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Coalition Warfare and Predictive Analysis
John A. Leide

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

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Coalition Warfare and Predictive Analysis

John A. Leide

Major General John A. Leide, USA, is Director, National Military Intelligence Collection Center, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). After joining the Army in 1958, he commanded airborne rifle companies at Fort Bragg and in the Dominican Republic, and held several combat commands in Vietnam. He studied Chinese Mandarin from 1970 to 1974, when he became the first and only U.S. officer to graduate from the Chinese Army Command and General Staff College. Thereafter Major General Leide served as Assistant Army Attaché in Hong Kong; Chief, China Far East Division, Directorate for Estimates, DIA; Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Commander of the 500th Military Intelligence Group; and Director of Foreign Intelligence, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. He was U.S. Defense Attaché/Army Attaché to China from May 1988 through the Tiananmen Square Crisis. In August 1990 he became Director of Intelligence, U.S. Central Command, and served in this capacity throughout operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He was Director for Attachés and Operations from June 1992 to June 1993, when he assumed his current position. Along with many military awards and decorations, he also has been awarded the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement for his duties in China and the Liberation Medal first class by the government of Kuwait for his duties during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Oettinger: We are delighted to welcome back General Leide, who is the director of the National Military Intelligence Collection Center and director of the Central MASINT Office (that's measurements intelligence) and Director of Defense HUMINT. By now, even if you have no intel background, you should all be able to appreciate the difference between Central and Defense. If anybody needs to have that expanded on, you can ask General Leide.

He is willing to accept questions early on and to go in any direction that the class wants to take the discussion. So, with that, I am delighted to welcome him once again. Sir, it's up to you.

Leide: Thank you very much. I can just suggest some areas for discussion. What I normally do is go into an area like coalition warfare and give a monologue. Sometimes that creates glassy eyes around the table. What I would rather do is get into areas of interest that you have. Let me just suggest some possible topics. One, of course, is coalition warfare, because coalition warfare is probably one of the most difficult things that we do during times of peace and also certainly during times of war.

The other things that we can get into, of course, are some of the intelligence areas that I'm responsible for, and those are human intelligence and measurements and signatures intelligence, which few people understand, but if explained the importance becomes self evident. Collection in general is another topic. Another topic is that I've now testified three times to the Aspin Commission on the roles of intelligence and the process that we're going through now to reorient and probably reorganize intelligence in the United States. Then another topic that we can use as a vehicle is my experience during Desert Storm and thereafter, if you'd like to get into that, and some of the still viable topics that accrue from that war are of great interest even today.

Starting on coalition warfare, I can give you many examples of fighting coalition warfare from my five combat tours—three as an infantryman, and the others as a more esoteric intelligence officer. Coalition warfare is very difficult. There are things during wartime that we in the military refer to as the frictions of war. What coalition warfare does is create, almost geometrically, frictions that are almost insurmountable at

times. They are very frustrating and very difficult.

If you look at such complicated warfare, and trying to avoid the frictions of war, the problems that you have with coalition warfare are something like this. You have cultural differences (and I can explain those), you have religious differences, you have organizational differences, you have doctrinal differences, you have capabilities differences, training differences, motivation differences, the compositions of force are different, political differences, logistical differences, operational differences, the senses of urgency are different, senses of mission are different, equipments are different, communications is different. Even when you get down to identification of friend and foe, those are different on the battlefield. Discrimination on the battlefield is very difficult. I'll just give you one example of that from Desert Storm, and then we can go back to the others.

We had as part of our coalition Syrians and Egyptians. Here we are on the battlefield where the Syrians and the Egyptians have SA-6 surface-to-air missiles and Russian tanks. There are all kinds of radars that are the same. The coalition had the French F-1s, same thing as the Iraqis had. So how do you discriminate on the battlefield? When you've got an F-15 pilot up there and he sees an SA-6 Straight Flush radar light up, he's going to hit it. What if it's an Egyptian Straight Flush radar? What if it's a Syrian Straight Flush radar? How do you discriminate on the battlefield? Those are the kinds of problems we had. That's just a kind of on-the-ground problem, but all these other cultural problems are very, very difficult. We can get into those if you'd like.

You have systems interoperabilities that are different. You have personalities that are different. The differences between, for example, Prince Khalid, Commander of the Arab Corps, and General Schwarzkopf are huge. How do you get through all that? Their personalities are different; both have very strong personalities. All of these intricacies are actually put on top of the normal intricacies, the normal frictions of fighting a war. It's almost, in many ways, geometric. How do you do that? That's a problem that isn't going to go away. It's a problem we have to face and try to contend with as we go through the next 10 years.

Student: Sir, in last year's seminar, you talked about the horns of a dilemma within a coalition where there is or isn't a first among equals. Given that a year has lapsed, I'd like to know what your thoughts are about that, in the context of, for instance, a Bosnian scenario, where the United States is not the main actor as it was in the Gulf War. Could you talk about the problems that NATO might have in finding a kind of first among equals where the United States is not a dominant player per se, in terms of troop strength, et cetera?

Leide: Without being parochial, I hope, you notice what's happened in Bosnia. It's virtually paralysis. If you look at the command and control structure in Bosnia, where you have NATO and you have the United Nations involved, you've got commanders on the ground who are NATO commanders or United Nations commanders and they say you've got to get permission from everybody to get to hit something. Then you say, "Well, we're going to hit something," and then you don't hit something. And if you do hit something, then the British or the French are going to say, "Hey, don't do that, because our troops are at risk." So you talk about a horns of dilemma! Our Congress is now placing more restrictions on that: that only under very limited circumstances can you have American troops under foreign control. I'm not so sure it's gotten better or worse since last year because of these not only restrictions, but constrictions.

Oettinger: Could you expand on that a little bit more? Maybe you won't want to, but speculate on sort of which came first. That is: is the structural situation you described that complicated because it's complicated, or is it that way because nobody really wants to act? So which came first? It seems to me that there was a clear consensus about something that needed to be done in the invasion of Kuwait, whereas the political backdrop in Bosnia was more confused. Nobody's heart was in it, in a sense,

so you have an organizational situation which reflects the political disarray rather than the other way around. Or is that just nonsense?

Leide: No. That's a good point, Tony, and I think it dovetails nicely into the fact that, for example, in the Gulf War there wasn't any problem of command and control. Norman Schwarzkopf ran the war. You had something called an Arab Corps, but I was there, and General Schwarzkopf ran the war, and everyone said, "Great!" You had all these political machinations that went on about, "We've got to have this Arab Corps." The Arab Corps was there, and they were the ones who were going to take Kuwait, for whatever political reason, but there's no question that we ran the war, and there's no question that no one else could have done it, even if they didn't use an Arab Corps. They had little or no combat or combat service support. They had nothing except some divisions. Logistics were being provided by the Saudis or us, and maps were being provided by the Saudis or us, basically by us. So they had some divisions that came to the dance, but that's all they had. They had the shoes and that was it.

Again, I hate to sound parochial in saying that the United States is the only one that could do things, but on the other hand, that was true during the Gulf War. Face it, if it wasn't for us, it wouldn't have gotten done. Bosnia is a shining example. If we don't go in there and we say we're going to do this, it doesn't get done.

Oettinger: I think the larger point was, whether you or anybody else agree or disagree, that somebody's got to be in charge. Even in World War II, where the British and American efforts were more balanced, there were certainly arguments—epic arguments—between Montgomery and Eisenhower, and so forth, but ultimately, in any particular theater, somebody was in charge. Even the French had their share.

Leide: That problem was never solved right down to the very end, not only within the Allies, but with the Russians as well.

Oettinger: But ultimately, the desire to knock off the Axis focused things. It seems to me, in a way, that when there's a strong political will these issues get swept away. So, my point is that it seems to me that in Bosnia there is no equivalent central urge to get something done.

Student: Is that resolve? Is it resolve that creates that environment?

Oettinger: I think it's resolve about something, and it seems to me that in Bosnia there is nothing to be resolved about, because everybody involved is so thoroughly ambivalent that they don't even have something that they want to push hard on, other than saying, "We don't want to get anything done that might be counter to our interests."

Leide: I think the key here is that what we're coming more and more in focus with is the national interest. Is Somalia in the national interest? Is Haiti in the national interest? Is Bosnia in the national interest?

Again I go back to my original premise: that currently the tolerance level for casualties is very, very low. If we had taken an enormous amount of casualties during the Gulf War, it wouldn't have been fun, but on the other hand, people expected it, and we were there and we were supported. If you talk about Bosnia, that has a potential for a lot of casualties. Is that the reason why we're not there, or is it because we decided that it's not in the national interest?

Student: Sir, I appreciate your taxonomy for the multiplicity of challenges one faces in coalition operations, the cultural differences, et cetera. In fact, I was responsible for military exercises between the U.S. Army in the Pacific and our Asian friends and allies, and working with the Thais or the Bruneians or Malaysians all presented me with the challenges you mentioned. It leads me to this question: from your vantage point, with your experience, what would you see as necessary things that the U.S. armed forces should do to enhance our capability to conduct coalition operations? Is there something that we can do?

Leide: Yes, and it's very difficult, because what you've got to do is work together in peacetime. I'll give an example: the Saudis. We worked very badly with them, or they worked very badly with us, in the ground forces. They had terrible ground forces. I say that advisedly, because they wound up trying them very hard, but they were just not terribly capable. The Saudi Air Force was very capable. They fit in very easily with us, and during the war they were just part of the U.S. Air Force. They were in the ATO (air tasking order) and we never had a problem with them in the ATO. They did everything they were supposed to do. They knew exactly how to run the ATO, and they were very professional. Now, why is that?

Well, we've been training with the Saudi Air Force for years. They have F-15s. They know the ATO. They've been trained in the United States. General Horner knew them all personally. So that's a way of doing it. The problem is that even if you have a force that you work with all the time, if they don't have the same kinds of things that you have, or the same mentality, or the same training, or you haven't worked together before, combat is the worst time to do those kinds of things. It becomes doubly dangerous just to force people together in wartime, because you're putting both sides at risk.

I think the answer there is that you've got to have a very close relationship during wartime and during peacetime. Even in NATO, there are great differences between the NATO states in their capabilities, attitudes, doctrine, even though we tried to have NATO doctrines and so forth. It helps, and I think it's much better than if we didn't have it. But on the other hand, there are great differences between some of the countries in NATO and us. There are variations and shades of gray and black. So, I think that's the answer, but it's not an easy one, and I think the cultural differences, in many ways, are very difficult to overcome, no matter what.

Student: Sir, on NATO, the problem with expanding NATO is that if you have an organization that makes a decision by consensus. If you expand it, it's much harder to get a consensus, therefore it's much harder to take action, as we've seen in Bosnia. But then again, if we don't expand it, we won't have this experience with these other forces during peacetime. Can you comment on that? What's the direction we should go in?

Leide: I think the first thing we've got to ask ourselves about NATO is: what is it for? We know what it was created for. Does it still have that mission? If not, what mission does it have? It's a military organization. Whom is it defending against? That's one of the frustrations when you look at NATO. I think everyone thinks it's a good idea to retain NATO, but one of the problems that you have when you try to visualize what NATO's all about is really: what's it supposed to do? Is it supposed to be something that provides consensus and goodwill and working together among the states? Those are all valid objectives. There are those who think that we're just warping the mission of NATO, and it's just sitting there.

Then you look at the problems that we had with NATO, which is the only entity that probably could have done a Bosnia, and actually did a Bosnia, and what is it doing? Why is it being restricted, if it's being restricted at all? You've got four levels of command there in Bosnia. Again, if you look at coalition warfare, variances of command and control are fraught with danger, and then it creates an ineffective organization.

Student: Just to follow up on that, there's been a lot of talk about forming a U.N. force that stands on its own. My view of the whole thing in Bosnia is that NATO and the U.N. are actually tripping over each other. One gets in the way of the other; one can't act because the forces of the other are there, et cetera.

Leide: It's a command and control problem.

Student: So how do you resolve that? Do you get rid of one or the other? Or do you try to integrate them?

Leide: There again you go back to the horns of the dilemma. What is NATO for? Why is NATO there? Why are we using NATO rather than the United Nations? Is NATO part of the United Nations, or is it just the countries of NATO that are part of the United Nations? I don't think we've come to clarity on that. I've not seen it. I know that there are a lot of people who really have very fine ambitions for NATO, and I wish it well, but I think what we have to do is come to some clarity on what NATO is and what it is supposed to do.

Student: You started off this section, General, with the statement that coalition warfare is tough. But at least for 90 years or so of the twentieth century, warfare for the United States has been coalition warfare. So, what is the nature of coalition warfare at the end of the twentieth century versus the nature of it at the beginning of the twentieth century that makes it so different, or do we have just the same problems and we've not come to grips with them?

Leide: I think they are variations on a theme. If you look at the different wars that we have fought and those that have been coalitions, you start with World War I. You had one commander there, a U.S. commander, Commander of the Army, and it was fairly clear. Each of those major members of the coalition had sections of the front.

World War II was not peaches and cream. World War II was not easy. If we think it was, we had better read history, because we couldn't decide amongst us where to attack and when, where the second front should be, where the attack arrows ought to go, what should be the main attack and which should be the secondary attack, or who should be in charge. It was not easy, even with our closest allies, the Brits.

Oettinger: And with a sharply focused objective.

Leide: A very sharply focused objective. There were times when you had Montgomery going one way because he would insist on not going the other way, and he took the gas away from Patton. If we hadn't had a guy of Eisenhower's stature, I think we would have had a real problem. We did have a great problem. If you look at some of the discussions between Churchill and Roosevelt, they were rather difficult, and the decisions that were made were very difficult, and in many cases were not terribly agreeable to either side.

Oettinger: But, ultimately, there was a political consensus.

Leide: There had to be. As you saw, and as I think you've seen since then, as we became the predominant force on the Continent, at least on the western front, we took more and more control of the operations and made the decisions, even though we tried to make decisions that were not based on politics.

Oettinger: And to this day there are arguments over the wisdom of having divided Germany the way it was divided.

Leide: Yes, if you look at the Potsdam Agreements and so forth, you can ask why those decisions were made, and how they were made, and whom were they trying to please?

Oettinger: I cannot resist telling this story about a meeting between Eisenhower and DeGaulle. This was told to me by Eisenhower's interpreter, a man named Léon Dostert, who was present at a meeting between Eisenhower and de Gaulle shortly after the liberation of Paris, and de Gaulle asked for permission to send the Division Leclerc into Alsace. De Gaulle, of course, was a thorn in both Churchill's and Eisenhower's sides because he refused to speak English even though he understood it; this was part of his political image. So Eisenhower turned to the interpreter and said, "Tell the son-of-a-bitch he can't do it!" Dostert says he was shocked by this, and turned to de Gaulle and said, "Le Général dit que, sous les circonstances ..." De Gaulle stopped him straight and said, "Monsieur, vous adoucissez!" (Sir, you are softening it!). That was the nature of coali-

tion discussions in World War II. I mean, it was not easy.

Leide: But if you carry through and analyze each of the conflicts that we've been in, if you go into the Korean War and the Vietnam War and, of course the Gulf War, we were terribly predominant there and we had 90 percent of the forces.

Student: Just for the benefit of my colleagues here, I'd like to bring an example of one of the biggest fiascoes in Israeli history, which is actually due to cultural differences in coalition warfare. This was in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The allies of the Israelis were the Christian forces of Lebanon, and after a short period of occupation of Beirut by Israeli forces, we started handing over areas, territories, for them to control. The first thing we found was the massacres of Sabra and Shatila. As if behind our shield, civilians were massacred by our allies who have a completely different set of values about treating civilian populations. This, of course, ruined our whole war strategy. It brought down the Israeli government, and had great implications for Israeli politics for the next decade or so—good implications, but that's got nothing to do with it.

Leide: That's a bright example of what I'm talking about, and a very clear one, but I can give you example after example after example of that kind of thing. It's absolutely frustrating when you look at it. People look at things differently. If you go to Cairo, to the 1973 War Victory Museum, you kind of wonder: was this a victory or what? It was a victory for them, in a sense, initially anyway, even though at the end they lost big. But they consider that the initial part of that—putting Israel at risk (great risk, frankly, for a period of time)—to them was a great victory, even though they won the battle but they lost the war. They publicize it in the middle of Cairo. So, I guess that there is a lot in the way you look at things, in the way you have to promote it internally as well as externally.

Student: I have a question about culture. This is a stark case, but in a lot of our discussions of the various elements of the U.S. Army itself, the same things that you said about coalition warfare came up. There are precisely the same categories: cultural differences, different types of technology, and so forth, even the sense of mission and urgency. All of these things seem to appear in problems within the U.S. Army. So when you talk about cultural differences, which seem to remain almost the only thing, even though again you have cultural differences between the Army or the Navy, then what is really the problem, because it seems that if you just work enough time together then that'll be fine. You're going to have the personality conflicts everywhere, regardless of whether it's Prince Khalid and Schwarzkopf or if it's two American generals. Assuming that you have the same time with the Saudi army and with the American army, what then remains the problem?

Leide: Those are very good points. If I look at the American military—and I'm in my 37th year now—I can see vast changes in cultural differences or the lack of cultural differences within our military. I'm sure there are still some, but I think the U.S. military is a shining example of how to break down those cultural differences. As for cultures between the services, we're breaking titanium rice bowls now, and I mean it, in trying to be more on the joint level, and this has not been easy. This is a very difficult transition for all of us.

If you're talking about all of the differences that I explained early on, or at least I tried to proffer early on, you're not going to solve all of those problems. First of all, you've got to realize that those problems are there, and you try to solve them as best you can to take away as much of the friction of war as you can. I use the example that I used last year, and I think it's a shining one, and that's where we needed blood samples from the Iraqi prisoners that the Saudis had. The reason we needed the blood samples was that we wanted to know whether the Iraqis had been inoculated against botulism or anthrax. That was pretty important to us, and pretty important to the Saudis. After all, the Saudi population was at risk if the Iraqis used biological

warfare weapons. We could not get the Saudis to take blood from the Iraqis. Arabs taking blood from Arabs is not good, but particularly, Americans taking blood from Arabs was anathema—total absolute cultural religious anathema.

Here you have a war about ready to start, Saudi troops at risk, the Saudi population at risk, but yet they were hard over that they would not give us that blood. They finally did, because we went to the king, and he realized how important it was. Those are the kinds of things we're talking about. Fortunately we had enough time to do this, but it took weeks. If we had to do it quickly ...

Oettinger: But it's unavoidable, in the elemental sense that each of us is familiar with at a much more personal level of existing with roommates, spouses, friends, whatever, and that's not been easy. It seems to me that, absent ultimately some outside pressure, nothing will happen. In your example of the U.S. military, "the prospect of hanging concentrates the mind wonderfully." If the budget gets tight enough, and you have to break titanium rice bowls in order to make do, that's what you do. I think that ultimately what makes coalitions work is when there is an overarching important goal that brings folks more together than they would be otherwise. In Bosnia, it still seems to me, there's a very simple explanation for all of the confusion, which is that nobody can agree on what the objectives are. It's lot easier having this fudgy fuzzing of command, because everybody can claim that they're doing something. They are not saying no, but on the other hand, nothing is happening, so it's an ugly way of having your cake and eating it too.

Leide: It takes very strong leadership. If you don't have very strong leadership, you can't do it. If General Schwarzkopf did anything, the best thing that he did was to put the coalition together and keep it together, because without the coalition we may never have attacked.

Student: I'd like to make a quick comment on the blood thing with the Saudis and then ask a question. Did anybody suggest to them that we should have the Saudis do it instead of the United States? If we let the Saudi doctors do the tests and everything, wouldn't that solve the problem?

Leide: We did. The problem that we had was chain of custody. What we wanted to do was have our doctors draw the blood so we could make sure that the blood that we got was what the Saudis say they took.

Student: So it started because you didn't trust them?

Leide: The blood could have been anyone's. We didn't know where it came from, but we had to take their word that it came from Iraqi defectors. You've got to do the best you can when you run up against something like this. This is something that they just would not give up on, even though the Saudi population was at risk.

Student: Aren't you saying that the cultural problem started on the American side? That we distrusted the Saudis?

Leide: Of course. Well, it didn't start that way, and we had to trust them. I don't think there was any distrust of the Saudis.

Student: You said you might not trust that they were giving you the right blood.

Leide: Well, we didn't, but you have to take it on faith, and that's what we did. We sent it back. We had it tested. It came back and the tests said, no, there were no inoculations. It wasn't that we didn't trust the Saudis, it was just that you want to be sure on something like that. You don't want guesswork. If you try to figure out whether somebody's going to use biological weapons against your soldiers, by God, you want to be as sure as possible that they're not.

Student: I agree with you 100 percent that your effectiveness in coalition warfare is infinitely heightened by training in peacetime and practicing together. But especially if you're going into areas where

you're not with traditional allies, for instance, the people of Singapore, with whom we're starting to do a lot more operations, how do you offset the balances of things like OPSEC (operational security) and effectiveness? I mean specifically using our command and control systems, our intel platforms, or those sort of things, and how much of the family jewels you show in practice. Does that make sense, sir?

Leide: It makes sense, and I'll give you an example from the Gulf War. There wasn't anything that we kept away from any of the coalition members, including Egypt. The Syrians were a little bit different. The Syrians are Syrians, but we gave the information to the Saudis. We worked very closely with the Egyptians. We didn't withhold anything that we got. Some sources and methods may have been disguised, but the information was still there, and every report and every assessment that I made, they had.

Student: But that was in a time of war. I mean in time of preparation and training and exercises, would we do that?

Leide: I guess you'd have to do it case by case. You've got to work through it. I think we're doing that pretty well now compared to what we used to, but you've got to do it on a case-by-case basis. You can't just give it carte blanche.

Student: General, this has applications within the connotations of coalition warfare. We've have a lot of futurists come by, from Alvin and Heidi Toffler through a bunch of others ...

Oettinger: I might say, other than in this seminar.

Student: Other than in the seminar, but in the Kennedy School.

Oettinger: I do not wish to assume the responsibility.

Student: I'm not saying that Dr. Oettinger had anything to do with it. Non-attribution.

Oettinger: You remember my comments on the futurists?

Student: This does have application to coalition warfare. Given your experience, I'd ask you please to share with us your feelings on the coming of the information age and C^4I and to put it in context. There's always been this insatiable desire for information at the commander's level. Could you express your concerns or beliefs about whether it'll work well: that we have this plethora of information available and that the methods that we have to get it there can make the difference between raw data, statistics, and just massive statistics, and good analyzed information?

Leide: That again is not a science, it's an art. How do you present information to a commander so he can make decisions? That's one of the biggest problems that I had with General Schwarzkopf—how do I present to him all of this information that's coming in, and how do I boil it down to a format that is usable for him to make decisions? Initially, I gave him reams of information, all these charts that had pretty yellow dots and green dots and pictures and stuff like that, and it was too much. So, it's almost a feel you have to get for working with the commander. I found that the simpler the better. If you understand what he's after, then you start putting it into the form that he needs to make that decision. Sometimes it's difficult because he doesn't even know how he needs it and what he needs, but if he can explain it to you, and you kind of feel what decisions he has to make and present him with information based on that—what we call essential elements of information—then he can make that decision.

By the time we basically got halfway through the air campaign, the stuff that we were giving to him was simple enough, precise enough, and in such a form that he was able to make all the decisions in the rest of the war based on what we were doing, without frustration. You're never sure of the information you're giving him, because again it's an art, not a science. Predictive analysis in particular is very difficult and is something that we, in intelligence,

earn our money for: dispositions, order of battle, and all that.

Information management is the wave of the future. If you can manage information—and that's intelligence or any other kind of information—and the information superhighway (it's kind of a kind of a hackneyed phrase, but it's true), that's the way to go. The problem is, if a commander doesn't have an insatiable appetite, then he ought to be fired. He ought to have an insatiable appetite for a certain kind of information. But, for example, commanders were not satisfied with just information. They wanted pictures. Everybody wanted pictures. Pictures are great, that's prima facie evidence: here it is. But he may say, "I want pictures instead of verbal things. There's a tank battalion over by such-and-such a port; okay, give me a picture of that!" Well, he doesn't need a picture of it. A tank battalion is a tank battalion.

But I think we in the intelligence business, prior to the war, were our own worst enemies because we'd go to a commander and say, "Boy, here's a color picture, a glossy print, it's three hours old, and we'll give this to you when you go to war." So, we went to war, and we had thousands of commanders. These thousands of commanders said, "Where's my picture? Why is it more than three hours old? Why is it in black and white rather than in color?" So the problem here is that you've got to be comfortable that what you're telling them is true. It's something that you've seen and you're explaining it to them.

The other thing that I think is going to help us is the digitization of the battlefield. I think that is the wave of the future. But again, it's not going to be an easy process to get that information out in the field.

Oettinger: You know, this is a marvelous segue into another topic. Over lunch, and also at the beginning of the session, General Leide pointed out that he testified a number of times before the Aspin Commission. In case some of you don't remember, that's a congressionally mandated commission with a mixture of members appointed by the President and members appointed by the Congress. It has recently begun to function with a staff director named Britt Snyder, who came out of the congressional staff, and its mission is to make recommendations about intelligence. It's one of several bodies charged with figuring out what to do with role, mission, and organization of the U.S. intelligence community. From your self-confessed 37 years in the military, some of them jumping out of airplanes, but in the latter years most of them in intelligence, I wonder whether you could spend some time now on your views of where's it all going?

Leide: The Lord only knows in what direction we're going. We're hoping that we won't throw the proverbial baby out with the bath water here. But there's no question that the intelligence system that we have is almost terribly archaic, and it doesn't work as well as it should, and it's fairly bloated. I'm not saying that it's bloated in the numbers of people and the amount of money. I'm talking about that it's bloated in efficiency. What we need to do is to focus. For example, in HUMINT—human intelligence, people gathering information—which I'm in charge of worldwide, whether it be defense attachés or clandestine officers or whatever, we've taken it all down. We've reduced the numbers of people in headquarters and places doing all this stuff, and we're focusing our efforts on the hard targets.

As I explained to the Aspin Commission, right now what we're doing is basing our intelligence infrastructure and our intelligence systems and capability for the future on today. Say we're looking 10 years down, and we say: Here's what we're going to do in R&D, and here's what we're going to with whatever," we're basing that on today's situation. What we need to do is to base it on 10 years from now, so that as we develop what we're going to be doing, and what we're going to look like in the future, we've got to look at what the world is going to look like in the future. That ain't easy.

Again, we go back to predictive analysis. Somebody has to bite the bullet and say, "Here's what we think the world's going to be like 10 years from now," so we can start developing our systems, developing our organization to compete with that. I

had to answer that question for Schwarzkopf. "What are the Iraqis going to do tomorrow? What are they going to do in the next 96 hours?" We have to predict what it's going to be in the future. It's not easy. You're always uncomfortable with it, but you've got to give it your best shot.

Student: But isn't that why we spend all that money and have those organizations: just to do that sort of analysis and prediction for policy makers?

Leide: Right now, what we do is concentrate on present threats. We have some assessments and we're saying, "Well, here is what a certain country is going to look like in 5 years, 2 years, or whenever it is." What we've got to do is look at it as a whole. What's the world going to look like as a whole in the future, and how do we craft our system to compete with that world in the future? If we look at it as what we're going to need in the future, we're basing it on today's situation, or next year's situation, or two years from now. That's easy, and we may be right. The problem is that if we're wrong, we're going to pay a hell of a price.

Student: But the problem with trying to look at the whole world is the same problem with trying to have total battlefield awareness. The more you want to know, the more processing power and the more collection you need, and this thing can just grow infinitely. So, how do you propose having that kind of awareness?

Leide: We've already got that expertise, and we've got people who are looking at every area of the world. What we need is a national look at what the world is going to look like 10 years from now. You see what I mean? We're already doing those things kind of individually. What we need to do is to have a global perspective for what the world is going to look like in the future. Again, it sounds simple, but it isn't. It's going to be tough.

Oettinger: But it doesn't sound simple to me. It sounds impossible. Can you be a little more specific in what you mean? Because what I hear you say is that you've got the pieces of a puzzle, but nobody's putting them together. That I can fathom, but then you're talking about doing that for 10 years out and I'm lost.

Leide: Well, it is impossible. Predicting the future is impossible. What I'm saying is that you've got to give it your best shot. You say, "Okay, this is what I think it's going to be," just as an intelligence officer has to do every day.

Oettinger: But 96 hours is a lot shorter than 10 years.

Leide: The first thing you've got to say is, "Do we need to look out 10 years in order to put together intelligence systems that we're going to be able to cope with?" That's the question we've got to ask. We'll need to do that to put together an intelligence architecture that is going to be able to cope with the world of the future.

Student: Certainly within systems and acquisition, it's at least 10 years.

Leide: At least. Now, what I'm telling you is we've got to start with a requirement—blinding flash of the obvious. If it's a tough assignment, we've got to do it. If it's impossible, okay. Is it possible at least to come close? Maybe. Can we give it a best shot? Yes, we'd better, because if we don't give it our best shot, then we're going to put something together that may or may not be right. I don't think we can risk that.

Student: Sir, you know the buzzword, at least a couple of years ago, out of Fort Huachuca, was the "seamless web architecture structure."

Leide: It sounds like a bunch of automatons.

Student: If you wanted something like a nexus of the systems, people, and doctrine, where would you say those three things relate to each other? Is one driving the other, or are they moving equally, or how is it?

Leide: I think what you have to do is look at these various parts, first of all in isolation. You look at the tactical level, the operational level, the strategic level. We have to leave the tactical level up to the services: "What are you going to need to support a corps in the future, no matter what the situation?" And a corps is going to fight in various spectra of warfare. When you look at what we are going to need at the operational level, that's when it starts getting tough.

The folks at Huachuca are thinking about the corps, as they should. What is the corps going to look like in the future? What are the corps responsibilities going to look like in the future? So you take a different perspective there. You almost kind of leave that alone, although when you get stuff off satellites down at the tactical level, there's a blurring of intelligence structure, and all the great striations that we used to have are gone. But you've still got these things that say, "I'm an army and I think I've got to support a corps or division. How do I do that? What do I need to do that on the modern battlefield?" Then you go up to the operational level and try to look at that.

The thing that bothers me about a lot of these phrases that are used is that you almost sound like an automaton. They sound good and they are good. The Army 's done a lot of great stuff in the last few years, as have the other services, but now you've got to look at how they focus at what we call the TIARA (tactical intelligence and related activities) level. What I'm talking about is at the operational and strategic levels, or the GDIP (General Defense Intelligence Program) level and NFIP (National Foreign Intelligence Program) level. That's driven with a national view of what the world is going to look like in the future, based not only on national requirements, but U&S (unified and specified) command requirements, which are important.

Student: My impression of what U.S. policy sometimes is, in terms of intelligence—and I thought that might an interesting prospect for the future—was that American intelligence builds coalitions within intelligence so as not to create that monster of monitoring the world. Rather, you have allies with whom you just engage in trade of intelligence so that you don't have to monitor Iraq 24 hours a day. You have allies who do that, and when you do need more information about Iraq, you move some of your sources there, but on a normal day-to-day basis you just have your allies doing that. What about that approach?

Leide: We monitor Iraq every day.

Student: I'm not talking about now, but before the Gulf War. What about saying, before you know that this is something that you're going to need, that you work on a certain target?

Leide: That's a very good point, because that's what I found as I reached CENTCOM just before the Iraqis launched over. If you look back at history, when you go back to the Iran-Iraq War, we were helping the Iraqis. People looked back and said, "That's anathema! You were working with the Iraqis?" Well, I mean, yes. Then you say, "Well, the lesser of two evils, I suppose," but that's the way it was. So what you're looking at here is a change of national doctrine and vision and policy, and you've got to be flexible enough to cope with that.

I hear a lot of folks saying, "Why are you putting stuff in place against Russia?" I say, "Because I'm looking 10 years down the road. The Russians are going to be Russians." I'm not saying that pejoratively against the Russians, but you've got to ask, "Are the Russians going to be a threat to us or a threat to Eastern Europe again? Are they going to try to get back to the Central Asian republics or whatever?" They're crippled now. I understand that, but are the Russians going to be Russians again, as they have been for centuries?

Student: I'm glad we have this discussion going on now. Let me tell you the problem that I've seen, and maybe you can educate me with a response. Just before I came here, I was in the dismounted battlespace battle lab at Fort Benning, Georgia. We looked out on the future, and I was in charge of future infantry concepts. As I would go to different wargames, high-level

ones like Prairie Warrior and General Headquarters Exercise, I came to see that within the Army, whether you were at the Military Intelligence Center, Infantry, Armor, or whatever, there were differences in perceptions of what the battlefield is going to look like X years out. Then as I went to some other exercises I saw that these differences, almost like what you were saying, were replicated in the other services. We didn't have a common vision of the threat, and of course, all of our developments in technology and weaponry clearly should be oriented on what we perceive as a threat. I was concerned that there was such bifurcation of views on this.

Is there, in fact, a process whereby at some point there's an identification of the threat, and maybe it starts at the national level or something, and then people start taking liberties with it when they have to break it out and get into specifics? What is the process, and why is it that I can't go to one blue folder or blue pamphlet or something that says "This is a threat, really, down to whatever level and, everybody, this is it?" I'm sorry about the long-winded question, but I know that there is some benefit in not having one identified threat. It's not such a bad thing for really smart people over here to have a slightly different view from these guys, and then everybody kind of works, because that way you kind of hedge your bets. It's more creative, innovative, and all that, but sometimes I say, no, I don't think that. That's it.

Student: I was just going to comment. I think one of things that Tony has tried to teach us a lot in this course is that if you put all your eggs in one basket, and we plan for one common threat, what happens if it's not there?

Leide: But that's okay, because I can say, "Then let's go for the most dangerous threat and we just go with that and we can ratchet down."

Student: But what if that "most dangerous threat" never even exists?

Leide: That's what we've been doing for years: we've had one threat, and that's what we have gauged our organizations on. We've had these other things going on around the world, but our organization, our doctrine, our training, everything, was gauged on that one threat. Now that threat is gone.

Oettinger: Over lunch you pointed out some of the consequences of that. Your MI (military intelligence) units with their wheel-mounted platforms couldn't go off track, but then they were designed for a threat with well-paved roads in central Europe and they couldn't follow anything in the desert. So I think you yourself made the point of where the danger lies. It seems to be following that.

Leide: The problem is that we're going through these pains now of asking "Who are we? Why are we?" If you look at what our military is being asked to do—two MRCs (major regional conflicts), i.e., two Gulf Wars—can we do that? Do we have the intelligence to do two Gulf Wars? Does our Army, for example, have the capability of fighting all spectra of war? If so, can they do one spectrum, one part of the spectrum, or all together, and do it well? What is our mix going to be? And then, what is our doctrine going to be? The problem is that we haven't totally developed our joint doctrine.

Right now the problem is that you see there are a lot of threats out there. We talk about these titanium rice bowls. The Army wants to do their thing, because the Army knows best what's best for the Army, and that may be true. Then you say, "Well, if the infantry wants to do it this way, how does the armor want to do it? How does the armor battle lab want to do it compared to the infantry battle lab? Do they dovetail together, which they should?" If they don't, we have a problem. Each is still trying to do their own thing, as we have for centuries. Unless we do it as an army, unless we do it as a joint organization, we're never going to get anywhere.

We saw the results of that kind of thinking during the Gulf War, where we had lack of interoperability. We couldn't pass information back from the Air Force to the Navy, that kind of stuff.

Student: Let me just ask as a point of clarification: in DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or whatever, does somebody come out with a book that says, "This is our best guess"? Looking at maneuver, air, whatever, from the red side, does it say, "Okay, Air Force, Army, everybody, listen up: here's what we see as your most likely or most dangerous threats in the year 2010. We think that it's quite likely that you'll face an adversary that has these land warfare capabilities." I don't know what level they go down to. If they go down to a level that an infantry battalion commander is concerned about, that's sufficient information for combat developers not to screw up. They don't have to start interpolating and extrapolating. Is there such a document? If so, how specific is it?

Leide: It is specific, but the problem is you could lay out all these threats in all these different countries, and all of them are threats. We intelligence folks have been told to keep an eye on them. Of course, the first time you tell us not to keep an eye on them, like Rwanda, something happens. So then you've got to worry about that.

The key here is that we in intelligence have to say, "Here are the threats." Somebody at an echelon way above us has to decide, "Okay, we can't do them all, so here are the ones that we need to do." We've just gone through that process. The problem is, how does that translate down at the division and brigade levels? How does that translate into what we're talking about? To the Army, that matters to a degree, but it really doesn't because they've got to be able to cope with all kinds of scenarios. That's the frustration. Right now we don't have the money or the people to do it all. So you've got the infantry, you've got the armor, you've got the artillery, you've got everybody trying to fight for their own rice bowl. That's happening within the services and between the services now because we've got these monetary threats against us.

Oettinger: I find this discussion fundamentally perverse.

Leide: It is. And it's necessary.

Oettinger: Let me try to articulate and see if I can get you or these guys to comment. The discussion is wonderful. It brings out important points, but there are some assumptions that I want to challenge: yours and more so some others around this table.

Student: He's ready, I can see it.

Oettinger: It's this notion of fathoming something 10 years out. You said a moment ago that you've got to do that because you've got to procure, but if I say to myself that I can't know what's out there 10 years from now, then what's wrong is the procurement cycle, and it would seem to me the important thing to do is to smash that into smithereens so that the system becomes more rapidly responsive. That's number one.

Then you say you lack a blue folder with the vision, and I've just spent hours with a bunch of corporate types who have been shackled by some vision which turned out dead wrong, and they're trying to figure out what the hell you do with it. It isn't that the boss hasn't given you a vision, it's that he doesn't even know what the vision might be, and he's hoping you have some idea. So the procurement for 10 years out and the vision—if someone, heaven help us, has one—are both probably wrong.

Then what is this threat 10 years out? You keep saying 10 years out. Whoever the threat is, he isn't going to get there overnight either. I mean, the poor son of a bitch is also, as we are, trapped in being where he is today, and he's not going to get to 10 years from now without going through some intermediate stages. So it seems to me that rather than talking about this impossible thing 10 years out there, why don't we talk more about tracking and reactions to tracking, so that you catch things as they develop?

Leide: But, Tony, look, you know, we go through developmental cycles that are 10 or 15 years long.

Oettinger: But then we've got to fix them! We've got to make those shorter.

Leide: We can't.

Oettinger: Why? Why can we not?

Leide: For example, we can buy stuff off the shelf, but we've got some specific requirements that we have to develop on our own. So the key here is, you can say that you can't have a vision of what war is going to look like in the future, or you can say, "It's going to look like this or it's going to look like that." That's just like my telling General Schwarzkopf, "Gee, I can't tell you that, boss, because that's too hard to do."

Oettinger: But with Schwarzkopf you had a short-term tactical thing, and for what you're going to do tomorrow morning, you'd better put your butt on the line.

Leide: But it's even more difficult, because there are more unknowns than knowns.

Oettinger: Except for this, you see. There's a big difference, which I hope we can get at. In the Schwarzkopf situation, in the Gulf War, what is today is today, and the odds of tomorrow morning being a lot like today are overwhelming. Therefore, I strongly respect your felt obligation to General Schwarzkopf to say, "I know, or I know as best I can, where we are today. The only reality we have is today and, therefore, my obligation to tell you about 24 hours from now or even 96 hours from now I take very seriously."

Leide: Right.

Oettinger: But when you jump to 10 years, and you say we've got to because we've got 10-year procurement cycles, what I hear is that a major problem in intelligence organization and reorganization is to break the procurement cycle.

Leide: No, this is intelligence as a whole. I'm talking about the intelligence architecture as a whole. I'm not only talking about procurement cycles.

Student: That's only a small portion.

Leide: That's a part of it. We have to play a role in that. When the F-117 came out of the box, they came to me and said they needed a certain kind of targeting material. I started scratching my head and other bodily parts and saying, "Why are you telling me that now, in wartime? Why couldn't you tell me that 5 years ago, when you knew that this was the kind of stuff you were going to need?"

Oettinger: But you see, now we're getting back at it: some things that might happen 10 years out may happen because the other guy has to make commitments today to build the weapon systems that you're going to need then.

Student: That's just specific systems.

Leide: That's just an example of what we've got to do with the entire structure, and the only way to do that is to look at what the world is going to be like. You can't get into specifics.

Oettinger: But the notion of what the world is going to be like 10 years from now strikes me as an absurd one, that I have to break out of.

Student: As an example, if I might, we're talking about a specific huge army. Whether we're talking about the previous Soviet Union threat or the Iraqi threat, we're talking about that old paradigm of a huge, strong armored force, that sort of thing. Now we're talking about the requirements that General Leide and the nation have: to identify the Rwandas, the Somalias, all those things, and enter into different areas, and at the same time downsize. You're going to operate with less money. You're going to operate with 30 percent fewer people, and meanwhile we're going to totally reorganize. So you end up with this new ... it's not a rice bowl, it's an aquarium that you're living in, and you're trying to reach out there, do more with less, and you can make all the trite analogies you want to, but you're expected to come up with these very difficult predictive pictures about what the new threat is. The new

threat is water in Rwanda. It's famine. It's botulism. It's all those things.

Leide: How do we base this study? How would you logically create a system that's going to cope with the future? Is it going to cope with the world of 15 or 18 months from now? Or does it have to be built for the world of 10 years from now? Because you can't change it easily.

Oettinger: Yes and no. I guess what I'm looking for is a gradation of things, since nobody is 10 feet tall, nobody has omniscience, and so forth. There are some things that people commit to in advance. Political systems, barring a quick revolution, are that way, some of them. There are other things that may make major changes in fairly short order that you can't predict. It seems to me you need something more subtle than saying "10 years out."

Leide: Tony, I've got to tell you, we have been doing it the way you are talking about now for years, and it's not worked. What you've got to do is build the system that looks 10 years out, and I've done this on three ten-year plans now. We build a system so that you reassess on at least an annual basis, and it's built so that it is a dynamic process. But you've got to start someplace. For example, we went through this process, and we said, "Okay, 10 years from now, this is what we think the world is going to look like, and these are going to be our requirements. Are we going to need Farsi speakers 10 years from now?"

How many times have we gone to war without linguists? Everything we do is ad hoc. We create organizations ad hoc. We create virtually everything. We're reactive. What we've got to be is proactive. Yes, it's a risk, but if an intelligence organization does not try at least to give us a best shot at predictive analysis, we're abrogating our primary responsibility.

Oettinger: But you've now enabled me perhaps to frame what I think may be the nub of the argument. What's wrong with aiming—either instead of or as well as—at being better at being reactive?

Leide: We can't afford to be reactive.

Student: Another thing is that you have a million and a half people in the armed services in the United States. You can't make a large organization like that react effectively in the manner you're referring to, because there are implications for any new capabilities or changed capabilities and what may introduce them to any or all of the armed services. It requires doctrinal modifications, training, and spin-ups, and people can't just get out there in these behemoths called services and integrate and operate that quickly.

Now, having said that, I think everyone would agree to this idea about procurement and acquisition. There's a panoply of regulations and laws that people are just trying to knock down. There are revolutionaries out there in the hierarchy that would want to get it down, but it's just proven to be, over the years, a very difficult thing, though there have been some successes in the lower categories of acquisition. It would be nice to be able to say, "Let's just kind of react. We'll have an acquisition system, and let's pick something off the shelf or get it funded and whatever." Even if you could do that, it's very difficult to get these very finely tuned armed services that we do have to operate effectively on the battlefield. We are well trained because we've taken the time to build up the high standards, and we knew what our doctrine was. All these things fell into place, and as soon as you pull out one piece and quickly insert another, there are implications that one must consider.

Student: I think it's not easy, but fairly possible to look out and make some general assumptions about what the world will be like at a given point in time. There will be more nuclear weapons states than there are now. There will be a greater dichotomy between the North and the South. There'll be more people living in China. The difficulty comes in trying to pinpoint the details. So if you can plan for the general, as opposed to planning for the specific, doesn't that offer some sort of option for saying, "These are the things that we think are most likely, and we'll do a yearly review and

keep up 'how's it going' type of stuff?" That seems reasonable.

Leide: You have to do that, and you have to get as specific as possible. You kind of look at what we consider the rogue states now. Are they going to be rogue states 10 years from now? Who knows? Something could change. Look what happened to the Shah. Iran went from being our best friend in the Gulf to being an enemy. So those things are going to happen, and it is very difficult to forget, but there were signs that we might at least have been able to pick up to predict hostility. But is North Korea going to be a rogue state 10 years from now? Is Iraq going to be a rogue state 10 years from now? Is Iran going to be a rogue state 10 years from now? Frankly, I don't know, but you've got to plan on certain things that are going to occur.

Oettinger: Yes, but you already softened it. I think you've said something very important in the last minute or two: that you're talking about a rolling process, which strikes me as being a lot different from a fixed point.

Leide: You've got to start someplace, though.

Oettinger: Yes, but starting a process with the understanding that what you are aiming it toward is adjustable.

Leide: It's got to be adjustable.

Oettinger: That's an important element, because I'm more at peace with the view that there's a blue folder that is revised every three months or six months or even every year, than that it's just a blue folder.

Leide: I go back to the Gulf War, again, because it's a microcosm, but I adjusted every hour. If we set this thing in stone, and we don't go back and reassess, or if we reassess and we see we were wrong and we don't admit it, we've got a big problem.

Oettinger: But now you've given a very different message. It says now that all of these ponderous things that you've described—the doctrine, the training procedures, et cetera—may not need to be instantly adjustable, but they need to have built in as part of the doctrine an adaptation to this rolling planning that you're talking about. That strikes me as very different from the usual doctrine. Most doctrine manuals don't say, "By the way, everything on all the preceding pages may be revised tomorrow, and be on the alert for the revisions." That breeds a very different mental attitude.

Leide: Let me tell you: I've done this and it works. You've got to put in flexibility. For example, when I did this 10-year plan for my defense attaché system, and I looked 10 years down the road, I didn't know that I would have to put people in the Central Asian Republics, or that I would put people in Vietnam, or I would put people in Cambodia, but I'm going to do it because those are requirements. I was able to adjust to those because I've got a plan.

Oettinger: But speak a bit more, for our benefit, to how the plan aids and abets the adjustments. Can you talk to that issue?

Leide: I'm not so sure it's the plan that aids it. You've got to have a plan that is capable of being adjusted, and you've got to build the plan that way. That's what we do. They've got to know what the plan is, and they've got to know that this is an adjustable plan, so that they can react to it. That's the only thing I'm telling you. The way we have done it in the past is that they've gone off on their own and done tactical and operational doctrinal stuff in their research and development and in the purchasing of systems. What we've got to do is say that there's got to be a rhyme or reason for it. It may not be valid 10 years from now, but we've got to start someplace because we've never really done it that way before.

Student: But why be so concerned about the threat? I realize that this is a different view of things. Why should the militarily most powerful nation in the world, arguably the most influential and the most

technologically advanced actor in the world, be concerned about reacting to what we can guess about what will happen in various different places? Why not just decide what capabilities we feel are required to maintain that status in the world, and say we're going to work to that capability? Maybe that's just a little different way of saying "threat-based requirements."

Leide: If we don't know what those requirements are, then we're just out there in the dark going around in circles.

Student: And no money comes. Congress won't give you money. That's why everything gets shot down right now. It's like, "Why do you need the F-22A? What's the threat out there?"

Student: To me then it's just a façade to say we are basing all this on "I need the money because of this threat that I perceive 10 years out," when what we've discussed is that predicting that threat is impossible.

Leide: Let me tell you the "open sesame" here. The magic to this is that if you do it right, my plan stands on its own merits, because it's based on requirements. It's not based on my requirements as an intelligence officer; it's based on operational requirements, it's based on strategic requirements, it's based on policy requirements. We in the intelligence business tried to do this in splendid isolation. It's not the way you should do it. You've got to go out and say, "Okay, Office of the Secretary of Defense, what do you need? JCS, what do you need? CINCs, what do you need?" Then you put all that together. Somebody prioritizes it for you. They say, "Okay, this is what we're going to do to meet those needs."

One of the things you have to do—and they're doing it all the time—is ask what they think the world is going to look like 10 years from now. That's what we put into this plan. It's a viable, dynamic plan that we go back and reassess all the time. If we don't do it that way, we're going to do it exactly the way we've been doing it for as long as I can remember, and it hasn't worked. We have muddled through because we've had a lot of money to do it with.

Student: And we had a pretty good guess as to what the threat would be because the threat was, for the most part, based on a single perceived opponent.

Leide: That's right. It was easy.

Oettinger: And it was based on the fact that this opponent had, as one knew to an extent determined by one's intelligence capability, made significant investments that he couldn't turn around easily either. It seems to me that what is missing is some flexibility in terms of looking at an opponent's capabilities that aren't on a time scale commensurate with one's own formula.

Leide: To go back to research and development, once he was putting something into a 15-year plan, which is basically what he put it into, it never came out in less time. So we could almost bet that it was going to happen 15 years from now if we knew when it went in. They were strict on their 15-year plan, their cycle. They never varied from it, so it was easy for us to plan. Now it's not easy, because we don't have one place to look.

Oettinger: Right, but if there's nobody out there who is making guaranteed 15-year plans or 10-year plans, what is the point of planning against something that doesn't exist?

Leide: How do we know they're not? Do you think Iran's not making a 15-year plan?

Student: But I would maintain that the infantryman in his electronic suit that our friend in the Army's future battle lab was building in his mind is much more of a threat to anybody else in the world than could be mounted against him.

Student: But that's what the Spanish who designed armor thought about the musket. They didn't consider the musket. When the musket came along, armor was no more. They figured they were the

strongest in the world, so they just kept making armor for their troops.

Student: But they probably guessed that some one else was going to design a musket. They probably had it at least in their minds.

Student: That's where the failing was, though. They didn't do any intelligence estimates and say, "Hey, this new technology is going to wipe out our great, big, strong nation." What if we sit on the F-22, and we say, "We need the F-22. It's going to be a great aircraft," and then suddenly we're dealing with smaller pockets of forces where you can't just go in a drop a whole bunch of bombs? You can't build B-52s and carpet bomb a town, because the forces are going from house to house now.

Student: You've just speculated the existence of those things.

Leide: There are things we know are coming down the pike. We know the North Koreans are developing a long-range missile. We know they may have a nuclear capability. We know it's going to be a threat to Japan and Asia as a whole. We know eventually it could be a threat to the hemisphere. We know that we've got to plan for that kind of thing.

Student: Without getting off the subject, just to bring in the HUMINT aspect, what I'm hearing here is that someone is afraid that if we don't plan well, in 10 years' time we'll wake up and see that some enemy has some great capability, which will be a threat to the United States. So shouldn't more emphasis be put on intentions, instead of on capabilities? This brings up the question of how you see human intelligence in the next few years in comparison to the other forms of intelligence.

Leide: Human intelligence has always been critical. We've just never done it very well.

Student: Is there anything you can say about organizational change to push human intelligence forward? Because there's a lot of criticism on the value of human intelligence.

Leide: I'm doing it. It's expensive, and one of the big problems we're having with this is that we're breaking service force structure. When you start breaking service force structure, because we're eliminating battalions and brigades and stuff that used to do these things before and we're centralizing it, we're getting bleats from the services. We're taking away battalion commands, we're taking away brigade commands, and those things are happening all over the place anyway. This is just another part of that.

I think the way we're doing it now is much more effective and will be much more effective than it has been in the past. But it's just one of those things that was forced on us, frankly, even though I and others had wanted to do this for years. Budgetary requirements and stuff like that have forced us to make these changes, and it's going to be better because we're going to be able to break down an awful lot of nonsensical things that we used to do just to do them. Now we're focusing on the things we need to focus on.

Student: I would like you to talk a bit about the reorganization in intelligence, because I think you haven't really gotten down to that. I believe a lot this reorientation has to do with what you just mentioned: centralization of a lot of the assets under DIA or CIA and so on. Does that mean that now you have less independent analysis, and will have a kind of aggregated analysis? And is that a danger?

Leide: Yes, it is. This is one of the problems we had in the Gulf War. It's been something that we all have to look at because, as you know, as a result of what happened during Vietnam, our CIA was given the charter to provide an independent view, and that's something we need continuously. We need something or someone to look at these things and try to make sure that they're not being politicized or that there's nothing radically wrong with the assessments. I think we can still do that, and we've got to continue to do that.

Now the problem is, do you need a whole agency to do that? Do you need duplication to do that? And how do you do that? What kind of balance do you have? Really what we're looking at now in the intelligence community is that we need a structure, and it's got to be balanced. We don't have a balance now.

I'd just like to talk about that independent view, because it's one of the things that caused us this great ache and pain during the Gulf War. If a theater commander or a tactical commander asks his intelligence officer what he thinks, he can't get four different views of what is going to happen tomorrow. The intelligence officer has to give him his best shot. What General Schwarzkopf was upset about during the Gulf War was that he was getting assessments from the national level that said, "They may do *this*, but so-and-so says they might do *that*, and this other one disagrees with that and thinks they're going to do *this*." But when you're making tactical and operational decisions, that's not the way it's got to be. When he asked me a question—and he asked me all the time—"What's going to happen in the future?" I couldn't say, "Well, I think he's going to do *this* or he's going to do *this*, or he might do *this* because he might do *that*." How's he going to make tactical and operational decisions on what he's going to do and tactic his force based on something that is imprecise as that?

If I give him my best shot and it's wrong, then I've got a problem. But on the other hand, unless a decision maker gives his intelligence officer the opportunity to fail, he's going to have an intelligence officer who is going to be afraid to give him his best shot. He's going to safe-side. So remember the opportunity to fail. Fortunately we were right most of the time, and we were right all of the time on the major decisions.

The problem that we had with Washington was that some of the key things in the assessments we were getting out of Washington were caveated. I said, "You can vet all of those things and have independent views within the Beltway, but when you come out of Washington to a tactical commander, you've got to give it your best shot. You can't equivocate, because you've got a lot of lives at stake out there. These are precise decisions that are being made, and he's trying to be proactive." On the battlefield, if you're proactive you're way ahead of the game. You're talking about a fast-moving battlefield, you're talking about logistics, you're talking about tactical units. He would rather know where the enemy is going to be so he can tactic his organizations and his logistics and so forth way ahead of the game, rather than be reactive.

So an independent view is important, I think, insofar as strategic assessments are concerned. When you start talking about some of those assessments going down to the operational and tactical unit levels, they've got to give their best shot.

So how do you balance that and how do you get an independent view? You've got to have a way of doing that, for sure. How do you do that? I don't know. Hopefully, they'll find a way of doing it. Right now the CIA does that, but on the other hand, it's been spotty.

Student: I have a question regarding the discussion here. There are a lot of assumptions being made here about the role of intelligence, and I have a sense that even that is not necessarily resolved. Some people seem to think that we should expect intelligence to make good predictions. I tend to be a little scared by the tendency that you think that you're in intelligence and you have all this information at your fingertips, and you should still exert a kind of seductive pull on the officers to tell you the one thing they want to know and then kind of push the responsibility to you because you said what's going to happen, and you were mistaken, and I as an officer operated on it.

I think you raised the distinction between the tactical and what the world is maybe going to look like in 10 years, but as to what the world is going to look like in 10 years at the general level, I don't think intelligence is any better than the academy, or for that matter anybody who's reading the op-ed pages of the *New York Times*. Therefore, it probably should not be the role of intelligence. However, in terms of

what kind of weapon is being developed currently in North Korea, and what will be developed in 10 years, I think intelligence can do an excellent job, because it has information that's not readily available. But I think that intelligence, in general, should avoid the tendency to predict just because you feel that you have all this knowledge, and therefore you are very capable.

Leide: No, it's not us. The decision makers should demand that we tell them what we think the future is going to look like. That's what intelligence is all about.

Student: That's what I don't agree with.

Leide: We in intelligence do a lot of things, but the most important thing we do is try to say, "Here's what happened yesterday." This is what all my people used to do before I got to CENTCOM. They provided historical data. The next step to that is: what does that mean? You can just dump that on a decision maker's desk, and say, "Here's what happened yesterday." He'll say, "Oh, that's good."

Student: Does this say there's a difference between meaning and prediction?

Leide: Yes. Wait a minute. There are three steps to this. The second step is: what does that mean? You, as an expert on the Iraqi army, have got to tell me what that means. You studied the Iraqi army for years. That's what you're there for. What does that mean as far as his capabilities are concerned? Then, based on all that, can you tell me what that means for the future? That's where you give the decision maker the leg up: prediction of the future so he doesn't have be reactive, he can be proactive. Now, if I, in the United States, am planning my force for the future, is it good to plan my force based on today, or is it better to plan based on what we think the future is going to look like?

Student: I'm not sure that one is better than the other, precisely because of that notion that if you don't know what the future is going to look like you might have been better off planning based on what you know has happened—what you do know about it—rather than on what you don't know.

Leide: Logic will tell you that if you have a good assessment of what you think it's going to look like in the future, it would be better than just saying, "Well, you know, it's very safe to base it on the present." That's very safe, but it may be terribly wrong. It may be even more wrong than trying to give it your best shot, as experts, as to what you think the world is going to look like in the future.

Oettinger: Let me try to divide it. A moment ago I was where you are in terms of my reaction to that statement, but once he qualifies that by saying "I revisit it the next day or next month or next year," then I think it is a very sound compromise between the extreme of betting on today and the other equally (to my mind) absurd extreme of betting on some unique thing 10 years out, which is what I first heard and what I think you're reacting to. But I think the argument, now that I think I understand it better, is a much more subtle argument. It says that if I want to liberate myself (and correct me if I'm wrong, because I'm now trying to test an understanding that I've developed in listening to you today), betting on today being a projection for tomorrow is inane because the odds are very small that it will be. Okay, so now what do I do? Well, I project out X—whatever it is, 10 years, 5 years; it doesn't matter. I know that that's bound to be wrong also, but at least it jars me off the complacency of thinking that 10 years from now it will be like today, which is sort of dumb.

Now, I also know that my guess at 10 years out is going to be wrong. So what do I do? When I know a little bit more tomorrow, the next day, the next year, I'm going to modify, and I'm going to keep doing that. That's a fairly rational approach to avoiding the pitfalls of the extremes. If, in the same process, that leads to a flexibility in the instruments, because I don't just want to do this monolithic plan, but this adjustable plan, that's critical. If my instruments stay put, then what the hell, this is a waste of time. But if my instruments

are also tailored to be an appropriately rolling set of instruments, then I have a process that has some element of rationality. Have I understood what you're saying?

Leide: Absolutely. Let me just take an example. What is the Iranian threat to Israel today?

Student: One is the atomic bomb, if they're working on it, or other nonconventional weapons. And the other one is the Islamic revolution spreading.

Leide: Okay, how about missiles?

Student: Yes, the missile as a platform for delivery of nuclear warheads.

Leide: Can the Iranians hit Israel today with nuclear-tipped missiles?

Student: Nuclear missiles today? No, we think not.

Leide: Okay. Do you think they're going to be able to do it in the future?

Student: Yes, that's a working assumption.

Leide: So we've got to plan on exactly what you're doing. You're developing a missile, an anti-missile missile, right?

Student: Anti-missile missile. Correct. You're paying for it. Would you plan for that, and not for whether they would want to use it? What if we say that 10 years from now, Iran has changed its policies?

Leide: Aha! See? Okay.

Student: What you want to prepare for is just the fact it might have a nuclear bomb, not whether it's going to become a westernized country again.

Leide: Can Israel afford, or can we afford, to say we shouldn't prepare for that because they may change in four years?

Student: But that's exactly what I'm saying. You don't look at the policy or what Iran is going to look like as a country in four years, you just look at its capabilities in four years, so that's something that an intelligence service can do.

Leide: We just did.

Student: We're also looking at intentions. It's not only capabilities. In the case of Iran it's easy because you have intentions and capabilities. But you have to think of other countries also.

Oettinger: There was a period under the Shah when Iran was one of Israel's best friends. So the intentions also change, but I think there is this element of rationality in saying that if he's got the capability, I do have to plan against worst-case intentions. This is the gist of the argument about the Russians: that the intentions and at the moment the capabilities have gone down some, but who is to say where the weathervane of intentions may go?

Leide: That's right. When you think about those kinds of things, that's really what I'm saying here: you plan for the future. You can afford to do no less. That doesn't mean you can't change. If you develop this system so that you can change and reassess and reevaluate, and you've got a dynamic process, that's the key here.

Student: I think what we're also talking about is recapitalization, which is a challenge we heard about from some folks here in terms of industrial base and all that. The recapitalization of sources, of the way you do things, the training, as you mentioned, sir, you can't do overnight. That's the reactive part. You have to build the total system.

Leide: That's right. All I'm saying is, it's not going to be perfect, but it's got to be something better than the way we do it now.

Oettinger: But let me interject here. If you put on the policy maker's hat, this gets to the essential need for at least two estimates, because now that I understand the process, or think I understand what you

said, the perversion of the process is to gear those estimates not to reality, but to the rice bowl bureaucratic wishes, and tailor the threat to the desire for the size of the response rather than to the actual need. It seems to me there's plenty of historical evidence for that unfortunate perversion to take place, and so you need at least one independent threat assessor. The minute you do that, then you get into the kind of hassle that Jack described as between the Washington estimates and the field estimates. If it isn't Washington and the field, then it's A and B, whoever A and B are; it doesn't matter. But again, nobody does that wantonly. You do it because there's good historical evidence for damn near any one organization, sooner or later, getting somewhat perverse, and you reduce those risks if you've got two of them. Then you create a whole other set of problems, which you talked about very eloquently.

Student: Sir, what is your assessment of our linguist capability within the active force, or total force, and our ability to draw from outside? In the era of drawdown, how do you think that's either being enhanced or ... ?

Leide: Right now it's bad to terrible. We learn lesson after lesson after lesson. The problem that we have is, again, how do you plan for the future for linguists?

Student: Who would have thought a couple of years ago we'd need Serbo-Croatian linguists?

Leide: Or somebody who spoke Tutsi or something. I mean, how do you do that?

Student: Are we reacting to this or not?

Leide: Yes, we always have.

Student: I read a complaint just a couple of weeks ago, and this was by I think a master sergeant who had been sent to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey. He had all this fantastic training in Spanish, and as soon as he was done with that training, they sent him off to Japan or somewhere, and he has not used it, he said, in about 15 years.

Leide: There are horror stories upon horror stories upon horror stories. I could go back 37 years and give you chapter and verse on that.

Student: Because you concentrated on Mandarin Chinese.

Leide: Yes, it was a miracle.

Oettinger: Well, but then he came from China and went to Iraq.

Leide: Well, that's true. Yes. I went from being the senior China analyst to being the senior Iraqi analyst very quickly. But the beauty of this kind of planning is that at least you can stress certain areas. We saw that Turkish may be something that we need. Farsi is a language we may need in the future. We found that Arabic is certainly a language that we need. As you go through the process that we just went through, it's amazing how we were able to provide the services with the numbers, the types, the grades of linguists that we're going to need seven years from now. We may not need them, but at least we aren't reacting the way we have in the past and having to go all over the place trying to find linguists to do a certain mission.

The first thing we don't do well is identify our linguists, even within the services. When I was G-2 of the 82nd Airborne Division, somebody came up to me and said, "We're short of Spanish linguists." So I said, "Let me check." So I went down to the S-2 of each battalion. We had 4,000 native Spanish linguists in that division.

Student: Sir, I had to learn the jump commands in Spanish.

Leide: Yes. See? And you did okay. Your lips moved and all that. But we had Blackfoot Indian speakers and stuff. There were people we didn't have any idea we had, but we don't do that very well, even within the service. Now, what we're trying to do is go out and draft the reserve force.

But again, you've got to have a plan. You've got to have the requirements.

Oettinger: Let me take you full circle because that's a cultural problem. I speak as a former professor of linguistics. It's a discipline that this university has tried repeatedly to abolish, the most recent attempt being last year. It has a peculiar status. Historically the United States has never paid much attention to other languages because of its charmed geographical location, even given the fact that it has one of the most polyglot populations in the world as a result of immigration and one thing or another. It's just not in the U.S. culture. But little by little, you see it moving.

For years we've now had maritime reserves, then air reserves, contracting with airlines to be available for transport. You heard last week from General Edmonds that the communications people are coming around to the notion of having contingent contracts for communications bandwidth capability in that fashion. But that's a latecomer, because culturally that doesn't sort of sit right the same way. Maybe the day will come when we can contract for linguistic reserves, because with American business becoming far more multinational, the odds of having identified and having on hand linguistic assets are at least as good as the odds of having communications capabilities or shipping capabilities or airline capabilities. But you also have to have a will, and for the last 200 years there's been the notion of "Who gives a damn about linguists." It's not something that anybody cares about, except for intelligence specialists. You even find in our record Bobby Inman complaining about it,* but the common person? It's not something you think about.

Leide: They are thinking about it, because I'm bringing it to the forum with them.

Oettinger: Good luck this time around!

Leide: No. They're very supportive. I think we may have hit a resonant chord here, because we've had this problem almost universally. Every time something happens, we're always scratching around for the proper linguists, and they're out there.

Why did we have to go and hire 300 Kuwaitis? It was a great initiative, and they worked out fine, but I'm sure we had 300 Arabic speakers who were available to us. We just didn't know where they were, and we didn't have a way of getting them. I found out early on, when I was a young company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division and we went down to the Dominican Republic, that we had a whole bunch of Cubans in the 82nd Airborne Division who had been at the Bay of Pigs. They were now in the U.S. Army, and they were worth their weight in gold. Were they intelligence officers? No. But I'll tell you, every commander had one with him. They're invaluable. I say that because I'm a linguist, but there's no question in my mind that it's invaluable to a commander, or intelligence officer, or whatever.

Student: We discussed lots of threats and needs we'll be seeing in the future. If I could take a step back to the Aspin Commission for a minute here, do you think we're looking at functional changes within extant organizations? Do you think we're looking at restructuring within those organizations, rather than just functional changes? Or are we really going to look at a wholesale cross-organization remapping in the intelligence community? Where do you think this new look is taking us? The latter or all of the above?

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* Bobby R. Inman, "Managing Intelligence for Effective Use," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1980.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 1980; "Issues in Intelligence," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1981.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 1981; "Technological Innovation and the Cost of Change," in *Seminar on Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, Guest Presentations, Spring 1986.* Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, February 1987.

Leide: There's nothing that is sacrosanct. I think you'll see a big change, and I think it's going to be for the better. At least I hope so. I hope they take their time in doing it, rather than doing it quickly, because there's a lot of emotion that's going into this. There's a lot at stake in this. If they have to strip it and put it back together again, so be it, and hopefully, it'll be for the best, but there is nothing that the commission is not looking at, for change or for otherwise.

Oettinger: On that note, sir, I notice that it is approaching four o'clock, and I would like to thank you for once again bringing us a very, very stimulating and informative discussion. We have for you a small—but different from last time—token of our appreciation.


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
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