**Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control**

**The Role of the Current Intelligence Officer for the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff**
**John M. McConnell**

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# The Role of the Current Intelligence Officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

## John M. McConnell

*Since 1990, Rear Admiral McConnell has been Director for Joint Staff Intelligence (J-2), the intelligence officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the Defense Intelligence Agency. After commissioning as a line officer, McConnell's first tour with the U.S. Navy was as damage control officer aboard the USS* Colleton *in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. He next worked as a counterintelligence analyst and command administrative officer in Japan. McConnell attended the Defense Intelligence College in 1970 and became an intelligence specialist and augmented to regular Navy in 1971. After serving three years in the Pentagon as an analyst and supervisor of CNO Undersea Warfare Intelligence Watch, McConnell was assigned as Force Intelligence Officer for Commander, Middle East Force, on the USS* La Salle, *which was deployed to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In 1976, he became Operations Officer for the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facility in Spain, providing 24-hour real-time intelligence support for the Sixth Fleet. He became the intelligence officer for the Commander of the Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Hawaii in 1981. Back to sea in 1983, McConnell served two years as Fleet Intelligence Officer for the Commander of the Seventh Fleet aboard the USS* Blue *deployed to the Western Pacific. After graduating from the National Defense University's Industrial College of the Armed Forces and earning a Masters Degree in Public Administration from George Washington University in 1986, he served for a year as executive assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence. He then served as Chief of the Naval Forces Division at the National Security Agency prior to becoming the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for CINCPACFLT. At that time he was selected for Flag rank.*

**Oettinger:** It is an enormous pleasure to introduce to you Admiral McConnell.

**McConnell:** Thank you, sir, very much. It is a real pleasure to be here. I never expected I would have an opportunity to come to these hallowed halls and talk to anyone. This is my first visit and it is indeed a beautiful facility and a wonderful day. I thought it might be useful to start off by just telling you what I do and what my role in life is to frame the discussion. And one of the things I will tell you early is as a result of being chosen for flag rank in the Navy, I learned early on that admirals don't work very much. So I don't intend to sit here and lecture you for the next hour and a half; I intend to make this a discussion. I want you to participate and if I don't get a reaction from you, you'll find me stopping and asking you a question.

I am the J2 for the Joint Staff. What does that mean? What do I do? Probably the easiest way to describe that is I am the current intelligence officer for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. If it is a current issue and he's interested, then that is my job, if it is in the intelligence arena. Now, what do I do beyond taking care of the intelligence needs of the Chairman? By the way, let me clarify — General Powell is an incredibly brilliant man and he is connected to more places in the U.S. government, academia, and business, nationally and internationally, than anyone I've ever seen. He receives a constant feed of information. So I rarely get there with news. I may get there with context or depth, but being his intelligence officer is a real challenge.

What do I do today? On the Joint Staff and as a member of DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency — set up some years ago to consolidate defense intelligence — I am responsible for four things. The first is "warning" and there are some issues that I will talk to a little bit later in the presentation with regard to how warning worked during the Gulf crisis and how warning has worked in the past, and what are we doing to change that or to make it better.

The second thing I am responsible for is current intelligence. If it is a current issue of interest to not only the Chairman, but other members of OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Joint Chiefs, the U and S (unified and specified) commanders, anyone in government in defense, then I am responsible for assessing the information, doing some evaluation, and publishing. It is very much analogous to a newspaper. A classified *New York Times* is probably the best way to understand it.

The third responsibility is crisis management. If there is a crisis in the world, it probably is going to involve the Department of Defense. Someone has to focus on it with regard to what we know, what do we need to know, how do we task sensors, how do we collect information, how many analysts should be working the problem, who should be getting the product. That is my responsibility. I'll give you a couple of examples.

There was a crisis in Liberia on the west coast of Africa in July 1990. It had been building up for a period of time and the decision was made to move Americans and allies out of Liberia as the tempo of the civil war increased, as troops were closing in on the city, approaching the embassy, and so on. So the intelligence portion of that — what's happening, who's on the opposing sides, what's the pace, and what's the timing, and so on — that's my job. And I

don't do that personally. There's a staff of people that help me do that, but I've become a focal point in feeding that information to the user, whether it's the J3, the operator on the Joint Staff, or the Chairman, or the Secretary of Defense.

Another example — most people have already forgotten about this one — there is a civil war going on in Somalia right now. As Desert Storm was concluding, the civil war had progressed to the point that Americans were being threatened, so the Marines and amphibious ships had to move quickly to get down to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, go to the embassy, pick up the Americans and allies, and bring them out. The intelligence part of the mission was "Where is the embassy?" Most people had forgotten it moved in the last six months to a new location. All the plans and procedures that were laid out — wrong place. So, "Where is it? Where are the bad guys? Where are the good guys? How high are the telephone poles?" A question you might want to know the answer to if you're going to land a helicopter. Those are the basic issues that you need to do quick research on and answer questions for the J3 as he's advising or planning and the Chairman's making a decision, talking to the Commander in Chief on the distant end. But the real user of that information would wind up ultimately being the Marines, all the way forward. And I'll explain some of the community issues and how you address them all.

The fourth mission, or function, I have is I am the advocate for the U and S commanders. There are 10 four-star admirals or generals around the world that command U.S. forces in some warfare area. Either they're a nuclear CINC, command nuclear weapons, and all those guys are migrating to Omaha, Nebraska, with a new command. Shortly SAC (Strategic Air Command) will be called Strategic Command. Currently other nuclear CINCs include CINCLANT in Norfolk, CINCPAC in the Pacific, and CINCEUR in Europe, of course. Unified means you are in command of all the services in a given geographic area. The specified commander has a specified mission. SAC commands the nuclear capable airplanes and ballistic missiles that would respond to, for example, an attack by the former Soviet Union. Transportation Command is another specified commander. If we are going to move troops, or beans, or bullets, or whatever from Omaha to Savannah to Spain to the Riyadh desert, there is a commander — a four-star Air Force general — who is responsible for running all that. Just to give you a quick anecdote about what this

means: when we had the war in the Persian Gulf, what was moved from the United States to Riyadh, or Saudi Arabia, was the equivalent of moving Richmond, Virginia, 8,000 miles. Now when I say Richmond, Virginia, understand Richmond to be every building, every train car, every railroad tie, all the street signs, all the stop lights, all the people — that's the equivalent of what was moved by the specified commander, in this case the transportation commander.

As the advocate for the U and S commanders, if they have questions, needs, interests, problems in intelligence, I am the entry point for helping them to get the responses they need. So day to day, mostly I focus on wherever there is a trouble spot in the world and I am either worrying about warning, to make people pay attention, or the substance of the information that is being processed, or if it is a crisis and we're moving people, or ships, or airplanes, or whatever, then I would be focused on what's happening. I had the opportunity to take this new job on July 18, 1990. Now the significance of that is the Iraqis moved their first heavy division up to the border of Kuwait on July 19, 1990. So my opportunity to learn the ropes was pretty limited. I recall the first morning on the job going in to see the Chairman and saying, "Sir, the Iraqis have moved heavy divisions up to the Kuwait border." And he said, "Yes, I know that. What I need to know is how many maneuver brigades." And you almost have to have a naval background to appreciate this, but Navy guys don't think in terms of brigades and divisions. So I just looked down at my white shoes and my white trousers, and my white shirt and said, "Sir, when I figure out what a maneuver brigade is, I'll come back with the answer." That is literally how we started this problem, the second day on the job.

**Oettinger:** You have said a number of things now, and I have been holding a remark which I hope will not strike you as unduly impertinent, but you gave me an opening. You have several responsibilities, each of which has to my mind sort of a flavor of "I'm from corporate, I'm here to help you" vis-à-vis a bunch of other people, and, you know, that old story of which the punch line is a mother says to her son, "Yes, you're a captain. By me you're a captain; by you you're a captain, but by captains are you a captain?" There are people who might regard you, or your position, as, somebody who is interposed rather than somebody who is helping.

**McConnell:** Well, when I say "mission and function," I am a member of DIA, an organization of 6,000 people. For example, there are attachés and what we would call human intelligence collectors — people who talk to people. It's fairly large and it's located in a different portion of Washington. There's a building at Bolling Air Force Base, across the river from the Pentagon, with lots of people who do estimates and databases and deliberate thinking and writing long-term estimates and studies in order of battle and so on. And then there's the group in the Pentagon. In the Pentagon I have about 200 analysts. We are focused on the world — current information — so, with regard to the mission and functions that I mentioned, I am a part of that. They are my folks. We work one-to-one, face-to-face. It's our mission and we're a team. It works pretty well. When it goes from warning, or current intelligence to warning, and to crisis management, now it's a very different problem because it's bigger. I cannot do the function with my relatively small staff so I need help from all those other people. In that context, most of the time it works pretty smoothly. I ask for help and I get the help. On occasion, we will debate some issue such as the order of battle in Iraq — how big is the army and where are they? Those who do the long-term thinking and planning wanted to keep the order of battle above a certain latitude and give to me, as a current problem, everything below that latitude. My argument was, "Wait a minute. You don't understand the problem because if we engage with Iraq, I have to know the entire order of battle; therefore, I need to move it to the Pentagon to where I am." I knew the timing on the war because I had a seat at the table with the Chairman and the SECDEF. I understood what was happening so I just let the debate continue until we got close to the time when I needed a decision and then I said, "I need a decision and either you cooperate or I will get direction from the appropriate senior level to make it happen." They cooperated. It worked out. I tried to be fairly reasonable in how this works.

Now let me explain a little bit of background in the cultural sense of intelligence and I'm going to try to make this relevant to those of you who may not have a military background or any association with the intelligence community. Some accuse the intelligence community of being very much in an academic mindset. You are studying things for the pursuit of knowledge, the desire to know more about a given subject. You want to become experts.

You want to be an instructor or whatever. And then there are those who see intelligence for its purpose, which in my view is to support three things: policy making, operational decision making, and tactical decision making. So if you are in the intelligence business, your purpose should be to produce information to solve one of those three levels or to support one of those three levels. Policy, generally at the national level: operational decision making, it could be the chairman or the CINC or even the component commander; or tactical, now we're down to the foxholes — where do we put the bomb, where do we fire the artillery — that sort of thing. I have an advantage over my sister services because of the way navies operate. In peacetime, navies intermingle. We go to sea. We see the potential enemy. We see them, they see us. We follow them, they follow us. They bring out submarines, we want to find them. We want to know when they leave port. We want to know when they go back into port and so on. So what has been created in the U.S. Navy over the past 25 years is a system that is shore-based, that focuses on potential enemies (which has always been the former Soviet Union up until this point). So we would work ashore on a 24-hour basis, seven days a week, around the clock, focused on if a submarine left the port in the Pacific, we wanted to know the moment it left. Even better, we wanted to know that they are thinking about leaving. Even better, we want to know that they're thinking about leaving and two submarines are going to get underway: one of them is going to go out and practice and the other one is going to sea for an operational patrol. Now if I'm doing my job, I can sort it to that level of detail. For example, if you were assigned to intercept a submarine coming out of port and I can tell you when he's coming, and of the two that are coming out, you want to focus on the second one because he's your target. That's pretty good support. Now, I doubt if he's ever had that level of support because we don't do that with surface ships very often but we have that capability and it's been derived over time. The reason I'm giving you this sort of background and flavor is because of the cultural development on the Navy's side with regard to how we do intelligence. In the Navy, when a ship goes to sea, it takes everything — the operators, the intelligence, the planners, the cooks, the gunners, and so on. If the ship goes down, you all go down. Consequently, you tend to build certain bonds in the sea environment. You eat at the same table, you spend lots of time together, you're constantly interacting. And it's a motion

problem. At sea everything is always in motion, either over the sea, on the sea, or under the sea. So if you're dealing with a motion problem, you have to pay attention all the time. So what happens is because the commanders want to understand the relative motion and intelligence people are sensing that relative motion and refining it and understanding it and are planning for it, we're constant companions with and supporters of the operator. It happens more in submarines and more in the air world — aircraft carriers — than it does on smaller surface ships. So over time we have developed, on the naval side, a closeness and an association with the operators that is not necessarily the same in other services. Sometimes in other services, intelligence and operations may even be seen as competitors. So what I'm trying to set here for you, is the scene of how coming through the Navy system, I have an advantage in identifying with an operator. I understand his needs, I know what he's going to ask for, and if I really do my job well, I know what he wants, I go for the answer, and I've got it ready before he even knows he has a question. He's a busy person with lots of things going on.

**Oettinger:** You just suddenly, in the last five minutes, put in focus for me something that's puzzled me for years and I want to comment on it because I made some remarks — uncomprehending remarks — to this clan earlier this semester and there's a record in an earlier seminar of some of the agonizing over a warring relationship between intelligence people and operational people. You've seen it in some of the writings of McManis in the proceedings of earlier seminars and in some of the literature. And in Admiral McConnell's description of living with the customer so that you think like the customer and so that this issue simply disappears is something, the force of which had not occurred to me before, which is why I take the trouble to break in and commend it to you because if I missed that insight, I'm arrogant enough to believe that maybe it never occurred to some of you the way it just came to my mind as Mike was talking.

**McConnell:** Those organizations that we established ashore to provide support are called OSIS nodes (Ocean Surveillance Information Systems). We provide a stream of information messages, flow of data, whatever was needed. Out in the fleet, they were very quick to point out any failure. We had very demanding customers. For example, I ran one of those OSIS nodes ashore and there was my customer, sitting on a carrier. If the carrier went to a

place and Soviet aircraft flew out to his position and I didn't tell him they were coming, he was not a happy sailor and I heard about it.

**Oettinger:** But, you know, we still hear today complaints about green doors — intelligence kept from operators — which are not unknown complaints even in the Navy, so there's something about your account which either reflects a latter day reform or some missing perceptions.

**McConnell:** Let me just put a couple of things in context for you. If an airplane in the Pacific — a bad-guy airplane — approached a carrier closer than 200 miles without being under Navy Air escort, the commander of the battle group flunked — he failed. His report card was F. For that commander to never be surprised, he had to know they were coming, because you've got to load the deck, get the tankers, get the radar, get the picket ships — all the things you have to do to intercept an airplane out 200 miles so he could do the appropriate intercept — he needs intelligence. So he has a need and he would embrace his intelligence officer. There are actually three times when operators really love their intelligence officers. One is when potentially somebody is going to surprise you and you want to know what's out there. Our OSIS support system would handle the problem until it got close and then hand it off to one of the ship's sensors. Another time is if you were going to attack a target — you were going to bomb a target — and the operator says, giving his intel guy a little squeeze, "Where's the target? How am I going to get there? What's the threat?" Now, you give him all that information and he flies off. When he comes back, he squeezes his intel officer and says, "Did I hit the target? How'd I do?" When it comes to actual execution is when we generally get very close to these operators. It takes close cooperation by both operators and intelligence people to work properly.

Now, why am I going into all this background? I mentioned that there are U and S commanders, there are 10 of them. Five of them have their own JIC, Joint Intelligence Center. What's a JIC? It's a lot of people. It's analysts, it's a collection of managers, people who know how to turn sensors off and on. It's an organization that can send messages, receive messages, display data, do analysis, and provide support. And there are five U and S commanders who do not have JICs. Now the rough division is, the way I describe it, is the "haves" and the "have-nots". What's a "have" CINC? A have CINC owns forces. CINCPAC owns a lot of ships, a lot of

people, and he has forces and they're right there. He directs things that are going on. CINCLANT, the same story. EUCOM or CINCEUR in Europe, the same story. SAC in Omaha owns airplanes. His JIC helps him employ those airplanes. Now, let's talk about the other CINCs, CINCCENT — no forces. CINCSOUTH — headquarters, four-star general, doesn't own or control large forces. Over the years, the "have" CINCs got all the intel resources. The "have-not" CINCs did not get intel resources. Lo and behold there was an imminent invasion in the Gulf, Iraq was going to invade Kuwait. CINCCENT looked around, and there was no intel infrastructure to help him do the mission. They had a problem here because it's a big issue. You need to do a lot of things — targeting, order of battle, terrain, maps. What happened early in that process is this organization I represent, the Defense Intelligence Agency, has for the most part over the years mostly worried about the Washington community — the policy makers, the Joint Staff, the office of the Secretary of Defense. I told you half of the story earlier, about when I didn't know what a maneuver brigade was; when I asked the new J2, CINCCENT what he brought to this particular problem, he told me he spoke Chinese, which wasn't particularly valuable for fighting Iraqis in the desert. He had just come from being the attaché in China and had spent most of his time in the Army in the HUMINT arena. So he didn't have a lot of background for this problem. Now, let me try to explain to you what I mean by "all source fusion and support to operational decision." The reason I told you about how Navy people grow up doing this culturally, is because it is not as refined in the sister services. And we found ourselves with a "have-not" CINC, a potentially big war, and not a lot of understanding by the CINC's staff on how to do all source fusion and intelligence support . . . operational support. As they moved to the desert, they took nine intelligence people. Now, the first thing that we did was to ask the CINC if he would accept a communications pipe, a big pipe. What goes through the pipe? All kinds of things — order of battle, imagery, a wide variety of information — to allow him to have on his end the information he needed for the conduct of the war. When we asked the question, the response was, "Thank you for your interest in national security. Don't call us, we'll call you." And I said, "I really don't understand that. These folks are about to go to war and they're going to drop bombs, and who's going to tell them where the targets are? Who's going to tell them where the bad guys are? Who's going to sort

out the terrain and all the various things, because when he left and went to the desert, he had nine guys."

There's a group in Washington called the MIB, Military Intelligence Board. The chair of it is the director of the DIA. It consists of the NSA director, the service intel chiefs, and I get to be a member as J2, Joint Staff. Now, why all this long buildup? At the table, there were four Navy flags, one on each corner. And as we talked about this, without ever talking among ourselves, as we addressed the table, we talked about "all source fusion" and support to operation decision-making. There was a lot of argument around the table but what was being proposed was "CINCCENT does not have the capability in theater, we need to set it up here in the Pentagon, in the basement of the Pentagon" — analysts from the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Army, the DIA, NSA, and CIA. So we could focus all resources of the U.S. Government on any potential question that needed to be answered for the CINC. The reaction around the table immediately was to say DIA is an organization of 6,000 people and why do we have to provide you people? This is a traditional resource argument. My response to that was, "We need to set up an all-source effort and if I don't get your best and brightest from the Army, from the Air Force, from the Navy, in this organization to work it, then you will duplicate it in the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy and you will carp at what I am doing because you kept your best guy. You're going to sit out there and tell the world how I'm wrong." I said, "We can't stand that. I'm working for the Chairman and the Chairman has to have the best information. Nobody knows the ground problem like a ground officer or a maritime problem like a maritime officer, or an air problem like an air officer, so I want your best." There was a lot of debate, it was finally resolved, we established that JIC in the Pentagon. In that JIC, we had watch officers from air, ground, and maritimes with an NSA analyst doing SIGINT analysis and a few CIA representatives, and some imagery experts, and our mission was whatever the CINC wanted.

**Oettinger:** I'm losing you a little bit because a moment ago you said, you know, they said, "Thank you very much, we don't want anybody in Riyadh," you were still gearing up for a customer who, as of then, didn't quite know he wanted to buy.

**McConnell:** You're absolutely correct.

**Oettinger:** OK.

**McConnell:** The second time we asked the CINC the question, "Do you want this pipe to give you answers?" His answer was, "Don't call us, we'll call you." This same organization I mentioned to you, the MIB, said, "He needs this. He just doesn't understand." So I got the mission to ask the Chairman to explain to the CINC what was going on.

**Oettinger:** So far, you had the muscle of the intelligence community and your peers, vis à vis the operators who didn't know they needed it yet and at some point there was either demand or muscle to . . . How did you get the best guys? Was it because they were only intelligence resources — we're still talking of intelligence resources?

**McConnell:** Yes. The MIB voted; we got the multiservice, multiagency personnel assets we needed for the Pentagon JIC. As our analysts got target smart, we migrated them to Saudi to support the CINC and his component commanders on-scene.

**Oettinger:** OK, that's how you got the muscle.

**McConnell:** I'm attempting to give you an appreciation for how a maritime intelligence officer grows up in a culture where his total focus is on the operational support. Remember my example — navies always worry about motion. Armies and air forces don't do 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. So it's a cultural thing the way we in the naval service grow up. As we built this big thing in the Pentagon, DIA ultimately had 2,000 people focused on this problem. Now they weren't all in the Pentagon. Some of them were located at Bolling Air Force Base, some of them were involved with the attaché system. In the Pentagon, in the basement, the proverbial basement of the Pentagon, I had 300 people. Of the 300, about half of them were DIA and the other half included Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, and CIA. We put a colonel in charge, gave him a computer terminal, a television screen and some support and our mission was "whatever they want to know we will try to answer." Now, the Navy captain sitting in the back of the room had lots of questions as the Intel officer for the Naval Component Commander. He knew what he was interested in. He could ask me a question and I could provide an answer. The rules were he had to go to Riyadh to ask a question, and Riyadh would prioritize the questions and send them to us. We'd put some capability in the field called NMIST, National Military Intelligence Support Team. Basically, it's a couple of analysts with a communications computer, a satellite computer

dish, and the ability to move data or messages or voice back and forth. He could ask a question, I could give him the answer. And that little system was pretty useful to attempting to answer a lot of, in some cases, esoteric questions. If you were a naval commander, you'd probably be very interested in disposition of forces on the beach. If you were a ground commander, you'd probably be more interested in tanks, APCs, and artillery in the desert, their number, and their location. So we were attempting to look at the entire battlefield. Now as we progressed through this, and it became apparent we were going to go to war, the target-smart analysts that had been educated as a result of being a part of this process — they understood the order of battle, where is it, we've studied their tactics, their doctrine, their chemical warfare, their biological warfare, and on and on and on. We started to send them out there because they were needed to understand and combat Iraqi forces.

I don't want to paint the CINC and all of his staff as being unsophisticated, that's not the case. They started with a relatively unsophisticated appreciation for intelligence in my view — command and control — but they very quickly started to understand it. So as they looked up and said, "Hey, we're going to need some help out here," we started to flow people. And when the war started, he had a thousand people. Remember, I said he started with nine. He had a thousand when the war started. He had about 500 or so focused on his all-source fusion and he had about 500 or so doing targeting and imagery processing and all those sorts of things. Now, where it failed to achieve a level of maturity that we had hoped it would achieve, is to go from that organization in Riyadh to the component commanders. Let's take an example. Say this was a war involving CINCLANT or CINCPAC. There's a level of manning, sophistication and understanding already there so you wouldn't have to go through several months of start-up and learning where does the desk go, where do you put the maps up, and so on, and culturally understanding the fact that there's an operational commander out there that needs support quickly and you've got to focus on his needs.

Now I've done all the talking and I know you have got to have a question or two.

**Student:** In this little basement room that you had, did you have a pipe going into the command center at JCS or were we talking about the same animal separately?

**McConnell:** Yes, I probably need to explain to you. The command center at JCS is a room smaller than this. Now there is a command center that's big — six screens, flashing lights, and all that sort of thing. The command center where decisions are made is smaller than this. There are two rooms — one on this side, and there's a set of televisions in the middle, and one on the other side. When the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense come down for their briefings, we go to the vacant room, this room will hold maybe 10 people, and talk it over. When the crisis is evolving, at a table very similar to this, one seats the J3, in that case it's General Kelly; the other seats the J2, in this case it's me. The JIC that I mentioned was down two stories in the basement. I have, and this is information management processing, at my terminal to my right, I've got a television screen, an off-the-shelf, commercial television screen. I hit the buttons and I'm talking directly to the analyst on the maritime desk. "Where is the ship that left Aden this morning? Where is it bound?" And he would give an answer. You hit the off button, dial again, and I'm talking to AIR analyst. "When is the last time we saw ground attack aircraft fly in Iraq? He'll give me the answer." He would go off and I could dial in the ground analyst and ask, "When they dig in, did they do one up and two back, or two up and one back for fighting positions?" And he would say, "Don't know for sure, let me check and I'll get back to you." So, we had this ability to go down to the individual analyst or over to the supervisor, or over to the signals intelligence analyst, or imagery, or wherever there was something being done, and get quick answers. In addition to that, I had a series of phones that I could talk to anybody in Washington or call out to the theater to get information, share information, ask a question, provide information, or whatever. Sitting next to me was the J3 who had a similar capability to connect to all the operational channels. And every time we would go through some evolution, we'd come back and put our heads together on where we're going, what are we doing, what do we need, and so on. We had a display across the front of the room — three screens. One of them would be a map of the area and the disposition. One of them is a log. Everything that's going on around the room, somebody's typing in, and it's just scrolling on the screen. So if you were a new person to the watch environment, and you want to catch up on what's going on, you sit and read through that. And then the third screen, more often than not, would be CNN. CNN has changed not

only network news, it has changed the way we live. We would get an alert that there was a SCUD launch, we'd scramble to our positions, somebody said, "Turn on CNN," and we could watch it on television, just as it came down in Saudi.

I'll give you an example of how fast things move. We were briefing in the Pentagon, and the Iraqis (this was after the ground war started) were setting the oil wells on fire. Reuters is the news service worldwide and it's mostly, although they do lots of things, it's mostly a business support organization. They process business news. Reuters had their agent, their correspondent, not in the room but located in his cubicle and he had planted a question at the Pentagon daily news briefing. The question was, "How many oil wells have the Iraqis set on fire?" He had, "The Iraqis have set _ _ oil wells on fire and the impact will be _ _ (you fill in the blanks)." When the question was asked, and the J3 didn't know the answer, and he turned to me to answer the question. I knew the answer but it was a classified answer. So as I stepped to the podium, I was making national policy disclosure decisions in about two seconds because my instructions from the Secretary of Defense were to be honest and forth-coming with the American people. We were going to tell them what was going on. So I said, "There are currently approximately 650 oil wells on fire." By the time I said that, the Reuters agent filled in the number, pushed the button, and it went to Chicago, hit the worldwide distribution net and went out throughout the world — and the price of oil increased $2 a barrel in about five minutes. Everybody was glued to those televisions. I had people come up to me after the war and say, "I'm in shock. I'm having withdrawal symptoms. I've been focused on this for so long."

**Oettinger:** Might I add a footnote to that, because it might be useful to compare what Mike just said with some other accounts, like Harvey Sapolsky's account of the Polaris missile program, which years ago with more primitive technology showed a management style very similar to what was described here. There are people sitting around a table, and in that instance, essentially with phones or people flying in and in constant contact with one another and with people they knew. The official smokescreen for that was an elaborate analytical technique called "Program Evaluation and Review Technique" alleged to be the source of the success of Polaris. In reality, PERT had nothing to do with it except it kept fending off Congress. The reality was

very similar to what Admiral McConnell has described.

**McConnell:** When I was in the Pacific Fleet working for Admiral Jeremiah as his N2, not a J2 but an N2, which means you're a Navy intelligence guy, the USS *Blue Ridge* embarked for Shanghai, and Tiananmen Square was happening. I was watching in my office and I'd been a fan of CNN for years, but I had never appreciated the power of the media. I have since done some independent study and the U.S. public is the most well-informed body of people in the world if they choose to be so informed. I was watching what was happening in Tiananmen Square. They had cameras going up and down the streets with interviews and so on. As they were approaching Shanghai and it was keying me to what I needed to do in the event this got very ugly and Americans were threatened. What if we had to do a rescue? We went through a lot of different planning gyrations. We were focusing the collection system on all of the support that would be required for the USS *Blue Ridge*, in the event the situation turned anti-American, to be able to collect whatever information they would need to carry out that rescue mission.

I want to talk about Goldwater-Nichols and I want to talk about warning.

**Student:** Admiral, before you do that. There are two things that might be interesting. First of all, a little definition of all-source fusion? And the second might be, "Who are the people who do that for you?" Who are the people who are actually sending the messages? This is truly an important aspect of this culture that the admiral was talking about because of the seniority.

**McConnell:** That's a good point. If I ask you what all source fusion is, I'm sure you've all got some idea. You could write out a definition. When I say, "all source fusion," the example I was giving you earlier about attempting to understand everything that is going on in a port so you could make some value judgments on who's coming to sea, and where he might be going, and what he might be doing. You are looking at every potential source of information that could give you some insight. Who is the captain? How old is he? Where did he go to school? Does he like to turn left or turn right? How big is the crew? Is the crew full up or half-trained or not well-trained or whatever? — might give you some clue if you are taking every potential source of information and focusing it on a need. The need in this case was

to advise some ASW commander what to expect in his assigned mission to go observe, engage, or whatever the mission might be. Many people will say "all source fusion" but I have found that very few people truly understand. It's when you focus entirely on the need of the person using the information and look at it from every context. It could be weather, it could be terrain, it could be sand, it could be enemy, it could be how far the gun shoots, it could be how long it takes to go from A to B. You're just looking at it in total context as the ultimate user of the "fused" intelligence.

**Oettinger:** A quick underscore as to why this is not platitudinous, what you're hearing. The ordinary way is to look at these things from the point of view of a provider but what I hear Admiral McConnell saying is that the attention here is all from the point of view of the customer or the user and what he/she needs and any place where it might come from, as opposed to the usual point of view, which is that of the supplier.

**McConnell:** Take news, for example. The U.S. Government cannot afford all the news organizations in the world. It's very costly and it's worldwide so why shouldn't I use public news as a source? And I'll tell you that I've learned, with some level of sophistication, whom I can trust and whom I can't. A lot of news organizations are not trustworthy. A lot of them are very trustworthy. So you learn to use it as a source just like I would use any other source of information. I mentioned a cultural aspect of it. One of the other things that has helped me do that is as a Navy intelligence officer, I don't own anything; all I have is my integrity. I don't own a sensor, I don't own anything in the SIGINT world or imagery world and so on, I just use it all, therefore it gives me the ability to make value judgments on it. And I don't get penalized for making those value judgments.

Green door — the person who probably did the most for a green door removal that I know — is Admiral Inman. I'd be surprised if you find naval officers that would complain about the green door. The other role naval intel officers have been given, over the years, is to stand with a foot in the all-source, highly classified world, and a foot in the real world and we bridge that gap fairly comfortably. When I had to go from briefing the Secretary of Defense at a classified level to briefing the public, that was a little traumatic the first time around, I must admit. Quite frankly, I was terrified. But I was comfortable with it after one or two times because it

was just like going from the highly compartmented all-source center to brief the operators. So it wasn't really that bad.

Many people think that we flunked in the warning of this particular crisis. I want to set the scene for you. Remember I told you about unified-specified commanders? Unified, think about CINCCENT, its mission and life, its reason for being, was a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf. I hope you noticed and paid attention that the Soviet Union is changing so this terrible organization called DIA started writing assessments saying, "Soviet threat's receding. It's going away." The way the CINCs divide up the world is on the unified command plan (UCP). Remember I mentioned 10 U and S commanders? Some of them own real estate. They are very, very protective of that real estate. Occasionally, with budgets receding, you review the UCP, potentially reducing the number of CINCs. So here's a CINC, owns no forces, owns lots of real estate, the threat is the Soviet threat through Iran to take a warm water port in the Gulf and it's a receding threat. DIA wrote that down and sent it to CINCCENT. CINC said, "You're doing a disservice to your country. Take your information and your people and get out of my command. Well, we went away and we started writing about instability in the Gulf. We noticed this big war between Iran and Iraq had been going on for eight years. A lot of people died in that war — half a million. The war was over and Iraq kept building this military machine that was getting bigger, bigger, bigger. At one time, it had 70 divisions. The United States Army had, at its greatest size since World War II, 28. But 70 divisions! One analyst said, "You know, this is crazy. He can't afford this." Another analyst said, "You know, if he can't afford this, he's probably going to have to do something like get support/money from somewhere else. What about Kuwait? Yeah! He might invade Kuwait to get money to afford this big military machine." So we wrote that down and sent it down to CINCCENT. CINCCENT got the paper and invited us back. That happened in the fall of '89. In January of '90, CINCCENT did a war game. The war game was Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Now is that warning? I think it is. If the intel guys were able to focus on a potentially unstable situation, and cause the CINC to do a war game to practice war on something he's going to fight six months later, in my view that's warning. He did a war game in January. He did a war game in April. He did a war game in July, and he did a war in August.

**Oettinger:** You know, I don't believe we've ever had in this seminar a better vignette of a couple of things. One is integrity, and the other is debates about politicization of intelligence, meaning they're usually when you see them in the papers, sort of dealt with in terms of presidential elections or one thing or another, but this day by day kind of having integrity within the bureaucratic "normal" "environment" is the much more likely one for anybody in their career to encounter on a . . . if not on a daily basis, then some time in their career, unlike you know, the high politics. So I'm very grateful to you for this particular vignette.

**McConnell:** The first time I went in to see a Chairman to tell him there was a threat, he threw me out. I wasn't very effective. I didn't have my act together. I went down, did a little research, thought about it a lot more and went back in and said, "Sir, think on it." He threw me out. The third time he threw me out I said, "Maybe I've lost my touch. Maybe I just don't understand. Maybe, I'm a maritime guy, I don't understand these ground guys. I've got to go back in again." So the fourth time he said, "Sit down." So I sat down. This was a four-star general and I was a captain at the time, an 06; I had been selected for Flag but then wasn't wearing it. I laid out my scenario. He said, "Do you believe that?" and I said, "Yes sir, I do." He said, "All right, now tell me what's fact, tell me what you don't know, and tell me what you think." And I haven't forgotten that. You always tell them what you know and you try to make sure you tell them what you don't know. Then you say, "Now I'll tell you what I think but I can't prove." The Chairman and I were communicating then. He accepted that I was a reasonable professional who warranted some of his time because he's a pretty busy guy, and so it worked out pretty well from then. I learned so much from watching this process.

There's a thing in Defense Intelligence called "WIMS." It's a warning system, I don't remember exactly what it is. I'm not very good at acronyms. But there are two intel professionals in this room and I'd be surprised if the other one knows what the WIMS acronym means and I'd be surprised if he's ever read or paid attention to a WIMS message. Is that true?

**Student:** You'd be wrong.

**McConnell:** You do know? He is an exception. WIMS was created by SAC. Its purpose was nuclear strike warning for the United States — it was important — I'm not trying to demean it in any way

— but it had become so big, so complex, that it was irrelevant. What would happen is analysts would argue back and forth in a very esoteric way about the significance of splitting hairs and no one, attempting to digest it, could really understand what was going on so it wasn't a relevant product to a wide body of consumers. There were few who used it and focused on it — usually those who were very interested in that specific subject. It occurred to me in this process that the DIA, which is responsible for warning, has a watch-con system that goes from five to one. One is highest. When you go to one, you mean, "Hey, something bad is going to happen!" It's kind of like DEFCONs, Defense Conditions. At Defense Condition five, you're at peace. If you go to Defense Condition one, you're ready to go to war. So, it's an analogy.

The DIA had not been to watch-con one in its 30-year history. It sounds to me like they flunked since we had a few serious things happen — the '73 war, the Yom Kippur War, India and Pakistan going to war, the Soviets invading Afghanistan. Lots of things happened. My observation was 1) this system is too complex, nobody understands it; and 2) we've got to be willing to take some risks. We've got to encourage these young analysts who are doing this work to take some risks and be willing to accept an occasional miscall. So here are the rules. If we have a situation in any country in the world, or something happens that is inimical to the interests of the United States — Americans are killed, embassies bombed — and we are not at watch-con one, then you flunk. If you go to watch-con one and nothing happens in a week, you flunk. Pretty tight rules! And that says that your success rate has got to be about 70 percent. When the invasion of Iraq into Kuwait happened, we were at watch-con one — the first time in history. Whether it was a stroke of luck, a good analytical call, the right conditions, who knows, but we did it. And so growing out of that, I said, "All right, we're going to change the system. We want to make it meaningful to the decision-maker. For example, "Something bad is going to happen in Pakistan. The Indians are going to attack the border. The Pakistanis are going to react and they potentially would use weapons of mass destruction and it's going to happen in two days." That would be a pretty straightforward unambiguous warning. That's the objective. You do it with watch-cons. You have watch-cons bubbling all over the world where there is something that could happen. So far we've been pretty good. We called Yugoslavia. We called Zaire. We called Haiti. We called Somalia. So far, so

good. The troops know their subject, they're focused on it and they're willing to take some risk because if they call it wrong, I give them a hug and say, "Don't do it again. Just pay attention and work the problem."

**Student:** Are you also watching Armenia?

**McConnell:** Yes, you name the place. We own the world. I used to have this situation where I would go to a command somewhere in the Mediterranean and I would worry about the Mediterranean. When I went to the Indian Ocean, I would worry about that. And now I've got a job where it's the world. If it happens, and it's going to impact the U.S. in any way, then we're focused on it. We've got some analysts looking at it and it can be one guy, or two, or six or 300, and our effort will grow, expand, or contract depending on the needs regarding that particular situation.

**McLaughlin:** For those interested in this subject, a past speaker, Dave McManis, has spoken on it a few times, including phone wires, national intelligence officer for warning, and how much warning is possible. Much of his message is the same, that you cannot be afraid to warn. You can't be punished for warning.

**Oettinger:** But you can't be wrong too often because if you cry "wolf" too often nobody will pay any attention to you. So there's an inherent tension.

**McConnell:** You have to have some discipline, but warning as a function is a different discipline than doing intelligence analysis. Intelligence analysts, by nature, are conservative. I've learned that over the years. The only thing they have is integrity and you don't want to be wrong because if you're wrong, then that's the only thing you had. So analysts are, by nature, very conservative. You make a call that you generally are very convinced that you're making it the right way. The warning analyst gets paid to talk about the possibilities for a situation that's going to be harmful. So we, in our little world, have the analysts do the day-to-day business. We take people out of the analytical shops and make them "warners" and then they will focus on providing potential outcomes and implications in various world situations.

**Oettinger:** It's like the difference in some respects between a market analyst who worries about general economic trends and so forth and the kind of broker who says, "Buy or sell." It's two different kinds of mental outlook and two different kinds of rewards.

**McConnell:** One of the problems with our system is it's a Defense system. Defense means DIA and the CINC — the U and S commanders, which I mentioned earlier. My view is the entire community should participate. Let's say a fight is potentially going to break out between the Russians and the Ukrainians. That could be a problem for us because nuclear weapons are potentially involved, so I do a little arrow. The arrow goes from five to one. One is something bad is going to happen now; five is peace. So I will establish a warning problem and I'll put my check in block number three. What I want to see is CIA's check, NSA's check, I want the State Department's check, I want CINC EUCOM's check, and I want CINCPAC's check, and I want CINCCENT's check. I'll know where all of those guys stand analytically, in a warning sense, on this particular problem. Right now that doesn't happen. We're going to make it happen. We're going to change that.

**Oettinger:** This is a perennial and very difficult problem. It's at the heart of some of the ongoing and currently high peak debate on whether the role of a director of Central Intelligence or National Intelligence, somebody who pulls all of these threads together. It has been suggested that the National Security Counsel staff or somebody in the White House staff should be doing it with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and so on. And I think one of the reasons it is such a perennial argument is that if you center this in somebody who owns something, they will tend to look at it from the point of view of their own discipline or their own responsibility or whatever, and they won't do it from the point of view of the customer. If you put it close to the customer, then the customer or his immediate staff won't know anything, and they have to rely on all of these folks so then their tendency is pretty quickly to try to know something and then you grow your own staff and you start being in competition with all of the folks who are the suppliers. And as a consequence, over the years that I've watched this, nobody has ever been very happy with whatever the compromise of the moment has been and my guess is that whatever happens with this current spate of legislation, it's likely to push it a little more toward a central netter-outer because of the dissatisfaction with the absence of netting-out, but the minute that happens, then people will start saying, "Well, this, wherever it is, is trying to preserve the functions of the individual suppliers and all the climb will start to blow it up again."

**McConnell:** The approach I'm trying to take is to overcome that. My interest is the customer. My customer is a national decision-maker or a potential CINC and I want to tell him that something bad is going to happen. He's a busy man. I don't need to get esoteric with him, but I need to tell him, "Sir, something bad is going to happen in Yugoslavia. There's going to be a war and there are Americans there who are going to be at risk." I want to tell him in those kind of terms. So I visited the CIA and State, and NSA, and I said, "Look, I don't want to influence your process. I just want to know your judgment now, and I'm also doing this with the CINCs."

Now the way this is starting to work is we've learned a lesson from CNN. CNN has changed network news. You want to know what's going on in the world, you can find out in 13 minutes on the hour and the half-hour. If it's important, it will make the news. They generally keep you well-informed. Now you need to go read the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* to find out a lot of the nitty-gritty details, but headlines are there and available for you. We have started a program called JWICS, Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. What is it? It's a top secret CNN. If you saw the front page of the *Washington Post* yesterday, it was described in pretty good detail. Now, why am I telling you about this? Why have I saved JWICS to the end? If my warning system's going to work, I've got to move CNN-like service to customers — get rid of the green door, get it on the desk of people. And I say, "I've got a news flash for you. There's a problem in Yugoslavia. We're going to show you where the community stands on this issue. Here's my arrow — Yugoslavia crisis." And everybody votes and shows you where they stand. Now when that starts showing up in the White House, and it will, then the keepers of scores at CIA and NSA and State and the U and S commanders are going to start paying attention to the warning because the Chairman is going to look at this; so they're going to pay attention.

I want to expand on JWICS just a little bit. JWICS is a system that's centered in the Pentagon. It is analogous to Atlanta for CNN. There are affiliates, they pass things in and we do tape shows and so on. We have a live announcer. He talks to the camera. You've got a Teleprompter just like they do at CNN. I went down and visited CNN. We have taped segments and we introduce the show at the top of the hour and the half-hour and say, "Now, we're going to have a review of the situation in Yugosla-

via or Azerbaijan and Armenia or the current negotiations in the Baltics with the withdrawal of the Russian troops, or we're going to review a Blackjack airplane, or we're going to talk about a missile, or the India-Pakistan situation — whatever it happens to be. And we'll have a taped segment. We can break in with live reports when there's an evolving event. Now, here's the difference: 1) it's classified at the Top Secret level; 2) it is interactive — if you were a customer, you can say, "Stop! I need to know more about such and such," and the guy at the other end will say, "Yes sir, what was your question again? I'll get that for you." It's a television that you can talk back to. Now the second part of it is if I've got this nifty bit of intelligence at the national level, whatever it is, I could put it on my screen and the user could push a button and it prints out on his end. Now let's think that through a little bit. If we've got a situation in the Gulf war and I've got downtown Baghdad, which we studied in great detail, and I've sorted out all the key command and control nodes, and we want to take away their communications capability, we could instantly provide the information to the operational user. If I've got a map and photographs, I say to Riyadh, "Stand by Riyadh, here it comes," and I transmit it to them. And Riyadh receives it and they say, "Hmm, we need to divide up the tasking areas. Let's give it to the ACC, Air Component Commander. You decide how we're going to divide, how we're going to bomb this thing." The Air Component Commander does an ATO, Air Tasking Order, and he decides who will arrive at what time, who will approach from what direction, what kind of bombs, and the Air Force will do these targets, and the Navy will do these, and Recon will do these, and so on. He makes the plan. He sends it out to those users. So the integration of the effort is to move information in the system between U and S commanders and the Pentagon and then the U and S commanders can use secondary systems to move it to, potentially, not only battle groups and frigates, but tanks and foxholes.

**Student:** Where do they integrate the operational and the tactical information . . . not back in Washington?

**McConnell:** No. Intelligence is a function of command. An intelligence officer has to earn his seat at the table. He demands a right to be at the table because if military decisions are going to be made to engage, people may die unnecessarily, objectives may not be achieved without the intelli-

gence officer's input. He is a professional, he has studied the target. One way to think about an intelligence officer is he's the J3 for the other side. So you earn your right to sit at that table and what you will find, or what I have found in my career, naval operators don't go to a decision table without getting their intel officer. You are expected to be there. Your input is sought and you are a member of the decision-making process. That's what I mean by intelligence is a function of command. You have to be close to the decision-maker. And that's why I just got the question from Captain Perras about integration of the information. There is tactical information. You can't get that in Washington. You get that from local tactical situations. His nervousness was, "My God, he's going to try to do it all in Washington." Not at all. I want to do what I can in Washington and give it to the next level and then they will do whatever integration is required.

**Student:** Who is developing this information for JWICS? I mean, who in DIA is getting together the forecasts?

**McConnell:** I'll tell you the story of how this happened. Some of us in the system were so impressed by CNN, how it was so dramatically changing the way we access news, that the idea started in about 1985. It was actually started by a gent who is currently a flag officer in the Navy, Rear Admiral Ted Sheafer. He was the J2 for CINCLANT. We saw some technology demonstrated which was a telephone with a TV built into it. You called somebody and you'd look at them and if you wanted to send them a map or a picture you would just press a button and boom, it would print. So he decided that he wanted to integrate that into his office network so he could talk to people. Then the idea was "Gee, wouldn't it be nice if we could do this from command to command. If I need to talk to the Navy in Washington or whatever." So it started as an idea in about '85, it got formalized as a program in '87, and it languished, and it languished. Have you ever tried to convince somebody that you got a new and better idea? I kept making the CNN analogy at my attempt to sell this and it just wasn't getting through.

I just could not convince the decision-maker with money that this was something he wanted to invest in. Quite frankly I was having difficulty understanding because it was so apparent to me. So the war started and I had five lieutenants — smart, good, bright, cheery-eyed young sailors and airmen and I said, "Hey, guys, I want you to make some tapes of the war, what's going on, and we're going to hook it

up to a television and tell people what's going on in the war, rather than have a situation where they've got to come to a briefing." It took them 12 hours to make the first four-minute tape. But they were bright-eyed and bushy-tailed; and they bought a couple of cameras and a tape recorder and they kluged it together and it looked like a Rube Goldberg. We had a little room about this size, we built a studio, they got all excited and built the props. They were trying to do the news reading from a piece of paper and it drove the viewer nuts; you started counting how many times a head bops up and down. So we said, "We've got to have a Teleprompter, make it look professional." They said, "We can't afford it, it costs $8,000," and I said, "Go buy one!" "Where are we going to get the money?" I said, "I don't know, just buy it and we'll figure that out later." So we did. And so we started. And all of a sudden, people noticed, "Oh, if I buy a TV, can I hook it into your system?" And we said, "Sure." And, boom! Now Congress is throwing money at us saying, "go faster, go faster." We started out with a plan to wire up the U and S commands and we will wire up 90 subscribers in the next 18 months. During the Gulf war, we had a man in DIAC (Defense Intelligence Analysis Center) who started working the chemical warfare problem in 1952. He knew a lot about it. So my view was why not just put him in front of the camera and let him talk to the user about what the user might need to know. We worked a lot of questions about how big, how wide, how to attack, how to defend, what kind of antibodies you need, and all those kinds of things. Right here today we're practicing communications. I look at you, you look at me, if you look interested or you have a question, I'll answer it . . . we've just taken that and put it in a different format and called it television. So now I can broadcast the news, I can talk to listeners two-way, face-to-face.

The second part of it is what we call electronic publishing. I can send an intelligence publication in about five seconds. The user can receive it electronically and let's suppose he is most interested in what's on page 101, section 8. It's very easy in electronic publishing to just move it up and make it page one. So now he has reformatted the national intelligence product and added information of his own, so he can print it, and deliver it to his boss. His boss is accustomed to reading the morning newspaper, he's now got it tailored to his need. Another part of the system is the ability to ask questions like, "How long is the runway? How wide is the runway? Can it accommodate three C-5s loaded with tanks or

bullets or beans, or whatever, from Transportation Command?" He can come into my database and ask those questions and get the answers. So now I've got four functions: I can broadcast news; I can interact with you via video teleconferencing; I can deliver a publication to you or I can receive a publication from you; and we can query each other's databases.

**Oettinger:** A couple of footnotes if I may. Going back to Wayne's question about where the tactical stuff gets fused with the national and so on. My inclination is to take the answer more as a matter of where is it controlled from than geographic locale because there are a lot of things to be said for the locale being someplace else; for example, one of the things that comes to mind in describing this facility to produce a printed document at a distance fairly easily means you don't have to store them and if you get captured, if you are the U.S. embassy in Tehran or a forward command post or something, there isn't as much for the Iranians to get and piece back together again if it isn't all in one location. So that whether your job is done geographically here or someplace else, strikes me as, you know, less critical . . .

**Student:** We may have a problem with the definition of what tactical and operational is as opposed to that.

**McConnell:** There are two comments that I will make and then we'll see what Captain Perras was going to make. First is that intelligence is a function of command. You can't be at the table unless you're there. The second point I would make is when tactical things collect — an airplane, a person, a van, a truck — you go out and collect that information. It has to come to somewhere for fusion to take place. Remember when I discussed all source fusion? In our current environment, the philosophy is not to send all the information back to Washington.

Let me tell you a quick story. You saw in the newspaper the feud over battle damage assessment during Desert Storm. The issue was with national, technical means, we could sense the battlefield. We could make some judgments. The weather at this time was such that we could see the ground less than half the time. Our systems are not all-seeing, all-knowing. We couldn't see all the ground all the time. As a matter of fact, we had a very limited capability. So what we could do from the national level was somewhat limited. At the tactical level, or command level in Riyadh, they had U2s, a high-

flying airplane; it sees a long way. You go out and take pictures, and we had something called JSTARS (Joint Strategic Target and Radar System), a big airplane flies and uses radar to look at the battlefield. The picture I'm attempting to paint for you is that there are a lot of things going over that battlefield. All the information came back to CINCCENT in Riyadh. CINCCENT was the organization to do battle-damage assessment — how many tanks, how many artillery pieces, and how many armored personnel carriers — APCs — were out there. First question. Once you've answered all that, then how many have I killed? How many are dead? So the debate became — "How many have been killed?" Why do you care? If you're going to commit to a ground war, you're going to make the decision to do the ground war at a time when you don't lose people. So a big decision was "should there be a ground war and when are you going to do it?" One of the agencies in Washington chose to publish "CINCCENT says the number of tanks that are killed is (I'll pick a number) 1200. We could only confirm 300." Now by implication he said, "CINCCENT is misinformed, misleading, whatever." This came at a time when they were going to make the decision on the ground war and from General Schwartzkopf's perspective, the national community let him down in his hour of need and he was angry. When you saw the headlines, "Failure of Intelligence," that was the issue. "When I needed them most, they turned their backs on me." So the reason I drag you through that point is intelligence is a function of command. The commander had and must have the best information. Our system was designed so that everything we had was provided to him. The system is not designed that anything he has, he provides back up to us. Should it be changed? You all probably could address that better than I. CINCs are very reluctant to give that information up. Should it be changed? You can argue it both ways, but right now, today, our system is designed to support the CINC. He had the best picture. He made the recommendation for the ground war. It took four days and we lost 148 people in all the combat of Desert Storm. We don't know the number of casualties on the Iraqi side. They started with a force of 4,280 tanks and we destroyed about 3,800 of them and 90 percent of their artillery, and about 50 percent of the APCs.

**Oettinger:** The last word hasn't been said on that set of arguments. John?

**McLaughlin:** Yes, I can't resist. As a footnote to the JWICS, and going back a number of years when

Richard Beal was here from the National Security Council and the fact that in those days there was a different kind of perception but with a president who liked getting information television style so the way to do a national security briefing was like a 10-minute news program each day, and hours of video preparation went into it as it would for any good video production, but the fact that he always convinced you could burst so much information in 10 minutes if you used high-style video techniques.

**McConnell:** A picture is worth a thousand words.

**McLaughlin:** That's right. And so I think that's probably totally unconnected, but an interesting precedent.

**McConnell:** The security clearance of JWICS might consist of a retina scan or something that identifies the user, and it's a very closed circle — the President, the Vice President, National Security, and so on. It goes out six or seven days a week to a very select audience in town. He wants to deliver it that way. So he's looking at that. I have invited State, NSA, and CIA to connect to JWICS so I can give them what I have and ask them questions.

**Oettinger:** One additional footnote before I let you go, on this matter of innovation that you raised with regard to the ripeness of this video-seeing thing and Ted Sheafer's antecedents and so on. There is in the course bibliography an account by Elting Morrison of the invention and eventual adoption by the U.S. Navy of a self-leveling gunsight, which is an admirable account of the kind of technico-political evolution of an idea to the time of its adoption, which, as a parallel to the history of this video thing, would make a wonderful comparative study. But in any case, you ought to read the Elting Morrison piece because it reads very true even though it's almost 100 years old now as kind of a background for the innovation process of large organizations.

**McConnell:** I've been doing all the work. You guys haven't asked me enough questions. Sir?

**Student:** Admiral, at the beginning you described that your chief customer in your present job is the Chairman. My question has to do with the responsibility of people at one level providing intelligence for people at lower levels. How automatic is it that the information that you give to the Chairman about an area — let's say, Yugoslavia — how automatic is it that that information goes to the CINC?

**McConnell:** All of it should and most of it does. The service that I provide the Chairman is face-to-face. Generally, I mentioned to you that I rarely get there with news. What we produce, that he receives, also goes to the CINCs. Now JWICS will let me do that faster and better with color graphics and so on. The way the system works, we start a relatively early day. I get in around 5:30 or 5:45 to read. I'm a reader. I don't do as well on JWICS. I like to read what I'm going to be involved with. At 6:15, JWICS comes on, "Good morning, this is Defense Intelligence news with what's going on," and will talk about whatever the current issues are. It usually lasts about 20 to 30 minutes. And they will go through what's happened in the previous 24 hours. At 6:45, I go up to a little briefing room that we have and the watch that's been on the night before, or any special watch team for a given crisis, comes in and now we broadcast that briefing to me over the network to all the JWICS subscribers. So now if you're a U and S commander out there, you get to see what the J2 and the Joint Staff are asking questions about. It gives you insight about what the Joint Staff is worried about. I'm getting prepared to go see the Chairman at 7:30. So while I'm sitting there, I've read for a little bit, I've watched the news and now I'm asking questions. If I'm out there, let's say I'm CINCSOC, what's his mission in life — crisis, special OPS, something threatening is going on, got to get ready for an embassy rescue or whatever — so he knows exactly what I'm zeroing in on. He gets a handle on the problem. The briefers will talk about whatever it is — maps and charts and so on — and that's being broadcast. We do not yet have the ability to have them come in with a question or make a point but we will . . . that's coming. We'll give it to them.

**Student:** Any terminals going afloat?

**McConnell:** The one that I mentioned, the tactical terminal. It's called JDISS — Joint Deployable Information Support System or something like that. And we just had one on a frigate? We had one in the embassy. We had one afloat. We had one with a joint task force commander in GITMO — Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. And we had one at Camp LeJeune for the augmentation forces. We had one in Norfolk and we had one in the Pentagon. This set was working the crisis in Haiti.

**Student:** What did you have, T1 lines for that or . . . ?

**McConnell:** No. We had an INMARSAT channel — a little slower. It did not have full motion video but it had voice and images and maps and charts.

**Student:** Did you pay the INMARSAT bill?

**Student:** At $10 a minute? Come on!

**McConnell:** In my view that is very cheap when it comes to execution and in our situation there, we were concerned that we would have to do a rescue. So you'd know and understand the mission — a coup in Haiti — let me play this out for you. We saw that something was about to happen. We started our watch-con warning routine. We went to watch-con one and the reason is that there were a lot of Americans there and we knew what was going to potentially happen so we told the chairman, "Mr. Chairman, something bad is going to happen," and it did. The big worry was that Americans were there and we'd have to get them out. So we went through this big planning episode. Where would we land? How high are the telephone poles? Where are the guns? How many guns did they have? How long does it take to get from point A to point B? All those kinds of questions have to be asked when you're working a crisis like this. How many Americans, and what are you going to load them on, are there special medical considerations, and so on. So this connectivity to the embassy and to all the task force commanders put us all on the same sheet of music. We could all talk to each other. It worked out very well.

**Student:** I'm just curious — what do you see as the effect this has had on your J3 and many of the others — J3, J4 and — J5s, is J5 plans or . . . ?

**McConnell:** Five is plans, right.

**Student:** Have those people started looking toward you now for the key to what's going on?

**McConnell:** We were discussing this earlier at a somewhat humorous level. In a big staff, J5 is the world plan — the policy thinkers — they think about if they're always doing things and then when something starts, somebody uses the analogy, "If they wait by the phone to be called, then they're never called," because when the action starts, J3 does it. When we go to crisis, J3 sits here and J2 sits here side by side. So we are bosom buddies. I see

them every day, we talk every day, we wave our arms, we get excited, we're doing things. Remember the division in DIA. I've got the current problem; across the river's got the deep esoteric longer range mission. J5, for the most part, draws from across the river — what are the long-range implications of this, what's the likelihood that we're going to have problems in the START Treaty verification process, or the nuclear weapons — it's sort of in the future. So they do a lot of business with each other. When it comes to now, that's the business I'm in. So that's generally how it works. I am closest to the J3. I provide a service for the Chairman and the vice, and the director of Joint Staff that's maybe a little unfamiliar to you all but we've got somebody in charge. The Vice Chairman is the deputy to the Chairman. On the Joint Staff there's a director of the Joint Staff. He's like the chief of staff. And there's J1, personnel; J2 is intel; J3 is ops; J4 is logistics; J5 is plans; J6 is communications, and it goes on to J7, J8. Director of the Joint Staff runs the total staff for the Chairman and the Vice Chairman.

**Student:** As a result of this, any changes that you've seen, are there different staff relations now? Is J3 looking at you in a different light since Desert Storm?

**McConnell:** Remember that I mentioned that we had an advantage because of the way the Navy does business and the J2 seat in the Joint Staff has been occupied by a naval flag officer for 10 years. The reason the command center is a small room with a two-mirror image — one for briefing the principals and the other one for working a crisis and you sit side by side — is in large part because of the consistent insistence on the part of the Navy guys that we ought to make sure we're sitting side by side. I'll deliver my stuff and you get your stuff. I'll make sure you know everything you need to know. The mindset is what do you need? I will deliver whatever the system can generate — and tailor it for the user.

**Oettinger:** We thank you!