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The Evolution of Special Operations Forces
Earl F. Lockwood

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The Evolution of Special Operations Forces

Earl F. Lockwood

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Oettinger: Our first speaker today needs no introduction to those of you who have done your homework and read his biography. He is Earl Lockwood, and we're delighted to have him with us. I would simply make this remark: that he is the first person who has spoken to us this semester who comes out of the private sector and is a kind of provider of things, whether it's thoughts or objects, to the kinds of folks we mentioned earlier. So in terms of a walk around different parts of the elephant, this is a rather different vantage point from the ones we heard earlier.

Lockwood: Thank you, Tony. I guess there are two mysteries. One is “Why am I here?” and the other is “Why am I talking on the subject at hand, on special operations forces (SOF) and low intensity conflict (LIC)?”, because I'm not a retired military man, nor have I ever been in government. I come from the private sector of the aerospace industry, notably MITRE for 10 years, and RCA for 8, and Betac for the last 11. But I've been associated with the military for the last 30 years, all branches of the services, and I certainly have a deep and abiding interest in the area of SOF, and what people refer to as LIC. This interest goes all the way back to World War II when I was 12 or 13 years old and a cousin of mine was invalidated back to the United States, having been wounded at Anzio with Darby’s Rangers. He told of his experiences with the Rangers, I became fascinated, and began to read all I could about what we now know as special operations.

I'm going into a little history, but first I should probably explain that the speaker following me today is General Bob Kingston. I provide the comic relief up front, and getting to him later is probably a good thing for you since our comparative knowledge of this area of special operations is as relative as our ranks. He is a four-star general; I was a private first class.

Oettinger: General Kingston happens to be with us during this session in the back of the room. Feel free, Bob, to reply to any scurrilous remarks.

Kingston: He was a private first class three times.

Lockwood: No, a corporal twice. I believe that the areas of special operations and of so-called low intensity conflict are most crucial and important to the government and the American people today. Let me say why I believe that: I do not believe that there will be a nuclear war in the next 40 years anymore than in the past 40 years, though we must maintain a strong deterrent. I do not believe there will be a conventional war in Europe, but we must maintain a strong deterrent through NATO. Indeed, we haven’t had a conventional war since World
War II. Actually, you can argue that if you wish — that Korea was one, Vietnam was one, but I'd say they were not. But as sure as we're all sitting here, well into the 21st century we will be having these so-called exchanges in the low intensity conflict arena. Such goes on every day. It's been going on since World War II. It is also my belief at this time that we are not well prepared to deal with those two items. And there's a lot of work that needs to be done.

I'm going to talk first about special ops, leading into low intensity conflict. It's my view that special ops is not a new thing. It's been around all the way back to Joshua when he sent out his first recon patrol in the form of Caleb. He came back and he said, "Well, here's the enemy's disposition, sir." Joshua thought about that and brought up his own special forces and high technology in the way of trumpets. He won the battle.

I could go on to Agamemnon and the Trojan Horse, and so forth down through history, but it was really World War II when this rather arcane form of warfare came back into play and it was the Brits who led the way. The first of what became a number of innovative British officers was Orde Wingate, who was, in many ways, a mystic. Wingate was dispatched, with a meager troop, to Ethiopia. Once there, he used what was at hand, operated behind the lines, employed elephants for transport, and successfully routed the Italians in a number of instances. Wingate's innovative approach to the Ethiopian area caught Churchill's eye. After face-to-face discussions between those two, Churchill dispatched Wingate to Burma to form another behind-the-lines force which became popularly known as the Chindits. Jack Masters' book, The Road Past Mandalay, gives a good account of those times.

Actually, Wingate used regular forces in an irregular manner; the U.S. Army did the same in Burma with Merrill's Marauders. One could question in the light of what we know today whether these units were special forces, as they held the form of fine battalions and companies supported along classic lines.

Later on, other British units came into being, such as "Popsky's Private Army"; the Jedburghs, a commando unit that several Americans served in; the Commando Units; the Long Range Desert Group; and David Stirling's Special Air Service, the famed SAS.

It is my view that David Stirling's concept for the SAS set the standard for the special operations units that exist today. David Stirling is a most remarkable man. He is the product of a distinguished Scottish family which is seated in Stirling, Scotland, in the Lowlands. Now 73 years old, Colonel Stirling retains his six-foot, five-inch stature, his twinkling eye, and his creative mind. Still active in the daily operations of his own companies, he continues to be sought out as an adviser in the special operations arena.

Colonel Stirling's concept for the SAS came to him while he was recovering from injuries sustained in a parachute jump in the North African desert. His definition of strategic operations or special operations is: "strategic operations aimed at destruction of key targets deep behind enemy lines by four-man parties with every man trained to a high degree of proficiency."

Though only a second lieutenant at the time, David Stirling was able to convince the British Commander, General Wavell, that his concept had merit and he was given leave to raise a regiment: I believe he was the last man in the British army to do so, and the last before him to have the honor did so in the middle of the nineteenth century. Within two years, David Stirling had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel, with a sizable force under his command. The successes of the SAS were legend and the value of this special operations unit could be measured by the fact that they destroyed more German and Italian planes on the ground than were destroyed by the entire Desert Air Force — and at a cost in lives, equipment, and manpower far less than that required by an air arm.

Unfortunately, Colonel Stirling has never written an autobiography. However, his exploits during the war have been recounted in a number of books. I would recommend that you read The Phantom Major, by Virginia Cowles. Though Colonel Stirling did not collaborate with the author, the book is based on well-researched material and tells the story of the founding of the SAS and its part in the Desert War quite well.

David Stirling's clarity of vision, singleness of purpose, innovative training methods, leadership and personal bravery in combat, and continued devotion to the safety and defense of the free world have served us all well. Were one to visit the SAS in its homebase of Hereford, David Stirling's original SAS concept could still be seen in today's units. Certainly refinements have been made, but the

original foundation and structure exist as before. We all owe Colonel Stirling a debt.

When the Americans came into World War II, our own special operations-oriented units came into being. Probably the first was the Filipino guerrillas, and their formation came out of necessity, not planning. Early in the war, Carlson and Edson put together Marine Raider battalions, but they were short lived. Next were Darby’s U.S. Ranger battalions and a combined U.S./Canadian Special Service unit who served with distinction in Italy. Finally, there was the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), better known as Merrill’s Marauders. All of these units were formed along regular lines of companies and battalions, but were used in an irregular manner. They were trained for special operations in particular parts of the world.

When these specially trained units were used in regular combat situations, such as the Rangers at Anzio, they usually suffered great casualties due to lack of equipment, an altered situation from what they were trained to do, and facing odds not planned for. For example, I believe the Rangers had about 100 survivors out of a battalion at Anzio.

**Kingston:** They were hit by an armored regiment.

**Lockwood:** Probably one of the more exceptional units in World War II, not because of its composition but because of its accomplishments, was “the Marauders,” or “Merrill’s Marauders,” if you prefer. There’s no need for me to repeat their exploits; that’s done in a splendid way in a book by Charlton Ogburn titled *The Marauders.* Ogburn was a communications officer with the unit and served throughout the entire Burma campaign.

A product of that particular special operational environment is Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.). General Wilson was an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon leader and later a rifle company commander at the age of 20. He was one of the very few who completed the campaign from start to finish and is mentioned throughout Charlton Ogburn’s book.

General Wilson stayed in the Army, compiling an interesting, even maverick, career pattern. He became a Foreign Area Specialist in the Army’s Russian Scholars program. His assignments included those of a diplomatic courier, several tours in the CIA, Defense Attaché in the USSR, Commander of the 5th Special Forces Group, the first CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) Director in Vietnam with the rank of Minister in the State Department, and Special Assistant to both William Colby and Vice President Bush when those two were Directors of Central Intelligence. General Wilson retired as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in June of 1977.

During his 37 years of active duty, General Wilson became one of the recognized leaders in the U.S. Army in the area of special operations. He and a few others, like General Kingston and Lieutenant General Bill Yarborough, USA (Ret.), were responsible for keeping the special operations flame alive and continuing to burn up to the present.

If you will now direct your attention to this first slide (figure 1), I will make a sweeping generalization: “Special operations are conceived and developed by the gifted amateur or the maverick regular who grows into the specialized professional.” I have named a few in Orde Wingate, David Stirling, Popsky, Carlson, Edson, Darby, and Merrill. Actually, it was not Merrill who formed the Marauders, but a gentleman named Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hunter, USA. Merrill took over after the 5307th had reached the China-Burma-India theater of operations.

**Kingston:** After Merrill had a heart attack, Hunter took over.

**Lockwood:** Let me now extend a hypothesis about how special operations come about in wartime (figure 2). Special operations seem to arise in a period of sustained conventional war because: (a) the gifted amateurs, such as David Stirling, come on the scene or (b) the maverick regulars, such as Orde Wingate or Darby, are unfettered by the times.

Combine that factor with the unlimited resources available in wartime, rapid expansion of the armed services, theaters of operation not considered in peacetime, combat situations that require innovation, and you have an environment that lends itself to the rise of special operational units. A most important factor to note is that, heretofore, the time to form, equip, and train the special ops unit has been available. That may not hold true for the future.

Traditionally, when the war is over, such as World War II, everything reverts back to normal: rapid demobilization and departure of the gifted amateur; drastic budget cuts; a resumption of regular army units trained and equipped to fight in a conventional manner, and little, if any, room for elite units. The time following World War II was no exception for the United States and other nations such as Great Britain. The Rangers were retained in a drastically curtailed form (figure 3), but the SAS was disbanded. There was little emphasis in this
Special operations units are often conceived and developed by the gifted amateur or the maverick regular who grows into the specialized professional.

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<th>Battle of Jericho:</th>
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<td>French and Indian War:</td>
<td>Major Robert Rogers; &quot;Rogers Rangers&quot;</td>
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<td>Revolutionary War:</td>
<td>Mad Anthony Wayne; Francis Marion</td>
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<td>Long Range Desert Group</td>
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Figure 1. SOF History

During major and/or extended combat periods (war), special operations forces are acceptable and supported:

- Lots of resources and money
- Injection of new blood, new thinking
- Lots of opportunities and unique situations

Following a major war and into peace, SOF units are disbanded, scorned, shunned, ignored:

- Rapid demobilization for all armed forces
- Euphoria of peace
- Extreme reduction in funding for all
- Absence of threat
- Regrouping and reassessment by military
- A return to classic thinking and planning
- A more rigid adherence to classic combat arms and career goals

Figure 2. SOF Hypothesis
• Very little use of SOF units in Korea, even Rangers
• US emphasis on strategic resources vis-à-vis USSR
• Episodic revival: Rangers – SF stirrings
• The Uncertain Trumpet – JFK – Green Berets
• Vietnam
  – SOG
  – ‘A’ Teams
  – Son Tay
  – Mike Force
• Another "Down Dip"

Meanwhile:

• British SAS: Malaysia, Yemen, Rhodesia, Aden
• Israeli Defense Forces special units
• Spetsnaz

Special operations forces rise as the need becomes apparent or becomes clearly understood or an aperture opens.

Figure 3. The United States Since World War II

period of peace on special ops of any kind by anyone. During the Korean War, special ops played but a small part. There were a few Ranger units and some CIA units that operated behind the lines using American-led South Korean combatants. One such unit was commanded by then-Lieutenant Bob Kingston.

Following Korea, the U.S. emphasis was on strategic deterrence during the Eisenhower years. With the nuclear buildup, conventional warfare and, thus, the U.S. Army received less attention. Special operations forces suffered accordingly. This period is well described in a book by Colonel Aaron Bank, USA (Ret.), titled From OSS to Green Beret. An important figure in special ops in this time period was Lieutenant General Bill Yarborough, USA, and another important event was the resurrection of the SAS in the British Army due to the situation in Malaysia.

In the late 1950s, General Maxwell Taylor, then retired, wrote The Uncertain Trumpet, which pointed out the need for conventional forces in the not too distant future. This book caught the attention of John F. Kennedy. Following Kennedy’s election, he made a trip to Fort Bragg and presented a symbolic Green Beret to then-Colonel Bill Yarborough heralding a rebirth, if you will, of U.S. special forces. Is that correct, General Kingston?

Oetinger: I cannot resist, in the context of the John F. Kennedy School of Government and later developments in this institution, pointing out that the green beret, as a symbol itself, was designed by Jacqueline Kennedy. At least she seemed to take credit for it, and it has been repeated around here.

Kingston: It’s a foreign headgear and initially they wore it illegally. After the Green Berets were formed John Kennedy presented it because it was foreign and they were formed from foreigners and trained foreigners to fight.

Lockwood: It was also during this time period that the United States developed an exchange program with the Brits. For example, Bob Kingston served with the British 5th Para Regiment as a major. Also, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, then a captain, was an exchange officer with the 22nd SAS, as were several U.S. Army enlisted specialists such as Master Sergeant Dick Meadows of Son Tay fame.

Oetinger: Going back to your grand generalization about special operations and the mavericks and so on, somewhere I hope you will address the question of whether that’s an accident, and the extent to
which you can plan the special work for reacting to unusual situations. The impression you left me with was that it was kind of inevitable, but I don’t think that’s what you’re leading to. Maybe you can address that more explicitly now.

**Lockwood:** I’m not sure I understood the question. Try me again.

**Oettinger:** You said historically that special forces have always arisen during major conflicts in the instigation of, or aided and abetted by, maverick types or gifted amateurs. What wasn’t clear from that statement was whether it was simply an observation — that’s the historical fact, or whether it is kind of an inevitable condition under the widest observable range of human conditions and organizational inventiveness.

**Lockwood:** First, I would have to say that it’s an observation because I’m certainly not an expert, but given enough time in a wartime situation, special forces are an inevitable happening. Their value is recognized in certain situations and they are supported. Again, the main issue is that we may not have the time in today’s world to let special forces emerge and must prepare and train in peacetime rather than waiting. We can’t afford to wait for a David Stirling or a Wingate to come along.

**Oettinger:** But, if that’s the case, then might it not be a contradiction in terms to talk about special operations forces as a regular, rigid thing? And if the answer is no, then I hope that between you and General Kingston, somewhere between now and six o’clock, you would lay out for us what you believe to be the necessary conditions for creating and maintaining such things under conditions other than the historical ones you describe. I think that’s the gist of my question.

**Lockwood:** Maybe I’ll get there. I’m going to try to.

**Kingston:** They have tried to institutionalize this. The Army has formed a separate branch for special forces. I was probably the only single, senior officer requested who said, “Don’t do it. It’s a stupid thing to do.” SAS has NCOs staying as long as they are physically able to perform. The officers come in for two or three years and then go back to the regulars. Special forces were formed initially for guerrilla warfare, to support the conventional theater command in a real-warfare fight. The Defense Department has now institutionalized the new command which I’m going to speak to later. There again, you’ve got the people who are going in the special forces in the Army, the Air Force has the 23rd Air Force, and that pyramid for promotion is going to be very, very tight. People who are outstanding in special forces will retire as captains and maybe as lieutenant colonels. If they stayed in infantry, they’d be general officers, but there’s no place to put them. They blocked themselves by trying to institutionalize special operations.

**Oettinger:** But if you don’t institutionalize, then you are consigning it to the historical fate that you have described. How do you balance that?

**Lockwood:** Being one of the listeners over the years to the real participants and not being in the military or hardly of it, I sort of sit and ponder on these things while they’re talking. They know what they’re doing. I would agree with General Kingston that forming a special operations branch doesn’t make a hell of a lot of sense. We don’t seem to use a proven pattern over here that others have found successful, and I point to the British SAS as an example. They do it the right way and they keep the enlisted ranks there forever. Occasionally they will commission an officer from the ranks and he will stay with the regiment but he, too, will then go out and be assigned occasionally somewhere else. Then they rotate their officers from the regular Army through there. That has worked very successfully.

David Stirling’s thesis on the four-man unit, the tightness of the entire regiment, even how the families conduct themselves, is a tried and proven way. We didn’t pick that up. Charlie Beckwith, when he was charged with building Delta — and I get this from reading his book, *Delta Force* — wanted to institute what the Brits did with the SAS to form our own unit, that they referred to, at least in that book, as the Delta Force.

But there is another way: if you look at the Israeli Defense Force, they have very, very successful special operational units, yet they have no special operations command or organization so defined. Yet, paradoxically, if you have not served in special operations in the Israeli Defense Force, you can never achieve the rank of general. And what is the reason for that? It’s very simple. Regular forces and regular wars, to use that term, like World War II or even Korea, are fought with big formations — regiments, battalions, armies, corps, divisions — and it’s macroscopic in nature. Special operations is microscopic in nature, and causes you to think in microscopic detail about everything you’re going to do, and that wonderfully sharpens the mind. When you learn to think in those terms, you’re learning in those terms.
You tend to carry it on and think of all of the extra details as you grow up in the ranks.

General Kingston, as a second lieutenant in the 7th Division, led a 300-man task force to the Yalu River, a very unusual event for a second lieutenant, and there’s been a lot written about that feat. There was this young second lieutenant sitting on the head of an APC (armored personnel carrier) with captains, lieutenants, and one major in his task force command, and he had to think about a lot of things. It was, in effect, a special operation.*

He was later picked up by our friends in the CIA and taken for training and then inserted back into the special raiding parties behind the lines of the North Koreans for another year of special operations. He was a Ranger after Korea, which was the nearest thing to special forces we had at that time. I’m using Bob as an example because he’s here. He served in our own special forces, yet he would be in regular line units, and finally he commanded the U.S. Central Command, he was a division commander, a brigade commander twice in Vietnam, but all the time he was applying this learned special forces microscopic knowledge in all his later assignments. Actually, Tony’s point has been overtaken by an event: special forces have been edited by law in the form of an amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.

Perhaps that legislation came about because of the items depicted in figure 4: the stirrings of the 1970s and 1980s following the Vietnam War. The war in Vietnam did see the use of various special forces units and several specific special operations. Inevitably, there was drawdown after Vietnam, but not as severe for special forces as in other post-war periods.

The mid-1970s saw the advent of terrorism in greater force and with greater frequency. The United States military services began to stir and respond. The first response to receive attention in the press was Blue Light at Fort Bragg. As I understand it from Charlie Beckwith’s book, Delta Force, and other discussions, Blue Light became a diversion and cover for Delta Force.

Other nations had already built their counterterrorist units. The Brits had over 20 years in training, using, and refining the SAS; the Germans had developed GSG-9; the Israelis have already been discussed. Delta Force became the U.S. answer to the surgical side of special ops; their first major publicized effort was the so-called Desert One, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt. The failure of that mission certainly heightened interest in the special ops area, but most of that interest appeared to come from outside the military and centered in certain members of the Congress. But appearances are sometimes deceiving. There were proponents of special operations within the military, or else Delta Force, the SEALs (Sea-Air-Land Units), the USAF 1st SOW (Special Operations Wing), etc., would not have existed. Forward thinkers such as General Edward C. (Shy) Meyer, USA (Ret.), a former Army Chief of Staff, deserve great credit for their efforts on behalf of special operations. True, the Pentagon might have been able to move faster and the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the amendment pushed things along.

McLaughlin: Before you start in on that, just so we maintain some chronology here, because I’m sure we can spend a lot of time on that, we sort of glided over the Vietnam era. If you have a few comments on that...

Lockwood: Vietnam was an irregular war that, in the main, employed regular troops in regular formations: companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions. But there was no front, as such, and at times these regular units were used in an irregular manner not unlike the Marauders in World War II or Wingate’s Chindits. It is important to note that when we met the North Vietnamese army in a “regular” fight, we won every time.

We did use a number of special operational units: Green Beret “A” teams, the so-called “Mike Force” that used American-led Montagnards, the SOG (Studies and Observation Group) units, and the Son Tay raiders. The Son Tay raid was almost a perfectly executed special ops mission. It combined U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force elite personnel into a well-coordinated team. Had the U.S. prisoners been at Son Tay, it would have been perfect. A good lesson to dwell on is “how to do it.”

Kingston: One comment on Vietnam with regard to special operations and special forces. We had corps, we had divisions. The First Cavalry Division was probably 14,000 men. The 5th Special Forces Group never got over a strength of 2,000 at the most, yet they won 17 Medals of Honor and three Victoria Crosses (the Victoria Crosses went to the Australian warrant officers). Most of the divisions got maybe three out of 14,000.

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- **Terrorism**
  - Blue Light
  - Delta Force
  - Other improvements

- **Desert One**
  - JSOC
  - 1st SOCOM
  - Additional structure

- **Amendment to Goldwater – Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986,**
  **SEC 1311 (S1224/H1011) Special Operations Forces**
  - Special Operations Command
  - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
  - Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Low Intensity Conflict

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**Figure 4. Stirrings of the Seventies and Eighties**

**McLaughlin:** How about lessons learned? Certainly we went through the big drawdown again after the war.

**Lockwood:** I really don’t know the numbers or the details, but there certainly was, and is, a perception that the DOD was neglecting the special operations area. There was a great deal of questioning after Desert One by the media and the Congress. The late Congressman Dan Daniel has to be regarded as the prime pusher of legislation to establish, “improve” would be a better word, our special ops capabilities. There were numerous hearings on the subject with a more or less reluctant Department of Defense. Congressman Daniel had support for his views in both the Senate and the House and from both sides of the aisle. There was also support from numerous retired senior military officers, such as Lieutenant General Sam Wilson, General Dick Stilwell, General Shy Meyer, General Bob Kingston, and others, for increased tempo and spending in the special ops arena. It is my view that the perceived reluctance of DOD management to support special ops enthusiastically caused the legislation creating a new command to come into being and a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to be created. The feeling by the Members of Congress concerned about special ops and/or low intensity conflict was that the DOD would continue to treat both areas with benign neglect. They felt, it would appear, that the United States should have a capability to meet the threat and challenge of the future — which may be here as we speak.

**Oettinger:** Could you try to sharpen up the image you’ve painted here? One of our earlier guests this semester was the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Heres, who was, in his particular way, not terribly complimentary about the set-up that these amendments created. His animus was directed towards a specific point which, if I hear him and you, implies perhaps no disagreement, but maybe it does. That’s what I want to hear from you now or later on. If I heard him correctly, he was not objecting to the notions, and the need for, and the quality of special operations forces, etc. What he said, and correct me if I quote him wrong, was that what happened was the creation of another damn military department, and that we don’t need. He was implying that what had happened in the legislation was the creation of an unnecessary rigid bureaucracy rather than the upgrading of whatever it takes to get good quality special operations. I don’t know,
hearing you, whether that's in agreement with your views or in disagreement.

McLaughlin: Well, let me crystallize that a little more sharply. Herres characterized it as creating a fifth service, sort of a plot of the green beansie and SOF people. He said — I will paraphrase — “We don't need a fifth service and we need those special operations capabilities deployed underneath the CINC’s.”

Kingston: I'd say that's typical of the military bureaucracy, and that's why they're getting it shoved down their throats by Congress. Because as Herres said, they did not respond to the intent and wishes of Congress, which they were told many times.

Lockwood: I don't know that I would completely remonstrate with everything that General Herres said, but I would certainly remonstrate with one thing: that all we needed to do was put these special units together and put them out and deploy them under the CINC's and that's that. That ain't that. Anybody who reads a little bit of history, even very recent history, would see the folly of that approach. I don't know General Herres personally, but I know he's a very smart man. He's in a very important position and he sees things the way he sees things, but coming around at it from another way, let me try this. If you were the Chief of Staff of the Army and I came in to you and I said, “Special ops,” you would register one percent of the budget, yawn, and fall asleep. But if I said to you, “Bradley fighting vehicle,” or something like that, you're up on your toes and alert. When you say, “Special forces,” those fellows, the chiefs of staff, their ops deputies, whoever does their work, think in terms of one percent. You know, they've got bigger things on their plate. These are different battles that you're fighting down there. An exception to that, I think it's fair to say, was General Shy Meyer, because of his support of special forces.

Kingston: We put the Delta Force together because Shy Meyer allowed it to happen while he was Chief of Staff.*

Lockwood: He allowed it to happen, and that's about all you can ask for these days, you know. I would say first of all you've got to allow something to happen in that kind of arena.

Kingston: The people in JSOC (the Joint Special Operations Command) are probably the best trained people that we've ever had in any military service. They move out and they've been committed many, many times, but the only time you ever hear about them is if there's an Achilles Lauro or something like that. They've gone out and done jobs and some are overseas right now, today. The Army, of course, will deny that there is a Delta Force.

Lockwood: Beckwith got the job done. He did a great job. I'm told by those who should know — from the SAS, others of the foreign units who came over — that our unit is the best. I've heard that from several of the SAS guys. There's a great interchange in there between those two units.

Kingston: When we formed the JFK Center, I was picked to go confer rapidly with General Singlaub at the leave of the President. General Meyer said there's only one man capable of training Delta, and that's Charlie Beckwith.

Lockwood: In the next slide (figure 5), I say, with tongue in cheek, generally speaking DOD civilian and military leadership have not been attentive to or enthusiastic about supporting special forces. I would say, for the most part, that those in charge see special forces as an infringement upon the primary mission of the military services, in support of national policy; an area that would draw off money from strategic deterrence and a conventional war in Europe. I would also say that special ops is an arcane area and it's difficult to understand if the professional soldier, sailor, or airman has not been trained or fully exposed. In short, special operations is an alien thought path for the traditional military.

Another point is the elite nature of special forces used in special operations. They are, indeed, a breed apart from the mainstream. The regular military, generally speaking, rankle at the symbols of elite troops: berets, paratrooper boots, etc. It's subtle, but there is that difference in thinking.

Oettinger: Let me stop you there and explore that one a little bit because in the intelligence world the special operations people tend to be elite. Historically within the CIA, the feeling was that they are indeed the elite and everybody else, the analysts and so forth, are second-class citizens. So, if that's correct, you have an instance where the elites are in control and the sloggers are in disrepute and don't make it to the top. Is this because of military history, or is it because of the nature of the organization, or is the premise false? Maybe it's nonsense.

Lockwood: Generally speaking, all operational people consider themselves to be the ones at the cutting edge of the problem and think of all others

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Generally speaking, civilian and military leadership have not been attentive to or enthusiastic about special forces.

- National policy and strategy
- Resultant service missions
- Lack of a clear understanding of the benefits and uses of special ops in an ever changing personnel environment
- Elitism vs. the main stream
- The natural lag time in policy shift to problems other than strategic parity issues
- The command and control structure
- The turf structure

Figure 5. Some Observations and Perceptions

In the organization as support elements. I believe that holds for the CIA, the military services, and business organizations. However, one really can’t do without the other. It’s a team effort and all parts exist for a reason. Looking at the history of the CIA in the form of its directors, the operational types could be personified in Dulles, Helms, Colby, and Casey. But there were also McCone, Raborn, Turner, and the current DCI, Webster, who were not, per se, intelligence operational types.

There certainly has been a strong military flavor in the operational side of the CIA, from what I can understand: a strong military flavor in the sense that many if not most of the officers were recruited into operations after stints in the military. Bob Kingston is an example: the CIA offered him a GS-14 slot after Korea, as I recall.

**Kingston:** They brought a lot of military in during the Korean War for paramilitary, but they weren’t big enough. They’re still not big enough. They’d like to see the special forces, the Special Operations Command forces be the PM — the paramilitary — of what the Agency used to be, but they don’t have the capability. They’re very limited.

**Lockwood:** I don’t know much about the CIA, but the operators, I think, are a rather small percentage of a very big budget, and from what I can read we sort of got out of the human spying business under Stansfield Turner.

**McLaughlin:** I’d sort of like to recast this because, Tony, I think you’re asking the wrong question in that case. Any organization has an operating ethic. If it’s the post office, it’s people who used to “throw mail,” and in the CIA, coming out of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), it was the people who were the field operators — the Jedburghs and people who had overseas assignments. That, I think, is a little different from what Earl was talking about. The different version of it in the Army is its combat arms — its armor, infantry, and artillery. In anything else, including special forces, well, you’re out of the mainstream. For a while you were allowed the title of paratrooper. But special forces were considered tangential and out of the operating mainstream. The operating method is still there, and some people were lucky enough to be able to go back and forth and get a regular infantry command and maintain their respectability. But Earl’s point
about elites is, I think, a special problem of the United States Army. I mean, the idea in the British Army is each regiment is allowed to maintain some kind of separate identification that lets them claim to be the best of whatever they may be. Maybe it's just different facings and cap badges, but in the U.S. Army there always has been a sort of great fear of elites, and you stomp them out after every war.

**Lockwood:** Absolutely; that was the observation that I intended to make.

**Oettinger:** Okay, but my point is that for a period, elitism in an area of operations that is maybe shading off, but not too far off, from the kind of thing we're talking about, was not only tolerated but was mainstream within something called an intelligence agency. When we discussed this a couple of years back in this seminar with Bob Inman (this was when he had just become Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), we asked, "What are your views on this question of where should special operations be — under intelligence or under the military?" He said, "Life is too short to fight these reorganization battles. It's not bad where it is, etc., etc." What I'm trying to drive at is when you're saying, now here is a situation where it isn't welcome. It keeps getting destroyed and will have to be rebuilt and require almost underground movement within the military.

**Lockwood:** That's counterrevolutionary.

**Oettinger:** Then the question is, is there a better home? Over the last decade or so, the intelligence community has not, for reasons having to do perhaps with other congressional views, been the best home. In fact, you see some of the effects of groping for a home within the U.S. government in the fallout from the actions, later on, of Colonel North and so on, which in a way you could interpret as looking for an institutional home. Perhaps we're looking at a mistake or the attempt is still something that's out there before us in terms of sorting it out. But I guess what I'm trying to get from you, Earl, and later from General Kingston, is a sense of where, prospectively, you might find a home given what you know the U.S. government and U.S. society are like. What's a best home? And for what reasons?

**Lockwood:** My view is that there are apples and there are oranges. A special operations unit like the so-called Delta Force is based on David Stirling's four-man patrol concept, with a high proficiency in all their training, cross training, and continuous very, very special activities. They're fifth-level vol-

unteer. The only place you're going to find those types of people and be able to put together a special operations unit is the United States military. We can do it. We can create a school, I guess, but it takes a certain type of person who wants to do that — a fellow who is willing to stay an enlisted man for his entire career, just so he can stay in that unit. That's happened time and time again in the British Army and the U.S. Army. I think that's correct, Bob?

**Kingston:** For the first three officers we selected for Delta we screened almost a hundred people. We never sent anyone back to his unit looking like he failed; we'd say "This guy's great, but we don't need him at this time."

**Lockwood:** The CIA, from what I can read and understand, de-emphasized the HUMINT — or spying — side of the business over the years. The advent of technology and the cast that came with it effectively de-emphasized HUMINT in terms of sheer numbers of dollars. Bob Inman came up through the technical side of the intelligence business and he's probably the best we've had. If I remember correctly, it was Stansfield Turner who drastically changed the HUMINT side of the CIA by forced reductions, retirements, and removal of the old salts. This point is a little hard to pin down because we really can't determine what the size and composition of such a clandestine operation might be — and we shouldn't be allowed to know.

**McLaughlin:** I'm wondering, though, because I raised this question with Bob Inman each of the three times that he's spoken here and got somewhat different answers each time as his view changed. I remember I first asked Ray Cline the same question back in 1977 when he was speaking here and he declined to answer. At that time, or for a long time, the CIA recruited out of the military for operations but, to a large degree, those recruited lost their military status. You also had the other "mobs for jobs" — the Cubans and others, but it was very had to accommodate paramilitary forces on a continuing basis. In contrast to that, the British have the SAS and SBS as part of the permanent military establishment. Inman's statement was, "Gee, it would be nice to take the covert operations function out of the CIA and base it in the military so that people have a career pattern to which they could return. They always need the Defense Department logistics over time and that might be one of the adjustments you would make." That was a statement about five or six years ago. By the same token, the U.K. gov-

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*Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA, 1962–1966.*
ernment admits the existence of the Special Air Service regiment, while we play this game, you know, there’s no Delta Force.

Lockwood: What can I say about that?

Kingston: He has some problems with the oversight committees of the Agency, and then you’ve got problems with the military on the War Powers Act. We’re being prohibited from doing things we should be doing. And there’s that bottom line on the side: the turf structure and the command and control problem.

Oettinger: That question of the overlap of the War Powers Act on one side and the prohibitions and the executive orders and legislation on the intelligence side is one of the more fundamental structural questions that makes this so very hard.

Kingston: On the oversight committees you’ve got people leaking what they want to leak to the press. They had one Senator taken off the committee because of that, and he wasn’t even censured. It was perfectly all right.

When you do it, it’s in the national interest, you don’t call it a leak, you call it informing the press. When we do it, you call it a leak.

Lockwood: Now this is supposed to be a group in command and control studies, right? If you want to look at the command and control structure of something like our special forces as opposed to, say, the Brits, Maggie Thatcher controls the SAS and, I think, their combined special forces. She plays the exercises when she’s needed to participate and she controls it directly. Now, I’m certain the President of the United States controls any unit we might have, such as Delta Force. But by the time he speaks and it thunders down the line, there are a lot of complications from all the staff levels.

Let me see if I can construct a situation that may be compared. Let’s say that we need to respond quickly to something and we send a unit and it has to go somewhere and it has to fly to get there — Achille Lauro. An order is signed by somebody like the Secretary of Defense, or the President of the United States, or the Assistant Secretary of Defense and you’d think that’s what would make everything move. Not in our bureaucracy, it doesn’t. They say, “Now wait a minute, you can’t take off because of this, and we’ve got to get clearances for that, and the regulation says so and so.” You could sit for hours.

Now, fortunately, as these things pop up, somebody will look into it and solve that one problem.

But I don’t know that there’s been a strong analysis or a good analysis done on the overall process to find out where those blockages are, but surely they come up from time to time.

Most of you in this room are experienced with our command and control structure, as I’m given to understand, and Jim Croke and I have been trying to figure it out for 30 years; failing miserably, I might add. It’s still a mess. And it’s a mess not because people haven’t thrown money into it, thrown time at it; a lot of it’s cultural. The President goes into the Department of Defense, to the Secretary, to the Chiefs, to the services, to the command, and finally, it trickles down to the unit.

According to Beckwith’s book, there was a great fight to put Charlie’s Delta unit under Forces Command, 18th Airborne Corps, Special Warfare Center, and eventually getting down to the unit. The generals were all fighting and General Kingston fought the good fight, beating back Forces Command when he was a one- or a two-star. And then he left and the next guy who replaced Bob in that arena stumbled and flagged and failed, until General Meyer as Deputy Chief of the Army came down and said, “Right, this is the structure. There will be Forces Command, 18th Airborne Corps, Special Warfare Center, and finally Charlie Beckwith’s Delta Force. Right. But we’ll have this little thing here called a loop up to me from Charlie any time he wants.” He didn’t violate the structure, but he violated the structure, and that’s the only way you could do it. The Brits are much more straightforward about it.

Kingston: It still exists today, and I’ll get into it later.

Oettinger: We’d appreciate that, because one of the things that we’ve gotten fanatical about in this class is my notion that a lot of these things are due to balances. You’re taking a view that says a short span of control and a direct one from the top — Prime Minister or President to an operating unit.

We have a good deal of testimony to the effect that every time that’s happened, it’s been a damn disaster. It may work for Maggie, but if it’s one of the yahoos who gets elected to the White House and he sits in the Situation Room and does direct control, we get into problems. There are people like General Stilwell and others who say what a wonderful thing it is to cut things out and make sure the reporting is down at the operating unit, maybe going a layer or two up, but for God’s sake, no connection to some amateur sitting in Washington.
Lockwood: I don’t think that the SAS reports back to Mrs. Thatcher for direction once she has authorized it. There is a ministerial level in between in all cases.

Oettinger: So you’re talking about initiation.

Lockwood: Yes.

Kingston: The Director of the SAS stays in Whitehall. He’s a brigadier; he’s there. The regiment’s at Hereford, and a lieutenant colonel runs and trains that regiment, but when something goes down, as they say in SAS, when we go, Maggie’s involved. The director’s right there. When anything goes down, he’s got his intelligence, he’s got the positions, they sit around the table much like this, and they discuss it. “I can do this, I cannot do that, for many reasons. I don’t have the capabilities, or I need to be supported.”

Lockwood: And in some cases, “I won’t do this.”

Kingston: That’s correct.

McLaughlin: But I think you need to distinguish the cases that you have in mind from something like a standard military operation, where we still deploy troops, like Stilwell with the tree-cutting incident or the Mayaguez. What we were talking about here are special missions, and at one point, at least, the Brits deployed special missions through something supposedly called “UNICORN,” a committee of about seven people, including the Prime Minister, the Director of SAS, the Home Minister, the Defense Minister, and the head of the Metropolitan Police, if it was in London. Since the Director of SAS was in there, you obviate all that chain in between through the military departments. I think that’s a different case than sitting in a Sit Room and trying to win the Vietnam War.

Lockwood: Your examples are probably better than mine. Some of the observations and perceptions, perception being reality most of the time, at least in Washington, that SOF can be utilized across the entire spectrum of war (figure 6), I wouldn’t argue with one minute. Unhappily, the tendency can become, if we’re not very, very cautious, that all of the training and equipping that we do in the special ops is to support the war that it looks like we’re going to fight now, namely a nuclear war or a conventional war. I would say, yes, special ops forces can be used in that spectrum. But I would go further to say that special ops forces and certain other forces should be trained to look at the low intensity side of fighting as opposed to the others.

- SOF can be utilized across the whole spectrum of intensity of conflict
- Conventional force planning is macroscopic; SOF planning is microscopic and in great detail
- Innovation, creativity and use of high tech are required for SOF; updates must be continuous
- The uses of U.S. SOF capabilities are going to be broader and, thus, somewhat different than other countries with different national security interests/problems
- Above point further complicated by U.S. government structure

Figure 6. Observations and Perceptions
I would say that the Special Ops Command will slowly get there. You can’t get anything done in less than two years. I find a lot of cooperation and a lot of good thinking, at least in the military, that I’ve come into contact with along these lines. But the groundswell is for people to do what they understand best, which is nuclear war or central front Europe.

Kingston: Everything’s central front Europe. Any problem that you bring up, it’s Europe.

Lockwood: I have shied away from having our company even work on European problems because, as you know, it’s a one-year experience repeated 40 times, or 45, or whatever it is now.

But there are enough people getting educated, I think, who will get this pushed back down to the end on the Third World. But it’s got to be done on the LIC issues. I’ve talked about the conventional force planning as macroscopic. The innovation and creativity and use of high tech for the front-end special operations units, a Delta type of unit, are very important, but maybe not that necessary for, say, an airborne unit.

There is a lot of comparison—I’ve done it today—to the British SAS or the German GSG-9, or the French unit, or the Israelis. But the United States is in a different position. The Israelis are contained in this one geographical area for their types of low intensity conflicts, if you will, and the Brits also, but in our contest with the Russians in the Third World we’re going to be in a lot of places, and we don’t even know where they are, or where they’re going to be. A group of us, of whom General Kingston is certainly one, has tried to look at that. We had a session three or four months ago where 20 of the best minds in this business carefully prepared for an all-day, completely unclassified discussion on trying to prioritize where the 10 hot spots would be around the world for the United States and the so-called low intensity conflicts. We failed miserably, absolutely; I was embarrassed. We had briefers come in from the DOD to tell us what they were doing, and how they rank the priorities. It’s a very difficult subject. Who would have anticipated a Grenada 30 days before it happened, or who would have speculated on the Persian Gulf?

McLaughlin: Let me interrupt you here. At least, though, we could have anticipated Grenada. The President of the United States was on national TV six months before it happened and publicly anticipated it, which has always puzzled me about some of the operational problems that we had.

Lockwood: What makes you think the system reacts to all the potential situations?

Kingston: On Grenada, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was briefed on Friday for the first time. Admiral Metcalf, the three-button in the Navy, joined his staff aboard the flagship Sunday. It went down on Tuesday. The Marine barracks were blown up in Beirut that Sunday. P.X. Kelley, then Commandant of the Marines, went to Jack Vessey, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and said, “The honor of the Marine Corps is at stake. We’ve got to put a halt to Grenada.” They just happened to have a Marine Amphibious Unit en route to the Mediterranean. They changed their run. And you’ll notice in the command and control of that operation, Wesley McDonald, the admiral in charge of Atlantic Command, never put an overall commander in. He kept the Marines up in the northeast and kept the Army in the southwest and west. Interesting structure on command and control.

McLaughlin: And moreover, nobody gave them the key to communicate.

Lockwood: There’s an apocryphal story about a command and control SEAL unit that was alleged to have landed on a beach, lost from where they were supposed to be, and they were captured by an American unit. They were taken to the battalion headquarters, to the battalion commander, under guard. And the battalion commander said, “Give me the password.” The SEAL said, “I don’t know the password. We’re SEALs, we’re Americans, I’m Lieutenant Commander so and so. We were in a boat, we got lost, we can’t find our landing zone. We’re Americans.” “Although you talk like one, give me the password or you’re going to go in the clink.” And the SEAL said, “But I don’t know the password because I’m not part of your unit.” And the lieutenant colonel said, “If you don’t know the password, I’m putting you under military arrest.” The SEAL happened to be looking around and there was a blackboard that said “black-white.” The SEAL said, “Black.” He said, “White; pass, brother.”

McLaughlin: That raises the question about special operations forces being utilized across the whole spectrum of intensity of conflict. Historically, at least one of the regular complaints from the special forces community, or from the special operations community, is the tendency to use them at the wrong place at the wrong time as part of conventional operations, at which point, you know, you lose that seven years of training investment.
Lockwood: Well, it’s happened in the past. I think it’s less likely to happen, except there’s always a tendency because an untrained regular, a commander, tends to see all soldiers in the same light.

Student: If I understand the question right, you were talking about microscopic versus macroscopic planning. I mean, to some extent, it seems to me there’s the same amount of planning; you’re just suggesting that the microscopic planning is happening on a higher level for SF.

Lockwood: No, what I used in context of commanders and units is that a regular Army unit is made up of a brigade, a battalion, a company, and the commander plans in movements of that sort — of moving that kind of force forward. General Kingston, who’s done both, might be able to state or define that better than I. But in a special operations unit — the basic four-man cell, or it may be six, or it could be two — you have a mission and you have to plan meticulously, exactly, what you’re going to do. Even a squad leader in the Army, when he’s moving, is actually thinking in more macroscopic terms. But you can’t do that with SF. It’s a different way of sharpening the mind. As one Israeli said, their general officers must have served as special officers because of the training it gave them in their thinking. I guess what he was trying to say, at least the way I interpreted it, is that it makes you more alert to catch something you might not catch before; gets you in the habit of scrutinizing each little block along the way.

Student: So what you’re saying is that the difference between what the special operations people do and what a squad leader or fire team does is mostly in the planning.

Lockwood: It’s in the execution. The special operations trooper is certainly trained to a higher degree of proficiency in several functions than is a regular straight-leg, machine-gun squad, or rifle squad for that matter, or airborne unit, even. He’s cross-trained, he’s generally multilingual, he can handle any variety of weaponry that he’s trained on, and trained on, and trained on. He could be demolitions, he could be a medic with cross-training in two other areas. But he’s also older, smarter, better trained to begin with than regular line soldiers are.

Kingston: Special forces medics get probably the most rigorous training that we have in special forces. They get a year down in Brook Army Medical Center.

Lockwood: There is a tendency to run the terms “special operations” and “low intensity conflict” together into SO/LIC. And then people tend to think of those as one and the same thing. Even in the bill that was passed, the amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols bill talked of SO/LIC. There is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Ops and Low Intensity Conflict specified in the bill.

It’s important to make the distinction between special ops and low intensity conflict. Low intensity conflict is an environment in which special operations may or may not take place (figure 7). My observation is that the special ops side is getting on fairly well; sort of “ticking over” as a British acquaintance described the situation. General Kingston can describe that to you better than I can.

General Lindsay* has certainly had his hands full, but is aggressively pushing the new command along and, in time, it should be okay. When you think about it, even if the special ops area had as much as 5 or 6 percent of the budget, it would probably be too much to absorb at the present time.

A more important issue, from my point of view, is the world of the so-called “low intensity conflict.” General Kingston, I believe, will get into that area later on today. I believe I mentioned earlier that these low intensity conflicts are the types of engagements we will be fighting well into the 21st century.

This is not new ground, as we have engaged in this type of conflict in the past. We seem to ignore history. Who was it who made the statement?

Oettinger: “History tends to repeat itself.”

Lockwood: George Santayana, A New Program. Because we do repeat history. Right now we have the Philippine situation. General Richard Stilwell, at the age of 72, went out there recently on his own to evaluate the situation. He spent eight days out in the bush.

Kingston: He said 30 percent of the country is occupied by communists and they’re extracting a million dollars a day in taxes. That’s just an example. The country denies it, but the government is losing.

Lockwood: There are 73 provinces, 73 dialects, and 73 views by the Filipinos. We’ve probably got 73 organizations in the U.S. government that deal with the Philippine problem. Each department and agency has a Philippine desk.

*General James J. Lindsay, USA, Commander in Chief of the Special Operations Command.
• SOF is a capability; LIC is an environment in which we operate

• The boundaries of special operations are defined by the beholder
  - We are all victims of our experience
  - Purposes, capabilities, limitations are not clearly defined
  - No "thread that runs so true"

• Lessons learned and those who learned them go relatively unstudied and unused
  - "Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it"

Figure 7. Observations and Perceptions

Oettinger: Just let me add one other statistic: there are 7,000 islands.

Lockwood: If you look a little into the past, you'll find that what's happening in the Philippines now has happened in the past, and probably started 380 years ago when the Portuguese came on the scene. I don't know whether it's a solvable problem or not in terms of low intensity conflict.

Snyder: There's one unresolved issue between proponents of special operations forces and the Defense Department, and that's the location of the commander of the Special Operations Command. You mentioned the British model which has the head of SAS in Whitehall. I think the Congress wanted to locate the Special Operations Command headquarters at or near Washington and the Chiefs aced them out and put it down in Florida. Does it make any difference, and if so, how would you do it?

Lockwood: Let me attempt to address that point from a non-expert point of view. If someone in the Congress stated that the headquarters should be in Washington, and some apparently expressed that desire, and how did you say it, the Chiefs aced them out—I don't think it was that sophisticated. They probably said, "Well, we got this thing directed on us, we don't have any choice; who's going to run it?" Somebody else then said, "Jim Lindsay's down at REDCOM (Readiness Command). Jim's as good as we've got for this job; let's eliminate REDCOM and use that staff and facilities for the new command." That's probably how it came about, nothing cynical or sneaky, in my opinion.

Where should the headquarters be? The best guy to talk about that is General Kingston, so I'll pass to him. Does the location harm anything?

Kingston: They have a Washington liaison office. When I had to take the rapid deployment joint task force over from Kelley, he had a Washington liaison office. In establishing the U.S. Central Command, they made me do away with my Washington liaison office, because the other commands didn't have one. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had hiccups. You can't do that now because we were getting into their business.

Student: Don't you think maybe the functions are different that the Navy SEALs have, as an example, versus, say naval officers on board a ship? As you indicated, they're a very elite group, which I agree with. I'll give you an example. Obviously, if you're
out at sea on a ship, you’re not going to go running six miles a day to stay in shape. A few people may, or they may ride a bicycle that’s down in the cargo deck or something like that, whereas the Navy SEAL team probably is running six miles a day, probably is swimming five miles a day, or whatever they do to stay in shape physically. The other officers stay in shape, but that kind of conditioning is not possible in that environment. Combine that with the fact that the typical naval officer is probably worried about such things as engineering examinations, such as OTPE (operational propulsion exam), or REFTRA (refresher training) which is pressure training, or INSURV (Board of Inspection and Survey) inspections which are coming down and which become administrative nightmares, not only if the equipment isn’t working, but also if the administration books aren’t correct. So you’re going to be on the line, versus a Navy SEAL who is an officer. I won’t say they probably don’t do some of those things, but they probably don’t worry about REFTRA, they don’t worry about INSURV, because those things are very characteristic of a ship since you have major equipment on board. So, yes, they are elite in their area, I agree with you, but they are elite in the special type of knowledge through special conditioning which makes them different, which ultimately means that there’s going to be a difficult time for them in communicating to the regular officer because in a five- or ten-year career path, they’re going down separate roads.

Lockwood: Well, I don’t know that much about the SEALs. I don’t know that much about any of them, but there is a SEAL admiral or two.

Kingston: In the last three years they promoted a captain and drafted him to the SEALs.

Student: I’m not saying they shouldn’t be in the top ranks. What I’m saying is it would be very difficult for a SEAL who spent maybe the last 10 to 15 years as a SEAL to come on board and be captain of, say, a Ticonderoga-class cruiser.

Snyder: It’s a little more difficult maybe to slide back. I think that’s recognized. There is a career path in the Navy, like Irish Flynn.

Lockwood: There’s LeMoyne, there’s Bob Hamilton. There are three or four.

Kingston: Also to get back to your business about keeping fit. Yogi Kaufman, who retired as a three-star admiral, took one of the first nuclear boats to sea for six months. He had a PT setup on that ship and he did 5,000 sit-ups at one session.

Lockwood: He was the guy who was beset by four muggers in Washington, D.C., and he broke two arms, I think a rib cage, and severely wounded the fourth one. They had to take them all to jail in an ambulance, and they tried to sue him for assault and battery.

Oettinger: Ladies and gentlemen, we ought to break up for the moment. Earl, thank you so much. This was wonderful.