I wonder how serious we

really are. I may not be right up to date — maybe some of you in this class are — but a couple of years ago when I was looking at the status of the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance in the Central Region, I was shocked to discover that many key communication nodes in NATO had virtually no hardening or protection whatever, so that a skilled enemy using strikes or sabotage could knock out NATO's command and control structure within a few hours of an initial attack.

I'm not sure how far along we are in improving the situation. We need to get serious about hardening our intelligence collection satellites, our communications and relay satellites in outer space, because the Soviets mean business with their antisatellite interceptor, as they have demonstrated on numerous occasions. They do have the ability to knock out some of our systems. We cannot think of space any longer as hallowed turf where no hostilities will occur. Perhaps the first warning sign of major confrontation will be when we discover one of our satellites out of commission.

I've talked about technology, and I've also talked a little about people. People are still the key, I believe, even more than technology. Let's consider a major problem we have brought upon ourselves over the last decade, one we are now on a crash course to correct: getting the people we need to run the systems. We neglect the people questions while technology fascinates us. If you walk into the Pentagon, or up on Capitol Hill, especially around the Armed Services Committee or the Appropriations Committee, there are any number of salesmen around — not your proverbial Fuller Brush and magazine salesmen, but technology salesmen from Martin Marietta, TRW, Litton. You name the corporation, they're all represented, they're selling their technology. There's nothing wrong with that; that is part of American enterprise. It's the competition for dollars, for who can turn out the best product. But the lobbying is for the most part totally dedicated to buying system X, or component Y, or computer Z. While this is being done we lose sight of the most important peripherals required to make the systems work, namely people.

Unfortunately no human factors salesmen go around to those committees. No one comes into the Secretary of Defense's office or to the chairman of a major congressional committee to sell the concept of getting good people in advance of the system buy. Indeed what we have done in the past is reduce people so we could buy systems. Admiral Stansfield Turner took a lot of heat for cutting back our clandestine services in the CIA. Turner's housecleaning may not have been all bad in itself; it was how he did it. He offended and insulted an important and skilled cadre of professionals who had served in difficult circumstances. As a result people tend to forget some of the good things Turner did while he was Director of Central Intelligence; they only remember that he scuttled the Deputy Directorate of Operations.

During the last fifteen years we've had unprecedented growth in technical systems. The decision was made in the early 1970s that the price of those technical collection systems would be paid in people. You may think I'm kidding, but believe me it was a conscious decision. A number of people in the intelligence community have told me the same thing. As a result of that decision we find ourselves in poor shape as we try to assess



the Third World, analyze the Persian Gulf, predict trends in Central America. We find ourselves with few linguists in languages which we felt a few years ago were insignificant and unimportant, but which today are highly critical.

The positive thing I can report to you is that the Executive Branch is now attempting to redress the imbalance. The intelligence community is trying to recoup what it has lost — primarily manpower. I think there will be some significant increases in intelligence community manpower within the next couple of years. I'm a bit concerned by this. Of course, more people can be applied in some areas with beneficial results. But the growing bow wave that more people is the answer must be coupled with improved managerial and organizational initiatives. We've already been told that in some areas the individual agencies' training programs can't handle this influx, and that is a limiting factor in bringing large numbers of new personnel on board. Somehow I see a tidal swell growing, that the time to cash in is today and we've got to get it all in one fell swoop or time will pass us by and the opportunity will be lost. I'm for proceeding with caution in this area. While I wish there were more human salesmen around, a graduated response is far preferable in my view to throwing a lot of people or a lot of systems at these problems overnight.

**Oettinger.** Could you dwell on that a little? Fifteen or so years ago, the problem was all the other way. World War II romantics were pretty much in the saddle, and the notion that such a thing as a technical collection system might have anything to do with anything would fall on deaf or hostile ears. It took enormous managerial pressure from various directions to alter that. Then there was an overreaction, to the point where the people got cleaned out. Now you're describing the danger of an overreaction that goes lurching in a "let's buy people" direction. Meanwhile the House and Senate committees have come into play. Would you say that increases or dampens the likelihood of even wilder swings? Or would it provide some stability?

**Rose.** I hope it will be a dampening and stability factor, but I'm not sure the two committees have zeroed in on this peak and valley swinging situation to the extent needed. We've also seen some evidence that the intelligence community is playing a little game with us — coming in and requesting one of those elements in their budgets knowing full well that they have omitted the other one. For example, they come in asking for hardware but for no people, and they say "Well you know, my God, Congress will add the people" or they come in asking for people and no hardware — whichever one they forget to ask for, good old Congress in its patriotic wisdom will add it — and that way they don't get caught inflating the budget.

Being aware that the swing has existed is the first hurdle. Realizing what the dynamics of that swing may be, and how to dampen it, is the challenge, and I'm not sure we're there. As I said, one of the major problems of the Washington community is that we often throw too many people and/or committees at a problem. For example, a couple of years ago we reviewed the government's organization for coping with terrorism. A bigger nightmare

the world has never seen — not that our people couldn't cope with it, far from that. The individual who headed, and as far as I know still heads, the State Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, Ambassador Tony Quinton, is probably one of the finest around. But he is saddled with a large number of organizations within the federal bureaucracy that have an interest in the subject. There are separate databases and organizations for looking at terrorism within the Central Intelligence Agency alone, not to mention the Federal Aviation Administration, the Secret Service, the Department of the Defense, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Department of Commerce and a few others. With that many players you have a game plan that could spell disaster.

Today we find ourselves with an ever expanding definition of what terrorism means. The CIA, for example, tends to define it rather conservatively and narrowly. One can clearly see problems on the horizon. Certain things cannot be done by committees, but the opposite extreme can cause a more serious problem. Consider the Iranian hostage rescue mission. I'm sure some of you have read the unclassified version of the after-action report by the five generals on the mission; the top secret version which I have had access to is not really much different. In it they discussed a couple of problems that tell me we haven't learned the lessons of the past very well. One of those problems was excessive secrecy, too much compartmentation. Another was fragmented lines of command and control. I had occasion recently to scan a fine book entitled *First Line of Defense: The Navy Since 1945* by Paul Ryan, published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford. It discusses the Bay of Pigs operation and the role the Navy played or did not play in it, with some very cogent comments from Admiral Arleigh Burke and others. The key operating factors in the Bay of Pigs and the Iranian hostage rescue mission were similar. Individuals who ought to have had access to information did not. Planning took place in isolation and clearly was hampered by the poor command and control setup.

**Oettinger.** To return to terrorism for a moment: one of the things I've argued with this class is the question of balance among values that may be all highly held but are in conflict. This is a serious problem, and what you said about terrorism brought it back to mind. You've described all those scattered data banks that might have some relevance. Now, that's an old problem; it was noticed ten or fifteen years ago. Some steps were taken to remedy it. That then ran into the Watergate and post-Watergate mood, aggravated by the civilian privacy issue — the whole anti-data bank and privacy kick. Now, clearly we value defense against terrorism. We also value civil liberties. Unavoidably those things come into conflict to some extent. To your mind, is there anything in place anywhere that would help us arrive at a balance without lurching from one extreme to the other?

**Rose.** The other lurch extreme would be reconstitution of the House Un-American Affairs Committee. We get letters every week; there are several organizations out there demanding that lurch be taken again. Our subcommittee is going to focus rather heavily on this. We had a CIA briefing last week on the Soviet interest and activities in terrorism.

All I can say right now is that the State Department and the Intelligence Community haven't gotten their act together yet. We are going to continue to watch them to make sure they do get their act together, and develop the kind of coordinating capacity you mention.

**Oettinger.** One of the members of the class is looking at the Iranian crisis, using the unclassified books we have. He's formed a hypothesis that the obsession, in planning for the Iranian rescue, with communications security, compartmentation, etcetera, might be understood as an overreaction to the lessons learned from the Mayaguez incident, where too much happened in the clear. As if they overlearned the lessons from the Mayaguez and went smack in the opposite direction. Does that make any sense?

**Rose.** That makes a lot of sense. I was at the White House — I happened to be the only member of the House Intelligence Committee who was in town when the President summoned everybody from Capitol Hill to talk about the aborted rescue mission. The President was all ready to talk about the Hostage Rescue force, and the Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in the briefing going, "Shhh, don't talk about it." So I don't know where all the paranoia, the compartmentation and secrecy came from, but the President was ready to tell it all, as if to say, "It wasn't my fault it didn't work." That wasn't the aspect you had in mind, but clearly that's why you all are in this course — to get that kind of global perspective on the mistakes the country has made on various occasions.

While I do not believe that everyone should have access to secrets, and I do support the need-to-know principle, I think this problem can be exacerbated. We have found time and time again that excessive compartmentation in some of these super-secret projects has tended to diminish their success.

Now, as to committee review — I'm talking about review by both the House and Senate, but mainly by the House Committee — one of the things we did when we started off as the Subcommittee on Evaluation (we gained the oversight role this year) was look at the warning capabilities of our intelligence community. We did it in a unique way. The Subcommittee staff director, who had worked in the community for many years, quickly admitted that he had several biases about the warning problem. So we took one of our newly hired staff people who had absolutely no knowledge of anything that had to do with warning, and put her on the task. She learned warning from A to Z. As a result we came up with an objective analysis and were able to effect a number of changes that I believe were beneficial to the intelligence community and put a more centralized focus on managing broad community-wide warning issues. Our study was found so useful that the Defense Intelligence Agency printed some 300 copies and sent it around the world.

We have attempted not to spend much time looking at the past, instead directing our energies to impact and influence the future. In many cases of past "failures" it has been found that information was largely available, but either hadn't been analyzed or hadn't been placed in proper context. This is partly the fault of intelligence, but is shared

equally, and sometimes to a greater degree, by the policy community. Certainly it is true in the case of the fall of the Shah of Iran. Our examination of intelligence performance in Iran prior to November 1978 found that the intelligence problem was partly due to the collection elements' failure to ask the proper questions. This so-called failure, however, was orchestrated by the policy community, which had forbidden the intelligence community to go out and collect data on dissident groups within Iran, lest our intelligence activities offend the Shah.

I'm concerned that we don't put ourselves in that kind of position again, and I think there is great danger that we could do so, especially in some areas of the world where we are awfully cozy with our allies. We may have a tendency to overlook things going on within a country which could be inimical to our relations with that country, perhaps not today, but five or ten years in the future.

**Oettinger.** Can that be helped or hindered by separating management of covert operations from intelligence operation? One could argue that people might feel more comfortable with intelligence gathering on dissident groups, etc., if the folks managing that were reasonably distinct from the folks who might also then deal in covert operations.

**Rose.** I think what would cure that problem best would be finding some way (I don't have the solution) to depoliticize our whole intelligence operation. Time and time again our national intelligence estimates seem to have been rewritten because the policymakers didn't like the bottom line. Maybe dividing up the chores the way you suggested could have somewhat the same effect. Now that Mr. Casey is an actual member of the President's cabinet, one must seriously question how much the policy of the White House drives analytical conclusions. And, analysts and collection to the contrary notwithstanding, how often do those conclusions wind up being a justification for a policy that was made somewhere else? These are exactly the kinds of matters our Committee looks into.

**Student.** In the case of Iran, the *Times* spoke extensively of the listening posts in northern Iran, and I would infer from the description that they were very sensitive, both to us and to the Iranian government. Don't you think that their concessions in allowing us to have those sorts of installations in Iran may have been made because we agreed not to conduct any surveillance of them as the host country?

**Rose.** I have not seen anything that leads me to believe there was a quid pro quo, except that in the genuine friendship relationship you don't send spies out to see whether your friend is really all he says he is.

**Student.** Is that a good reason for not having surveillance?

**Rose.** That could have been one reason. I don't think it would have been a sufficient overriding reason, because I think few listening posts are totally expendable any more. In somebody's mind, some policy might have put that together that way, and that might have been a reason. I don't know that I would have reached the same conclusions, but that's a good point.

**Student.** Not on the Iranian situation specifically, but you do have the problem of a policymaker asking certain questions in such a way that he's actually framing his own answer. But on the other hand — and this is that balancing thing we're talking about — when you totally decouple the collection of data from the questions asked, you might have all the data in the world collected but still not be able to match it to the specific question that the policymaker needs to answer to make a decision. In one recently suggested instance, the commander goes down to the central command authority during a nuclear war and asks one question. They have everything else there, but they didn't know he would ask that one question, and they can't answer it. When you decouple the collection of data from the asking of the questions, you have that problem as well.

**Oettinger.** I think the story was about Harold Brown going down to one of the command centers and wanting to know — or maybe this was in the Schlesinger era, the 1973 fracas — whether the B-52s had taken off yet from the Azores or wherever. That data wasn't available, so they had to call somebody. I wanted to use that to go back to something which you said earlier about bottom-up and top-down. You seem to argue for the bottom-up kind of approach, where the guy who needs it, whether he's a battalion commander, the commander-in-chief or whoever, says "I need this." But the commanders-in-chief rotate at four year intervals, sometimes even more rapidly, and the lower-level commanders sometimes rotate in less than two years. So if you tailor a system from the bottom up, you may tailor it to a guy who's no longer there. Let's say you react to what Schlesinger wanted, you buy the system, and the next Secretary of Defense comes in and he doesn't give a damn about it. He'll think, "Why did you spend all the money on this when I really need something else?" So, quite aside from the problem of who peddles what kind of hardware and so on, there's that stability question — if you do it too much from the top down or from the technology salesman down, you don't fit any particular command or user. Whereas if you cater to the users, then as they rotate you may just tend to spin your wheels, not fitting any particular one. Our discussion on that throughout a couple of sessions led to the view that you may have to take an evolutionary approach, developing bits and pieces and exercising them so that the individual user gets attuned, and perhaps makes a minor evolutionary adaptation. What are your thoughts on how one might strike a balance there?

**Rose.** That is a very logical way to approach that problem. You hear and read the horror stories — we get briefed on them — about a new commander coming in, whether it be the Chief of Naval Operations or somebody in a field position, and throwing everything out and asking that the whole information system be restructured to meet his own needs.

What you suggest makes tremendous sense, and raises questions in my mind as to why we haven't looked at that more. I'm going to go back and ask some questions, because that's a subject we haven't addressed very well.

**Student.** You've focused on the people problem. And "people problem" means how to deal with the social system, with the psychological system, how you specify the content of people's needs, how you cope with the interactions people produce in an organization. I tend to think of the problem more in terms of organizational development than in terms of management of information systems, which deals more with the technicalities of the question.

**Rose.** I was talking more about the decision whether to buy people or hardware systems.

**Student.** I'm reflecting another dimension of the problem, apart from the technicalities and the organizational development point. What I find is that — though perhaps I am making a very strong statement — the competitive values of this society are not an optimum framework for an optimum information flow because, in comparison for instance to what might be a collaborative style — I am thinking mainly of the Japanese way of dealing with information — in a competitive game, information is power. So if we are stimulating competition, at the same time we cannot avoid stimulating non-transfer of information. And really this creates a self-defeating mechanism, a barrier, so that whatever we design is backed by a doctrine that is killing the system we are designing.

**Rose.** The footnote I would add is that properly programmed computers freely pass all the information they're given — and sometimes the people and the society that generates them don't do that. But that's a very interesting point.

**Oettinger.** That's why computerized systems in many contexts seem such a threat. In general, in public, they appear anti-libertarian, but within organizations, or across the economy, they present themselves, I think, in the terms that the questioner indicated — counter to the compartmentation that may be associated with the competitive view, and the use of information that is one element of that.

**Rose.** In the House of Representatives, the Appropriations Committee decides what money gets put into what program. The Budget Committee has now come along with another set of oversight values, but the appropriations are still made by the Appropriations Committee, even though now with direction from the Budget Committee. Knowledge in Congress about where appropriations are headed is true power, and the House Appropriations Committee has never agreed to use the House Computer System, but has bought from a timesharing operation in Cleveland, Ohio just so all that knowledge wouldn't be available for anybody to tamper with. Only now that the Budget Committee has decided to put all this information out into everybody's hands has that game changed.

**Oettinger.** Let me make an observation slightly off the subject which may be useful to some of you as you develop your papers. I think we've touched on a very profound and rather ill-understood problem. Doug Price in the Government Department, I know, has been interested in this kind of thing since graduate student days, and may one of these years offer a course related to it. I've mentioned Chandler and some of his writings, including *The Visible Hand*. Lindblom's latest one is *Politics and Markets*. These are the beginnings of scholarly works that go behind the fiction of the philosopher kings at one extreme or the perfect Adam Smithian market, prices being the only signal, at the other, and try to look at a system that is closer to reality: part-administered, and within that part that is administered something of a premium on non-competitive sharing and part market, part-competitive. Some of the writings of Argyris and Schön go in similar directions, though they're very fragmentary. It's less than the fingers of one hand, the writings that address this kind of problem and begin to shed some light on it.

**Student.** I wanted to tie the problem you were speaking about before, the problem of analysis, to what was said about the fact that competition in this society is such that it doesn't provide for an optimum flow of information. I was wondering if the problem with analysis might be that you're selectively analyzing the available data for the specific reason of building up a good case in the direction you want to go. In that case your analysis becomes in fact advocacy, and because you don't have enough people to analyze all the data, you analyze only that which is going to strengthen your side of the case, and therefore you do not get objective intelligence assessments.

**Rose.** I'm going to talk about that. One of the responsibilities of our Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation is to encourage competing analyses on especially close points, and to do everything we can to see that collection and analysis is free, independent, untainted and unbiased by either the analysts or the policymakers. I wish I could give you some examples of covert actions that would prove just exactly what you indicated. Covert action gets authorized, a finding results, and then somebody's told to go out and make it come true. On a few occasions we have found that the finding is not always supported by the collected and analyzed data.

**Student.** I want to come back to your statement that the House Appropriations Committee is jealously guarding its information. That relates to the fragmented information on terrorism you were talking about earlier. What suggestions do you have to make that better?

**Rose.** I think your professor put his finger on the main problem as to terrorism: the considerations of privacy and not having a Big Brother computer that's watching everybody. In the appropriations situation it's just the pure power of the chairman and the members of the Appropriations Committee, who realize that the lifeblood of their authority comes from knowledge about numbers. They basically had to buy us off one at a time by saying in effect, "You're my friendly member of the Appropriations Committee and I go to you and you take care of my needs, and you slip a little something in the

appropriations bill, but far be it from me to ever question or ask to see the total picture you're putting together, because that's in the private domain of appropriations." But that game's changing.

**Student.** I would imagine that's like you going to the Executive Branch and asking for a grant for your district without really wanting the Executive Branch to consider the entire program. My point is that it happens in a variety of circumstances, and you have these duplicative information sources, because we have a system of checks and balances. The other speaker who raised this question — I think it was the former chairman of Bell Laboratories — suggested that technology would allow you to maintain that duplication by enabling you to put better information in all the sources.

**Oettinger.** That was Bill Baker. But he was talking about technological possibility. Let me reiterate. The technology we have heard about and that you are familiar with has one major impact: it broadens the range of available choices, so that instead of having discrete, somewhat extreme points, it almost fills in a continuum of choice. As a consequence the argument that "it isn't possible" has sort of disappeared. It reduces the kinds of questions that Charlie Rose is raising and that you raise to matters of policy choice. The excuse that "it's technologically determined" no longer washes, and one simply has to face the fact that he can have it either way — but it now becomes a naked question of policy or power.

**Student.** You said that to preserve checks and balances you had to increase the information, competing information in fact, and the various sources that need it. What I hear you saying is that you need to create an institution that coordinates the information. To me that's a departure from a system of checks and balances.

**Rose.** What we've done is begun to create a check and balance on information scarcity, the old method of creating a quilt a little piece at a time where everybody bought on for their own little square — and always constructed a quilt too big for the bed. The House Budget Committee has responsibility for setting the broad parameters of the budget and is now trying to whittle it all down so that they have a spectrum of interest that differs a little bit from the Appropriations Committee's. They want everybody to have everything, so just this year they have come to the House Information System, which is our computer operation, and said, "We want you to run all our computer operations. We're going to give you everything, and we want every member to have at his fingertips essentially everything we've got about what's in the budget" — which is a check and a balance against the appropriations process. The score is still 4 to 2 in Appropriations Committee's favor, but, you know, in another couple of years the information will truly be in the street and in the hands of users.

An interesting footnote: what we debated was how you deliver to the members all that budgetary detail that's been hidden from them all these years. Do you give it to them as you develop it? In other words, it's going to take a lot of software development to get the



Defense Department's budget, or the Health and Human Services budget, ready to go online into everybody's office. When you get Health and Human Services ready, should you give it to the brothers and sisters, or should you wait until you get all the budgets ready and hand them to everybody all at once? Because if, all of a sudden, the membership had access to just the budgetary details of the Health and Human Services Department budget and nothing else, they would tear it apart. That's all they would do. That information overload would so unfairly equip members to oversee and pick at that particular function of government that it would amount to a windfall to all the other agencies who weren't similarly exposed. So we're going to wait until we get everybody's mess at one time, then hand it out all at once, not piecemeal.

**Student.** This trend toward openness of information contrasts with what seems to be an opposite tendency toward centralization of information and functions in the Office of Management and Budget in the past year or so. Would you comment on that dichotomy?

**Rose.** You're saying you've seen a decentralization?

**Student.** No, instead of the openness you are indicating, my understanding of the OMB function is that it's more closed, more centralized, more limiting.

**Rose.** Did this happen in the Carter administration?

**Student.** Yes, it was one of the last things that got through.

**Rose.** Well, Stockman is a computer programmer and his chief assistant is a programmer. They both speak fluent COBOL. I don't know what has happened to them since they got down to the OMB. They used to believe in pretty open and far-reaching access for people who wanted information when they were minority members. Now they're the majority.

**Oettinger.** In the Franklin D. Roosevelt era there was a cartoon showing two old grads at a Harvard club sitting under the portrait of that illustrious alumnus, now President, and saying "The trouble with a Harvard Man is that when he gets to the White House he doesn't act like one." Stockman in the House and Stockman in the Executive —

**Rose.** — May be two different characters, yes. But he's the only congressman who's a programmer — myself included, because I couldn't program a stopwatch, much less a computer. I have a lot of fun using them, but —! Stockman's a programmer and anybody who gets data processing in the government today and is not aware of that when he deals with OMB is in for a surprise.

To sum up. While we've made great technological progress and will continue to do so, I'm not sure we've got the people problem in sync with it — and by that I mean the number of people required to run and handle all our technology. I'm concerned that as we continue to make this technological progress we will not keep pace, and that if we throw

too many people at some of these problems too quickly we may develop an imbalance in the system. We may leave out the people who should be following the less interesting issues, monitoring the foreign press, reading open source material, and putting that information in context with the products of the technical collection system to fill out the total assessment. Again, it's a management problem.

Secondly, there is a need, not only to insure good competitive analysis, but to maintain the objectivity of the intelligence process and keep it as depoliticized as possible in a highly strung town like Washington. This not an easy issue to come to grips with. We're far better off structuring our estimate products with footnotes and diverse opinions, rather than trying to develop consensus judgments on issues. You may have read in the newspaper a couple of weeks ago about some problems with a recent estimate on terrorism. This issue is still in the limelight. I'm reluctant to comment on it too much, except to note that the more the administration dillydallies in attempting to come to a consensus judgment on such issues, the more it will open itself up to accusations of politicizing intelligence judgments. The less it is tinkered with, the better off it is. In the final analysis a better intelligence product will be produced. If you've got five different analysts' opinions that you can't somehow meld into one, don't fudge it, don't hide the bottom line. Show that there is a diversity of opinion, a genuine attempt is being made to come up with the answer. There may be more than one answer.

All too often there are subtle pressures involved. It's rarely a directed solution, though it can be. Of course, the analysts are usually aware of the inclinations and mindsets of policymakers. There's a subtle, almost unconscious swing that tends to develop analyses in a way policymakers will find acceptable and compatible with their view. As I stated previously, one of the issues our committee pursues on a daily basis is to insure that the intelligence product be kept as pure and objective as possible.

I have not spent too much time discussing the technical side of the C<sup>3</sup> problem except to say that, while we hear a lot of talk about it, I still think a lot more needs to be done. While there is a relationship between intelligence and C<sup>3</sup>, you can argue that the artificial construct which was developed several years ago to put them together within the Office of Secretary of Defense has not worked very well. Certainly there should be interplay between C<sup>3</sup> and intelligence, but from my perspective the management of intelligence will proceed at a far more efficient pace if it is kept separate from C<sup>3</sup> management within the defense community.

Lastly, a thread that weaves through my talk this afternoon is my concern about the need for the academic institutions in this country to turn out educated people. The sophistication of the 1980s and 90s may outstrip the ability of people to both operate and maintain equipment. This is not the sort of thing you can solve with a simple budgetary fix; it means taking a serious, long hard look at what our schools are teaching. It never fails to amaze me that you can still go into major institutions and state universities in this country and get academic credits for courses in hiking. While I know that smacks of the

old joke about the University of Miami basketweaving course, I'm not sure that the problem lies in the university structure — instead I think it lies in the basic educational system and the three Rs.

I think oversight is alive in Congress. You notice I don't say it is well; let me say why. I think there is a general sense in Congress that during the mid-seventies the intelligence community took a beating, far more, perhaps, than it deserved. The intelligence community on its own dropped programs though they were not even suspect as far as some of the investigating committees of the Congress were concerned, simply because the community felt they might give it a bad name. We're paying the price for dropping some of those programs to this very day.

While Congress is keeping a watchful eye on the intelligence community, it is reluctant to press too deeply. I'm convinced that the community will get all the additional personnel it asks for. This concerns me — not because I don't feel there are areas where they require additional personnel, but because throwing too many people at a problem often leads to managerial inefficiency and organizational chaos without necessarily improving the quality of the intelligence product. This current reluctance is a part of our heritage from the past. But I am convinced that the so-called abuses of the past, because of the oversight process we have, will not be repeated in the future.

**Student.** I want to address something you raised right at the start, concerning vendor-generated need. I think it ties in both with the problem of analysis and with compartmentation. I'm in the Army with an intelligence background, and it seems to me that, first, vendor-generated need does exist. But I think a large problem behind it is that the person on the receiving end (I am speaking now primarily in a military context, even at a high level — for example, general officers) has not had the necessary background or experience. The kind of people who became generals are generally not the kind who are in the intelligence field, and even though they are at a high rank they have not had access to that kind of information. So by the time they do get access they don't know how to use it. I think that problem may resolve itself to some extent, but it is a large problem, and the same thing is true in analysis. The people doing the analysis (again it's primarily the military context I'm talking about, though I think it's a large problem) don't have the experience in field operations that they need to make the analysis, and those on the receiving end don't have the intelligence experience. To my mind the biggest cause of that is the overcompartmentation of information.

**Rose.** I agree with you completely. Once I started (my staff talked me out of it) to write the Director of Central Intelligence to say, "Will you please send me a map showing where all the compartmentation exists." They haven't got one. Compartmentation is sometimes very helpful, but overcompartmentation is something else again.

**Student.** To go a little further with that — I'm a believer in need-to-know. I think only a very small minority needs to know the technical characteristics of the systems, and probably a smaller minority could even understand it if they did. But when you get into

the product itself, I think that level should be more extensively circulated, even if in a sanitized form. If people are used to dealing with it for years and years, and when they get to the top they know how to use it, that itself will do a tremendous amount for intelligence.

**Oettinger.** Very interesting point. You ought to reread last year's presentations to see the progression of that point of view from some of the early paranoias to the comments of both Colby and Inman, who are lifelong pros. They make comments that agree with you, though you'll notice that they are kind of defensive, feeling that they are ahead of the rest of the herd.

**Rose.** Inman is the coolest hand in the business. I don't have an intelligence officer I think is any finer than Bobby Ray Inman. I'm glad that you're all going to get to see him.

**McLaughlin.** This also cycles back to the top-down/bottom-up kind of issue. You mentioned earlier, for example, the people down at RADCOM or the RDJTF not feeling there was a need for a real-time system. We heard General Cushman talking about when he commanded the 101st Airborne Division, and when they actually went out and tried evolving a system on their own, apparently there was some guy further down the chain who felt the need for that kind of thing at one point, and this goes back five or seven years ago. Last week we heard a retired admiral talking about having been in for 30 years, having reached flag rank, going out and taking over station 77 or whatever in Vietnam, and finding out for the first time what kind of intelligence the Navy had been gathering. And it seems to me that it's damn near impossible for a commander of the 101st Airborne, or somebody perhaps in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force or whatever, living in that kind of world, to know all the things that are possible.

**Rose.** It's like the story of the two old ladies who came out of church, and one turned to the other and said, "Our new preacher is great. He could ask the Lord for things in prayer that our other preacher didn't even know the Lord had." We faced the same problem in Congress. It's a trickle-down operation for us, because most congressmen don't even have an idea what information systems might be available. We've trickled down enough to get them interested, and now we're going to bubble up from here on out because we're out of money.

I went down to the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg when Volney Warner was the Commanding General, in my capacity as evaluation chairman, to see if they had the kinds of field systems they needed. And over in one corner of the 82nd Airborne division command post at Fort Bragg was a Reuters wire service terminal. They said most of their current information on what was going on in the world came to them over the Reuters wire service. I felt real good about that.

**Oettinger.** But that's been going on for years.

**McLaughlin.** Let me add a footnote. Larry and I were down at the SAC command and control center two or three weeks ago when the presidential assassination attempt took place, and an awful lot of the attention was on the television screen.

**Rose.** When General Haig rapidly deployed himself he was our one-man RDF.

**Oettinger.** You have talked about separating the I from C<sup>3</sup> and so on. We've been noodling that around for awhile, and it's clear that those are lousy terms in part, because it confuses things to have communications, which is a means, in there with a bunch of ends and functions. General Paschall remarked last year about how different people look at them in different ways.\* It may make good sense to take them apart.

**Rose.** In the sense that you have taught it and used it in this course, and have applied it to activities outside of the pure intelligence community, I think it should live and prosper and be a good conjunction.

**Oettinger.** Let me just try one more on you. The terms have problems as well, so we started relabeling things as intelligence, command and control, on the grounds that those are the three coherent functions; you've got to have intelligence, whether in a military organization or a business organization, to know what's going on in the world around you. Command is the function of telling the organization what to do; and control is figuring out what's going on inside you, whether you're a person or an organization. Now, it seems to me that those are critically interwoven functions; you may argue up and down how best to organize the organization and what kind of hardware to set up and so on, but the question is, are we crazy in lumping that — pardon the expression — “triad” together as a kind of coherent group?

**Rose.** No, because I think you create a new way to give people permission, as I like to say, to think about those things all together when more traditional disciplines may have dictated that they be kept very separate. By bringing it all together in the way you explain it, a certain holistic benefit comes out of it that I think might well be argued for in all levels of government.

**Oettinger.** It leaves you open, then, to ask how to create an organization that splits it up in this or that way for effectiveness, or efficiency, or practicality. It's sort of a neutral concept, it seems to me, with respect to the particular organization or procurement or whatever details you superimpose it on.

**Rose.** It's grown beyond its original definition.

\*Lee Paschall, “CI and the National Military Command System,” in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations — Spring 1980*, Center for Information Policy Research, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 1980, pp. 67-86.

**Student.** How does Congress handle communications and information exposure from its own point of view? The job of a congressman is fantastically difficult, and needs more technical support — bigger staffs for each subcommittee. What's available to you, and how do you handle it?

**Rose.** Your assumptions have been questioned recently! We are the true sufferers from information overload, and some of us have felt that the modern-day computer communications system and all its spinoffs and allies might help us marshal the pieces of the puzzle better so we can be better decisionmakers. But what most of us — or, let's say, a larger and larger group of us — are concluding is that the transformation process that needs to take place to make us better decisionmakers is not necessarily just within our information flow systems. By and large it's a very personal thing within ourselves. So we have some self-evaluating to do about how we approach our job, literally how we manage our time, what are our habits of doing our job, and, generally, how we look at the world and at the people we represent. We've got to get some of our internal wiring a little straighter before we can better connect it into the modern command, control, and communications system. A lot of members have felt that going out and buying all the latest electronic gadgets and putting them in their offices would automatically make them better congressmen and better decisionmakers, but they don't work that way.

I'm sort of at the same place Tony is. He was telling me that 15 or 20 years ago he stopped kicking tires and started worrying about how the policy was getting made and how it all was feeding into the overall information flow picture. I'm getting to the same place with congressmen, where I stop throwing so much technology at them and start sitting down with them and saying, "Now, just calm down for a minute and let's talk about what your information needs are, what you would like, what bottlenecks you have. Do you really understand computer technology? Does your staff give a damn about it? Is it something you delegate to the word processing part of your restroom? Is it something you're really serious about improving?"

**Student.** I want to refer exactly to the internal wiring question you mentioned. This is a big problem, this is the issue, if you want to cope with, rethink, reorganize the internal wiring system of the human being. I'm assuming that the human being can then, as a standard operating procedure, do what he has done before. It's quite clear to me that the education arising from the industrial world, focused on compartmentization, on specialization, by proposing these concepts in a holistic perspective, really has been preparing people to have a very analytic, synthetic, compartmentized way of looking at things. So your system is just responding as it was prepared to do by your education, from your family upbringing through high school and so on to the challenges that are posed to you by the world. That is really finding its advantages much more in a holistic than a specialized perspective, in an integrating, global management synergetic approach more than in a very specialized segmented approach. So if you want to cope with the problem, the issue is not to discuss C<sup>3</sup>I. It is to discuss C<sup>3</sup>I in the global educational, cultural and so on system.

**Rose.** I agree.

**Oettinger.** Let me pursue that point in a slightly different vein. You talked earlier about complexity — you know, equipment and comic books, the comic-book stage of preparation and so on. The implication was that there is an educational problem, or a problem of the difference between a volunteer and a draft force. Clearly, one way of getting a better match between complex problems and people is to select smarter or better-educated people. But another approach might be this. There is nothing inherently complex about the technology. The early automobiles were complex as hell and they were dangerous. When you turned the crank you got your chin broken. I'm asking how much of what we now describe as complexity is genuine rockbottom complexity, and how much is just poor systems engineering, in the sense that some of these gadgets can be made to couple with people at various levels of intelligence or education, or to perform tasks that can either be parceled out atomistically or be made more complicated with greater latitude. I'm talking about whether the astronauts were flying the Shuttle in at one o'clock this afternoon or letting a computer do it.

**Rose.** You have both come up with good rebuttals to my earlier statement about a dropping competence level on the part of the American worker. The technology's going further — the in-the-trench approach is a bad systems engineering approach. I had lunch with the chairman of the board of Tandy Corporation, and he told me that Charles Tandy always said that if an employee can't do something in his corporation he looked upon it as his personal failure — that he hadn't trained that guy right. That's another way of saying what you said.

**Oettinger.** But I think that's the central point. That there are several knobs one can twiddle, and there is a critical question about which ones are easier or more effective, or what the consequences are of twiddling them. You could raise the educational level or you could decomplexify the task, or maybe you want to do a bit of both. But it strikes me that if you take one or the other option as given, you lose the flexibility of changing your approach in a particular situation. A prize example: I would argue that the need to teach arithmetic in the schools is gone. That was a consequence of having to train clerks to man checkout counters in stores and stuff. Now when was the last time you had a clerk in the store add up the bill? It's all little machines.

**Rose.** I thought it helped you learn how to think.

**Oettinger.** No, I think that's bullshit, spread by the education folks. I think that's become an obsolete skill because the skill part has been built into the machines. Somebody may ask, "Well, what if the machines break down?" But it seems to me that the last thing in the world you worry about is whether, if you lose all electrical power, you can add up the bills at the supermarket. It's a lot more important to do some careful thinking about how much we fiddle the technology to meet the people versus how much we fiddle the people to meet the technology.

**McLaughlin.** It seems to me that a lot of these questions, when you break them down that way, also ignore the motivations. In the same way, you have math teachers in school who drill kids on three times three because that's their ricebowl, and maintain that it teaches people to think.

**Oettinger.** The same thing needs to be said about Latin.

**McLaughlin.** Well, it also applies to a lot of other things. There have been arguments that much of the military personnel problem stems from military people who are convinced they need the draft back and believe they have to let the system degrade to prove to Congress that we need the draft. I'm not saying that's true, but it's an observation that's been made. The same argument can be made about the complexity of the congressman's task.

**Rose.** We need smarter congressmen.

**McLaughlin.** The problem has also been greatly multiplied by the increasing emphasis in the last decade on constituent services. Which has led to the argument (which may primarily be inspired downtown, I don't know) that Congress has a built-in incentive to keep the bureaucracy from functioning, because if Social Security or the Civil Service retirement fund actually got checks out on time, how would the congressman be the white knight for his constituents?

**Rose.** Oh wow! You are getting close to home. If the State Department processed passports as fast as it should, a large segment of the congressman's loyal constituency would go away. You know that a congressman can call up on the telephone and vouch for your citizenship and get you a passport if he actually wants to.

**McLaughlin.** And do you know that, at least as of 1972, there were more people in the Passport Office in Washington running around taking care of individual requests than there were people processing the regular passport applications.

**Rose.** That's the kind of information we try to suppress.