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Defense Intelligence: Adaptability, Character, and Capability
Walter Jajko

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Barry M. Horowitz; Randall M. Fort; Gary W. O'Shaughnessy; Nina J. Stewart; Walter Jajko; Edward D. Sheafer; Michelle K. Van Cleave; Jerry O. Tuttle

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Defense Intelligence: Adaptability, Character, and Capability

Walter Jajko

Walter Jajko serves as the Director of the Special Advisory Staff, Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense. On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, he is responsible for developing national and departmental policy and recommending approval of operations in: covert action support, sensitive support to intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and joint reconnaissance. His background includes national security, defense, and intelligence policy and operations, National Intelligence Estimates, East European affairs, psychological operations, special operations, long range planning, and programming. He is a retired Brigadier General of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, with ten years of active duty. Walter Jajko's education includes Harvard University's JFK School of Government, National Defense University, Defense Intelligence College, and Columbia University.

Oettinger: It is a great pleasure to welcome Walter Jajko. I won't go into details of Walter Jajko's career as you have had the opportunity to read that. He has asked — looking me squarely in the eye — not to be interrupted while he goes through the essentials of his presentation,* and so I turn it over to you.

Jajko: Thank you. I'll make the usual disclaimer before I begin. Obviously, whatever I have to say is my own opinion, not that of the Defense Department or the intelligence community. You can be sure of that. Also, before I begin I'd like to go through one definition so you know what I'm talking about. I'm going to talk a lot about defense intelligence, and I want to make the point that there really is no organization as such called "defense intelligence." It's a handy form of speech; there's no single unified entity. What defense intelligence consists of is a bunch of components that eventually all report to the Secretary of Defense in one way or another. These components consist of the following. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), there is the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Then there are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the intelligence elements of the military departments: the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the Department of the Army and the Army Intelligence and Security Command; the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Intelligence Command; and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force, and the Air Force Intelligence Command. Also, there are the intelligence elements from the military services that are assigned to the Unified Combatant Commands, and the National Reconnaissance Office, of course, and the National Security Agency (NSA), although I would say parenthetically and off the record that a lot of people in the National Security Agency will claim they don't belong to Defense, but that's not true.

I am going to be talking in a kind of shorthand, because I don't want to go through all of my paper in considerable detail and eat up all the time. So, I am going to try and hit upon my main points and maybe the most provocative ones will elicit some discussion and some debates from you. If I get bogged down in the jargon that all good bureaucrats use, please call it to my attention. Just interrupt me if you don't know what I'm talking about.

*The Appendix (page 103) has the full text of Mr. Jajko's prepared remarks.
Now, as to my paper, what I want to do is in a way address the topic of this seminar, that is, intelligence in command and control and the command and control of intelligence. But I'm going to do it primarily from the viewpoint of intelligence and of course specifically from the viewpoint of defense intelligence. I want to go about this in kind of a roundabout way, indirectly. I feel there are a number of very important factors that will influence the evolution of command and control and intelligence in the next couple of decades. Some of these factors are almost household entities. They are well-known and they are not thought of as being factors that could affect the evolution of intelligence. Others, I think, are so important that they are almost transcendent.

I have a proposition that the world is undergoing two simultaneous revolutions now: one is a political revolution, the other is a military-technical revolution. Those of you who have followed Soviet military writing, now Russian military writing, will find the term "military-technical revolution" familiar, and I subscribe to that thesis. My thesis is that these two revolutions are going to transform warfare, its methods and conditions, and as a result are going to transform command and control and, of course, intelligence. In fact, I would go so far as to say that intelligence is really facing a new paradigm; I think we are really facing the 21st century in this case.

In this group of factors, the first transcendent cause is the military-technical revolution. It seems to me that the military-technical revolution that we are undergoing now — and we saw the results of some of that applied in the Gulf War — is as basic, profound, and consequential as the one that transformed war between, say, the American Civil War and the outbreak of World War II. What we have as a result of this military-technical revolution now is kind of a telescoping of tactics, operational art, and strategy.

It seems to me that the most interesting development in this military-technical revolution is the predominant role of intelligence now, because the technology has allowed intelligence to give it visibility of the entire battlefield. This is important, I think, in a rather profound sense, because what intelligence does is not only show you the order of battle, which intelligence is supposed to do, but now it also really gives you an insight into the strategy of the military commander as to how he thinks about the battlefield. And that's something that, except by inference, by intuition, we were not able to do before. That means that this promotes effective force structure because you can marshal forces much more economically and apply them decisively, which you also were not able to do before. So I think that what intelligence can now do is really set the terms of the battle and perhaps the war, and in this respect it may be the decisive arm of war.

**Student:** I've got a question. When you say you can marshal forces more economically, isn't that kind of misleading, because marshalling forces now is so much more expensive than it was 20 years ago?

**Jajko:** Economically, in a sense, you don't need as many forces as you did before and you can tailor them to the target or the mission more precisely. In fact, in my paper, I think the implications for force structure will be more profound than that, but that's my point there.

It strikes me that perhaps the most consequential part of this military-technical revolution is the information revolution, and, of course, there's a civilian dimension to this. We were just talking about printers at home. But I think its main effect is on warfare. In the past, warfare did not depend on information or intelligence, if you will. Now, I think, information dominates warfare and that's a qualitative change in the military-technical revolution. I think it's going to have a very profound effect. In fact, it may even create a new form of warfare.

The important thing that intelligence now gives you is an ability to take the strategic initiative. That's not necessarily new in warfare, but now it gives you more certainty in being able to take that strategic initiative, and by strategic initiative I mean the preemption of the enemy's ability to act. The information revolution, I think, provides the optimum opportunity for this because what the information revolution does is target the enemy commanders and allow them to be isolated as targets in terms of how they are thinking of their strategy, their conception of the battle and how it should be fought. You can use information more to attack the integrity, the coherence, the sustainability of the enemy's planning and battle management. In other words, what you're attacking is their command and control through your intelligence. However, a lot of this is still potential — formidable potential, but still potential — and potential for the offense as well as for the defense. I think the reason it has yet to be realized is that there hasn't been any doctrinal application yet because the technology is so new it
requires integration. Until we have new operational concepts, doctrinal writing, and organizational premises to bring all this together, I don’t think we’ll realize its full potential.

Oettinger: I can’t resist, because the full force of what he’s saying, if you’re inclined to interpret this via the Battle of Britain, is like the difference between the potential and the actualization, let’s say, of radar on the German and on the British sides. It gives us the full importance of what he just said about doctrine and so on. It’s hard to look at prospectively, but if you want a good retrospective picture of why all those ingredients are essential, the study of the application of radar in the Battle of Britain and the organizational, doctrinal factors — everything he just said — were absolutely critical at the time. It’s such an important point for you to get.

Jalajo: It strikes me that if we make the necessary changes in operational concept in the military, if the doctrine is written and you have the organizational adaptation that is needed, what you’re going to remove are the current premises for maneuver warfare — for the organization of maneuver elements and for supporting intelligence elements. I think military forces, including intelligence and command and control, will look very different in the future than they do now. It will take a couple of decades to work out, but we’re seeing the beginning of that. I think it’s very important. In fact, the effect may be so considerable that what we call victory in classic terms — defeat of the enemy and attainment of the political objective — may not require close engagement of the enemy and occupation of territories, and this is really a revolution in warfare. The most important fact about this military-technical revolution and the information revolution that is part of it is how we think about war and not necessarily how we fight war, because the technology will force us to make the changes in how we fight the war. The important thing is to get ahead of that and to be thinking about it correctly in advance.

Now, this change in warfare is that first transcendent factor that’s going to affect the flexibility, the adaptability, and the capability of command and control and intelligence to change. I think a second one is the political revolution that I mentioned going on in the world. You’re all familiar with international events. I’m not going to go through them, but I think that what we’ve done in 1991, not consciously or deliberately, is finish the 20th century that began in 1914. We have finally seen the end of the last of the great empires and with the end of the Cold War, U.S. military power is supreme in the world. We are the sole dominant military power, and I think the political change there in the world is comparable to what happened in Europe with the end of the Napoleonic era. It’s a real world shift.

However, the actual geographical and political changes aren’t always reflected in political thinking. We’ve still got a lot of old thinking around. A lot of the old thinking is still based, for example, on the existence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Our defense policy, our foreign policy, was founded, essentially, on NATO as the kind of foundation stone of our strategy writ large. The issue now, as posed particularly by the Yugoslav situation, is whether NATO is an anachronism as long as it can’t come up with a strategic rationale for the future. The immediate danger here, of course, is the renationalization of security on the Continent. I think, as a result of this political revolution, unprecedented conditions — challenges, opportunities, whatever euphemism you want to use — and dangers exist. There are challenges for both command and control and intelligence: intelligence in apprehending and understanding the situation; command and control in taking it and turning it to our advantage. I use command and control and intelligence here in the larger sense because command and control determines the statecraft, not just for warfare. So, I think of it in those terms.

There are also some rather mundane factors, some derivative and some not derivative, and let me run through an inventory of those. I don’t think there’s anything profound about these; they are just the ones that have occurred to me with no particular structure to them. I think about the most mundane factor affecting both command and control and intelligence is our regional defense strategy. It was announced toward the end of the Bush Administration. Again, that defense strategy is based on the existence of alliances, and on the old idea of collective security, foremost among these alliances, of course, being the North Atlantic alliance. Again, the challenge to that alliance and to the foundation of the strategy is the emergence of some kind of European security entity, which, in fact, we tried not only to recognize but to compromise with. Right now, it’s unformed; it’s uncertain; its institutions are incomplete; it’s weak-willed, as we’ve seen in the Yugoslav case; but nevertheless there’s something there. And however tenuous it may be, if this security entity continues, I think it’s going to erode the viability of NATO, unless there are first a strategic rationale for and a change in the geographic expansion of NATO.
Now, how is this important for intelligence? It’s important for defense intelligence because the whole strategic context and purpose for U.S. military intelligence really has disappeared in Europe. Even if NATO survives in some form or another, I think fundamentally the military intelligence premise has been changed, particularly because the removal of U.S. fighting forces from the Continent also removes the bases for military intelligence operations, which are forward based with the forces. These are bases for intelligence operations not only in Europe and the Soviet successor states, but also in North Africa, the Middle East, and to a great extent, Southwest Asia, because you have to remember that in the military structure, Central Command is terribly dependent on European Command. So there’s an extension of the intelligence forces there also. I think that eventually the political, economic, and security changes among our European allies and the resulting divergent interests will change their attitudes of acceptance toward our intelligence operations. I think we’ve seen some of that already in Europe.

**Student:** What do you mean by “change their acceptance of our intelligence operations?” How?

**Jajko:** In some cases it may go that far. In others, they may regard us not as people in a special relationship or as close partners, nor as a hostile state or an unfriendly one, but nevertheless as a state further removed than we’ve been, and a liaison relationship that’s not as warm as it was in the past. I think this is a natural development. People do grow apart.

Another of the mundane factors, as I term them, is that the regional defense strategy that was announced by the Bush Administration relies on the idea of reconstitution: of having sufficient strategic warning time (about two years) and being able to rebuild forces. Part of the forces to be rebuilt are intelligence forces, not only fighting forces, but it’s the whole tail that goes with the tooth to build the supporting forces. I happen to think that it’s very difficult to reconstitute intelligence capabilities. You have to remember that reconstitution here is not just calling up reserves. In fact, reconstitution under the defense strategy is building new forces from scratch: creating new military formations with new people, teaching them new skills, giving them new equipment, giving them all the support. It surpasses my understanding how in a two-year period you can build new intelligence capabilities from scratch. I don’t care if you call it reconstitution or something else. Not only that, but we haven’t gone ahead and in any rigorous way identified what I would call core intelligence competences, skills that it’s possible to reconstitute. And, if it is possible to reconstitute them, will we make the investment to keep them there, whether it’s reserves, components, or in some other form? None of that, it seems to me, has been thought out at all, and yet we’ve got a strategy that we are still supposed to implement while we’re reducing forces.

There’s been a lot of talk of roles and missions, and those of you who are in uniform know that roles and missions are the absolute foundation of the military forces. Most of the discussion, of course, is driven by the desire to downsize the forces. It has nothing to do with changes in roles and missions because of the strategic paradigm that we’re facing. The roles and missions — really roles and functions in military parlance — are important for command and control and intelligence because obviously what a service’s roles and missions are will define what their command and control task is, and also delimit what their intelligence task is. It’s just derivative. The important thing for intelligence here, depending on the role and mission and the force structure, is that you’re going to determine the capacity of intelligence, and that capacity of intelligence can compromise your ability to execute a role or mission. So, they fit like a hand in a glove.

Now to implement the defense regional strategy, the Joint Staff in the last administration came out with what is called a “base force,” and the two were talked about in parallel but not in any sense, I think, analytically integrated. The base force, of course, has to be supported by intelligence. It’s one of the essential supporting services. Whatever base force we eventually come up with (it’s already been cut once by this administration) will shape the size of defense intelligence, because that will be in some proportion to the base force. So the size of the force, its structure, and its posture — its readiness — will shape the capability of defense intelligence.

There have been a few recent developments, mainly organizational, in the Department of Defense, that I think will affect the capability of defense intelligence to adapt. One of them is the recent reorganization in the unified commands, where the service component intelligence staffs were consolidated to improve the joint staffs in unified commands. They weren’t eliminated completely, but they were downsized, and this, I think, will have a potential effect on the capability of the unified commanders to respond to contingencies in
their geographic theaters and to fight the wars unless they're augmented somehow. I guess this has been recognized, because there are now what are called joint augmentation teams or national intelligence teams (NITs) to which CIA, NSA, and DIA contribute people on a temporary duty basis in a contingency. They include analysts and operators and all sorts of people who are needed and their composition is tailored for the particular contingency.

A very welcome development is that these NITs will now deploy in exercises overseas, which is unheard of. You never had that before. Of course, they haven't been tested yet, so you don't know their readiness, you don't know their interoperability. There are a lot of bugs to be worked out in joint exercises. But, anyway, it's a move in the right direction.

**Oetinger:** Any relation at all between the notion of the NITs and the notion of a JIC (joint intelligence center)?

**Jajko:** Yes, the JIC is the consolidated facility for improvement of the unified commander's intelligence capabilities; that's his organization. The NIT is to go in and augment the JIC, to provide those skills that need jacking up that either aren't there or aren't there in sufficient numbers.

Another factor limiting the flexibility of defense intelligence in the future is the relationship of intelligence to command and control in the Defense Department. By command and control in this case I mean defense policymaking. This is kind of a bureaucratic relationship and people don't think that's very important, but in fact, if you examine it closely, the relationship really inhibits the making of good, well-informed, Defense Policy (with capital letters) and the Defense, or departmental, input to national security policy. There has never been a clear, procedural organizational relationship between intelligence, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy. It's not an anticipatory, initiatory kind of full partnership, and we, in Defense, have not been able to come up with an organization to solve that problem. Again, I say, it sounds like an administrative problem but it's not, because it requires a lot of shrewdness and astuteness about policy: how it's made, what the demands of the policymakers are, and astuteness on the part of the serving intelligence officers to provide a product tailored for what is needed on a fast-reaction basis. So it's not really mechanical, but I think until this relationship is solved somehow with a good proce-

dural organization, then in fact defense policies will not be operating at optimum.

**Oetinger:** My impression is that the intelligence folks see themselves as working for the Joint Chiefs, and I've never heard that anybody even thinks that they were working for the civilian policy office. So it's really a very deep problem.

**Jajko:** Maybe they feel that way. I don't know, but they do produce a lot of products for OSD, not just for the policy side but on the weapons acquisition side too. So there is a lot of product going across. The point is, how well tailored is it and is it anticipatory enough that, in fact, you can have creative policymaking and so forth? I don't think that problem has been solved.

Let me turn to another kind of bureaucratic, mundane issue, but I think a very large and important one: what I would call the command and control of defense intelligence, which really has to do with its organization. Organization is particularly important in military organization, to be redundant, because it's how you organize that determines how you respond and, in fact, what you do, what your job is. Where you're assigned is extremely important to how you look at your task, your product, and how it's shaping up and how it all comes out. I can't overemphasize that, even for those of you who are used to other bureaucratic organizations. It's particularly true in Defense.

A notable fact about defense intelligence over the past 12 years is that there have been at least five reorganizations and the last one is by far the major one. Like most reorganizations, the chief product, I think, is turmoil, and this turmoil will probably continue until fiscal year 1995 or 1997. We're not sure, because it's kind of a floating figure as to when the base force is completed. Again, let me stress that's important because when the base force is completed, defense intelligence as a supporting function will conform to the base force's mission, its organization, its posture, its strategy. So between now and 1995 or 1997, there's going to be a lot of churn about in defense intelligence.

The last reorganization that I mentioned in CFI, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for CFI particularly, I think was a great lost opportunity, because it really began at the beginning of the Gulf War and was postponed and came after the end of the Gulf War. It was concurrent with the great reorganization of the intelligence community and the CIA. There were a lot of other things going on at the same time. You can read that in the Appendix.
The interesting thing that did not come about from the viewpoint of most intelligence officers is that C3I was not separated from the 1 side — a separation dear to most, although maybe not all, people in defense intelligence. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for C3I is really an immense empire. Just think of it: he’s got all the parts of intelligence. He’s got the command, control, and communications; he’s got the counterintelligence and security countermeasures; he has the mapping, charting, and geodesy functions, which in defense are enormously important from targeting to ground navigation. He’s got all the continuity of operations, all the department’s computers, all the corporate information management, and all the defense information of the place. If you look at C3I, in my mind, it’s really C3IPM, which is a big office. He’s got staff oversight responsibility for the Defense Information Systems Agency, which used to be called the Defense Communications Agency. He’s got the Defense Mapping Agency, as I mentioned, and some control over DIA, for the military services’ intelligence elements, counterintelligence elements, the intelligence elements assigned to the unified commands, the central imagery office, worldwide reconnaissance operations of the services in Combatant Commands, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, the service cryptologic elements. That’s a lot. In the military, we call that span of control. Somewhere between three and nine is ideal — about seven. There’s a lot more than seven in there.

But if you look at it another way, what this span of control shows is, in fact, that most of the intelligence community is in the Department of Defense. All the INTs, all the disciplines — IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT — most of them are in Defense, as is most of the equipment, most of the collection and processing capability, the high technology disciplines that I mentioned, and of course the major human resources to operate them. Most of the bucks are in Defense, too.

I’ve stressed organization because I really think it’s an exceptionally determinant factor, which affects both the capability and the performance of intelligence because it shapes the understanding of the mission, as I said before, and the method of its execution. Another factor that I think is a little more obvious and, again, bureaucratic, is programming. This is an extraordinarily powerful and continuously limiting factor on the adaptability of intelligence. The programming function is controlled by the Assistant Secretary, and what you do through pro-

gramming is shape what intelligence looks like — the intelligence organization, and its capabilities in the next several years. The Assistant Secretary has a very important function. He sits on the Defense Planning and Resources Board, which is kind of the corporate board of the Defense Department where the budget is put together every year in sometimes bloody sessions. What he does there is tie the Defense intelligence elements to the national intelligence elements. This is important because he’s able, through programming, to ensure that there are national intelligence capabilities to support warfighting and that warfighting, in fact, is integrated into the national intelligence budget. But let me hasten to say there is no such thing as a unified departmental Defense intelligence program similar to what is called the NIFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, which is the total budget that the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) sends out to OMB (the Office of Management and Budget) and the President puts before Congress, or at least before four committees of Congress. So I think the importance of the board function cannot be overstated.

Along with this, I think, is a parallel function, and that’s planning, which, let me say from my point of view, is virtually nonexistent. Planning in its most important form — strategic planning — simply doesn’t exist. I think we need such a capability for defense intelligence, and we need one in Defense. Defense intelligence could help Defense in the long run if there were such a capability.

Oettinger: Before you leave the subject of the ASD C3I, Duane Andrews, who was the incumbent until January 20 [1993] at noon, spoke before the seminar last year and if any of you need his remarks for your papers we can make arrangements for you to come and listen to his tape. Number two, Nina Stewart, whom we were talking about earlier and who will be coming here, was until January 20 at noon one of the deputies to Andrews, and in fact had the counterintelligence, et cetera, portion of that larger set of responsibilities that we described. Questions on that score will be fair when she comes, as she’ll still know more about that job than about the Assistant to the DCI post that she’s in now, so keep in mind that in pursuing this large topic you have some other threads with which to do that. I wanted to interject that before you went off this topic.

Jajko: At lunch, some of you asked me about the reorganization of the policy side of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and, as you know from the newspapers, there are going to be six new assistant secretaries: one for environmental security and economic security, which is really defense industry conversion, and another one for democracy propagation, or whatever the proper title is for that, etcetera. The interesting thing about these offices is that they kind of parallel the results of the National Security Review 29 that President Bush sent around to all the executive departments and agencies, in which he asked for policy input as to their intelligence requirements up to the year 2005. This was to be answered by policy people, not intelligence people, so we got a lot of interesting answers as to what departments such as EPA (the Environmental Protection Agency) and the Veterans Administration and Commerce and Agriculture needed. Without lapsing, let me just say that the majority of the answers had to do essentially with the economy and ecology, and it is interesting that the new reorganization kind of reflects those requirements.

What's interesting for defense intelligence is that obviously defense intelligence does not have the capability to answer those kinds of questions. We don't have the experience or the resources to go after economic or ecological issues, and if these are going to be part of defense strategy and defense operations and defense policymaking, either defense intelligence tasks will change fundamentally in some respects, and the Defense organization of intelligence will change fundamentally, or we'll be looking for a lot of our intelligence outside the Department of Defense. But either way, I venture to say 10 years from now defense intelligence ain't going to look like what it is now. The definition of defense intelligence, both as an organization and as a work product — and I don't mean just an analytical finishing piece, but as a task, as an occupation — is going to be considerably different. Now that doesn't mean that all the traditional tasks will go away. We're still going to be engaged in fighting enemies, but I think a big chunk of it is going to be devoted to something else. So, it's going to be an interesting time for those of you who may be starting careers in intelligence and going into Defense.

The last kind of mundane factor that I want to mention is culture, maybe with a capital C. It's kind of a sociological factor. I want to talk about institutional culture a little bit and how it's changing and how it affects both intelligence and command and control and their adaptability to this new world we're facing. You have to remember that, except for DIA and the service cryptologic elements in NSA, all of DOD intelligence belongs to the military services, that is, the military departments — Army, Navy, Air Force — and this is established by law, Title X. Most of the military and civilian personnel in defense intelligence belong to the services. The service Secretaries are the heads of components having intelligence elements. They have a legal responsibility, in fact, a constitutional responsibility, for raising, training, and equipping intelligence forces as part of military forces. Understanding this, I think, is critical to understanding these organizations and their cultures: what they do, why they do it, how they do it, and then how well they do it, because they very much have their own agendas. As you know, warfare today is combined joint warfare, not service warfare. That makes for a perfect dichotomy. The services, of course, develop their own intelligence to support their own forces, their own weapons, their own doctrines, their own tactics, and their own training. But they have a joint requirement to support the commands. There is always some resistance to jointness, I think. This stems from the statutory independence of the services. They still have large headquarters intelligence staffs, even though they're not combatant commands, and since 1968 they no longer have their own operational responsibilities according to law. So, parenthetically, I find it interesting that each service still has a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations when they don't conduct operations or fight wars.

Oettinger: The last time, we just handed you back your critiques of Allard's book. I would strongly urge you to read each other's critiques and in the light of that reread Allard because we have a set of questions about the relationships between the services and combatant commands and the whole structure and the effectiveness of the defense organization. It's hard, I think, for me to be more critical of organizational factors. You're hearing it again, coming at you from a somewhat different direction. Pay attention, because it's the heart of at least the military side of everything he's talking about.

Jajko: Another item in my inventory. I think if we're to face this new kind of warfare and whatnot, the national role of DIA has to be improved. In the past, the President, the Commander in Chief, has turned to the director of the CIA for all of his

intelligence, including military intelligence. But it’s kind of been a filter there. I think it’s time for the director of DIA to be the principal military intelligence advisor to the President. It’s long overdue. In looking at the title of this seminar, I don’t see where military intelligence is supporting national command and control statecraft now as it should.

**Student:** Excuse me, sir. Did you say the principal military advisor to the President?

**Jajko:** I said principal military intelligence advisor.

**Oettinger:** I assure you that’s a debatable point. There are folks over in CIA and in the White House who would argue that there are Presidents who have relied much too much, though not formally, on military inputs — DIA and NSA — and not paid attention to the professional statesmen, et cetera, et cetera, at State and CIA, so I’m a little puzzled. You and I seem to have observed different parts of the elephant.

**Jajko:** Yes, that could be.

I’ll wrap up pretty quickly here. I think another factor to look at in terms of “culture” is increasing civilianization and its effect on the military significance of information you’re getting. This may be a natural development from the fact that we are putting fewer and fewer people through the services with a volunteer army. It reflects the general situation in our society. Nevertheless, I think it can have a profound effect on defense intelligence and its quality. The military ethos, in DIA, I think is endangered.

**Oettinger:** Budget cuts may help with that. I think the number of civilian positions is going to shrink faster than the number of military billets there.

**Jajko:** It may, but it’s very difficult to get rid of civil servants. I am one, so I can tell you that.

**Student:** Aren’t civil servants cheaper than military?

**Jajko:** Well, I don’t know.

**Student:** I was just wondering why budgetary constraints were thrown in for the number of civilian components?

**Student:** I would think the military might be cheaper. The probabilities are lower that they would elevate people above their level of competence.

**Jajko:** I’ve talked about our kind of institutional culture. Looking at culture on the other side, I don’t think we do well with foreign cultures in intelligence, and I’m talking about defense intelligence now. Obviously intelligence is grounded on a profound knowledge of the culture in a foreign state, that means language and history. As in everything else in defense, weapons and people are the most important things, and if you are going to have trade-offs in programming, language and culture are going to suffer. There is a lot of lip service paid to this, but I’m afraid there is underfunding. I think this has had profound consequences, not just recently, but for decades. I think our understanding of adversaries is not always adequate, with Saddam Hussein being the most obvious example, and that extends beyond defense intelligence. There are deficiencies, I think, in all parts of intelligence and counterintelligence in understanding what kind of collection is necessary, and in the production, from requirements to analyses, in warning, and current, and estimates, and even scientific intelligence. Again, Calutrons in Iraq are a good example. I guess the most obvious effects are seen in two disciplines in defense intelligence: in HUMINT and in counterintelligence.

**Oettinger:** Excuse me, I was just trying to process . . . what in Iraq?

**Jajko:** Calutron — the old-fashioned method of extracting plutonium to make atomic weapons. We never expected that they would use that method. And they used three parallel methods.

As I say, and without going into a lot of detail, HUMINT and counterintelligence are essentially long-range occupations, if you do them correctly. In HUMINT, I don’t think we’re really able to get long-term immersion and targets, and in counterintelligence I don’t think we’re able to mount really long-range, sustained, strategic attacks against hostile services simply because we don’t have the understanding of the culture. This also affects warfighting, because I talked about information and understanding an enemy commander’s strategy, his understanding of the battlefield, the ability to penetrate the commander’s mind, et cetera. If you don’t understand his culture, it’s very difficult to do, and it’s unlikely that you’ll do it. Assisting your commander in making a decision in warfighting is more than just working within the timelines of the enemy commander’s decision. It’s really an insight into how his mind works and what’s important to him, and only a profound understanding of the culture can give you that.

That’s kind of my inventory of factors — some as I said transcendent and some mundane — that, I
think, will, over the next several decades, limit the
capability, the flexibility, and the adaptability of
defense intelligence and command and control
unless we do something about them. Except for the
revolutions going on in the world — political,
military, and technical — the other factors are in our
power to change. They mostly have to do with
bureaucracy, and maybe that’s why we’re bringing
this up to younger people.

I have a charge for you before I quit talking. As I
said, intelligence will have to grasp the nature of
these political and military-technical revolutions,
and command will have to act to master them. I
think sustaining adequate intelligence and command
and control capabilities will be extraordinarily
difficult, not just because of budget cuts. Now,
whether the nation will provide for the kind of
intelligence, command and control that we need in
both peace and war, I think is problematical. The
answer is leadership, and it is imperative. That’s
all I have to say.

Student: I wanted to return to the point you made
about planning. We had a speaker a couple of weeks
ago, Michelle Van Cleave* . . .

Jajko: I know who she is.

Student: Okay. I believe that the National Security
Review 29 is the document she was speaking to. She
was highly critical, and expressed a lot of disap-
pointment in what was returned from the request for
these inputs. I guess she just felt there was no good
attempt at doing it, although she mentioned Treas-
ury as being the exception. Do you have any
thoughts on how well that was accomplished?

Jajko: Yes. I think in some agencies it was a pro-
forma exercise. I know some of the results were
startling because I think there wasn’t sufficient
filtering. You know, there are people in some
Departments who don’t understand what intelli-
gence is about, or what it’s for, and you can’t fault
them for that. But they came up with intelligence
collection requirements that really are not something
for intelligence to do — technological changes in
foreign automobiles, something like that. A lot of
professional intelligence officers whom I know, not
just in Defense, are highly critical of that exercise
and, in fact, speak of it jokingly and disparagingly.

I’ve looked at the results myself. I think there was
a serious attempt to anticipate the world situation.
Some of those requirements will be necessary, and
let me explain why. There are some climatological,
medical, and environmental changes taking place
that are going to have some profound political
consequences — AIDS in Africa, deforestation —
and are not just something the Greenpeace move-
ment is interested in. Economies change. They
fade, they are not able to support the people
throughout a country if there is flooding and the
like. Governments are unable to cope, because of
their lack of economic resources or financial
resources for these things. Political turbulence
results. The United States will get pulled in.
Somalia is one example where you have some
natural disasters coupled to a breakdown in a
political system and we have gotten involved.
That can happen in other places.

Student: I think a lot of the same way you do, in
that there are certain global trends and things that
promise to cause us some problems down the line.
But we have always had droughts, we have always
had famine. Is the real turmoil where those things
are happening, or is it a change of mentality on our
part? To be new interventionists and go in and
forcefully try to fix something in a place where
maybe they really don’t want us to be?

Jajko: That’s part of the debate now. The first
thing, obviously, is that television, CNN, brings it
to people’s attention. So all of a sudden, it becomes
a domestic political issue, at least for some tran-
sient period, and what the actual truth is doesn’t
matter, because it’s the perception of those who
have some political clout. The second part is that
intervention in the situation is somehow considered
in their national interest. Now, I don’t think there
has been serious debate about this. There’s some
debate among columnists in the newspapers, but
there hasn’t been a determination that if you meet
certain thresholds, certain policy criteria, it is
worthwhile to intervene, and if you don’t, it’s not
worthwhile. There is no such rigorous policy
process involved in this. Why we intervened in
Somalia and why we are probably not going to
intervene in Rwanda might be an interesting point.

Oettinger: I think there are some very important
subquestions being raised here. It’s sort of at the
heart of what puzzles me about what this course is
all about, and I’d like to rephrase this slightly
differently to see if I can get your reactions on two
dimensions. You anchor a set of issues that are
kind of mixed up in this set of questions. One, I
think, is a fundamental epistemological issue,
which is independent of what the knowledge is

*See her presentation later in this volume.
about, which has to do with the fact that some things are knowable, "seek and ye shall find," and some things are not. In this context, it is both knowable and findable to say, "I think this guy has got airplanes on 'A' airfield, and I'd like to know how many there are and what type and maybe their armament," and so forth. It's a question I can ask. It makes sense to expect an answer. Where all the threats are coming from — past, present, and future — and what questions I should have known, et cetera, et cetera, is at the heart of this age-old debate over whether the customer or the producer writes requirements, or whose responsibility it is. There may or may not be an answer, because in the limit, nobody knows what the hell they are. I'd like, as sort of question #1, to ask where, to your mind, between "how many airplanes" and "what's the state of the world 10 years from now" is there a reasonable boundary between requirements, recipes and so on that can be reasonably set with the expectation of an answer, versus things where we have to trust to serendipity and luck because you are not smart enough even to ask the questions, whether you are a customer or a producer?

A related, but quite different set of questions is, regardless of where on that first scale you might be, there's an intelligence issue over whether that knowledge — obtainable, unobtainable, reasonable, unreasonable, whatever — is the province of a secret intelligence-gathering organization, as opposed to universities, businessmen, soothsayers, or crystal balls, or what have you. But, clearly, no matter where on the scale of knowledge you are, some things ought to be done by the government, under wraps, as opposed to being done by whoever the hell else in ways that are open in a normal course of business. I think these are two very distinct, though related, questions, but I'd be interested in your reactions to both. First of all, have I posed this in a reasonable way? And if you agree, then address it on those two dimensions.

Jajko: I would tend to fall on the more limited end of the scale. It strikes me that there are things that intelligence ought to be doing and there are elements that the Germans would say don't belong to their "Fach" [profession, field of expertise]. It's not part of their job. Let me kind of answer it in another way. I think the problem is that a lot of the policymakers think that, in sum, intelligence is there to provide them with an answer to any question that they ask. A lot of policymakers also think of estima-
tive intelligence as being some kind of predictive intelligence, as forecasting. Forecasting is not soothsaying, but it's certainly not intelligence. It's a discipline unto itself somewhere out there, and that's not an intelligence officer's business.

I also think that what intelligence has to limit itself to are two kinds of questions going back to the summary discussion of the contrast between tactical and strategic. I would say, particularly for defense intelligence, that there are tactical issues, and by tactical I don't mean a low echelon on the battlefield, but intelligence that is needed for daily operations. By daily operations, I don't just mean military operations, that is, exercise, reconnaissance, contingencies and whatnot, but the operations of the Department of Defense, whether it's acquisition of defense systems going through a restart process or whether it's policy contributing to a discussion at the National Security Council and the Deputies Committee, or a status of forces agreement, or lowering the ceiling of something; all the functions that are done in those departments. Those are tactical and they should, in other words, distinguish between information and what's not information because it's secret intelligence. That's the difference. But it's intelligence support to your day-to-day business, your bread and butter. Then there are the strategic issues, which to me are the most interesting and I don't think we do so well on. By strategic issues, I mean not soothsaying, not forecasting, but looking ahead at the shape of the world, at the political equilibrium in the world, and the military makeup of the world, not just threats, and applying intelligence to that, and attempting to be anticipatory. This is why I put so much stress on strategic planning and having the capabilities for that.

So, I don't know if I've answered all parts of your question well, but, again, I tend to be on that limited side of the scale. It is an epistemological issue and what I'm afraid of is that a lot of people in the intelligence profession don't think about their profession that much. Even if you read studies in intelligence of the CIA, now and then there may be a good article but there's no raging debate on this. There isn't one at the Defense Intelligence College* in the center and I think now is the time for this sort of thing.

I put tremendous stress on the opportunity for reorganization of intelligence. You know, reorganiza-
tions are really traumatic things in the bureaucracy. You don't do them easily and if you get them wrong, you aren't going to go back and fix it, and

*Renamed the Joint Military Intelligence College.
you aren’t going to fix it easily. So you’re stuck with it for a long time. Well, we had a real opportunity at the end of the Gulf War, and I think what I call coming into the 21st century, the political revolution, the end of the Cold War, we have exactly the opportunity to do that in intelligence because we’re going to be facing budget cuts and all that. We need to reorient ourselves and we need that kind of an intellectual debate. It’s going to have a practical effect. We don’t have that.

Then my other point is, of course, we don’t have the means to implement it because we don’t have the strategic planning capability. Now Robert Gates, to his credit, as DCI, attempted to set that up in the CIA. Duane Andrews, to his very great credit, for the first time in Defense, came up with a Defense Intelligence Planning Guide, but it’s still in the works. I hope it comes to light, and I hope it grows as the Defense Planning Guidance did and helps guide the department and defense intelligence. That’s all in the future; that’s all promise, but at least those are first steps. But there’s no deliberate, coherent, organized, systematic attempt to face these kinds of issues and do something about them practically in the bureaucracy. That’s where I fault all of us in the bureaucracy, including me, for not paying attention.

Oettinger: Could you pursue that just a little bit further? That’s what this classroom is for, so if anybody ought to do it, or can do it, here is an opportunity. Push it a little bit further. We all agree, things are more chaotic than they’ve been in quite a while. What do you have in mind when you say “more systematic,” “more coherent,” because that isn’t clear to me? If you had your druthers . . .

Jajko: I didn’t say “in combat.” I said “close combat.”

Student: This involves a new subject. I’m going back to one of your original statements about the revolution in the military technology and how to focus the commander in combat and things like that.

Jajko: Not necessarily, because in fact, the special operations low intensity conflict forces are looking toward those kinds of developments more and more.

Student: It could, I’d like to go back to some of those comments you made earlier, in that you talked about the fact that there is a revolution on the horizon about where we’re going to go with command and control and intelligence collection and all this stuff. How is the pace of those developments going to be affected by the drawbacks and cutdowns that we see . . . the shift toward domestic priorities?

Jajko: I think the services have already staked out their agendas for survival and for budgets quite clearly. I think there are two things that will limit our — I’ll use the word “grasp” — of the military-technical revolution. Of course, we may understand it intellectually, but there are two things that I think are going to limit it. One is how fast this intellectual understanding seeps down to the level of the generals and the colonels, the admirals and the captains, who are not involved in strategizing, but are
involved in the day-to-day administration of the forces, the ones saying “We’ll keep the institutions running”: the two-stars, the one-stars, the O-6s. The other is our will actually to grasp this revolution and do something about it. By will, I mean willingness to come up with the operational concepts, the doctrine, and the organizational adaptations, changing what forces look like, altering the force structure to absorb that military-technical revolution, because to do that, you’re not only talking about budget changes, but you’re also talking about institutional culture and some of the values that are very important. Let me draw one quick comparison to show you how difficult I think this is emotionally. It’s not just a dollar issue.

The British government, and the British Army, understand very well that they are probably a third-rate power, and that they’ve got to cut forces. The most difficult part of cutting the forces under the changes paid for now, and as it was under the first Mountbatten reforms about 15 years ago, was the amalgamation of regiments, because the British Army, since the beginning of the 17th century, has been built on the county regiment. You join your regiment in the county you spend your existence in. Even if you go on to become a general officer or a field marshal or whatever, if you join the Grenadiers, by golly, until the day you die, you’re a Grenadier Guard, or you’re from the Staffordshire Regiment, or whatever. The uniforms, everything, are there. It’s like the Marine Corps here. When they play the Marine Hymn out in Maryland, every old guy who’s ever been in the Marines stands up. The emotional ties are there.

That’s the kind of thing you’ve got to overcome in the services when you start changing things like force structure and what the mission is, and I think the military-technical revolution is going to force it. Think back to the changes between the Civil War and 1939. The most obvious example is the tank — armored warfare. The Germans finally picked up the whole idea of maneuver warfare, of the tank-airplane team and all that. The Germans didn’t invent that; it was British and French officers who wrote about it. The French would not pick it up, notwithstanding the bloodbath they had gone through in World War I. They just couldn’t face up to the institutional change emotionally.

Oettinger: They ostracized de Gaulle.

Jajko: We still had horses in the U.S. Army in 1942. The Germans, notwithstanding that they were the ones who developed the tank and the Panzer forces in World War II, had horse-drawn artillery until the day Hitler committed suicide. Most of the artillery was horse-drawn. Military institutions — and this is their great strength — are very stable institutions. They do change, they adapt, but they’re very, very slow to change. The French army, when it went to war in 1914, was still in part fighting according to the doctrine of Napoleon. That’s why so many were killed. Our Civil War generals — Lee, Grant, and others — are highly praised, but none of them really grasped the essence of maneuver warfare. That’s why our Civil War was so bloody. The beginnings of technology were there.

Oettinger: This is a chapter of Lincoln’s life that needs to be better researched and understood. I think it could be so influential. With all this log-cabin claptrap, people ignore the fact that he was a professional railroad lawyer employed by Chicago railroad magnates and understood railroad probably as well, if not better than, anybody else in this period. It must have been absolutely frustrating to him, on the lines that you’re talking about, as a guy who understood railroads and the potential of railroads in moving troops, and telegraph, because railroad and telegraph went hand-in-hand, that his commanders would be fighting these wars of attrition with scissile forces when he knew he’d made his living creating railroads. Of course, he ultimately got a general who helped move stuff along on railroads.

Jajko: You know, to show you the power of these institutions, look at the uniforms of the United States Army between the Revolution or between the War of 1812 and the First World War and you’ll see that first the uniforms are British, then they’re Napoleonic, and then they go to the Second Empire and then after the Second Empire fell, what did the U.S. Army adopt? Pickelhauben!* Prussian helmets, Prussian uniforms, because it was not just a fashion in uniforms, but it reflected the way that you looked at warfare and the way you fought wars. Those were the dominant examples. And it didn’t matter whether it was applicable to fighting the plains Indians or not, because that is what the U.S. Army did.

Oettinger: An odd reflection on this is that the Prussian general staff and the Prussian organization were in fact modeled on American railroad organizations. The historical importance of railroad organizations doesn’t tend to be appreciated.

*"Pickelhauben" are really "pimple helmets."
**Jajko:** In fact, don’t let me interrupt you, but we will play on your nickel. The key German general staff officer in 1914 was not the planner. It was General Groener, who was on the general staff and ran the railroads and made sure their timetables all fit together.

**Oettinger:** You’ve got to read Al Chandler’s *Visible Hand* and his earlier book on the history of American industry, which really made his reputation. Anyway, Alfred Chandler, business historian here at Harvard, is the best reading available on railroads, the railroad organization, and then some vignettes that give insight into the copying and adapting of that railroad organization structure by the Prussians. It’s a very, very important element in understanding this, but I think it’s interesting because the Germans, as you point out, understood mobility and understood tanks and so on.

What they did not understand was radar. Both the Brits and the Germans had radars, and it shows the importance of organizational mindset, because the Germans screwed it up. The way they tried to use radar was essentially as an augmentation of ground observers with binoculars covering the waterfront and reporting on stuff that passed overhead, and that was that. It wasn’t worth a damn. British Bomber Command was somewhat similar. Fighter Command had the idea of a radical, different approach using a new tool, and organizing themselves differently: namely, instead of patrolling everywhere, using the radar evidence to concentrate their forces so that at the last minute, instead of having the traditional air war, which at the time meant having some cover everywhere, they waited for the radar to indicate where the bomber formations were coming from and concentrated all the planes in that direction. This is what made that minuscule piece of the RAF look to the Germans like an enormous force, because the Germans then interpreted that through their eyes. This again illustrates the importance of culture, in this case, miniculture, because there wasn’t such a thing as British culture. The Germans had good spies and good HUMINT from Bomber Command who said, “Oh, yeah, you know, the Brits are just like us.” They’d have to have had awfully good people inside Fighter Command to understand the radical restructuring of their outlook on everything.

So here we have practically a laboratory-purity experiment in essentially similar technology available across the border to Germans and to all British air arms. The Germans screwed up, Bomber Command screwed up. The British Fighter Command used it. There are a number of histories whose names and titles I can’t remember, but I’d be happy to dig them up for you.

One piece that you should read, because it’s such a marvelous piece, is by Elting Morison.* It’s on the self-leveling gunsight, which is a U.S. Navy episode, and leading up to the end of the story is that Teddy Roosevelt ordered the Navy to start using them. This was an invention that enabled naval gunfire, which had been terribly ineffective, among other things, to work. You know, when you’ve got a ship rolling and pitching and so forth, you don’t know where the hell things are going to land. So it was one of the worst possible kinds of gunnery, and this guy had the idea that if you did some timing of the rolling and pitching, you could adjust the guns so that they’d be in kind of the right relationship to the rocking cycle and could lob something that was many percent more accurate than its predecessors. The Navy insisted on testing the thing. They picked a test site in Maryland or Virginia or someplace, solid concrete on the ground, and concluded that there was no difference between self-leveling gunsights and older gunsights because the accuracy was about the same. Armed with this scientific evidence, they resisted until Teddy Roosevelt told them to shove it and move on. You have to have personal presidential intervention to get the mindset in the organizational structure altered.

So, don’t think it can’t happen here. Don’t think it cannot happen prospectively and so on, but the only thing one can offer is these kinds of historical precedents. They’re not terribly encouraging, and I think this is why Walter Jajko is right to make the case here before young folks, because by and large it takes a new generation, along with some degree of muscle, like a new President or something, to make these things happen, partly, and this is part of the message in Allard, because you can’t dismiss the old ways of being just a pile of shit. They’re not. Like those regimental things in Britain, they have considerable importance. Why does something as ridiculous survive? Because it provides a sense of belonging, a sense of “I will be taken care of,” a sense that, if necessary, somebody will know who I am and ship my body home to my widow, which won’t happen in some impersonal thing where

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nobody knows anybody else. Those roots lie deep because they fulfill some very important purposes. In the absence of a great deal of persuasion that the new ways will really deliver without just screwing up the old ways, one cannot totally fault folks who like to have regimental security. It’s an awfully warm, furry feeling to have the folks from the old regiment looking after you.

Jajko: Let me suggest something to you. To take an historical example, you look at the situation now after the Gulf War and the debate over aircraft procurement and you look at our so-called “regional defense strategy” and then just think about which aircraft may be more important to us. Is it a short-range fighter, like an F-16 or an F-15, whether it’s air defense or ground attack or multimission, or is it a B-2 that’s refuelable and has global range and is stealthy and can deliver precision-guided munitions strategically on a target? It’s a good one, especially if we don’t have overseas bases. You begin to see the trade-offs you have to make. And then, what kind of operational concept do you need, what kind of organization, what does it do to your doctrine? Let me make a one-sentence observation. I think the Gulf War was the first time that the Air Force, notwithstanding previous claims, carried out Billy Mitchell’s ideas and more than that, Douhet’s ideas on their doctrine. It’s taken a long time.

Student: Going back to the technology and innovation area, how do you see the military restructuring once we start moving into an area where some of the warfighting will be noncombatant, i.e., technology, i.e., I’m going in and I’ll pack my computer system back in the middle of Nebraska, or whatever, and use the internet-type thing. That’s very much in the noncombatant mission where you have a large portion, potentially, of the effectiveness of warfighting being done by basically the technicians that have nothing to do with the troops, and probably do not have the same skills as the people in the field or anything else, but it’s electronic technique that is divorced from the rest of the services basically.

Jajko: Well, the question is, “Does it have to be done in the service?” That’s a fair question, you know.

Student: Is there a better place for it?

Jajko: Well, yes, that’s exactly it. Some other department better suited to that or some civilian part of the Department of Defense.

Student: Which is where that expertise is based today in the intelligence agencies — some of them.

Jajko: Sure, sure and the natural thing to do would be to turn to and tell someone in an intelligence agency to execute that. You begin getting into not only the philosophical and organizational issues, but also the legal issues, because if you get information warfare, and you’re not engaged in otherwise traditional combat hostilities with the nation, then the question is, what do you define it as, an act of war? Is it really command and control countermeasures or is it just plain old sabotage, economic sabotage? I don’t know. There are all these issues to be worked out that are part of it.

Student: If you give it to the intelligence agency, they basically now have an operational mission, which is “Get outside — war abroad!” That’s their culture.

Jajko: Exactly, and the point of it is also, it’s looked at in intelligence terms from their narrow perspective. The purposes for which it will be conducted might be organizational purposes or intelligence purposes, rather than a wider purpose of fighting war, because who doesn’t really shape that to a greater extent?

Oettinger: I’m not inclined to be looking for revolution along this. Let me deliver myself of another generality. Especially in the United States context, if you expect a revolution on what is warfare and what is civilian and what is military and who has legal authority, I commend to you a look at old-fashioned things like highways and post offices and so forth, where, analogous to the civilian-military distinction, there is a public-private distinction that has a long history. Much of the debate underneath all of that, for decades, tends to be polarized: you’ve got to make this public, or it’s got to be private. That argument has not gone away yet if you start looking at the spectrum between public and private, you’re surrounded by authorities — the Port Authority, MassPort, the Turnpike Authority, et cetera, et cetera. Ask yourselves why these things were created. Every damn one of them is along a different point on the spectrum, from public to private. It may be private ownership, public borrowing authority, the borrowing with the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or the government of the United States behind them. There’s the Postal Service, a private corporation with government financial backing. The Postal Rate Commission, a special regulatory agency that does
nothing but regulate another government agency. On the civilian side between fully private and fully governmental, you can go on and on putting in those changes. I think the same is already true, never mind having to be invented in the military, somewhere between totally civilian and totally armed force and police of various kinds in between and intelligence agencies with or without operational responsibility, there is one hell of a lot of populated points where without constitutional amendment we address some of these problems. I think we are quite capable of addressing them . . .

Jajko: I think that’s a natural. I think the reflex is to address them in bits and pieces as they come along and go one organization at a time rather than in a comprehensive way. It’s something else that’s not economically feasible anymore, and in the case of the information warfare that I talked about, computers are ubiquitous, information is ubiquitous, so you can’t artificially divide it. In fact, you may find that in an information war the center of gravity may be the financial system of the country. So, the distinctions, I think, are artificial.

It isn’t the other side of the coin, but there is kind of another aspect to this — the military. The drug war is getting involved in activities that were never considered part of the military mission. They have existed since they created the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense, but some of the things that the Department of Defense is engaged in in South America would actually have been mind-boggling back around 10 years ago, and so would the law enforcement activities and what the intelligence agencies are involved in. It was just unthinkable, so there is a spread of functions and missions.

Student: You act as if they did it on purpose on their own. What is your point?

Jajko: No. I said from the other side that there is a spread into other activities, nontraditional activities, and that has been done deliberately.

Oettinger: I think he was trying to reinforce this point that I was making: that there is more of a shading already in place than one might think. The way that the Bush Administration introduced the organization of the war on drugs is an excellent example of the shading from the military into police and intelligence, and so forth, the commingling and the jointness, if one may speak of it in those terms. Is there any term yet for what happens when you get all the cats and dogs that are involved in the drug business commingled? I mean, it’s chaos. But somewhere between coalition and service and joint is the chaos that is multiagency of various stripes engaged in the drug war, so one has models that exist even though they’re not actively recognized in here.

Student: Sir, there’s a certain philosophy that tends to anchor what the military does to many of its nonmilitary missions and say it degrades its readiness, its strength, for military missions, and I would ask if you could make that argument for humanitarian assistance or mainly our drug war. You were talking about economic intelligence and you were talking about environmental intelligence.

Jajko: Now, you know, if you want to begin changing the basic purpose for which the organization exists and what its basic mission is, I think you ought to be quite conscious and deliberate about doing that and recognize what the consequences are. I tend to be very conservative on that and not to favor it. I think that’s someone else’s job. I’ve read the article on the coup too in the Military Review, and, you know, I buy that argument. I think there’s only so much of that you can do and you’re no longer soldiering. There’s one country that has adopted that very well, and that’s Canada. Canada doesn’t have armed forces that are there to fight wars. Again, they say so. They talk about sovereignty, particularly in the northern region zone. They’re a professional peacekeeping force. In the 18th century, they were Hessians.

Oettinger: But it seems to me though, you’re making a much more profound point that I’ve heard, which is quite aside from these humanitarian, et cetera, et cetera, issues, which may or may not be designs for warfare, tactical or whatever. I heard you say that the nature of warfare, in terms of this electronic, or whatever, war is altering so profoundly that the very definition of what fighting or its equivalent means has changed, and that’s a much more serious problem.

Jajko: Yes, and the appearance of a military force, its composition, I think will change radically. I guess my point is that we ought to do this in an organized, deliberate, conscious way, that is, know why we’re doing it and what the consequences are, because there may, in fact, be some risks and losses. There are a lot of anomalies and there is a lot of what you might call dissipation on a mission. RAND has done the thinking for the Air Force for 40 years. The Air Force has not had a general staff in the 19th century continental sense. There are a lot
of organizations that already perform quasi-military, paramilitary tasks, and the military, as you pointed out, has taken on a lot of civilian tasks. So it's mixing.

Oettinger: I think the central point I heard you make, though, is that having some place with responsibility to think about these issues and develop a strategy for coping with them is essential. Have I heard you correctly?

Jajko: Well, I think there ought to be an institutionalized process, which doesn't exist at all. I guess the hope when McNamara became Secretary of Defense was that OSD/PA&E would do that, the 'whiz kids' who, in fact, do operational research and whatnot, and that they would provide guidance to the Defense Department in a rational way and come up with solutions to problems like this, not just acquisitions of weapons. That never took place. I mean, the only thing we have left over is the Office of PA&E and the Defense Planning Guidance, but what we don't have is a planning institution to do that.

Oettinger: Is some of that buried in NDU (National Defense University)?

Student: Air University would like to say that they're doing a lot of that stuff.

Jajko: Well, at NDU there are the organs that are supposed to do that. I personally don't think that's being done at the Institute of National Strategic Studies or wherever. Let me make one remark. Since you mentioned NDU, there is a lot of talk at NDU and there's this marvelous little monograph that came out by Dunn on the future of warfare. There are a lot of individual articles by a lot of bright people being put out, but there's no organized effort, even in the Institute on Strategic Studies, to look at these issues, and I really thought that was their job: to think about the future of warfare. That's why there are strategists supposedly, there at the National War College. What I really found telling was I went to a war game at NDU and I found out that the people who had the responsibility for looking at information in warfare are in a little program in a department in the Information Resources Management College at National Defense University. Now, the Information Resources Management College is one of those $20 titles for the old DOD computer institute, where 15 years ago they would take you in and teach you the fundamentals of working a keyboard. In other words, it teaches you the trade of how to handle computers, either to operate them or how to manage them as an executive, whether it's purchasing or using them or whatever. But it has to do with the management of tools, of machines, and I find it interesting that this highly cerebral concept now is stuck away down on a tool bench rather than being up with the strategists at NDU. Again, that's a reflection of how the culture accepts these things.

Oettinger: That's a question of whether you look at the glass as half empty or half full. I'm delighted to see that they've even managed to bury it somewhere, instead of rejecting it outright. That's progress! That is progress.

Jajko: Maybe that's one way of protecting it. I don't know.

Oettinger: Well, sometimes it is. One of the techniques for raising fledglings in any organization is to bury them out of sight. Sometimes that's done out of love, not out of hatred. The idea is to have them report directly to the top, independent of any existing organization, but that has the demerit that it makes it visible and trackable, although that sometimes works. There are only two live parts in General Motors: one is General Motors Europe, and the only live part in the United States is the Saturn Division, which follows that latter model of having been hung off the top of management in an entirely separate location, with separate management, built up from scratch, but vulnerable from day one to sniping, et cetera, et cetera. When you're buried deeper, you have a period when they can't come and get you because they don't know you're there. So, in terms of the fine arts of bureaucratic infighting, and sometimes that happens inadvertently, they may have burrowed in there without anybody even knowing it. I don't know whether it's a half-full or a half-empty situation there.

Student: Sir, you mentioned in your paper that counterintelligence operations are segmented within the services, and that, in your opinion, hampers fusion of intelligence within the Department. My question is: has there ever been a serious effort to consolidate the counterintelligence operation within various services, and if so, what can we do about it?

Jajko: No, no. Of course, the services would be strongly opposed to that, and I would imagine that people who run counterintelligence, you know, in OSD, would be opposed too. I think they kind of like the current arrangement. I guess I'm a centralizer by visceral tendency, but I'm not sure that that would help counterintelligence.
I'll backtrack my answer. The first part is that the Army some years ago did consolidate counterintelligence with positive intelligence in INSCOM (Intelligence and Security Command). The Navy is going the other way now because of Tailhook. There are some changes there. That's been lumped in with the criminal investigative people. The influence of the people in charge of counterintelligence in the DNI staff is weak, not impressive.

My principal charge is against the Air Force, and I'm an alumnus of the Air Force. The Air Force from its inception has lumped counterintelligence in with its law enforcement people in the OSI, the Office of Special Investigation. There's a simple reason for that. When the Air Force was created as a separate service, it slowly cut its umbilical cord from the Army and at some point they realized they needed this law enforcement capability to carry out criminal investigations. The Air Force shopped around, some of it was set up, and whoever made the decision, I guess the chief at the time, liked the FBI model, so he went to the FBI and he hired one of their senior people. So Joseph Carroll was brought into the Air Force, was commissioned a colonel, and was told to establish the Office of Special Investigations, which he did. He modeled it on the FBI because that's where he came from, and that's what he knew. He looked around for someone to be his godfather, his boss, and knowing the law enforcement role, not the military role, he decided that the Inspector General was the appropriate place to put that. Ever since then, counterintelligence has been under the IG in the Air Force. I don't think it makes much sense. A lot of other people don't. Counterintelligence agents are happy, the Air Force is happy, and the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the guy in charge of intelligence, doesn't seem to care. I think this has created one bad kind of culture for counterintelligence. It gives a law enforcement flavor, a plain-spoken kind of German mentality, to counterintelligence. The FBI is very successful in counterintelligence, but it is secondary to law enforcement. It shouldn't be in the Air Force.

Counterintelligence is an extraordinarily important function in intelligence. It is your check against the enemy. It's your way into the enemy. Counterintelligence, if done properly, is probably the most cerebral activity, the most demanding intellectual activity, in intelligence, because what you've got to do is penetrate the enemy intelligence service. If you do counterintelligence correctly, you don't wait for them to attack you. You don't simply provide physical security and whatnot to your station or your facility or intelligence element, whatever it is. You go out and try to penetrate the other service, get into it, and then you try to conduct offensive actions against them. This is where I come back to culture in my paper. You've got to understand the opposition. You've got to understand the nuances of his thinking, of his language, and what he's all about. You've got to get into his head. That's what counterintelligence is supposed to do, and I submit, if you've got counterintelligence with the cops, you ain't gonna do it, because you trade assignments back and forth and the cops are interested in arresting someone. We've got that problem with drugs in Latin America. Why? Because intelligence isn't designed to put someone away, or to build up intelligence space for some strategic strike, some higher level. There's this constant tension in the background.

**Student:** While we're criticizing the Air Force on its organizational response to intelligence, how do you feel about the Air Force Intelligence Command not having its fingers in the IMINT pie?

**Jajko:** I don't. I think they should. I don't like it. I think if you are going to be a proper intelligence organization you've got to deal with all disciplines of intelligence on all scales. If you were going to ask them about their doing away with intelligence...

**Student:** That was my next question.

**Jajko:** Abolition, which I've heard is going to happen, I think is a dreadful move. There was also talk about abolishing the Defense Intelligence College last fall. It was pretty close, which I think is horrible.

**Oettinger:** Yes, it was great stupidity, but having been close to that here, it was one of those ideas that was floated as a possibility and that got transmuted subtly and with actuality until some of us got hold of the idea that put a knife into it.

**Jajko:** But that always happens in the budget.

**Oettinger:** It is amazing how such things acquire a life of their own. Now, you are absolutely correct. Let me take you back to one of your comments about counterintelligence, and for a moment let me be the devil's advocate on this point, because I don't know whether I believe it or not. Knowing the other guy, et cetera, I can buy, but I sense a tendency to have interpreted that in the past as knowing the
other guy’s intelligence organizations. Then it becomes a kind of mutual navel contemplation society, which doesn’t necessarily do much about real intelligence. I find that worrisome.

**Jajko:** Well, there’s kind of a vulgarization there, because people tend to do the easy thing, you know. In policy, it becomes bean counting. Intelligence has very similar phenomena. It’s always easier to do the order of battle, find out how many of them there are, and where they are, and what they are doing. That’s not the important thing. The important thing is to find out why they are doing something, what they are after. So, what happens is you get a kind of trade school approach. You find out how they go about doing it, how the opposition does it, what their procedures are, what their trade is like, and you know all about them, you know how they are organized. Then you have got a perfect description of them. That doesn’t tell you anything. You still don’t know why they are so good, and why they are doing it, and what they are really after. We knew a lot about the Stasi. What we didn’t know was what made those guys at the top tick. What were they really after? And why were they so damn successful? Why were the Cubans so successful in turning out people? We just haven’t penetrated under the surface.

**Student:** Sir, let’s take that a little bit further. Do you find one of the problems is just the incentive structure — the immediate gratification?

**Jajko:** That has to do with an agency of which I am not a member, and although I have some opinions on their incentive structuring and organization, I don’t think I should speak for them. In defense of counterintelligence, I would say there is nothing wrong with the incentive structure for the working troops. I have to say, though, I don’t know very many of them that have made general officer, so there may be something to the business of having incentives. The Army, I think, has tended to take their people from the positive side, people with a lot of battlefield-support strengths, as they should.

People have commanded CEWI battalions and MI brigades and whatnot. The Air Force has taken people who are technically very well grounded and have worked in the important commands. SAC (Strategic Air Command) in the past would be kind of separate. I’m not sure how the Navy works that except that I know that if you really need to get to the top you’d better be an N-2 — one of the two intelligence chiefs of a Navy Fleet Command when you’re a captain. I don’t see any counterintelligence people that are getting to the top. They may go to O-6, Colonel, Navy Captain. I don’t see anything beyond that. We’ve had a couple of brigadier generals who have headed up OSI and one that I know of had a counterintelligence background. But it depends on how many general officer positions there are in the Air Force, and with cutbacks and all, it’s not a post that is always headed by a general officer.

**Oettinger:** Are there any closing thoughts you want to leave us with that somehow haven’t emerged in what you said or what we would question you about?

**Jajko:** No. I think intelligence is a fascinating profession. Let me go further. I think it’s a calling. It’s like a military calling; if you’re going to do it right, it demands sacrifice. It demands a lot of intelligence. It demands a hell of a lot of hard work at all times. Above all, I think it demands integrity, intellectual integrity, ethics. I think it’s a damn fine profession. I would urge anybody to get into it in any of the agencies, whatever your inclination is. You have to give it your all, the country certainly needs it. I didn’t mean to give a rousing speech, but that’s it.

**Oettinger:** That’s perfectly fine. You’ve given us an enormous amount of food for thought and I want to thank you for that. Also, although we are professional beggars, we would like to leave you with a small token of our appreciation for coming here.

**Jajko:** Thank you very much.
APPENDIX

Comments on Intelligence and Command and Control in Defense

Walter Jajko
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Note
Throughout this paper, the term "Defense Intelligence" is used as a convenience. It has one of three meanings, depending on the context in which it is used. These meanings are Intelligence as an organization, Intelligence as the process of the Intelligence Cycle, and Intelligence as a supporting activity. Defense Intelligence also refers to the intelligence product originated by a Department of Defense Component, although intelligence for defense purposes can be provided by any member of the Intelligence Community. In fact, increasingly, intelligence, from whatever source, is intelligence for all in the government.

Defense Intelligence as an organization is a misnomer; there is no single, unified entity. Some components have separate statutory establishment. What all of the components of Defense Intelligence have in common is that they report, ultimately, to the Secretary of Defense. Defense Intelligence consists of the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the intelligence elements of the Military Departments — namely the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Intelligence Command, and the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force and the Air Force Intelligence Command, the latter, perhaps, soon to be disestablished; intelligence elements from the military services assigned as forces to the unified combatant commands; and the National Reconnaissance Office and the National Security Agency.

Introduction
I intend to address the topic of this seminar, Intelligence, Command and Control, in both of its constituents, which are indicated by and inherent in its title, namely Intelligence in Command and Control and the Command and Control of Intelligence, but I will address them primarily from the viewpoint of Intelligence and, specifically, Intelligence in the Department of Defense. I will address the topic indirectly on several levels at several echelons and from several aspects in an idiosyncratic, but not unconnected, inventory of issues bounded broadly by the desiderata of Defense. To speak of Intelligence and Command and Control is, of course, to speak of statecraft and warfare.

Thesis
The United States is entering a new epoch. United States' national security and the national security community are in transformation. Defense, as a constituent component of this community, will partake in the transformation. To understand the possibilities for the transformation of Defense, it is necessary to consider those factors that place primary parameters on the possibilities for the transformation of Defense Intelligence and Command and Control because, in so doing, these factors will shape the adaptability, character, and capability of Defense Intelligence and Command and Control. Some of these factors are external to Defense and uncontrollable, others are internal to Defense and controllable. Some are transcendental, others are mundane. Some are familiar and taken for granted, others are unfamiliar and only surmised. Several of these factors, although disparate and not all-inclusive, have been specifically selected because of their
— not always apparent — intrinsic importance and extended effect.

**Revolutions**

A transcendent cause of the transformation of United States' national security is the simultaneous revolutions in technology and politics that the world is experiencing. These revolutions will transform war, its methods and conditions. The transformations will define what and how Command must control and will delimit what, how, and why Intelligence must learn and understand. Intelligence and Command and Control, in short, are facing a new paradigm. How Intelligence reacts to this paradigm may determine how our power survives in the new epoch.

**Military Technical Revolution**

A transcendent factor fundamentally affecting Command and Control and Intelligence is the contemporary Military-Technical Revolution — a revolution as basic, profound, and consequential as that that transformed warfare between 1865 and 1939. The technological constituents of the current Military-Technical Revolution — computers; multisensors; electronic warfare; communications; directed energy; low-observables; standoff, precision, area, high lethality, and nonlethal weapons; global strike; space exploitation; and Intelligence — have telescoped tactics, operational art, and strategy.

The most interesting development in the Revolution is the technological advance that has provided visibility of the entire battlefield. Intelligence now can see the enemy side. Intelligence has dissipated the fog of war. This development has made Intelligence the first Principle of War.

Intelligence provides insight from information; command turns insight into action. Intelligence can identify the political, military, and psychological centers of gravity where wars are won or lost; it can identify the operational points of decision where battles are won or lost. Visibility of the battlefield provides Intelligence and Command not only knowledge of the disposition of the enemy and the understanding of the battlefield but also the enemy's accommodation to and application of those conditions, i.e., the enemy commander's understanding of the battlefield. Visibility of the enemy allows Intelligence to inform Command so that combat power can be marshaled and applied decisively — whatever the operational environment, land, sea, air, and, soon, space. Intelligence can anticipate the enemy's intent and render it irrelevant, informing Command of where, when, and why to initiate the decisive engagement. In short, Intelligence can establish the terms of the battle, nullifying the enemy's strategy and forcing him to conform to one's own strategy. Intelligence, therefore, could become the decisive arm in war.

The most consequential part of the Military-Technical Revolution appears to be the Information Revolution. Whereas in the past warfare was dependent on information, now information dominates warfare. The Information Revolution may have the most profound effect on warfare — on Intelligence and Command and Control. Information Warfare can change the assumptions and expectations, the potentialities and possibilities of war. In fact, Information Warfare is a new form of war.

Intelligence has become the essential element in providing the strategic initiative — the preemption of the enemy's ability to act. The opportunity to preempt enemy action is most obvious and attractive in Information Warfare because the target is the enemy's decisionmaking, whether in politics or warfare. Although it is axiomatic that the more you deny, deceive, disrupt, or dominate the enemy's decisionmaking, the less you must destroy the enemy's warfighting, it is only the Information Revolution that has provided the optimum opportunity for this exploitation. Information Warfare allows the isolation of the enemy commander rather than the enemy force. Information Warfare has as its objective the enemy's conception — his strategy — of how to fight the war or the battle. Information Warfare can attack the integrity, coherence, and sustainability of the enemy's planning and management of operations, in short, the enemy's Command and Control. Information Warfare's most useful application is to Time, which has become the decisive dimension in warfare. Information Warfare can shorten or lengthen the duration for decisionmakers, the enemy's or one's own. However, Information Warfare's formidable potential — for the defense as well as the offense — has yet to be realized.

What is lacking is the understanding of how to apply Command and Control — and Intelligence — systematically in new ways and for new ends that are decisive. This, doctrine could and should provide. Notwithstanding decades of discussion and dollars dispensed on Command and Control, the armed forces do not have an intellectual explanation that uniformly integrates their understanding: They do not have a doctrine. The lack of a Command and
Control Doctrine is impeding the exploitation and application of the full potential of Information Warfare. Doctrine is important because it provides order to management and understanding to operations. Doctrine is indispensable if Command and Control is to be other than instinctual and inferential, and, therefore, unpredictable and unreliable. Too, the relationship of Command and Control and Intelligence has never been clearly established other than they are connected by communications and each has to communicate to the other what they have to say to be of any use.

The amalgamation and application of the technologies associated with computers and communications already have had an effect on governments. They no longer can control all communications and information to their peoples. In fact, a new relationship between information and authority has evolved: Information allows autonomy from authority. Authority no longer assures control. Distributed systems permit information to be acquired, processed, manipulated, and stored at lower echelons. They also allow information to be used for purposes and in forms unintended and uncontrolled by a center. If information is distributed, decisionmaking may be distributed. The obvious effect of this devolution could be on Command and Control. Centralized institutions, such as military forces and intelligence elements, may not be able or may not want to enforce comprehensive control. The coherent direction of the battlefield, in strategy and management — i.e., Command and Control — may be difficult to maintain, not because of the friction of war, but because of the operational autonomy of elements of the organization.

If this be so, the conception of a problem, not just its content, and, therefore, its meaning could be different at the center and at the deployed echelon. Not only would command, control, and communications be tenuous, but the understanding of them may be different in the headquarters and in the field. If this is true for Command and Control, it also will be true for Intelligence. The meaning of intelligence processing — and Intelligence itself — may be changed. At the least, the differences among data, information, and intelligence may no longer be associated exclusively with echelons. As a result, it may be that the operational, doctrinal, and organizational premises for maneuver units and intelligence elements will have to change.

Ultimately, the cumulative changes in technology, operational innovation, doctrine, and organizational adaptation may be so considerable that defeat of the enemy and attainment of the political objective — victory in classic terms — may not require engagement in close combat of the enemy and occupation of his territory. But the most important result of the Military-Technical Revolution will not necessarily be how we fight a war but how we think about fighting a war.

Political Revolution

Another transcendent cause of the transformation of United States’ national security is the end, politically, of the 20th century, the period 1914–1991, a conclusion as significant as the end of the Napoleonic Era. With the new century and the new millennium, the struggle around the globe seems to be over sovereignty. Some states are suffering a segmentation of sovereignty. Ethnic, economic, epidemiological, criminal, and religious attacks on politics make their sovereignty meaningless. Governance is an irrelevance: Institutions regress from incapacity through illegitimacy to invisibility. Alternative sovereignties assume the administration of sectors of society. In South America, criminal conspiracies have subverted societies and captured economies by turning countries into narcotics plantations. In Africa, in some countries wars have sapped psyches so that societies are at subsistence in all segments of their lives; other states stand to lose their educated elites to AIDS. Across Eurasia, repressed and retarded nationalisms have been let loose and new nationalisms are nascent. Religious revival is causing the waxing of the old Islamic Crescent from Casablanca through Karachi to the Khanates. In China, mandarin Maoism and high-technology capitalism are seeking a synthesis that will again make the Middle Kingdom a great power after a half dozen centuries. The end of the Cold War and the Soviet Empire has freed peoples’ ambitions from the superpower struggle to be satisfied on their own merits and the interests, equities, and strengths involved. Although there is political partition in most parts of the world, it is paired with halting movement toward unification, economic or political, in North America and Europe. Nevertheless, the reappearance of the rest of the world in its own right reaffirms the fact that Europe remains for the United States the strategic center of the globe.

However, the inertia of Europe and the United States in Yugoslavia (merely the exemplar for the inertia from the Oder to the Okhotsk) tragically demonstrates that the end of the Cold War has not been accompanied by an end to “old thinking”. The
war among the Yugoslavs demonstrates the limited utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the instrument for the United States' participation in the politics of Europe, beyond its original purpose. It poses the issue whether NATO is an anachronism so long as it has not developed a strategic rationale for its future. The failure with respect to the present and the future on the part of all members of NATO poses the danger of the renationalization of security — on the Continent and in the United States. The indicators of this possibility are the cracks in the solidarity for the security of both halves of Europe: Western Europe is slipping back. Eastern Europe is being excluded, and the United States is withdrawing. If these suggestive indicators are allowed to develop into accomplished facts, the foundation for facing a failure in Russia will have eroded. The Political Revolution initiated by the demise of the last of the great empires and the tentative triumph of the United States has created unprecedented conditions, tasks, and challenges for Command and Control and Intelligence in statecraft and warfare.

Regional Strategy

Among the mundane factors affecting Command and Control and Intelligence is the new Regional Defense Strategy, which the Bush Administration announced in 1992 to cope with the end of the Cold War and to cut political and military commitments. A lightening of the load was thought to be not only desirable but feasible because the Cold War had ended with the unprecedented military, but not attendant political and economic, domination of the entire globe by the United States. This circumstance, consciously coupled to the system of collective security, caused the late Administration to conclude that the United States had secured safety through "strategic depth".2 The assumption of strategic depth is based on the existence of alliances, foremost the North Atlantic Alliance. However, in recent years, the U.S. has been forced to accept the idea of an emergent, independent European security entity, albeit of uncertain identity and incomplete and ineffective institutions. This emergence, however tenuous, erodes the viability of NATO, the institution that legitimizes American political interference in Europe in return for military security, and eventual unification indicates the end of U.S. involvement in Europe.

Moreover, with the end of the Cold War, the strategic context and purpose in Europe for U.S. Intelligence have disappeared. Whether NATO survives, and with new purpose and in new form, the premise for U.S. intelligence involvement is fundamentally changed. Furthermore, the physical foundation for U.S. influence in Europe has been undercut: Germany, in reunification, has regained its independence. Because military intelligence forces for theater commands are forward based, the removal of most of the U.S. fighting forces in Europe reduces military intelligence resources, ostensibly in proportion. The bases for much of the military intelligence operations in Europe, the Soviet successor states, North Africa, the Middle East and South West Asia are lost as U.S. combat forces vacate them. Except for the Defense Attaché Offices, Defense must rely mostly on resources not under its control. Eventually, the political, economic, and security changes among our European Allies and their resulting divergent interests will change their attitudes of acceptance of our intelligence operations.

The last Administration’s assumption of "strategic depth" was intended to permit the U.S. to provide for its security at less cost, less engagement, and less risk. The Administration concluded that less effort and more time could be applied to the world’s disorder, notwithstanding its volume, consequences, and violence, managing with far fewer forces than were used to deter war with the Soviet Union. To safeguard U.S. security in these circumstances, the Administration articulated its Regional Defense Strategy. The Regional Defense Strategy is intended to prevent the reemergence of a global threat and the success of a regional threat. (Yet, the very assumptions of the strategy, the desire for disengagement, and the reduction in resources signify that the United States may be relinquishing — voluntarily — its superpower status.) The strategy is dependent on the forward presence of U.S. forces to deter or counter any such threat. Similarly, much of the Defense Intelligence capability to support the Regional Defense Strategy is forward-based. In fact, bases and access are indispensable to this strategy. Yet, the strategy is meant to facilitate the withdrawal of forces from forward bases. Prepositioning of equipment, periodic deployments of forces, occasional exercises with friendly forces, and commercial access to facilities do not provide the necessary sustained access for forces, much less Intelligence, that only forward basing can provide. Forward basing is critical when crises occur with little or no warning. In fact, the reduction in the forward presence of U.S. forces will preclude Military Intelligence from obtaining that information that can be learned only on the scene, thus
limiting the comprehensive knowledge of changes in the military capabilities of adversaries.

Reconstitution

In order to reduce resources, the Regional Defense Strategy will rely on reconstitution to reply to a resurgent global threat or an emergent regional alliance. Reconstitution assumes adequate warning to provide the time to generate new military forces and to regenerate old military forces from reserves. The infrastructure that allows the ability to form forces in the future includes not only manpower, industry, and technology, but also Intelligence. The reconstitution of Intelligence itself is a problematical proposition. Expanding an existing capability is possible, creating a new capability from sample systems and unskilled recruits is doubtful, even with the duration dispensed by strategic depth. Moreover, it has not yet been discovered which core intelligence competencies in what parts of the Intelligence Cycle need to be and can be reconstituted and which must be preserved in service. It may be arguable whether investments can develop and maintain the variety of skills needed in Intelligence, particularly language and culture skills, in a part time posture, e.g., in the Reserve Components. A study of potential significance is underway in Defense to ascertain these possibilities. However, even if these determinations can be made, it is doubtful whether the investments necessary to develop new skills and sustain old skills will be available to reconstitute intelligence forces. The conclusion can be drawn that, if a resurgent or emergent threat appears globally or regionally, the U.S. will go to war with its extant intelligence apparatus alone.

Roles and Missions

There is much discussion concerning the roles and missions of the armed forces, much of it driven by the desire to downsize and to dispense with duplication. The discussion establishes emphatically that the criterion for cutting the armed forces will not be the traditional hierarchy of objectives, interests, threats, requirements, and strategies. Although Intelligence plays a role in determining the missions and tasks of the armed forces by defining threats, the roles and functions of the armed forces will define the role of Command and Control and will delimit the role of Intelligence. Roles and missions are the foundation of Command and Control, its concept and practice. The discussion is important to Intelligence in that the decision on roles and missions will determine the requirement for the capacity of Intelligence, and the capacity of Intelligence can compromise the ability to execute roles and missions, and functions and tasks.

Base Force

Contemporaneous with, but apparently analytically unconnected to, the discussion of roles and missions has been the discussion of the Base Force. Obviously, the Base Force should be the end, not the starting point, for a discussion of roles and missions. The Base Force is the minimum size and shape of the armed forces, some based abroad, some based at home, that will be needed to implement the Regional Defense Strategy, namely to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence and to meet the uncertainties of protecting the United States' national interests in several regions considered critical to its security. These regions include Europe, the Middle East, South West Asia, and East Asia. U.S.-based forces capable of rapid response in unexpected contingencies are crucial to the concept of the Base Force. Intelligence is one of the essential supporting services to the Base Force. The size of the Base Force already has been reduced once by the new Clinton Administration. A further reduction should not be unexpected. The size of the Base Force will shape the size of Intelligence. Force structure and posture are as important to Intelligence as they are to the fighting forces because they determine the responsiveness of Intelligence. The reductions in the Base Force will require earlier and more informative warning intelligence to reconstitute combat capabilities.

Intelligence and Warfighting

The penalty for an intelligence failure in DOD may be defeat on the battlefield. Therefore, the most critical role of Defense Intelligence is support to warfighting.

Planning for and fighting wars are the most important responsibilities of the regional commanders in chief. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the weight of the application of the intelligence effort is at the theater echelon, the intelligence staffs of the combatant commands are manned at low levels, especially after their recent consolidation. The combatant commands rely on intelligence augmentation in case of a crisis. Most of Intelligence is located in Washington; therefore, most intelligence support comes from Washington. Although the intelligence support is for the warfighting mission,
the Washington intelligence organizations do not practice war: They seldom participate as entities in exercises. Only recently have they considered deployments of joint augmentation teams to the warfighting commands in exercises. Readiness and interoperability, therefore, are yet to be tested.

The services and the unified and specified combatant commands have unique intelligence requirements for the support of military operations, which can be satisfied only by the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite long-standing agreements for support to military operations, CIA had not filled these requirements very well. It is curious that it is only after a half century of a Cold War, in which our survival was threatened, and several hot wars, in which our survival was not threatened, that CIA has rediscovered its responsibility for support to military operations, which is fast becoming one of its primary missions. As an outgrowth of the war against Saddam, the Director of Central Intelligence established the office of the Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Military Affairs to provide support to DOD. The ADDOMA is the point of contact for ensuring that CIA provides intelligence and operational support to military plans and operations. He also is the contact for support from Defense to the Agency. In the future, as the U.S. deals with regional conflicts on their own terms rather than solely in a bipolar context, CIA’s ability to support contingency operations will be essential. The ADDOMA, who is a serving general officer, also has had assigned the twin duties to educate the DDO on DOD’s military requirements and to disabuse the theater commanders of some of their operational expectations. With each institution, the understanding of the other, beyond its own cultural confines, must be expanded by the ADDOMA — probably his most difficult and worthwhile task. The ADDOMA has the potential to become a pivotal player in the DOD-CIA relationship.

Intelligence and Policy

Defense Intelligence supports, of course, the formulation of national security policies, the conception of military strategy, the construction of force development, the planning and conduct of military operations, the acquisition of military systems, and the development of countermeasures. Defense Intelligence also provides the Department with the expected services that other intelligence organizations provide, for example, warning, current, and estima
tive intelligence. However, much of what is Intellig
gence in Command and Control is intelligence support to policymaking — though, in the past, this support was not systematic. Historically, policymakers have preferred to be their own intelligence analysts, to reach their own interpretations of meaning, significance, implication, consequence, and risk. Therefore, intelligence support to Defense policymaking has been a demand system, neither anticipatory nor initiatory, depending on the inclination of action officer or policymaker. As Policy without Intelligence is thoughtless, so Intelligence without Policy is purposeless; the challenge has been to tie the two together.

The Office of the Under Secretary (Policy) has continuing requirements for analytical intelligence support to the formulation and execution of Defense policy and an organizational connection or procedure that institutionalized systematic intelligence support to policymaking, particularly to the Office of the Under Secretary (Policy). In the last Administration, several, supplementary steps were taken to solve this problem. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) was the cochairman of the Defense Intelligence Policy Council — a committee created specifically to solve the problem of intelligence support to policymaking; he, thereby, personally ascertained the intelligence needs, at a generalized level, of the senior Policy officials in the Department. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency merged the Director’s Staff Group, who provide direct, personal support to under and assistant secretaries, with the Defense Intelligence Officers into a new Policy Support Directorate. The head of this new directorate was invited to the Under Secretary (Policy) staff meetings, or at least to those during which sensitive subjects were not discussed. Of course, it sometimes was the case that it was these subjects because of their sensitivity which required special intelligence support. The new directorate has emphasized close collaboration between the DIA representatives and the regional and functional deputy assistant secretaries working on their immediate issues. To be performed effectively, this support is not a mere administrative task but a sophisticated assignment, requiring a shrewd knowledge of policymaking, an insightful translation of policy problems to intelligence analyses, and a skillful shaping of intelligence responses for policy positions. It is too early to tell whether the new organization will fulfill its twin intent of establishing a permanent procedure that institutionalizes systematic intelligence support to
policymaking and performs effectively. However, experience indicates that procedures are dependent on personalities in providing Intelligence to Policy.

This Administration's reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, particularly the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy into six new assistant secretaries presents a peculiar problem for intelligence support to policy. Two of the new offices will be charged with functions novel to the Department of Defense, namely peacekeeping, the promotion of democracy and human rights, domestic defense industry conversion, and environmental security. Some of this reorganization matches the novel requirements established in National Security Directive 67, dealing chiefly with economics and ecology. However, the intelligence elements in Defense do not have the experience and resources relevant either to the reorganization or the requirements. Given this Administration's de-emphasis of "old thinking" in Defense, the expansion of the Department's mission into new functions, the contraction of overseas military basing, and a reemphasis on recourse to rapid deployment joint task forces in contingencies, the definition of what constitutes Defense Intelligence is likely to change considerably. In fact, much of the Intelligence that may be needed in Defense may indeed match the new requirements set forth in NSD 67. And the organizations providing Intelligence for Defense increasingly may not be those in Defense Intelligence.

Command and Control of Intelligence

The organization of DOD Intelligence is mandated by several Department of Defense Directives, internal regulations having the nature of institutional charters. One such directive prescribes the authority and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence). The Office of the ASD (C3I) is a small part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense — a large, multifunctional staff organization. The ASD, like the rest of the OSD, exists to assure civilian control of the military. Civilian control over the military is exercised through approval authority, derived from the National Command Authorities, the Secretary's authority over the Department, and budgetary power. Because OSD performs staff, not line, functions, the ASD C3I does not have operational direction of any intelligence activity in the Department. He is charged with controlling Defense Intelligence. He does not command Defense Intelligence.

Reorganization

The most notable fact about Defense Intelligence in the last dozen years is the lobbying inside and outside Defense Intelligence for its reorganization. Indeed, four reorganizations were effected and a fifth is underway. For all the lobbying, there does not seem to be much satisfaction with the organization of Defense Intelligence, within and without the organization. The last reorganization was the most advertised and ambitious; it also was much compromised. The arcane arguments advanced, attacked, and abjured over the reorganization, reduction, and, ostensibly, reform of Defense Intelligence were beside the purpose of the reorganization — understood and admitted or not. The latest rearrangement of organizational architecture emphasized reduction in redundancies rather than reform. Its predecessors demonstrated that reform is relevant, but often incidental and sometimes accidental, to reorganization. Reorganizations should not be undertaken frivolously or frequently for they can not be repeated or repaired easily and their unsettling effects themselves impair capability and performance. A major effect of the reorganizations has been turmoil. In fact, Defense Intelligence has been in turmoil since 1990, and the turmoil will continue until at least 1995 or 1997, when the Base Force is supposed to be completed. When the Base Force is completed, Defense Intelligence, as a support function, should conform to the Base Force's mission, organization, structure, posture, and strategy.

The reduction wrought by the reorganization affected two components, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence staffs of the services' component commands in the unified combatant commands. Beginning in 1991, the DIA has undergone the most basic change since it was organized in 1961. The number of directorates reporting to the Director has been reduced from eight to four. Manpower in DIA is to be reduced by seventeen percent. Whether the reduction in personnel and the simplification of organization are relevant to performance is unknown. In the services, their theater component commands' intelligence staffs were reduced, but not eliminated, through consolidation. The consolidation allowed the ASD C3I to create Joint Intelligence Centers at each of the combatant commands. The consolidation should improve the CINCs' capabilities to conduct combat operations, but this is unknown as yet. The consolidation of the several headquarters intelligence staffs
in a theater means that the service that dominated operations, because of the primary warfare environment in the theater, now dominates Intelligence. Surprisingly, the OSD intelligence staff was increased substantially. Therefore, the purpose of the reorganization could be perceived to be not only reduction through consolidation at the field level but control through centralization at the headquarters level. Historically, the effect — though not the intention — of these reorganizations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has been to distance Intelligence from Policy and from policymaking, that is from the Command and Control of the Department.

The last reorganization was directed by the C3I Assistant Secretary’s Plan for Restructuring Intelligence. A major opportunity, that might not recur for decades, had offered itself. A war had been fought. The performance of Intelligence in that war had been severely criticized. The Defense and Intelligence Budgets were being reduced. The Defense Management Review had recommended major changes in the management of the Department of Defense. The Director of Central Intelligence had directed the reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community. The roles and missions of the armed forces were to be examined for change. A strategic epoch had ended. Unfortunately, the opportunity was not exploited. The Plan was compromised on two levels. At one level, several of the principal provisions of the plan were not realized. Some were withdrawn even before the plan was approved. Others were vitiated after the plan was approved. At another, and more important level, the plan was compromised because its principal provisions were decided before first order questions were asked, much less answered. Answers to the first order questions could have resulted in a significantly different reorganization. The first order questions that should have been answered concerned changed and unchanged threats, long-term and short-term national interests, the nature of warfare, and the missions, functions, and tasks of the armed forces. The answers then should have been examined for their effects on the mission of Defense Intelligence. How best to organize Defense Intelligence to meet this mission should have been derived from this examination.

The last reorganization is remarkable for the number of issues that it addressed but did not answer — issues that were popular among intelligencers and for or against which they had lobbied much, hard, and long. The biggest change that did not occur, notwithstanding so much lobbying for it, was the separation of Command, Control, and Communications from Intelligence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, who is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all of these functions and for counterintelligence and security countermeasures, and mapping, charting, and geodesy, also has control of continuity of operations, all of the Department’s computers, Corporate Information Management, and Defense Information. C3I is now really C6 I2 M. The Assistant Secretary has staff oversight responsibility for the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency and some ambiguous, indirect, and uncertain influence through varying authority or means over the Defense Intelligence Agency, the four military services’ intelligence elements, intelligence elements assigned to the ten unified combatant commands, the Central Imagery Office, the services’ and combatant commands’ reconnaissance operations, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency and the services’ cryptologic elements — an impressive span of control for one man. Parenthetically, this wide span of control of intelligence organizations illustrates the fact that most of the Intelligence Community is in the Department of Defense. Including all “INTs”, the DOD has the most people, the most money (even not including the TIARA), the most equipment, most of the collection and processing, and the control of the high-technology disciplines of IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT. DOD also is a major HUMINT operator.

Organizational assignment is an exceptionally determinative factor affecting the capability and performance of Intelligence. Organizational assignment is important because it can shape the understanding of the mission and the method of its execution. In Defense, the essential association — not connection — between Intelligence and Command and Control has been inadequately understood and incorrectly improved. Whether or not C3I and I belong in one organization because of some unbreakable bond or unspeakable reason, has not been explained. Apparently, there is an assumption that the systems inextricably interlink C3I and I, notwithstanding their different missions. In itself, C3I is an artifact, constructed from architectures of artifacts. The architectures fit together functions by their means, not their ends. The means of Command and Control and Intelligence may be similar, their ends
are dissimilar, as are their purposes. Equipment is only a labor-saving device; information systems are a tool to increase productivity. If the measure of effectiveness in Intelligence is wisdom, not just more and faster information, then the union with C³ has not improved I.

In the meantime, C³ overly influences Intelligence with technical and programmatic considerations that intrinsically should not have an influence on it. This influence has the deplorable effect of viewing I as a mere continuation of C³, rather than a unique service of common concern to the entire Department, independent in its own right. The important issue whether C³ and I each can better serve the Department separately has been obscured by an argument with the Congress whether the Secretary has the sole right to organize his department and whether the Congress will establish another assistant secretary and by a disagreement within Defense whether the Assistant Secretary should report directly to the Secretary or through an Under Secretary. The union of I to C³ means that not only is I poorly conceived, but the Assistant Secretary can not devote his full attention to I, the attention that it needs. This distraction is compounded by the fact that the union of C³ and I takes place only in the person of the Assistant Secretary; there is no organizational junction below him.

Programming

An extraordinarily powerful and continually limiting factor on the adaptability of Intelligence is the programming function, controlled by the Assistant Secretary. The ASD participates in the Defense Planning and Resources Board, the board of directors of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, which participation is critical to DOD and DOD Intelligence. It is through this participation that the ASD links the NFIP, the National Foreign Intelligence Program, to the FYDP, the six-year Future Years Defense Program, and provides direction to the TIARA, the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities programs. The NFIP is a consolidated expression of the best judgments, within prudent financial constraints, of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence as to how to satisfy the intelligence needs of the Executive. (There is no unified departmental Defense Intelligence Program similar to the NFIP.) The FYDP is the SecDef's consolidation, also within financial constraints, of the services' Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). The services' POMs are the most elaborate, detailed, stylized, important, peculiarly American, and the quintessential expressions of the best military advice provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief. The TIARA is not a single program, but a collection of elements found in several major force programs of the DOD Budget and includes, for example, most of the large, worldwide joint airborne reconnaissance program. The importance of the Board function can not be overstated for it allows the ASD, by means of programmatic and fiscal guidance, to influence the capabilities of national intelligence systems to support military operations and to develop tactical intelligence capabilities for the direct support of warfighting. Moreover, recently, the ASD C³I and the DCI have formulated a method for tying together related major activities in the NFIP and TIARA, which should improve planning and programming.

GDIP

The reorganization of Defense Intelligence has given the DIA Director programmatic control over the GDIP, the General Defense Intelligence Program, the part of the NFIP that finances intelligence elements in support of the fighting forces — the single most consequential instrument of policymaking in Defense Intelligence. The GDIP no longer is a compilation of the services' separate submissions. Instead, it is now developed by element managers and is constructed on a functional, rather than organizational, basis. This means that the DIA Director, through control of the GDIP, can evaluate and improve the effectiveness of Defense Intelligence using the total intelligence capabilities of DOD. However, the reorganization created an anomaly: Although control of the GDIP has been assigned, by law, to the Director, DIA, the ASD C³I maintains the Intelligence Program Support Group, which develops the GDIP — ironically, using DIA “borrowed” manpower positions.

The Intelligence Program Support Group, potentially, is an important instrument for the ASD (C³I) and the Director, DIA. The Group provides the critical capability for program analysis, evaluation, and integration across all the disciplines and systems of Defense Intelligence and even from the GDIP into the NFIP. It has the wherewithal to develop choices, trade-offs, changes, allocations, and cancellations among subordinate programs. To date, what the ASD (C³I) lacks is the means to follow up on his selections: He lacks an office to evaluate budget execution, establish performance
measures, and review mission progress in order to enforce the achievement of long-range goals — provided that those goals are known and accepted.

**Planning**

Principally to improve programming, but potentially useful to planning, the ASD has directed the development of a Defense Intelligence Planning Guidance. This is an instrument overdue for introduction. Herbert E. Meyer, a former Vice Chairman of the DCI’s National Intelligence Council, stated the important insight that Intelligence is the other half of strategic planning. Obviously, the reverse is true. Defense Intelligence, indeed the Defense Department, has long lacked and sorely needed effective, institutionalized, and enforceable strategic planning. International events, the reduction of resources, the reliance on reconstitution, and the requirements resulting from the responses to National Security Review 29 provide the present as an ideal opportunity, at last, to begin the strategic planning of Defense Intelligence and the participation of Intelligence in the strategic planning of Defense, including Command and Control. A strategic planning capability in Defense Intelligence could establish and validate requirements for the development of intelligence capabilities for all parts of the Intelligence Cycle and for the Future Years Defense Plan. The planning of intelligence capabilities to support the latter may become more important as the armed forces become more dependent on prototypes and reconstitution.

**Institutional Culture**

Defense Intelligence, even after the latest reorganization, will continue to labor from several anomalous, fundamental, persistent peculiarities. It is important to remember that the Director, DIA is the Chairman’s intelligence officer, but a flag officer heads a separate J-2 directorate in the Joint Staff, which directorate is staffed by DIA. This division does not make, in practice, for clear delineation of functions. The Director gives intelligence guidance through the Joint Staff to the unified and specified combatant commands. He must ensure that DOD Intelligence is responsive to the U&S commands’ warfighting requirements. To fulfill this assurance, the DIA Director includes intelligence support in theater operational plans and establishes intelligence architectures. DIA’s tasking of the services’ elements and DIA’s own operations should be directed increasingly to support of the combatant commands.

It is important to recollect that, except for DIA, the DOD intelligence elements are organizations belonging to the services and are established by law. Furthermore, all of the military personnel and many of the civilian personnel in Defense Intelligence belong to the services. The service secretaries, by law, are the heads of components having intelligence elements. The military departments, under Title 10, retain the legal responsibility for raising, training, and equipping intelligence forces. The service intelligence elements are the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Naval Intelligence Command, and the Air Force Intelligence Command. Understanding these affiliations is critical to understanding these organizations, what they do, why they do it, how they do it, and how well they do it. The services develop their own Intelligence to support their forces, weapons, doctrines, tactics, and training. However, the military departments are required to maintain organic capabilities and the force structure to support the unified commands’ contingencies — not just to service their own needs. Yet, the challenge to “jointness” from the services is seemingly constant and endless. Some of this resistance is a residue recurring from the services’ statutory independence. The services still have large headquarters intelligence staffs, though they are not combatant components and since 1968 have lost their operational responsibilities which had been written into law. In an age of joint and combined warfare, the services’ headquarters intelligence staffs are performing some redundant tasks, which ought to be performed in DIA. The laws ought to be amended so that the service intelligence staffs are reduced in functions and manning.

At the same time, the national role of DIA should be improved and increased so that it achieves parity with CIA. The credibility of DIA with the President should be established so that it is to its Director, not the Director of Central Intelligence, that the Commander in Chief turns automatically for Military Intelligence, which historically has not been the case. In other words, Military Intelligence is not supporting national Command and Control in statecraft, as it should. Sole responsibility for Military Intelligence, in practice, should rest with DIA. This responsibility should include control of National Intelligence Estimates on military topics. It surpasses understanding that successive Directors, DIA were not mortified that the CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Forces, who annually produced the National Intelligence Esti-
mate which, more than any other intelligence
document, for decades determined the force struc-
ture and budget of the services, usually was a
visiting scholar from a think tank.

Defense Intelligence is, of course, Military
Intelligence. Nevertheless, the office of the ASD
is populated mostly by civilians, and DIA and the
services are populated in larger and increasing part
with civilians. In fact, there is a trend of increasing
civilization of the military intelligence elements
with attendant attrition of military operational
expertise. This trend is the result of the military
departments reducing their intelligence forces,
purportedly in proportion, to their combat forces.
Cuts in fighting forces make for fewer available
uniformed intelligence officers. The trend toward
civilization poses the risk of developing military
intelligence organizations whose intelligence
officers can not understand the military uses of
intelligence and the military significance of infor-
mation. The ethos of DIA and the service intelli-
genience elements must not be civilianized to the
extent that the agency becomes insentient of the
needs of the fighting forces.

Counterintelligence operations in Defense have
not had the extensive and intensive policy manage-
ment from either DIA or OSD that has been ac-
corded to positive intelligence. The peculiar organi-
zational placement of Counterintelligence is one of
the reasons why policy direction to Intelligence and
Counterintelligence are not comparable in compre-
hensiveness. DIA, in the recent reorganization, has
reduced its management oversight even further by
resubordinating its counterintelligence staff, which
was a purely advisory special staff, to its analytical
organization. In the services, Counterintelligence is
organized by them to suit themselves. The Army has
organized all of its Counterintelligence and Intelli-
genience functions in the single Intelligence and
Security Command. The Air Force originally
established all of its counterintelligence functions
and combined them with its criminal investigation
functions under the Inspector General, not the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, in the
Office of Special Investigations, modeled on the
law enforcement functions of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The Navy recently reorganized
its Counterintelligence. Navy Counterintelligence
is merged with criminal investigation functions in
the Naval Criminal Investigations Service, which
reports to the Under Secretary of the Navy, but
receives technical counterintelligence guidance from
an assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

The current placement of the services' counterin-
lelligence organizations inhibits the development of
joint, long-range, strategic counterintelligence
capabilities and operations. Furthermore, the
placement has hampered the fusion of Intelligence,
a fetish in DOD for a score of years, which should
include the effective integration of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.

Foreign Cultures

The capability of Intelligence is grounded on the
profound knowledge of the culture of the states with
whom Intelligence is concerned. Profound under-
standing of a culture is based on the knowledge of
the language and history of the people. Understand-
ing the culture is the basis for understanding motiva-
tions and expectations and discovering intentions.
DIA and the services fund language and area
training. The attention to language and culture
training varies with the component. Generally, in
the services, language and area training receive
short shrift in the competition for funds with weapons
and equipment — notwithstanding much lip
service to the contrary, and they are likely to receive
shorter shrift in the smaller Defense Budgets. One
result of this negligence is the paucity of military
intelligence personnel trained and trained well in
languages, particularly exotic languages. Conse-
quently, the U.S. understanding of adversaries is
not always adequate. As a result, deficiencies are
described in all Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
from collection to production, from requirements to
analyses, in warning, current, estimaive, and
scientific intelligence. As crises occur in exotic
locales, U.S. policymakers and warfighters will be,
at least, disadvantaged by the lack of language
skills and country knowledge among intelligence
personnel.

The absence of cultural training can affect the
capabilities of Intelligence in other ways: HUMINT
officers are unable to undertake long-term immer-
sion in and penetration of a target, his way of life,
his thinking, and his decisionmaking; counterintelli-
gence officers are unable to mount sustained stra-
tegic attacks against hostile intelligence services. This
lack of specialized training renders the understand-
ing of foreign targets nugatory. A consequential
result of this defect for Intelligence is the mirror
imaging of other societies. The defect also compro-
mises the validity of intelligence support to long-
range planning and to the development of strategy.
Most importantly, the insufficiency of training
imposes constraints on the ability of Intelligence to
support warfighting. The chief function of Intelligence in warfighting is to enable the commander to understand the decisionmaking of an enemy commander in less time than it takes the enemy commander to arrive at his decision. Such understanding is much more than the mere mechanical processing of information faster than the enemy’s processing. To gain such insightful understanding requires profound cultural knowledge. The 1992 Intelligence Authorization Act legislated a national security educational foundation and fund in DOD to provide precisely this kind of training for students who express the desire to make a career in Intelligence. Whether sufficient funding for this establishment to support future intelligence requirements, including reconstitution capabilities, is forthcoming, is yet to be seen.

Charge

Intelligence will have to grasp the nature of the Political and Military-Technical Revolutions, identifying their dangers and opportunities. Command will have to act wisely, boldly, swiftly, and decisively in mastering them. Sustaining adequate Intelligence and Command and Control capabilities will be difficult. Nevertheless, as our military superiority dissipates, the need for superior Intelligence will increase so that, if need be, Command can act sooner and smarter. Whether the nation provides for the kind of Intelligence that Command and Control in war and peace requires is problematical. The task is clear; the understanding is not. The need is certain; the will is not. As always, leadership is imperative.

References


3 By warfighting, I mean any contingency involving hostilities, which includes low-intensity conflict.

4 Establishment of an Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review) and an Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); establishment of an Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence); establishment of an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) and transfer of the Intelligence and Space Policy Directorate from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence); transfer of the Directorate of Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Policy from the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).

5 DIA was founded in 1961, yet the first draft joint intelligence doctrine, which is still in draft, was not published until 1991.