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Intelligence Analysis in Coalition Warfare
John A. Leide

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Intelligence Analysis in Coalition Warfare

John A. Leide

Major General John A. Leide, USA, is Director of the National Military Intelligence Collection Center at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). He joined the Army in 1958, commanded an airborne rifle company in the U.S. and the Dominican Republic, and held several combat commands in Vietnam. In 1970, he began to study Mandarin Chinese, and in 1974 he became the first and only U.S. officer to graduate from the Chinese Army Command and General Staff College. Thereafter, he served as Assistant Army Attaché in Hong Kong, commanded a Special Forces Battalion at Fort Bragg, and was Chief, China Far East Division, Directorate for Estimates, DIA. As Military Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1983 to mid-1984, he had major responsibilities for counterterrorism, special operations, and international security assistance. Major General Leide then commanded the 500th Military Intelligence Group, with a Pacific-Basin-wide collection mission, and later served as the Director of Foreign Intelligence, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. He was the U.S. Defense Attaché in China from May 1988 through the Tiananmen Square crisis. In August 1990 he was named Director of Intelligence, J-2, U.S. Central Command, and served in this capacity throughout Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He was Director for Attachés and Operations from June 1992 to June 1993, when he assumed his current position. His many military awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star for Valor with three oak leaf clusters, the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement, and the Liberation Medal first class from the government of Kuwait.

Oettinger: You have all had a chance to look at our speaker's biography, and you know that he's had an extraordinarily varied career within the intelligence field and in a variety of climes. He's going to speak to us, perhaps, about his experiences in the Gulf, but I've also asked him to talk about his experiences in China or anywhere else. He has indicated that he is willing to be interrupted and steered in directions of interest to the class almost anywhere along the path. I will end sharply at quarter to four to make sure that he will not be so gracious that he misses his plane for us. It's all yours.

Leide: Okay, thanks, Tony, I would like to just start out by saying that we can probably take this discussion in any direction you'd like. Maybe we can tread in areas where humans have never trodden before, or slithered before, or whatever. What I wanted to do is just start out this discussion with some of the exigencies of coalition warfare, because it does, I think, portend the wave of the future for all of us, in all countries, and how we're going to conduct warfare in the future.

In fact, I was showing Tony that on the way down here I was trying to write down all of the various difficulties involved in coalition warfare. I got to a list that was beyond my capability and the space on the card, because there are a lot of things that people just don't really think about when you talk about coalition warfare.

Oettinger: May I interrupt? I can't resist this. Mike McConnell was here a year ago, and this is from his edited transcript, which is public, so I'm not telling anything out of school here. He said that you need to do a lot of things in coalition war—targeting, order of battle, terrain, maps. "What happened early in that process is this organization I represent, the Defense Intelligence Agency, has for the most part over the years worried mostly about the Washington community, the policy makers, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I told you half of the story earlier about when I didn't know what a maneuver
Leide: He gave you his side of the story. There are two sides to it, although it's actually the same story. The first part of the story is that: we had just come on board together. I got to CENTCOM on the 21st of July and, of course, the invasion happened on August 2nd. Mike McConnell got there a day or so after I did, and we were introducing ourselves, and he said, "Well, what do you know about all this stuff?" I said, "Well, I speak Chinese." Of course he giggled and laughed. I said, "What do you do?" He said, "I'm a submariner." He never told you that, did he?

Oettinger: No. That was just apropos of how much you have learned.

Leide: It's kind of interesting, because you have to be pretty flexible, and I went from being the senior China analyst within the Department of Defense to being the senior Iraqi analyst in the Department of Defense. I had to learn quickly because General Schwarzkopf was not asking very many questions of my analysts; he was asking the questions directly of me. I had to learn very quickly or perish, and so I had to spend an awful lot of time learning about the Iraqi army and air force and navy and whatever for that period of time before we actually went into the war.

In fact, there's an interesting aside here. Someone had done a survey of the war room in Riyadh, and how many questions

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important to the Saudi population than it was to us; after all, the whole Saudi population was at risk if the Iraqis used biological warfare. Nothing. This went over a matter of weeks, and was a very important issue. We had to go to the highest levels of the Saudi government, and I mean the highest level, to get permission to do this. They finally said "All right. We will draw the blood and we will give it to you and you can take it off to do whatever you want to do." So finally it happened after a long tedious process, when one would think that it would be very simple and should be done very quickly because it was in the interest of everyone that that blood be drawn and tested. At the time it seemed a very major issue, but that's just a kind of minor example of the frustrations that you have in carrying out coalition warfare.

I can give you an example after example after example. For instance, talking to defectors, debriefing defectors. They would not let us near a defector. The Saudis really didn't know how to interrogate. They did not even know the right questions to ask, but yet they wouldn't let us near the defectors to find out the information that they knew. They never did. The closest we were able to get was outside the flap of the tent, and we'd keep passing information in to them, and questions to ask. You know that's not the best way to do it.

**Student:** Is that an Islamic thing?

**Leide:** I think it's more of an Arab thing. But I think it's basically a mixture of both our being non-Arabs and infidels questioning Moslem Arabs. Again, there was a lot at stake here, and there's no better information you can get than from a defector or a prisoner because that's first hand, but yet we couldn't do it. Those are just a couple of quick examples.

**Student:** Could American Muslims make any difference, or were they utilized at all?

**Leide:** No, no way. We couldn't do it. We tried everything. We had people of Lebanese extraction and it just wouldn't work. It was the fact that we were Americans. We were not Arabs, and even though our people were supposedly Arabs, they just wouldn't let us talk to them. Incredible! It was important to them, but they did not understand the importance of intelligence. That doesn't get through. What they understand is, frankly, survival of the monarchy. They understand that. That means internal security. So they were not prepared and they were not comfortable with the importance of tactical and operational intelligence, even though it threatened them. It's incredible! It's mind-boggling!

There are other things that we can talk about when you talk about fighting a war. When you've got two, three, four, five, ten different countries fighting as a coalition, you've got so many differences among them that the most complicated thing you're doing is fighting a battle. It's got to be synchronized. But when you don't have the same culture, the same religion, the same doctrine, the same training, the same equipment, the same or compatible communications gear, the same ways of doing things, it really makes it difficult. As you increase the numbers of coalition members, the complications become almost geometric.

**Student:** General, I entirely appreciate the cultural difficulties in coalition warfare, and I speak as the man who was responsible for converting British service chaplains to moral welfare officers ...

**Leide:** Yes, that's a cultural change!

**Student:** I'm sorry if I'm taking you ahead here, but, on the basis of Desert Storm, do you think that coalition warfare is possible within a coalition where there is not a senior partner?

**Leide:** I guess it depends on what you define as a senior partner. Let's take Bosnia. Is the senior partner the United Nations? Is the senior partner NATO? Is the senior partner the U.K.?

**Student:** In that context, I would define it as NATO, because NATO procedures and NATO staff are in use.
Leide: But, you see, that's an entity, not a partner. It's a coalition itself. In the Gulf War, ostensibly it was a coalition. That didn't mean that it was any less of a coalition because no matter what happened, as we discussed at lunch, if the coalition fell apart, the battle probably would not have been joined. So it was critical to us to put that coalition together and keep it together.

What I'm saying is that the possibility of unilateral action in the future probably is fairly slight. Why? Because, as we said before, the tolerance level for casualties is very low. Secondly, whatever the tolerance level is, people are going to start demanding, especially when you take casualties, if it is really and truly in the national interest. I think that question is going to become continuously asked.

Oettinger: I think there are some subtleties in this, which I really would like to tease out, if we might, going back again to something else you said at lunch to the effect that at the last minute you can't go in there with staffs who don't know one another and have never worked together. It's the wrong time to learn. What's different about NATO from, let's say, what happened in the Gulf, is that it's been around for 40 years and perhaps as much, if not more so than, let's say, a U.S., or a U.K., or a German organization, these folks have gotten to know one another now. So in terms of camaraderie, esprit de corps, training together, et cetera, they were probably as far up as anybody else. Now the fact that they had nothing to do, and never fired a shot in anger over the 40 years, mitigates against their value along another dimension. But certainly it's a different kind of partner, as he said, from something that hasn't had 40 years to gel.

Leide: I must tell you, it's purely relative. I'm going back to culture now. Over the years, of course, you have people come and go into NATO. You have certain countries of NATO who grew their people very professionally, and they can fit in very well. There are those who do not, and no matter what you do, that will show. You can have a J-2 who is a non-U.S., non-Brit, non-Canadian, non-German, who is not going to work very well. I could give you chapter and verse, and the fact that it's inbred in the culture. It's very difficult, even when they're assigned to NATO, to make them different. There are different gradients of competence, but it's very difficult to change cultures.

I was down in Naples, and I briefed Admiral Boorda* for five hours. We went over this issue. He used the session as a training session for his NATO staff. It was incredible to me which eyes glazed over and which ones didn't. But there was a difference, and you could see it even in the eyes, between those who comprehended and cared and those who didn't. Now, I hate to use generalities like that, but even in an organization that has been in place for so many years, where we tried so assiduously to make sure that we had everything working together, you still have differences in doctrine, if you have doctrine at all. You still have differences in equipment. You still have differences in communications gear. We had that problem in our own forces during the war. We still have that same problem, and it was very difficult at times for us to interoperate. You can imagine what happens when you split that out and you magnify that ten times over, because that's what happens in warfare—little things become magnified almost geometrically. The frictions of war are always there.

Student: I don't want to monopolize this, but could I pick you up on the verb you used way back: "to fit into"? That seems to me to be the most central part. I'm not a military man, but it does seem to me that one of the very important parts of Desert Storm was that the coalition was able, to some degree, to use NATO/U.S. procedures for a large part of its operations. The only reason that was possible was because there was "a senior coalition partner." You had difficulties meshing with the Saudis. We (the British) had difficulties meshing with the Saudis. As you rightly say, there are tremendous cultural and administrative barriers to be overcome. Suppose, though,

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that Desert Storm had been fought by a group of ten completely disparate nations that were equal in size in terms of troop contribution but different in military cultures. In your view, would the operation then have been possible?

Leide: It probably would have been possible. I think we probably would have done it by dint of our weight.

Student: But you wouldn't have been there. Or do you mean that the forces would have just carried the day?

Leide: If we were there and there were ten different nations there as well?

Student: Suppose there were ten different nations of equivalent size making equivalent contributions.

Leide: Without us being there?

Student: Without you, yes.

Leide: No way. But now let's just take those folks that we work with as closely as we do with our own—the Brits. Look at the problem we had with friendly fire. That was not fun. We had friendly fire on own side, but we also had friendly fire with you folks. We have the same identification friend or foe kinds of things in our aircraft as we do with the Germans and all NATO forces, basically. But what happens with other forces' identification friend or foe? The French Mirage F-1s were there as reconnaissance aircraft. The Iraqis had F-1s. So my suggestion to the French, once the war started, was they probably ought to take those F-1s and go to Djibouti (and they did, gladly) but what happens when you've got the Egyptians and the Syrians there with all Soviet equipment, and they've got SA-6s and commensurate radars, straight-flush radars, that go with SA-6s? How can we discriminate? It's not easy.

So those are the kinds of things where we all have to realize that what we're doing here is really geometrically aggravating the frictions of war. I'm not saying that it's wrong. All I'm saying is that we can't be glib or flip—let's put it that way—when we say we are going to fight a coalition war, because it's serious business. We are seeing that, for example, in Bosnia, when the French and the British say, 'Hey, you know, air strikes are a good idea but we're here on the ground, and what's going to happen to us if you strike? Number one, do we have a way of discriminating, and, number two, what are the Serbs going to do to us once you do air strikes? Are they going to be that effective anyway?' It's a tough problem.

I think the microcosm of the problem, really and truly, is: what would happen if we did go into Bosnia full strength? We'd all really have a problem. I think we all realize that. So we're all sitting back and saying, "Hey, is this in our national interest?" That's the key question here.

Oettinger: What I hear you saying is that on one hand it's hard to imagine, prospectively, a major conflict, or even a minor one, that would not be a coalition conflict, and yet a coalition conflict is so hard to accomplish that ...

Leide: It's called the "horns of a dilemma."

Oettinger: Do you have any thoughts on that?

Leide: Well, yes, and I thought about this a lot. You try to take apart certain operations like Somalia, and I think Somalia probably became our defining moment, because we had had such great success with Desert Storm, although a lot of people didn't understand or realize the complexity of coalition warfare because it came out so well. But on the other hand, we thought, "We'll do this with Somalia. We'll get U.N. auspices here and we'll go in and we'll do our thing and we'll get out." It all seemed pretty good and it worked out pretty well initially. It was a U.S. operation, let's face it, under the auspices of the U.N., and it worked.

However, where the complications started to come were, one, would the mission perceptibly, or maybe even imperceptibly, change? And would the command and control structure change? What I'm
saying here is that I know what our training system is like. It's very rigorous within our system, and frankly, within the NATO system for the most part, but for various parts of NATO. What happened was that we got into a command and control situation there that was obtuse. The mission kind of changed but almost imperceptibly, and the command and control structure changed.

I think the microcosm of the problem happened, as we discussed at lunch, on the day the 17 Rangers died. What happened there? Was it a good mission? Was it the mission we were sent there for? Was it clear? Was it in the national interest? Was it in NATO's interest? Was it in the U.N.'s interest? Was it in the Somalis' interest? Was it in anybody's interest?

We had a Ranger unit go in. We had no way of going in to get them because we had no armor to speak of. The Italians had armor. The Indians had armor. Why didn't the Indians and the Italians go in? They were asked to do that rather late, but they didn't go in. They had to call Delhi to get permission. It never happened. They had to call Rome to get permission. It never happened. What kind of command and control is that? Are they under the U.N. or aren't they? Why do they have to get permission from Rome? Why do they have to get permission from Delhi? Lives are at stake here! Why are they there? Do we move in 17 tanks and move them off so that they're out of harm's way and can't be used? What are we about here? The clarity of mission, the clarity of command and control, are critical, and unless you've got those, you're going to have a quagmire.

Student: I didn't want to intervene again, but I must say that you're so right. I think this opens up a whole debate.

Leide: Gee, that's the first time this year. Thank you. I'm going to write this down.

Student: Again, I've had the good fortune or misfortune to spend six years of my working life at the U.N. in New York. I do think that it does raise a question about exactly what sort of operations it is feasible for the U.N. to undertake qua U.N., as opposed to a Desert Storm-like situation, where I like to call it subcontracting. It does seem to me that if the world wants the U.N. to do more in terms of nonclassical peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or what have you, the logical corollary of that is a standing training and staff organization, and I'm just not sure that governments will be willing to see that come into being.

Leide: I agree with you, and I think that it's something like jumping into the water for the first time. If, in fact, that force were well trained, well manned, well equipped, well led, it might attain some degree of credibility. But I've got to tell you, the first time something happens wrong, that force would probably be dismantled very quickly. The threshold of sensitivity to casualties these days in the world itself, but particularly in the West, is so low that I'm not so sure that we aren't paralyzed or won't be for quite some time.

Oettinger: I'm not sure that that is relevant to the question of coalition versus noncoalition, because as I hear you, I say to myself that Abraham Lincoln went through a lot of his generals. For every reason you dig up I can find somebody whom Lincoln went through who had that flaw until he finally found the right one. The U.N., to this point as a command structure, et cetera, is notoriously and incontrovertibly incompetent, so the issue of coalition or not is almost irrelevant because they're incompetent, period, and it's hard to say whether that has anything to do with coalition or not. Competence or incompetence can be national. So would a competent U.N. command structure be better or worse, or perceived to be better or worse, than a native general who happens to be so unlucky or so stupid as to have his troops butchered?

Leide: I'm not so sure they're mutually exclusive, Tony. The thing here is that Abraham Lincoln turned over his generals because they lost more men at Chancellorsville, for example, than we could even bear to have happen in two months, or two years, rather than one day. You start with a premise that the tolerance level for
casualties is low—I mean the tolerance level for the casualties in the FRG is incredibly low, the tolerance level for casualties in U.K. is fairly low except for Northern Ireland, and that's in the national interest. It depends on your internal determination on that. Those 17 Rangers were an awful lot of folks to die in one day, but in Vietnam we used to do that in one hour or less.

**Student:** You didn't have CNN blasting it all over the place.

**Leide:** That's true. That's probably one of the things that is driving this tolerance level down so low. It started in World War II, it continued in Korea (I'm talking press coverage), and it really was magnified in Vietnam, and, of course, in the Gulf War it was incredible. If we hadn't controlled that in the Gulf War as much as we did, it would have been an awful thing. I'm not so sure we would ever have gone. In Somalia, it was just as bad if not worse. You had people renting helicopters and going out taking videos from the helicopters. That's true! It's one of the things that has aggravated the tolerance level.

**Student:** I wonder whether the concentration on the tolerance of casualties really defines it? What you're really talking about here is whether all of these engagements were in fact in the national interest.

**Leide:** That's exactly right.

**Student:** That, I think, is the defining issue. In other words, all of these things that you were talking about are all peripheral and partially political, et cetera, and we do not have an answer. But if you would have a World War II type of situation, would the same intolerance to casualties exist?

**Oettinger:** Or let's say that the World Trade Center is multiplied by X, and it is clear that Muammar Qaddafi and Libya were the instigators, and the only way to get at it would be a Marine expeditionary force into Libya, what would the tolerance level be?

**Leide:** That's true, but it depends on whether that is in the national interest. I guess preventing terrorism is in the national interest. How do you do that? How did we do that the last time with Libya? Surgical strike! Not many casualties.

The first thing people are going to look to, and you see it if you look at our operations in the recent past, is to minimize casualties. There were air strikes, Tomahawk missile strikes first—no pilots! Pilots next, but very peripherally, and at night and under certain circumstances. Why? We don't want to take any casualties. Really and truly, it all evolves into the question of whether whatever we're doing is in the national interest.

Then the next step is: how do you define the national interest, and who defines it? It's a key question. I really think we haven't come to grips with that yet. We're trying to define that, I think, and it will be defined. The problem is that our determination of that may be warped by certain things. Who knows what they are, whether they're economic policies, political events, or whatever? I go back to the Gulf War and say, really and truly, we were very well supported during that war and we all were interested in the fact that we got back Kuwait.

Why was that? There was very little mention of the fact that oil was at stake here. There was this thing about "We can't have one country invading another." It was very important; there's no question about that. I don't know whether it was a driving force politically or not. I just shovel coal. But on the other hand, there were a lot of people in the United States who were castigating us because we were going over there fighting for Middle East oil. I'd like to find out if those folks would still castigate us for trying to do that if we hadn't succeeded, and they started to pay $75 for a gallon of oil. Look at the wailing and gnashing of teeth that happened in 1972 or 1973 or whenever it was. It was incredible. This would have magnified that dramatically. Saddam Hussein would have had 65 percent of the world's oil under his control if he took Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and he had Iraq. You can imagine, if he was irascible before, what he would be like after-

-81-
wards. That's a pretty dampened term for ... well, whatever. What we're leading to here is a very important logic train, and I guess where we end up is: how do you define national interest and who defines it?

Oettinger: That's taking us a little bit afield from our general subject, but I think ...

Leide: What is the general subject?

Oettinger: Intelligence, command, and control.

Leide: I forgot.

Oettinger: Yes, but this is sort of interesting because as you yourself said a moment ago, "I just shovel coal," and in a way, from that standpoint the course is about an instrument or set of instruments—intelligence, command, and control. But we keep coming back to these questions of the purpose of the instrument because we're in a period where the purposes are not clear, and therefore the shape of the instruments is not clear, and it is becoming impossible to talk rationally and without a waste of time about instruments without talking about the purpose.

Leide: That's a good point.

Oettinger: But let me pursue it then, since you agree, because you started a train of thought in my mind. One of the consequences of modern technology, both weapons and weapons control, intelligence and so on, has been kind of a speeding up of things, and people point to that. What we now have is almost the antithesis of that—whether it's Haiti or Somalia or the Gulf or now Bosnia. Far from being instantaneous, trigger-happy, quick-reaction things like the spasmodic reaction to an all-out nuclear strike—the 15 minutes' warning kind of thing that had become the paradigm and therefore one needed different processes—what you suddenly triggered in my mind is the notion that we are being forced back to very deliberative, slow, consideration of the nature of an engagement. When you then keep asking the question of who decides, one may need to reinvent the old-fashioned declaration of war and the deliberative political process that precedes all that, because when the threats or the perceived threats are of the kind that we face rather than an instantaneous nuclear strike, we may be in the cycle where reversion to pre-Gulf of Tonkin Resolution kinds of processes may be a necessary deliberative avenue.

Leide: What really constitutes the Constitutional requirement for a declaration of war by Congress? When was the last time we did that?

Oettinger: That's the point. The Second World War is about the last time.

Leide: How many hundreds of thousands of troops have we sent out to fight since then?

Oettinger: That is part of what constitutes this drive toward zero casualties, because as the legitimacy, or the perceived legitimacy, of the conflict decreases, the willingness to take casualties for it also decreases.

Leide: That's right. When I was an infantryman out in the jungles of Vietnam, somebody would say, "This is a hell of a war," and "This really isn't a war," and to me it was a war. I was being shot at and I was shooting at someone, and I would think "That's a war to me." I keep going back to the individual, and I guess what we're talking about here is a redefining of what "war" is. What's a police action? What is "something" under the auspices of the U.N.? What is "something" under whatever? Is it peacekeeping, peacemaking? What does all that mean? What is the difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking? We're losing lives doing it, so we probably ought to figure out a way of defining it. It's worth a definition, I suppose. I know there are probably official definitions to these things.

Oettinger: There are. There's a U.N. literature in which these things are explicit. But the fundamental point that you raise is
the one of what confers legitimacy and a willingness to take action, and I don't know any satisfactory answers to that. I think you framed it in a better way than I've heard around this table or, for that matter, read in newspapers.

**Student:** It's getting a little bit off the subject, but I had more of an intelligence, command, and control question (that was not a smart remark). After the Persian Gulf, one of the things we heard in the intelligence community was that the people weren't happy with how DIA/CIA and the regular military intelligence integrated. Now, we carry a card around and a lieutenant colonel is now at a desk at the CIA and you can call at any time, and all this before was *verboten*. Everything had to go through DIA. You couldn't even get a map if the letterhead didn't go through DIA. Could you tell me what exactly happened and what's happening now?

**Leide:** I guess the definition here is: where did the national and operational and tactical intelligence organizations mesh? We were all going through a defining process. The Defense Intelligence Agency, as a national organization, became a combat support agency during the Gulf War. I cannot say enough about how DIA transformed itself from focusing on what is within the Beltway to focusing on being a combat support agency. Now one of the problems that General Schwarzkopf and I had—I can go into excruciating detail, which probably would be very difficult in this forum, and we testified to this afterwards—was that the CIA didn't play the same role as well as it should have. They played a role to a certain extent, and they were very valuable to me in many ways. However, the constrictions and the culture change that took place with DIA did not take place with CIA.

General Schwarzkopf told me, when we were going up to the Hill to testify, "You know, I'm going to say things that a lot of people aren't going to like to hear. And I'm going to retire soon, but you're going to have to live with it." I gulped and I said, "Go ahead and do it, sir, because I think a lot of good can come out of this," and in fact, it has.

After the war, once General Schwarzkopf and I testified to the fact that one of the big problems was CIA support, the CIA got religion from the DCI on down, and I must tell you that the coordination and cooperation between us and the CIA is extraordinary. There are no seeming walls between us. I can tell you that. I'm very heartened by it. I have CIA people working for me. It never happened before. That was unheard of, and we're virtually seamless in doing the things we're doing, both here and in the field. I just sent General Schwarzkopf a note telling him that what he did was right, because the end result has been a dramatic change in the relationships. It takes wars to do it. It takes post-wars to do other things. I've testified to this before, and I will on Wednesday again, that the CIA's coordination, cooperation, and willingness to cooperate and to support is extraordinary.

**Oetinger:** A footnote, because I'm so interested, and, as I warned you before, because of my penchant toward these balances and irreconcilable opposites. To the extent that what you say is successful and, of course, it's devoutly to be wished because we know the horrible consequences of the lack of it, my guess is that the next scandal or the next complaint will be that where there is such harmony and agreement, the former salutary divergence of views regarding Soviet military budget, or strength of an enemy, or a missile gap, or some other issue will be missing because of the harmony. Somebody will say, "We need to separate these two; they've gotten too cozy. Having two independent agencies, one with a more civilian, national orientation and one with a more military orientation, is a great thing and we'll take our risks on lack of cooperation and so forth."

**Leide:** You struck a very sensitive chord here, Tony, and you're absolutely right. It's a topic that we all need to think about, because after Vietnam there was a lot of sensitivity about CIA's lack of independent view. We were always talking about "the light at the end of the tunnel" in the military, and the CIA, or elements of the CIA, were basically arguing whether they should
agree with us or not. So the CIA was given this charge to provide an independent view of intelligence as a kind of watchdog, so that things are not said because they back whatever political view is in vogue that year, or whatever an administration thinks, or whatever.

You all know, at least peripherally, about the controversy that we had with CIA over the numbers of tank kills during the war. I won't go into too much detail, but I just want to give you an idea of the pitfalls involved in this independent view kind of thing, from afar. What that leads to is someone 7,000 miles away who is not a military man deciding what's important to the commander-in-chief who is fighting the war.

Tanks were a shining example of that. Whether they were right or we were right is probably moot. I think we were much closer to being right than they were, but that's beside the point. The point was that they picked the numbers of tanks we said we had killed, and the number of tanks that they said, as the crucial issue of whether the war was going to be fought or not: whether the decision to go in on the ground campaign was going to be taken or not. The disparity in numbers was quite large. So there was a great deal of hesitation on whether to go to the White House and say, "Hey, we'd better postpone the ground campaign," a very important thing.

Now, was the number disparity in tanks a reason to stop the ground campaign? The problem was that those people back in Washington were deciding what was important, as I mentioned. The tanks weren't important to us. We couldn't care less about tanks. Our tanks could take care of their tanks pretty easily. That wasn't a problem. Our aircraft could take care of their tanks very easily once we launched across the wire. It didn't matter to us.

The key to us was artillery, because if you know military tactics and strategy, the most dangerous time of any attack is when your troops go through the wire, go through the barriers. What normally happens is that the enemy artillery is laid on the barriers, precisely to stop that attack and to catch all the folks there in a barrage and to stop it. That is the most vulnerable point of any attack. My main concern was artillery, because of the conventional reason I just mentioned, and also because if the Iraqis were going to lay down chemicals, that's when they were going to do it. They could do it by artillery, and they could do it by rockets—BM-21s, 122 multiple rocket launchers, will lay down a vast array of chemicals very quickly over a large area.

My main priority was taking out the BM-21s. The second priority was taking out all the artillery. General Schwarzkopf's priority was therefore to take out all the artillery, but down by 50 percent along the front line trace and 100 percent at the breach points. His strategy didn't say a thing about tanks. No one was looking at artillery but us. Now, what was more important? Was it what the guys back 7,000 miles away thought was important, or was it what General Schwarzkopf thought was important?

**Student:** Did you issue collection requirements, tasking of the various assets?

**Leide:** You bet!

**Student:** Then why did you get tanks? Did they refuse to accept your requirements?

**Leide:** No, we got it all.

**Student:** So you got what you wanted.

**Leide:** We got what we wanted, and it was just a misinterpretation of the damage that was taken. Let me give you an example. Let's face it, the folks back in Washington were using satellite imagery, and only that, to take the tanks, whether they were important or not. What we were using was satellite imagery. We were using signals intelligence. We were using defector reports. We were using pilot reports. We were using mission reports. We were using RF-4 photography. We were using U-2 photography. We had a whole plethora of things we were using, and they were using a one-dimensional asset. On top of that, we were getting all the stuff faster than they could ever think of getting it.
So, when you look at it you think this is kind of nonsensical. One of the things that was really great about this one compared to Vietnam was that command and control was left to the commander in the field. Truly. There were discussions—I was there—between General Schwarzkopf and those in Washington. However, he made the decisions. He made recommendations and the decisions and they left him alone. They let him do those things. Whereas in Vietnam, you know the old story of President Johnson down in the Situation Room picking out targets.

Oettinger: The 7,000-mile screwdriver.

Leide: Yes. So, that part was okay. The intelligence part was okay too because General Schwarzkopf was listening to us rather than anybody else, and that's what really counted. But the problem was you had this divergence and you had this misinterpretation of what was important to the field commander by the intelligence people, which almost drove decisions to delay the war.

Student: I just find it difficult to believe that the intelligence community would expend resources to answer questions that they weren't asked to study. In fact, maybe one of the ways to look at it is the defense intelligence establishment was serving a combat field commander whereas the civilian or CIA intelligence community saw their role as sort of the policy makers and that's where the conflict comes, not from the fact that there are non-military civilian idiots looking at overhead back at NPIC (the National Photographic Interpretation Center).

Leide: I hope I didn't use "idiots." That may be what I implied, but no. The first place I went when I came back from the desert was to CIA, and I talked to all those folks. I was a little testy at first, but I told them like it was. I've always been that way and I always will be. I'm not saying that they were saying and doing the wrong things. I don't want to get into internal politics here, but the thing is that they should have been working with the DIA people.

Now, we're also saying that with estimates—long-range estimates, strategic estimates, and so forth—you've got to have an independent view, and I agree with that. But if you've got national agencies doing assessments, they've got to vet those disagreements within the Beltway. When an assessment comes outside of that Beltway to a tactical commander it can't have caveats. You've got to give it your best shot. I was doing that every single day with General Schwarzkopf. He said, "What are they going to do?" and I told him what I thought they were going to do. I didn't say, "Well, I think he's going to do this, but he could do this, or he could do that, and he could do this." I said, "Here's what he's going to do. I may be wrong." That's the kind of answer a commander needs. But when you've got a caveated assessment, and it says that so-and-so says they're going to do this, but so-and-so says they are going to do that, and so-and-so says they're going to do this (and I can tell you those are the kind of assessments we were getting), it's virtually totally counterproductive to the decision-making processes of a commander.

Student: We've had a debate in here about tactical intelligence and when a strategic intelligence asset winds up supporting a tactical intelligence kind of situation.

Leide: Don't even separate them anymore. They're totally blurred now.

Oettinger: Exactly. I think this is the heart of this issue. Coalition and jointness be damned: whenever there are more than two people making decisions and having a viewpoint, the blurring of the tactical and the strategic has created a very serious set of issues here, which is part of what this is all about. That is why blame laying is not necessarily constructive because these matters outlast particular individuals and particular organizational structures. You have on the one hand what he's eloquently described—the need for the guys who are on the spot to make up their minds really
quickly and act or not act, and, at the same
time, their need for somebody to step back
and say, "Why the hell are we in this, and
what are the various considerations?" What
has happened both in the nuclear realm, and
in a situation like Desert Storm, is that
when the two merge, the question of who
is in charge is almost inevitably going to
lead to a kind of contention. I guess my
view on that, and one of the reasons why
I'm stressing this in intervening here, is
that I think it's unavoidable. You might as
well get used to the fact that no matter who
you are, whether you're working for the
President or working for a CINC in the
field, at some point you're going to have
this kind of disagreement. So, in thinking
through what you're going to do ahead of
time, not in some nasty way, it's unavoid-
able, because there are going to be different
viewpoints.

Leide: The delineation of processes is
critical here because we're going through a
transformation. We have been going
through a transformation since the Vietnam
War on who really and truly picks targets.
Who really and truly decides what we're
going to do and when we're going to do it?
The communications age has brought that
upon us. I'm not so sure that's good or
bad. Dialogue is good, but if you've got
dialogue that is counterproductive to a
commander who has actually got the onus
upon him to make the decisions where lives
are at stake, there's incredible pressure.

General Schwarzkopf asked me con-
tantly, "What is he going to do tomor-
row?" Predictive analysis, which is proba-
bly the most important thing an intelligence
officer does—predicting what the enemy is
going to do tomorrow, so that a comman-
der can be proactive rather than reactive,
which really gives him an enormous leg up
in tactics and strategy—is also the toughest
thing we do.

Student: But it sounds as though you
were getting way too much analysis, and
when they got the raw data that would have
helped you help the General make his deci-
sions about where to go and what to do it
was so watered down by, "Well, they
might do this, and caveat that, and IIR (the
integrated intelligence report) doesn't agree...

Leide: No. But I was doing that in the-
ater.

Student: How much analysis at what
point is appropriate?

Leide: What you need as a warfighter is
all the help you can get. It's hard to define.
We have a certain limited capability in the
theater. You're not going to have the best
analysts available on the Iraqi army or on
chemical warfare. So, if we ask a question,
"Is he going to use chemical weapons?"
what they've got to do is come back to you
and say, "This is our best shot," not, "He
may use it or he may not use it." That's
really what we were getting. It's counter-
productive to the guy who is making a de-
cision.

Oettinger: Yes. I think she misunder-
stood the point that I believe you were
making. It was not that you were saying
that you got too much analysis. It's that
analysis based on the limited set of inputs
was provided to the folks back home who
were looking over his commander's shoul-
der. That's what I think he means.

Leide: Well, they weren't, but a very
critical decision was being made; that is, do
we go into the ground campaign when we
scheduled it to happen? What they were
saying was that because the tank count was
different, the whole estimative process in
theater was wrong, and so we were really
putting our people at risk.

Oettinger: They were saying this to
whom: to Schwarzkopf or to the Comman-
der-in-Chief?

Leide: The Commander-in-Chief or his
representative, because that's their busi-
ness, that's their duty. So what their as-
sessment says is that we think that maybe
CENTCOM is wrong—or may be wrong,
which is the way it's crafted. Of course,
General Schwarzkopf said after the war that
the CIA was covering their fannies in case
something did happen and we really took a
lot of casualties. Let's face it, that's the kind of suspicions that people have when you do those kinds of things, because they have been in peril and have been wrong in the past. That's why this independent view kind of thing came out.

The key here is that you have to have been there to understand the enormous pressure that is brought to bear when a commander says, "What ... (anything)? Give me an analysis of something. Give me an estimate of something," and the decision that he makes is going to imperil thousands of lives. You've got to put yourself in his place because that's the way it is.

I'll give you an example. We had a limited amount of inoculations; I told you that before. Now the problem is, when you've got a limited amount of inoculations, whom do you inoculate? How do you make that decision on whom to inoculate? So General Schwarzkopf asked me whom Saddam Hussein would attack with anthrax, and whom he would attack with botulism, and what kind of units they would be, and where they would be—if he went through a logic train, which I'm not so sure he is capable of doing. The onus was now on the intelligence community to come up with where Saddam would use anthrax and where he would use botulism, and on what kinds of units? Would they be headquarters units, would they be airfields, would they be front-line troops or whatever? Because General Schwarzkopf had to make a decision on whom to inoculate and whom not. Now talk about a pretty heavy decision! Basically, if the Iraqis used biological warfare, 100,000 would be protected, and 300,000 would not.

You should have seen that session and what we went through. This worked out great, because what happened was that we asked the community, and they did this as a community. They worked over the weekend and sent us their assessment: "These are the kinds of units we think they'll use anthrax against; these are the kinds of units we think they'll use botulism against." So what we did then was to refine that down more and say, "We think that he'll use botulism against these units, and we think he'll use anthrax against these units." So that's when he made a decision, and how he made the decision, to inoculate certain units for anthrax and certain units for botulism.

Student: But you in the field still have to have some element of "With how much confidence was that prediction made?" Was it a 55 percent confidence level, or ... ?

Leide: That's right. But in warfare, when you're talking about these things, it's the same thing as with predictive analysis. You're never sure. You never have a high degree of confidence, because this is not a science. It's an art. So when I predicted what the enemy was going to do in the next 24 hours, or I predicted what he was going to do in the next 24 to 96 hours, do you think I was comfortable with that? If you look at the reporting and the intelligence reports that were coming out of the Gulf, the only ones that you saw that had predictive analysis in them were ours. It wasn't being done at a strategic level. It wasn't being done even at the operational-tactical level. It's the hardest thing that an intelligence officer does, but probably the most valuable thing, and we abrogated that responsibility long ago. We don't do it automatically. We don't do it well. Why? Because it's difficult, it's tough; because once you say something it gnaws at you—"Was I right?" There are a lot of lives at stake. It's not easy, and so confidence is a purely relative term here.

Oettinger: It's an unresolvable problem, by the way, because if you're saying, "Well, that is what the commander should do," at some level of decision making that becomes a copout because if one human being cannot do it, he needs staff. Then if the staff does it, what he calls predictive analysis is in some way, if you want to look at it pejoratively, preemptive decision making because you are so constraining the decision maker's range of choice by the prediction you're making that you are in effect making the decision. This is probably why it gnaws, because if he felt he was just putting another staff opinion in the mill, it wouldn't gnaw at him. There's no way out of that because you render the commander impotent if you don't do it, and you're
preempting decision making if you do do it, and it's only after the fact that you know which one might have been the right thing to do.

**Leide:** You go back to the eight out of ten questions.

**Student:** I would say the truth is anywhere in the middle, because that's a trade-off between the commander and his senior analyst or chief of staff or intelligence officer or whatever you want to call him. It depends on the personality of the commander. If he asks what the enemy would do in the next 12 hours and you give him an answer, that's what you do and that's okay. But maybe he can also ask, "Why do you believe that?" and then you must give him a reason for what other options he has. So maybe if the commander is more open to his intelligence officer he can base his own decision on more detail, but General Schwarzkopf had so many things to do so that he did not have much time, so he had to trust you as to why you came to those certain opinions. So analysis is your problem and his is command? Another commander could make his own analysis. It's regulated in manuals, but that doesn't mean much. Most manuals, okay: it's providing such and such information.

**Leide:** You're absolutely right. A lot of times he would ask, "Why do you say that?" and we'd go into some kind of dialogue. It's kind of interesting, because when I first got to Central Command in Florida, in my first discussions with General Schwarzkopf, he said, "You know, if you're right 50 percent of the time, I'll be happy." Well, that would have been okay in peacetime, I guess, but he would never have been happy with 50 percent in wartime, and I certainly wouldn't have been happy with 50 percent right in wartime. I think we were pretty well on the money if you read our assessments during the course of the war.

Basically, he really reacted to intelligence. He used intelligence. A lot of it was innate: as we gave it to him, he had one of those photographic memories and he would collate all this stuff in his mind. But he used it assiduously. The problem there was that he and I sat several times looking at each other, just really and truly worried about "Are we making the right decisions? Am I telling him the right thing and is he making the right decisions?" It's indescribable when you're talking about actually fighting. I've been in combat six times; the other times were at a lower level as a company commander or whatever. This time was the most excruciating pressure I've ever felt. You could see that in General Schwarzkopf as well. Just think of what responsibilities those decisions really were. It was incredible.

What I'm saying is that I'm not damning these folks because they've got good intentions. All I'm saying is that there's got to be a way that the procedure is right so that it, in fact, falls in behind what the commander-in-chief and his J-2 are trying to do. Rather than being competitive with him, it should be supportive. That's not saying "Tell us what we want you to tell us," but, "Give it your best shot. If we're giving it our best shot out there, give us something that isn't counterproductive to the decision-making processes, because I've already given it mine." If they say, "Okay, here's our best shot," then we can take that and use it and maybe change our views: that this is the best assessment of the national intelligence community and what I was giving General Schwarzkopf was the best assessment of the theater intelligence community.

I'm not saying that we were totally right or were infallible; all I'm saying is that the processes have to be in place so that whatever assessments are coming outside of the warfighter's theater are at least the best shot of the intelligence community, and we can't ask them to do any less. Why are they making assessments if the assessments are hedged so much that they're useless to the commander? We don't even want them. I'd rather not have them if they're a caveat. So, the key here is that every time I was telling him something, I wasn't telling him something else. If I was wrong, I was wrong, and we paid the price. There's no way that they can be wrong. That's what he got so upset about, because with what they were
telling him, no matter what happened, they were right.

Do you know what I call this, and I kept driving this into my people? I call it professional courage.

Oettinger: Yes, Jack, but you know, if one wants to look at it pejoratively, it is preemptive decisions, and I think that's why this is such a hard problem. It is a large, perennial, professional problem.

I'd like to exploit your presence here for the remainder of your time, perhaps to switch venue and ask you to comment on your experiences in China, because I think that's also so important. We have only another 25 minutes, and you may have some additional thoughts on the coalition thing.

Leide: I'll talk about whatever you want to talk about, and China's an important topic.

Student: Could I just make one supplementary comment about the tanks? The points raised earlier are very important. One of the things that I've been trying to come to grips with during this series of seminars is the process of requirements setting in the United States, and you will understand why with my British background we find it chaotic. The second is again this very, very difficult area of assessment. Here I find the concept of individual agency assessments with little defined relationship between them equally chaotic. Do you think that anything could be done about this? It's a long question, but could you give a short answer to that?

Leide: Sure. You've got to put discipline into the system, and there's got to be a dynamism and a synergism between those elements that are making estimates. You may or may not have lesser among equals. What we've had in the past is one or two organizations driving the process, and the others were there kind of ancillary, for more political reasons rather than not, so that you could say, "Well, everybody took part in this thing, but the driving force behind it was this one or two."

You've got to make sure that you have an environment conducive to open discussion, and that is not easy to do. It's easy to say, but not easy to do. But on the other hand, if you install discipline in that kind of procedure, then I think it can be done. What that says is that the requirements part of that is very important. Requirements systems generally are broken, and I'd say that in our system as well, although we're fixing it rather rapidly.

If you're going to solve a problem, you've got to define it. That sounds again like a blinding flash of the obvious, but it's not. It's so apparent that it becomes clouded. That's what I try to do as an intelligence officer: if someone asks me a question, I try to make sure that it's as clear as possible. After a while, people understand how you really craft a question, how you craft a requirement. So it's a discipline we need to instill in the whole system all the way down to those who are doing the analytical things that are coming out.

So it's a very good question, and it all starts with the requirements. We discussed this before: that you've got to make sure that you start with requirements and you talk to whoever the person is who has the requirement, instead of you, as intelligence officers, defining that. Again, a blinding flash of the obvious, but it's something that intelligence officers do a lot. They don't go to the person who has the requirement. I used to have a dialogue with General Schwarzkopf two or three or four times a day. I would say, "Here's what we think is important. What do you think?" Or we'd go to a commander and say, "Okay, you get to this certain point, what are you going to want to know?" Strange, isn't it? We went to the commander to ask the question.

It's an excellent question. It probably defines the whole thing that we've just been talking about.

Oettinger: Except for this: that so often under certain circumstances when you go to the customer—the commander, whoever—he or she doesn't know. There is then that further dilemma, which is also part of the requirements: when is it appropriate to take initiative and collect on things or analyze things that you figure they would be asking
if they had any brains. You're a hero then if you guessed right, because they didn't have the brains to ask, and you're a budget monger, an insubordinate, et cetera, if you guessed wrong, and you have been "squandering the budget."

**Leide:** It's process and what the student said a few minutes ago. I think that's the key here. It's the process and it's the relationship that evolves between a commander and his intelligence officer, or a commander and his operations officer. I hate to say it, but a lot of this is personality dependent. But a lot of it is also how we train our people, how we indoctrinate our people to how these things work, instead of going into these things ad hoc and saying, "Well, when we get there it will all fit together." It doesn't. You can't wait until you go to war to do things ad hoc that you can do ahead of time—such as establish relationships.

During wartime, to be honest with you, the commander becomes his own operations officer. It's really the commander and his J-2, because the commander kind of does it all. There's an old saying that in time of peace, it's the J-1 and the J-3, the personnel officer and the operations officer; in time of war, it's the J-2, the intelligence officer, and the J-4, the logistics officer. That's exactly the way it was in the Gulf. The two key elements were intelligence and logistics.

**Oettinger:** We were going to get onto China, and you've given a good transition. I hope you've seen from Jack's biography that he learned Chinese and is the only American officer who went to a Chinese military academy, and was the attaché in Beijing. So this whole matter of "you can't do it at the last minute, you've to know what the hell is really going on and find it out on the ground," is something that I hope he'll tell us a little bit about from that side of things because I don't know of many people with that kind of experience. We'd love to have you say a few words about it.

**Leide:** Do you want an assessment of procedure, or do you want an assessment of what's going on in China today?

**Oettinger:** Whatever you think; let's say procedure.

**Leide:** Let's go to the Tiananmen incident, which was during my time there. Needless to say, I had studied China so I knew all the requirements and I knew all the issues and so forth, and all the people I selected to go with me were China experts and linguists and the like. So we had a pretty good team that we put together. It was basically a military intelligence situation; I mean, it was strictly military. What was going on, what was the military doing out there in China? As far back as I can remember we had been working things and identifiers that we would look for in certain units and so forth in China. We studied the PLA (People's Liberation Army) for a long, long time.

When Tiananmen happened, we pretty much knew what was going on. It was a very dangerous situation. You just didn't know what the Chinese were going to do next. Prior to what the Chinese did, someone had asked me—in fact, it was an old China hand as well, but a political counselor in the embassy—"Do you really think that they'll run over their own people with tanks?" because the tanks were all poised and the people were out there in front of them. I thought, not for very long, and said, "I've studied Chinese history now for some 20—some odd years, and I'm trying to think of a time when they have refused when told to kill their own people." I said, "They will do it," and they did.

There was a time when we were getting questions from Washington, "Are they or are they not?" That's the kind of a time when you say, "Well, here it is. I'm laying it on the line." I said, "They're going to and here's when they're going to." There were those who were saying, "No, they are not going to and they wouldn't do that." I was going to say fortunately I was right, but unfortunately I was right, because it was really a terrible, terrible situation there. Frankly, we were all around that place and they just shut it down. We were the only folks who had a handle on the situation. The Ambassador recognized the fact that his defense attaché was the guy who knew what was going on. So, when the com-
mander—the Ambassador—called the President or the Secretary of State, I was the guy he had next to him. I was the guy he asked, "What do I tell them?" Not because of me; it was because of my position and the fact that, as an ambassador, and a very smart, very experienced guy, he knew that if he was going to ask anybody, it was going to be the defense attaché.

**Oettinger:** Was that because of the emphasis on defense or because you happened to be the guy who spoke Chinese and understood the Chinese?

**Leide:** It happened to be that it was basically what was happening militarily, because it was a military operation, let's face it, and so we understood it. I had all my people around who understood it and could give you an estimate. We were able to identify all the units and the Ambassador was confident that we would tell him what we thought was going to happen.

Again, that's important, and I keep harking back to that professional courage. People will ask you in great confidence what you think, and that will happen all the time. I guess it's like putting your head on the chopping block, and we're not really sure whether that blade's going to fall.

**Oettinger:** Jack, Tiananmen and the Gulf were moments where things were happening on a short timescale, so you had to put your chips down. Do you think the same way on sort of a daily basis?

**Leide:** Yes, it almost becomes automatic to you. But, you see, what I had to do, and what you have to do, is instill that same discipline in your people. When I first got to CENTCOM—and I think this is true in all organizational matters—my analyst would come up to me and say, "Here's what the Iraqis did yesterday," and I would then wait. You know, what's next? And there wasn't anything next. So I said, "All right now, what does that mean? You're an analyst, you know more than anybody else in the whole wide world about the Iraqi military, so what does that mean? I could almost read in the newspaper tomorrow what the Iraqis did yesterday. Now tell me what that means! And then what does that mean for what he's going to do tomorrow?" That's our business. Our business is not being historians; our business is assessing and predicting. After the first couple of times, that became almost automatic: that they never, ever reported something to which they didn't give those other two parts: what does that mean and what does it mean for the future?

**Oettinger:** May I push you? How far out in the future are you willing to make assessments?

**Leide:** Ninety-six hours. It's the furthest I go. I had two sets of assessments that I thought you could do in a tactical way. The first set of assessments was: what are the Iraqis going to do in the next 24 hours? The second set of assessments was: what are they going to do in the next 24 to 96 hours? I had two different sets of analysts doing those: one set doing the current intelligence and another set doing the assessments further into the future.

**Oettinger:** But further into the future here is 24 to 96 hours?

**Leide:** It's 96 hours. I almost was stretching it.

**Student:** But that was in the Gulf. In China, I presume that your future was way out there.

**Leide:** Yes, it was, for sure. But during the initial stages of Tiananmen it was more or less the next 24 hours. What kind of units is he going to bring and what is he going to do with them in the next 24 hours? We got up to 96 hours, and maybe a little bit beyond that, but not much more.

So it's something that has got to be ingrained. I mentioned to you that as I saw what our community looked like before that, I almost felt we had abrogated that predictive analysis "thing" that we need to do so much of, and why? Because it's difficult. It's tough to do. It puts you in a great deal of peril. I say that advisedly, but people feel that. It bothers me, but I've kind of gotten myself to the point where it's
just my job. It's part of my business. Unless you discipline yourself to do that, you're going to be worth at least 50 percent less to your commander than you would be otherwise.

There's an awful lot of pressure on you to tell the right thing. But when you tell the right thing you're normally the bearer of bad news, and that's the intelligence officer. I'm the one who throws the cold water on the fun.

I love pilots. Pilots come back and say that they got everything. Right? They'll even show pictures. You saw those pictures of the bridges and stuff like that. It looked like a 20 kiloton nuke hit that bridge, but we went back later and looked at it and they just took a little chunk out. So here this Air Force pilot had gone up and said, "Boy! Look what we did to this bridge!" and I had to show them the next day and say "It ain't down!" That happened continuously. We had to put discipline into the system, and we normally were the ones who were naysayers.

Operators love to show how great they are, and in many ways they are great. But the problem is that when they go directly to the commander without being disciplined through the intelligence system, they are going to say, "Oh God, we got all these things and look how wonderful we are." And then we have to go back and say, "Hey, they're wonderful, but not that wonderful." So it puts a great deal of pressure on the intelligence guy to say, "Geez, maybe I'd better not tell this tomorrow."

This is human nature. This is psychosomatic.

So one thing that General Schwarzkopf said to me, as we were coming down from testifying on the Hill, was, "You know the thing I admire about you folks most was that you stuck by your guns under excruciating pressure. You told me they were going to reinforce when I wanted them to do this. You told me they were going to do that when I wanted them to do something else. And you were right."

It was tough. I hope I'm giving you just kind of personal vignettes, but these are kind of basic things that we have all got to think about, not only in command and control, but where intelligence fits into that command and control. It's really critical.

Oettinger: I have to tell you that we would love to hear more, but I've got to get you to your airplane.

Leide: I just got through my first point here!

Oettinger: Sir, we would love to go on and on, but we do feel responsible for getting you on your plane. I want to thank you very, very much for a marvelous session. We can only give you a very small token of our appreciation for taking all this time.

Leide: Thank you very much. That's great. Do I have to carry it in my pocket?

Oettinger: I'm afraid so. Thank you.