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Roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Crisis Management
Robert Hilton

Guest Presentations, Spring 1985
Samuel P. Huntington; Lincoln Faurer; Richard Stilwell; Archibald Barrett; Richard DeLauer; Donald Latham; Robert Herres; Robert Hilton

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Roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Crisis Management

Robert Hilton

Rear Admiral Hilton's consulting business, Hilton Associates, specializes in national and international security affairs and political risk analysis. He has consulted to the International Planning and Analysis Center, Inc., the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, the U.S. Naval War College, and the Institute for Defense Analyses. Before his retirement from the Navy, Rear Admiral Hilton served as Vice Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and was responsible for supervision of the National Military Command Center and Special Operations Forces. He also served as Deputy Director, Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy for SHAPE, Mons, Belgium.

I was just adding up on the plane today the 22 years I spent in the grade of commander, captain, and rear admiral before I retired in 1983. I spent 15 of those years in joint, NATO, SECDEF, or National War College assignments. I spent nine years, four assignments, in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is a record; at least it's a record for the Navy. I spent six and a half years in Navy assignments, in two commands and also on the Navy Staff on two occasions. So I guess I could be classified as a joint officer. Today I would like to discuss the JCS and how it fits into the national security structure. I'm going to talk a little bit about the role of CINCs, the structure of the JCS organization, and then I'll put an emphasis on the JCS and crisis management, particularly C3I.

Over the years, a variety of criticisms have been leveled at the JCS (figure 1). I don't necessarily agree with them, but have compiled them for this presentation. Two recent reports that have criticized the JCS are the book by Edward Luttwak* and the report from the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).* One of my consulting jobs involves CSIS and the study they're doing on conventional force alternatives, but I didn't get in on the Defense Organization report.

I've included a brief history of the JCS (figure 2). Very briefly, the JCS as an organized group was formed in 1942 — shortly after Pearl Harbor — to act as the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the British. There were four U.S. members of the Combined Chiefs: Admiral William Leahy, Admiral Ernest King, and Generals Henry H. Arnold and George C. Marshall. The National Security Act of 1947** made the JCS a permanent body and created the Joint Staff of no more than 100 officers. There were three JCS members at that time, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations. This act also established the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Air Force. In 1949 a Chairman was


Military Advice
- Advice arrives too late to be meaningful
- Advice affected by service bias
- Unable to agree on resource allocation

Strategic Direction
- No overall military strategy
- Planning not related to fiscal constraints
- Each service wants "piece of action"
- Procedures too slow for operational advice
- Unable to provide direction for joint operations

Quality of Work
- Lowest common denominator
- Slow, cumbersome procedures
- Officers are captives of services
- Best officers avoid joint duty
  - poor promotion potential
  - few repeat tours
- Inadequate joint education/training

Criticisms of JCS
Figure 1
1942  JCS Formed
1947  National Security Act
      JCS permanent body
      Joint Staff of no more than 100 officers
      Department of Defense
      Department of the Air Force

1949  Chairman, JCS
      Joint Staff of No More Than 210 Officers

1952  Commandant, USMC

1958  Defense Reorganization Act
      SECDEF direction of unified and specified commands
      Expanded JCS functions
      Joint Staff of no more than 400 officers

1978  Commandant, USMC Full Member

History of the JCS
Figure 2
added, although he was a nonvoting member, and the Joint Staff was increased to not more than 210 officers. Then in 1952, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was added, with the stipulation that he could only participate in JCS matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. Over the years that came to be about 99%. So he was a full member in almost all respects. In 1958 there was a major reorganization* under President Eisenhower, in which the unified and specified commands were placed under the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff was enlarged to no more than 400 officers, and the Joint Staff was given expanded functions for the JCS. Also at that time, the Chairman was given a vote. In 1978, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was made a full member, which was just a de jure recognition of the existing situation.

The JCS has two basic functions. The first function is as the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs can also go to the Congress after informing the Secretary of Defense, so I would add Congress to that list of advisees. The second function is to provide various other advice, such as strategic direction of the armed forces. I'll come back to that in a minute and give you more detail.

It's important to understand the structure of the Organization for National Security, which is designed to assist the President (figure 3). The National Security Council was created in the same National Security Act of 1947, and has only four statutory members. A lot of other people are erroneously thought to be members of the NSC, such as the Ambassador to the United Nations. There are only four statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. There are three other people who participate on a regular basis at the invitation of the President: the Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman's participation has varied with the wishes of the President. Under President Reagan, the Chairman attends all NSC meetings.

I think it's interesting to see not just where the JCS sits officially as a principal military advisor, but how it relates to a number of NSC organizations (figure 4), such as the National Security Planning Group, which the Chairman usually attends, and the Special Situation Group, which is the crisis management group of the NSC. Normally the Vice President chairs that. The Crisis Preplanning Group of course doesn't plan a crisis in advance but plans to avoid a crisis. The JCS is normally represented there, and at the Restricted Interagency Group, by a three-star assistant to the Chairman, currently Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau. In the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), which is chaired by the Secretary of State, the Chiefs are usually represented by the Director of J-5 (Plans and Policy), whose deputy represents the JCS at the Interdepartmental Group (IG). The participation of representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as full members of various National Security Council bodies is significant, I think. Their advice in these NSC fora does not have to go through the Secretary of Defense. Major pronouncements are cleared with the Secretary of Defense's office, but in many cases the staff officer who goes to those working group meetings has not cleared his position with his counterparts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

These are the unified and specified commands (figure 5). A unified command has a broad continuing mission and employs the forces of two or more services. There are six unified commands: LANT-COM, PACOM, REDCOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM. There are three specified commands which use the forces of one service—ADCOM or NORAD, which General Herres commands now, SAC, and MAC. They are all basically Air Force commands. The forces of each of these unified and specified commands are assigned by the Secretary of Defense, and these forces can be reallocated among CINCs only by the Secretary of Defense. Any message that goes out from the JCS concerning the movement of forces will have "By direction of the Secretary of Defense." Now, the messages have been written up in the Joint Staff, and a lot of discussion between the Joint Staff and CINCs has gone on. However, they are officially cleared by the Secretary of Defense. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger personally does that. I had a message cleared by him to move two people out of CONUS* down to SOUTHCOM in Panama.


*Continental United States.
Organization for National Security
Figure 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>NSC</th>
<th>NSPG</th>
<th>SSG</th>
<th>CCPG</th>
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<td>Def. Policy: Defense chairs; add ISP</td>
<td>Intell: DCI chairs; add DIA</td>
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<td>C/S to Pres</td>
<td>C/S to Pres</td>
<td>DCI</td>
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| | *AttyGen | | | | | | *

* By invitation as appropriate

JCS Representation in NSC Organizations

Figure 4
Figure 5. The Unified Command Plan
If he’s in town, he releases it. If he’s not, then the Deputy Secretary will release it.

Now I’ll address JCS relationships with the combatant commands (figure 6). As you know, the JCS is not officially in the chain of command. All directives go between the NCA to the CINCs through the JCS, so they act as a channel of communication. They draft the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or the JSOP, which assigns forces and missions to the CINCs, gives them the guidance they need to plan for accomplishing their tasks, and requests submission of contingency plans for approval. Using that, the CINCs develop their own operations plans and concept plans, which are then sent to the JCS for review and approval. Because the JCS is the only military staff of the Secretary of Defense, OSD is not involved in this review.

The Joint Chiefs also give the CINCs guidance on principles, policies, and doctrines through a variety of publications, such as JCS Publication 1, the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. The Joint Staff interacts on a day-to-day basis with the CINCs, and supports CINC requirements. When I was at J-3 (Operations Directorate), we were in constant contact with the CINCs. Because of the time difference I used to spend most of the morning talking to the J-3 at CINC EUR during their afternoons, and the afternoons talking to the CINC PAC J-3 during their mornings. And we’d get CINC LANT anytime we needed. Occasionally I’d forget where I was and get the word back from the J-3 in EUCOM, “Do you know it’s midnight?”

Then there is the requirement to support CINC requirements. C5S has gotten into this probably more than any other directorate in ascertaining the requirements of the CINCs, developing, prioritizing, and then supporting them — really fighting them through the budget process, and ultimately perhaps taking them to the Chairman to take to the Defense Resources Board.

**Student:** Admiral, may I ask a question? You say the JCS supports CINC requirements. But aren’t the people in the JCS the heads of the services who might be in a situation where there is competition for resources between the CINCs and themselves? Is that ever a problem?

**Hilton:** Yes, occasionally there is a problem on that. One of the great criticisms of the JCS is that they can’t give truly unified advice on resource allocation for that reason. In developing requirements there’s not that much of a problem, because requirements have to be translated into programs, which are translated into budgets, which are translated into Congressional appropriations. And because requirements are generally broader than resources, the Chiefs can afford to support everyone’s requirements at that stage. But because not every service will benefit from a given CINC’s requirements, there’s bound to be conflict later. So you may find a Chief taking a position in supporting a requirement but then not backing it up when it comes down to his Program Objective Memorandum.

**Student:** Aren’t there two ways to send requirements up? One through the services and one through the JCS?

**Hilton:** There are three. First, the CINC can go to the JCS, directly to the Chairman or to the Joint Staff, and I’ll get into that a little bit later. Second, he can go through his component, for example CINC PAC to CINC PACFLT. Or he can go directly to the Chief of the service, not necessarily as a member of the JCS. The CINC has no real enforcement mechanism to make sure that his requirements, even if everybody supports them, actually get put into dollars. But as I’ll explain later, an organization has been established recently to assist in developing that mechanism.

Now, in this chart I have shown the expanded functions of the Joint Chiefs (figure 7). They serve as the principal military advisors to the President, NSC, and SECDEF. Additionally, they have the specific functions shown. Reviewing the material and personnel requirements is an area that the Chiefs in a recent review decided was not being adequately done, so they created a new organization called SPRAA, Strategic Plans Resource Analysis Agency. The JCS also formulates policies for joint training and education, and provides representatives to the U.N. Military Staff Committee. The heart of it of course is serving as an advisor and providing strategic direction. In summary, I guess the advice is neither as good as it should be nor as bad as it’s made out to be.

This chart shows the structure of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) (figure 8). The OJCS consists of approximately 1300 people of whom about 650 are officers. It is indeed true that the Joint Staff is limited to no more than 400. How-
- Channel of Communication
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
- Review of CINC OPLANs/CONPLANs
- Principles, Policies, and Doctrines
- Day–to–Day Interaction
- Support CINC Requirements

JCS Relationships with the Combatant Commands
Figure 6
• Serve as Principal Military Advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense

• Subject to the Authority and Direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense
  
  – Prepare strategic plans and provide for strategic direction of the Armed Forces
  
  – Prepare joint logistics plans
  
  – Establish unified (and specified) commands
  
  – Review material and personnel requirements
  
  – Formulate policies for joint training
  
  – Formulate policies for military education
  
  – Provide representation to the UN Military Staff Committee

Functions of the JCS

Figure 7
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Figure 8
ever, there’s no statutory limitation on the OJCS. Four hundred officers are assigned to the Joint Staff, but Congress knows all about the rest; it appropriates the money and clears every billet. But no one wants to tackle changing the law right now.

At the top of the corporate body, of course, is the Chairman (Figure 9). He is the ranking officer of the U.S. Armed Forces, but has no command authority. He represents the CINCs in operational matters; this was a recent change written in December of 1984, and attached to the 1985 authorization appropriation.* The Chairman presides over JCS meetings and determines the agenda. That “determines the agenda” was added in the 1984 action as well. Believe me, if the Chairman is presiding over a meeting, he establishes the agenda. Nothing gets on it if he doesn’t want it, and nothing stays off if he wants it on, either—if he wants to keep them in session that long. So that was strictly a cosmetic change.

The Chairman represents the corporate body, of course, in the NSC. When he goes there as advisor to the NSC he’s representing the Joint Chiefs. He also represents them in daily meetings with the Secretary of Defense and Congressional testimony on the Hill. The Chairman manages the OJCS for the Chiefs and selects OJCS officers; selection was also added in 1984. That kind of formalized the process. Previously, he had personally approved all flag officers before they went to JCS, and the senior service officer in each directorate had a crack at approving other officers. No Navy officer came into the Joint Staff in the J-3 if I didn’t want him. If I said he was unacceptable then they sent somebody else. (Or in the case of the Navy sometimes they just said, “Thank you very much, we’re going to gap the billet.” The other services would come back and send you somebody else. The Navy got better, but they had a tendency to leave some gapped billets.) Finally, the Chairman serves at the pleasure of the President, but then so do all of us who are commissioned officers. We’re appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.

As you know, the Joint Staff (Figure 8) is not a general staff. Although no one has really defined what a general staff is, it’s specifically prohibited by law. The Director of the Joint Staff is a three-star officer. Right now it’s Army and it will be rotating to the Navy this summer. I served in the Director of the Joint Staff’s office as the Executive Assistant in 1962-1964 to Vice Admiral Herbert Riley for about a year and a half when he was Director. The Director is a member of the Operations Deputies. Each Chief in the 1958 Act was given a three-star Operations Deputy to act for him in JCS matters. Those people spend, I would say, 75–80 percent of their time on JCS matters, even though they’re on the service staffs.

We now have seven J-Directorates. J-1, Manpower and Personnel, which was reestablished in 1982, handles matters such as joint manpower policies and military education. It is presently headed by a one- or two-star — she was a one-star and may have been promoted to two on the JCS intelligence support is under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Director, DIA, is in effect the J-2 of the Joint Staff. The Directorate for JCS support is now headed by Rear Admiral Bob Schmidt. He also runs the National Intelligence Center, which is inside the OJCS spaces. The JCS is tasked in DOD directives to provide joint intelligence for the Department of Defense.

Earlier I mentioned that the Joint Chiefs are not officially in the operational chain of command. But to all intents and purposes, they are. The J-3, Operations, monitors current day-to-day operations of the CINCs, and the Director of J-3 is responsible for assisting the JCS in this regard. Among other things, he operates the National Military Command Center, the Alternate Military Command Center at Ft. Ritchie and the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (the three 747s that are equipped for airborne command). In effect, J-3 operates today’s command and control system, and C^3S develops tomorrow’s. My last job on active duty was as the Vice Director of J-3.

The Logistics Directorate, J-4, is responsible for supporting the JCS in joint logistics and strategic mobility matters. The Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, supports the JCS in areas of strategic planning, force development, international negotiations and regional political-military matters. I served two years as Deputy Director, J-5, for force development and strategic planning.

The C^3S Directorate, of which General Herries (who was just here) was the second Director, was
- Ranking officer, U.S. Armed Forces
- No command authority
- Represents CINCs in operational matters
- Presides over JCS meetings / determines agenda
- Represents corporate body
- Manages OJCS / selects OJCS officers
- Serves at pleasure of the President

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Figure 9
established in 1979. It ensures adequate C³ support to the NCA and the CINCs and develops improvements for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). The C³S and the J-3 have a very close relationship. The Director of J-3 has a morning staff meeting at 7:45, and the C³S flag officers sit in on that meeting, so there are no surprises. The newest directorate is the Joint Analysis Directorate. It used to be known as SAGA — Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency. It was under J-5, but is now a separate directorate. It’s a primary source of analytical support.

McLaughlin: Can you enlighten us at all about the battles that have occurred with the Joint Special Operations Agency and why that evolved there as opposed to some sort of command?

Hilton: Yes, I was involved a little bit. I was in J-3 at the time and we had a division called the Joint Special Operations Division (SOD), which was doing basically the same thing as JSOA is now doing. The Army basically wanted to set up a strategic services command. They wanted to put all the special forces of all the services under that command and make it, if necessary, a unified command. The CINCs, by and large, opposed that because they didn’t want to lose the special forces that were directly assigned to them. The Navy and Marine Corps didn’t like it at all, seeing the Army taking over their special forces. The Air Force was kind of lukewarm. The Marines don’t have any special forces, by the way. The J-3 and, I think, General Vessey,* didn’t see any need for any change. They thought the situation at that time was adequate, so as a compromise, as so many things tend to be in the JCS system, they set up this Special Operations Agency. In fact, I suggested when all this was going on that they look at the history of what had been called SACSA, Special Assistant to the Chairman for Special Activities. Lt. General Victor Krulak (USMC) was the first SACSA. SACSA was killed when the Green Berets, and that sort of thing, went out of fashion somewhat; it ran into problems. But I pointed out we had already had SACSA and it had seemed to work. So it became the basis of the compromise. Although the Special Operations Agency Director is shown here as reporting to the Chiefs, he actually reports to the Director of the Joint Staff.

McLaughlin: Isn’t that an anomaly then, having troops deployed under someone other than a CINC?

Hilton: There’s only one exception to that, and that’s the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC was under the supervision of the J-3 when I was there and was then put under JSOA. I wouldn’t be surprised to find it back under the J-3. But that’s the only exception. The Army has three special forces groups that are not in JSOC but are under the appropriate unified commander.

This chart shows some special agencies that report to or through the JCS (figure 10). The U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee is one of them. The U.S. Representative to the NATO Military Committee is another. These three boards — Materiel, Transportation, and Communications-Electronics — consist of representatives of the J directorates. I was the J-3 representative for the Joint Transportation and the Joint Materiel Boards. We only did things in exercises.

The Joint Strategic Planning Staff is not truly a Joint Staff agency, since the Director of Strategic Target Planning is CINC SAC. However, the tasking comes through the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Deployment Agency is another hat for CINC REDCOM, and receives tasking from JCS.

There are seven negotiations to which the JCS sends representatives (figure 11). None of these has been conducted for quite some time. There are two others not shown: the Standing Consultative Commission, which verifies the ABM Treaty and SALT I and measures to prevent war, and the Incidents at Sea meetings, which I participated in on four different occasions.

Now I would like to address crisis management. The best way to manage a crisis, of course, is not to have one. If there is a crisis, we try to settle it at the lowest possible level. Let me speak briefly in general about how the JCS orchestrates a crisis response and then if you like I can get into some of my own experiences. I was in the Director’s Office when the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted, and involved in most of the crises up till Grenada. Since retiring I’ve done quite a bit of study on the Grenada operation.

Let me briefly describe the characteristics of a crisis. By definition, a crisis is a departure from day-to-day routine. It has intense media attention, which no military planner likes to have. A crisis is generally
Joint Chiefs of Staff

- U.S. Delegation
  - UN Military Staff Committee
  - U.S. Rep to the Military Committee, NATO

- Joint Materiel
  - Priorities and Allocation Board
  - Joint Transportation Board
  - Military Comm - Electronics Board

- Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
- Joint Deployment Agency

Director, Joint Staff

- U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board
- U.S. Section, Canada - U.S. Mil Coop Committee
- JCS Negotiating Representatives START MBFR INFE CDE SPACE CTB AS
- U.S. Mil Rep, Permanent Joint Board on Defense Canada - U.S.
- U.S. Section, Joint Mexican - U.S. Defense Commission

Other Organizations Reporting To or Through the JCS

Figure 10
• Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)
• Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
• Space and Defense (SPACE)
• Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe (MBFR)
• Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)
• Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations (CTB)
• Anti-Satellite Negotiations (AS)

Representation to International Negotiations

Figure 11
time sensitive; we want to resolve it in a hurry. The Iranian hostage situation was an exception in being much longer than the usual crisis. There are uncertain time constraints: you never know how much time you’ve got to resolve something before it blows wide open. Grenada’s a good example of that. There is usually a high level of interest, you suddenly find yourself down in J-3 talking to people you’ve only read about in the newspaper, who are now on the line wanting to get information. Or you’re getting calls from the Chairman’s office saying Mr. Meese wants this, or McFarlane wants that. A crisis affects the national interest, or at least appears to. There is generally a very high degree of tension, and force is threatened and/or used.

As you probably know, there are six requirements for crisis management: the basic organization; intelligence; communications; decision makers, analysts and their supporting staffs; procedures; and command and control. I’ll be touching on these a little bit as I go. Each President, as you know if you’ve studied any crisis management, tailors his own organization. President Kennedy used the Executive Committee of the National Security Council — it was not really the Executive Committee of anything, they just gave it a name and he brought in his personal advisors and friends and people from out of government but people whose opinions he valued. Of course, the normal NSC members were included.

This chart shows the key responsibilities of the JCS in crisis management (figure 12). Only two of them really are explicit under Title 10, and that’s “military advice, options, and information,” and “strategic direction.” Most of them come explicitly out of DOD directives, and some are implicit even there, just by the very nature of the organization. All of these are related (figure 13). Looking at this chart, you can identify the three elements in C³I — intelligence, communications, and command and control. You’ve got intelligence as a major input; communications, which is all of these various lines connecting to outputs and inputs (if it weren’t for communications you wouldn’t have a crisis management organization, and some argue you might not even have a crisis if people don’t know about it); and command and control down in these boxes indicating strategic options, direction, and the assignment of different responsibilities and priorities. Here we’re talking about a major crisis, not a small one like Grenada — and the issuing of operational directives.

We can then talk about the framework of the crisis action system as developed by the Joint Chiefs (figure 14). The event occurs, it’s reported, it’s assessed, preliminary options are developed, you set up your crisis staffing procedures, and then you go through this formal series: the warning order, the alert order, the execute order — and that’s generally where the JCS stops its crisis action planning. I have put in two others, because once you tell the CINC to execute, he executes and he moves his forces, and that is a major element of crisis action because the orders the CINC gives and the moves in engagement often serve to restrain a crisis and keep it, as we said, at the lowest level possible. And then finally, you either end the crisis or you move to a higher level, in which case you’re basically into another crisis. And that’s why I ended the chart with escalation and reinforcement or resolution and redeployment.

In the case of Grenada, we had both of these phases. The Deputy Commander of the 82nd Airborne arrived at what he thought was going to be a relatively low-intensity conflict and found his C-141 being shot up, so he called back to Ft. Bragg and said, “Keep sending troops until I tell you to stop.” So they brought two brigades of the 82nd down instead of one. It was very significant that he had those forces available to him, on tap, so to speak.

The CINCs are the cornerstone of the crisis action system. They have responsibility for the military operations in their areas, they provide the JCS with that vital on-the-scene report and local knowledge, and they are the ones who develop the options, from which a course of action is selected by the NCA in conjunction with the JCS. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) is the hub of the crisis action, at least on military actions.

Everyone else in Washington, I think, has a crisis center. The State Department has one. The White House has its Situation Room. The CIA has one. The DIA has NMIC, the National Military Intelligence Center, which is virtually collocated with the NMCC. The JCS has five teams under a general officer in the NMCC working 24 hours a day. These five teams match the NMIC teams, headed by a colonel or a captain. So you end up with your NMCC and NMIC teams working together, and they’re on the same watch pattern. And so they get used to each other and exchange information much more freely.
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<tr>
<td>2. Review military plans for adequacy, feasibility and suitability or develop new plans if necessary</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>3. Prepare estimates of situation; develop alternative courses of action/options; state risks</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Provide military advice, options and information to NCA</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Provide strategic direction to armed forces</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Assign logistic responsibilities to military services and Defense Logistics Agency</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Recommend changes in priorities and reallocation of forces/resources required</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Supervise implementation of integrated plans for military mobilization</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Provide joint intelligence for use within Department of Defense</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Issue operational directives</td>
<td>X</td>
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Key Responsibilities of JCS in Crisis Management

Figure 12
Interrelationships of Key JCS Responsibilities in Crisis Management
Figure 13
1. Occurrence of event and report to JCS/NMCC
   Event reported to intervening echelons and other agencies; media probably aware of event

2. Assessment of report

3. Establishment of crisis staffing procedures
   OJCS, services, other departments/agencies, possibly White House

4. Warning order to CINC(s)
   Development of response options

5. Alert order to CINC(s)
   Course of action selection by NCA/JCS

6. Execute/deployment order

7. OPLAN/OPORD execution
   Major force deployment commences

8. Escalation/reinforcement — — resolution/redeployment

Framework/ Crisis Action System
Figure 14
**Student:** How are they coordinated with the rest of the crisis management centers, say the White House?

**Hilton:** Pretty well. There’s a fantastic communications flow within the Washington area and into Washington, inundating decision makers with perhaps more information than they need. I think one of the greatest challenges in C^3I is to analyze this information and bring the relevant things to the decision maker, telling him what’s important, what he has to do, and what his options are. A lot of the circuits are there now. There is a secure voice link between the Pentagon, the White House, the service command posts, CIA, DIA, NSA and the State Department, so you can have an immediate conference. The numbers are preset — you punch one button and call up about ten of these agencies and you’ve got them on the line in literally a matter of seconds. The network is called NOTWN, National Operations and Intelligence Warning Net. In addition, they coordinate pretty well on paper by sending representatives to the Pentagon, to the NMCC, or by exchanging liaison officers or some such mechanism. Generally speaking, there is very good coordination in crisis management. Not always agreement — coordination doesn’t necessarily imply agreement. Coordination requires that you touch base with everybody and take account of their opinions and then you set up a course of action and people know what has been decided.

Another thing I would like to mention is that some of our best sources in learning of an event are in the news media. CNN has become one of our prime sources; it’s monitored in the Command Center all the time. There are also tickers in the National Military Command Center for Reuters, UPI, and AP. Many times a first indication of something is from a reporter on the spot, a stringer. For example, the first pictures we had of the barracks in Beirut being blown up were from CNN. We first learned of Sadat’s assassination from a stringer for CBS, I believe, who was on the scene and got to a telephone and got a call back before they could even get it back through the embassy circuits. I guess he had a handful of change in his pocket and used the local telephone, wasn’t worried about security or things like that.

**Student:** With respect to the intelligence factor in crisis management, it seems to me from what I’ve been involved with that we’re great at providing the intelligence ex post facto; knowing exactly why a crisis happened and what the circumstances were. But we’re still not at the point where we can predict crises and interdict them at that point. Would you comment?

**Hilton:** Sure. As I said earlier, a crisis is characterized by uncertain time constraints. There is a lot of uncertainty. You have to act on imperfect information. With the intense media attention, the time sensitivity, the high level of concern, the tension, and the possibility that the crisis may affect the national interest, you have to go forward with some sort of plan. So you start planning with as much information as you have. If you’ve got perfect intelligence, that’s great. You don’t have to go back and reevaluate your plan. But for the most part, intelligence input is not a one-time thing. It is a continuing flow, a constant loop; the intelligence agencies in Washington putting it back out so that the people in the field can see where it’s perhaps imperfect, the commander sending in his request for intelligence, the essential elements of information which indicate where he sees the gaps, and then the intelligence community trying to fill these gaps. Sometimes they can fill them, sometimes they can’t.

In any crisis you’re working in less than perfect circumstances. Many times decision makers will ask, “How do you know this?” “Where did you get this?” “How reliable is the person?” The SECDEF is a great question asker. And of course, our defense structure is strengthened through redundancy, but that also creates a lot of competition. You’ve got the State Department reporting, the DIA attached reporting, the DCI with his resources, the overheads, etc. You try to assemble this whole mass of intelligence and analyze it, do the best you can. You will still get a lot better analyses afterwards than you did beforehand.

Thinking back to my experience in the Chairman’s office, I guess I would take issue with Admiral Moorer’s statement that the Chairman doesn’t need a Joint Staff because he has a Staff Group. There were six of us in the group, but even if we were the six brightest 0-6’s, captains, and colonels, in the entire military service, which I doubt, six of us weren’t going to be able to provide the Chairman with all the backup he needed.

I was in the Chairman’s office when the Czech crisis came up in 1968. My specialty was the Middle

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East, but the man who had the NATO European desk was on vacation, so I got the job of taking over the NATO desk. Well, having followed Soviet affairs for a number of years, I had been watching the situation very closely, and I wrote a memorandum to the Chairman the night before saying the Soviets were poised for an invasion. That was my own analysis based on what I saw, and I was about 24 hours ahead of the intelligence community. It just happened to be unique circumstances. The point of the story is that my memo didn’t get to the Chairman because his exec looked at it and thought, “This isn’t of any interest to the Chairman, he has his intelligence reports.” And I got it back the next day while I was in the midst of writing up papers for the Chairman to take to an NSC meeting. I never had one of my memos to the Chairman turned back by the exec in the next three years!

After thorough analysis, the Intelligence Community decided we should have known the Soviets were going into Czechoslovakia. The DIA had correctly assessed — and all the community had assessed — that the Soviets were going in. But they had also correctly assessed that there was no direct threat to NATO or to the United States, or to U.S. forces, and so they saw no need to alert the President. I think what the community perhaps missed at that time was the policy implication of the President being surprised, even though it wasn’t a direct threat to the United States.

I think our performance in the Polish crisis, 13 years later, was much better. We had better monitoring, and even though the situation was not a direct threat to the U.S., we recognized that it could spill across the border. If fighting started in Poland, refugees could start fleeing into East Germany, which might create a snowball effect, and then you would have something going on along the East-West German border.

Oettinger: I think the post mortems on that one were also highly critical. And it seems to me that that’s endemic. Hindsight is better than foresight. For example, look at the record of last year’s seminar for McManis* poignant comments about inapplicable warning and so forth. You just don’t know much before.

Student: But I was thinking in particular about my experience in Beirut. Weekly, we’d get “This weekend something’s going to happen.” It was almost a crying wolf situation. And yet as soon as the bombing happened, three hours later the intelligence reports were incredibly detailed about what had happened, all the planning that went into this, where the explosives came from, what terrorist cell was involved.

Hilton: I thought that it was several days before that came out.

Student: I had a report four hours later. I can’t give any details, but there were names and everything, and our viewpoint from there on the scene was that all of a sudden they started squeezing sources and saying, “Okay, now it’s a crisis, now it’s important.”

Hilton: They probably went into the files where they’d put all the hundreds of reports that had been, as you said, “crying wolf,” and once the event had taken place, they could see a pattern, so they could go in and find the two or three that were relevant.

Oettinger: Think about the lists of potential presidential assassins. If you took that seriously, every five minutes or so, you’d go nuts. Now the minute a Hinckley goes up to the President outside the Hilton Hotel someone says, “How come you missed that guy?” What about the other five? There’s stuff like that in the file all the time.

Hilton: I’ll make some comments on the bombing in Beirut, but these are strictly my own personal views. A good part of what I think happened in Beirut was the fault of Washington. There was this constant discussion of, Why are the Marines there? I participated in the discussions. There was tremendous discussion: What are the Marines doing there? Are they going to deter by presence or are they going to defend by force? If you think about that, if you’re going to deter you have one type of force, one type of mission. If you’re going to defend, you have another type of force. You dig in in a different way, and things like that. The decision was made that they would deter by presence, and so therefore they went in with a light force, a relatively light force — I know the Marines may look pretty heavily armed, but when you consider the option of putting in an armored brigade or something like that, they are lightly armed. So they went in with a fairly light force, and they were highly visible, as soon as they
could get out on the streets they were out in their jeeps flying the American flag, and that was part of the purpose. They gradually dug themselves in more and more, but one of the things that kept the Marines there was the desire to keep a force that could be moved out quickly and be perceived as a nonpermanent force. In the classic amphibious operation, almost by definition, the Marines go in, secure the objective, then the Army comes in — either it’s over or the Army comes in and becomes the occupying force — and the Marines pull out. The Marines for a long time wanted to get their forces out, they said the Army is more suitable. I think that everybody agreed that the Army is more suitable for that type of thing, but they would be a permanent garrison, would be perceived as that, and so there was a lot of this. And a lot of this was conveyed down the line from Washington. I’m one of the ones who did that in reflecting what I was hearing and telling the J-3 at EUCOM that this is the concept we want. So therefore I think the fact that the Marines were less than fully prepared for this probably reflects some of this general philosophy, this general guidance, this general concept that came all the way down out of Washington. I’m not going to finger any particular thing, but they went in for a presence mission, and they did not go in to overthrow the existing government, they did not go in to fight on one side or the other. They went in as a presence force with a presence mission.

**Student:** If I could shift the subject a little bit, I’d like to know about the assemblage of intelligence and so on in a high-level crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. The kind of intelligence I want to ask you about is what’s incumbent beyond a strategic warning before they actually fire any missiles. Who in the crisis control area assembles that kind of information, or is there a competition between different people assembling it?

**Hilton:** There’s a good discussion of this by General Rosenberg* in the record of last year’s seminar. CINC NORAD or CINC ADCOM, Bob Herres,** who was here last week, is responsible for making what’s known as the attack assessment. His organization is also responsible for strategic warning, which comes through a variety of sensors such as the BMEWS radar and the various satellites overhead. You also have ongoing intelligence to prevent a first strike with no warning, with no assembly of any forces or anything. That’s highly unlikely, but it’s a possibility and we have to guard against it. That’s the so-called “worst case” military analysis. If that did happen, the first warning you’d have would be these different sensors picking up SLBMs coming out of the ocean and ICBMs coming out of the rocket fields. With the intelligence, we think we would see other indications beforehand, maybe you’d see them starting to stand down the Strategic Air Force, see more of the SLBMs being deployed out to sea, things like that. So all of these indicators would be fed in to the system. But you get the warning, and then of course you have to make the assessment based on what you know at the time. That assessment is given in a matter of minutes, and I do mean minutes.

**Student:** My question is more pointed to the other indicators you mentioned that occur before any kind of actual attack indicators. And my concern is that if we start to prepare ourselves in say a two-week or a three-week escalating crisis, that when the Soviets see that, they might start doing things, and when we see them doing things we escalate a little bit and a little bit more...

**Hilton:** You’re talking about the August 1914 scenario.

**Student:** Is there a particular group that deals with that kind of intelligence?

**Hilton:** Yes. There’s a system called something like “worldwide indicators.” There are about 800 indicators that the intelligence community monitors, including things like the movement of refugees, the requisitioning of food, the use of trucks for something other than the harvest — traditionally the military trucks go out and help with the harvest. That was one of the indicators that contributed to the post facto analysis of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The grain harvest suffered greatly in that period because they diverted the trucks. They did it under the screen of an exercise; that was the way it was assessed. These indicators are brief, I think, every day, to the Chairman of the JCS, and the DCI makes his reports to the President.

I remember when the North Koreans in December of 1981 went into the biggest exercise they’d ever
done at that time. In 1982 they had an even bigger one. We were watching those indicators and assessing whether they were, in fact, just exercising. In 1981 we didn’t pay as much attention to it as we did in 1982, because in 1982 General Vessey was the Chairman. General Vessey had been the U.N. Commander in Korea. He was much more sensitive to Korea than we were, and the point he made, I remember, was that even though it was correct to assess those as indicators for an exercise, each one was also a preparation for war. Now in these cases the war didn’t happen. But if they’re going to go to war, they’re going to go through all of those steps. Some day it may not be an exercise, and if you keep watching it as an exercise, you may be caught.

So you always have to be looking at the possibility that you are describing a process of going to war. And you look for other indications that it’s an exercise: Have they requisitioned the civilian economy? That was what DIA used as a deciding factor in the Korean thing — they requisitioned a lot of things, but not everything. The DIA thought that if they were really going to war they would not just have taken 20%, they would have taken 80% of civilian transportation.

**Student:** Do we have any corporate body with enough experience to keep up with that on a year-to-year or crisis-to-crisis basis?

**Hilton:** Computers are our corporate body, I think. There is also a national warning officer who is dual-hatted between CIA and DIA. One of last year’s speakers, Dave McManis, was the National Intelligence Officer for Warning.

At one time it was Linc Fauer,* when he was a two-star and double-hatted as a Deputy Director of CIA. The warning center was put in the Pentagon and it’s still there. So, you have this warning technology, but it’s only as good as the people who are on watch.

**Oettinger:** If you want to add another layer to it, you can read some of Roy Godson’s work — concerned especially with the earlier period when Ogarkov** was Chief of Staff — on the subject of disinformation, deliberate manipulation of the indicators. So you can continue to add layers to that problem, depending on how secure or paranoid you feel. All of which adds to the fog of uncertainty over whether somebody is crying wolf or being prudent.

**Hilton:** Now in the 1982 Korean crisis we took some very specific military measures, deliberately and in the open. We wanted the North Koreans to see what we were doing. Then, the North Koreans did say, “My God, the Americans are getting ready to attack.” The carrier *Midway* was coming in for the Christmas period and her ammunition had been unloaded because she was going into three months of special restricted availability. So we started reloading the *Midway* with ammunition and readying the planes at Atsugi. There was no way, with the number of Koreans who are in Japan, that they could have missed that. And I’m sure they were aware that the B-52s flew up from Guam and then flew along Nightmare Range just south of the DMZ and had bombing practice. It was the first time they’d been up there for several months. And we also moved F-15s and AWACS up from Okinawa and Kadena. So we knew they would catch the signal. We also did more subtle things, such as putting more forces on alert, as did the ROK. But these other things were intended to make the North Koreans think we were gearing up to react if they attacked.

**Student:** And what effect did this all have on the North Koreans?

**Hilton:** We don’t know whether it had any effect on them. The exercise ended and that was the end. But we know they saw. And of course the DIA people said, “Right, we told you it was an exercise. We told you it would end on the 22nd of December.” We don’t know whether they reacted to what we did, or whether they were planning to have only an exercise that ended on 22 December.

**Oettinger:** Could you relate these comments on crisis management to the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreements?** Even more remarkable than any success we might have in managing a crisis is the fact that more of these crises don’t break out, given that the U.S. and Soviet navies, for example, are international and run into each other daily, especially in the Mediterranean. There was a great uproar of course over the

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* See General Fauer’s presentation earlier in this volume.

** Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, former Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of General Staff.

** Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea and over the High Seas,* signed May 25, 1972.
KAL-007 disaster, but it seems remarkable that, with all the reconnaissance flights and shadowing and so forth, there isn't more conflict.

Hilton: Okay, I'll get into that now. I've just written an article on that subject for a German magazine called *Naval Forces,* which I'm sure is available at Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs. The Incidents at Sea agreement was signed in 1972 and came about primarily because these problems at sea were getting to be very dangerous. We had a couple of collisions in the Sea of Japan in the late 1960s, and the situation was escalating to the point that collisions were being threatened all the time. So the U.S. invited the Soviets to sit down on a navy-to-navy basis and talk about the incidents and work up some way to avoid them. The result was an agreement signed in May of 1972 by Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner — now Senator Warner — and Sergei Gorchkov — then and now Soviet Supreme Naval Commander.

The 1972 agreement contains some rules as to how to avoid these incidents. These rules are very simple and very flexible. They have to be in that way because relatively junior officers at sea — lieutenant commanders, commanders — are going to be interpreting these rules. The act provides for an annual review. On the odd years the review is in the United States, on the even years it's in Moscow. In between the annual reviews there's a channel of communications; if we have a complaint we call in their naval attaché, and if they have a complaint they call in our naval attaché. When Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr. was shot in Germany, one of the things the Navy did was at least register the U.S. Navy's strong displeasure by calling the Soviet naval attaché, Rear Admiral Ivan P. Sakulkin, back from Honolulu where they were having a naval attaché's tour. I noticed in the *New York Times* today that General Otis** and the Soviet Commander met Friday to discuss having this kind of agreement on an army-to-army basis.

The agreement also provides special signals which are used when the ships are in the vicinity of each other, to say, for example, "I'm testing my fire-control radar," or "I'm about to launch aircraft." And by and large the agreement works well. I think there are several reasons. One is that it's a single-service agreement. It's navy-to-navy. It was negotiated that way, signed that way, and it's been kept that way. Second, politics have, by and large, been kept out of it. When the Soviets went into Afghanistan in December 1979, the first thing that was going to be affected, of any major significance, was this annual review group going over to Geneva in May of 1980. And there was discussion as to whether the group should go. The Navy said yes, it should go, this is something that's clearly in the national interest. And that's the third reason this agreement works: It's clearly in the national interest of both nations. So what we did on this occasion was go to Moscow to hold the talks but cut down the peripheral activities associated with the talks.

Before Afghanistan the trips were longer. We'd get in there on, say, a Saturday, recover from jet lag on Sunday, meet, say, Monday through Thursday, and maybe Thursday night or Friday morning go somewhere. When I was there the first time in 1978, we went to Stalingrad — or Volgograd as it is now known — and saw a hydroelectric plant, which was very thrilling for the Navy to see. Then we went to Sochi on the Black Sea and stayed in a sanitarium that they use for their naval hospital rest home. No smoking or drinking — that caused some difficulty for some of our officers. When the Soviet officers come to the U.S. they might go to New Orleans or to the U.N. and New York. On one visit, Malcolm Forbes took them out on his yacht and toured Manhattan Island. But we did react to Afghanistan by cutting back on the fringe benefits of the annual review conference. They keep asking to go back to the longer conferences — they miss the ten-day trips to New Orleans, San Francisco, Malcolm Forbes' yacht, the Naval War College, and things like that. I don't really miss the trips to hydroelectric plants, however.

Student: Admiral, I want to challenge something about INCSEA. I've had some operational experience with it. I've been on the end of the long green table on some INCSEA processes. The INCSEA works great as long as there are minor incidents and there are no major crises. But in the case of the Korean Air Lines flight 007 incident, the recovery of the black box, it was apparent that the Soviets were under absolute orders that under absolutely no circumstances were the Americans to recover the box, and all of the mechanisms of normal navy-to-navy
channels — the calling in of the American naval attaché, talking to the Soviet naval attaché — everything fell down and nothing worked. So couldn’t a case be made that in a real crunch, the mechanisms don’t work?

Hilton: That could be, although there were no collisions involved in the KAL-007 search. And all of the mechanisms did go through. We did call in the Soviet attaché and protested very vigorously. The first big thing that occurred after the KAL-007 shoot-down was the Incidents at Sea annual review. There were talks off-line between Vice Admiral James (“Ace”) Lyons, the OP-06,* and Admiral Navaiosev (the Russian Delegation to the INCSEA Agreement), and the Soviets admitted off-line that they had violated the Incidents at Sea Agreement. However, that was nine months later. It didn’t stop them from doing it at the time. Yes, you could make a case that that might happen but you can make that case for any agreement. In matters of urgent national policy you would violate almost any international agreement. I think if we saw a real breakout of the Soviets in ABM, we’d probably abrogate the ABM Treaty. We would probably violate almost anything else — and so would they. The important thing is, there were no collisions, and although they did harass our ships, all of the things in the Incidents at Sea Agreement were used and still enforced. In other words, they did not go as far as to abrogate it, and neither did we. So I would argue as well that the agreement survived a fairly serious crisis.

Student: Another thing I think we could say is all these other minor things that looked for a long time like they might lead up to a major crisis — chicken games, collisions and so on — never became serious.

Hilton: Right. They were defused. We had another case where our destroyer, Lockwood, went into Peter the Great Bay. The Soviets have drawn a line across the bay: Inside that line is Soviet territorial waters. And our ship went in there inadvertently. There was a very severe Soviet protest on that. Of course, because not only did they claim we violated the INCSEA agreement but we went into their claimed territorial waters. We don’t recognize that claim, but we did get that ship out of there, because the commanding officer was in error. He had gone beyond where he was supposed to go. And again, there were very high-level contacts, even higher than the OP-06/Navaiosev level, to discuss this. And the agreement survived that. The Soviets came back to us after the KAL-007 incident, saying, “Remember, now, you put one of your ships into our territorial waters, and you put a helicopter over our territorial waters, and any country has the right to shoot down any aircraft in its territorial air space.” They proved they were prepared to do that with the KAL-007. I assume they were implying that they could have shot down the Lockwood’s helicopter, but didn’t because of the INCSEA Agreement. So the agreement survived that incident, too.

Oettinger: If we go back to your earlier Korea comments, it seems to me that one of the benefits of an INCSEA sort of agreement, even if it is imperfect in major crises, is that it reduces the probability that accidentally drifting off course or ramming somebody or being about to be rammed would set off one of these Korean-scale kinds of exercises.

Hilton: Yes. With respect to the KAL-007, nothing else occurred anywhere in the world between the Soviets and the U.S. Navy — no increase of tension in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Caribbean, or anywhere we were in contact with their forces, and you know we see them all the time all around the world. The agreement was maintained with perfect propriety in every other place. The trouble was a localized problem. Had they wanted to send a stronger signal, they could have suddenly started harassing us again in the Mediterranean — that’s an easy target since we are always in close proximity.

So in response to your comment, I would say their behavior in the waters of the KAL-007 crash site, in a sense, was a definite signal that they were highly displeased with what we were doing there. And in another way, I see their behavior elsewhere as signaling that, over all, they were pleased with the agreement. Even at the site, they did not press matters to a collision. That seems like a positive signal, under the circumstances. Now, this could also just have been good seamanship on the part of our sailors and ship captains.

Student: That was my understanding, that it would have been a collision, and that the Soviets were perfectly willing to take it to a collision if they needed to, but that only superlative seamanship stopped it from happening.

*OP-06 — Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Office of Plans, Policy and Operations.
Hilton: I was in a position where I was told, "If you have a collision and you’ve got the rules of the road on your side and they provoke it, then we’ll stand right behind you." I never pushed it that far. I doubt that I would be standing here as a retired admiral in good standing if I had pushed it that far. I was there, and they weren’t.

Student: Nonetheless, while the content is of course classified, it’s no secret that we have our own rules of engagement relative to INCSEA, the “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) version. I’m sure the Soviets have one as well. Doesn’t that suggest the agreement itself is still so general as to generate conflict in the very enforcement of it? The unilateral signals we send each other are fine, but for unexpected situations where we both must react at once, don’t we need more specificity in those agreements?

Hilton: One of the things that the Soviets have been trying to achieve ever since the agreement was started is what they call “minimum fixed distances.” Our argument is that the agreement depends on the judgment of the commanding officer, and it depends on good seamanship, and it depends on the rules of the road, and it depends on adhering to not only the letter but also the spirit of the agreement. And the Soviets reply, “That’s all very good, but you shouldn’t leave it up to the judgment of those commanding officers out at sea who after all are relatively junior and inexperienced. We more experienced officers sitting back in Moscow and Washington should set out some very specific distances, like 2,000 yards, and if you never get closer than 2,000 yards you’ll never have a collision.”

We point out that if you follow that rule you might run the other ship aground. We start discussing who gets to stay 2,000 yards from the other ship, or what happens when you start down a channel, and they say, “Oh, no, no, no, we don’t mean channels and things like that. We’ll write separate things for that.” And we say, “Well, suppose we’re maneuvering with our NATO navies. They don’t have an agreement with you and one of your ships comes up, now we’d have to leave our formation to get 2,000 yards...” “Oh, no, no, no, we don’t mean that; we’ll write separate things for that.” “Suppose we’re on a refueling course.” “Oh, we’ll write an agreement.”

Then we say, “All right now, you’ve just said you’re going to write an agreement about this, this, this, and this. Now, how big do you think this agreement’s going to be? How long do you think it’s going to take to write it? How long to negotiate it, and who the hell will understand it?” And so they say, “Well, I think we need to continue to study this problem.” So we then pull out the minutes that we wrote before we left Washington, which says, “We, the two sides, discussed minimum fixed distances and listened carefully to each other’s arguments and agreed to discuss it next year.” One of the reasons the agreement has lasted is that it is flexible, and it does allow interpretation. And of course I think this is part of the difference between our philosophy of command and training, and the Soviet philosophy. Our people are given much more flexibility than theirs ever are.

Our own operation orders do in some cases provide things like fixed distances. We’ve got them in our instructions, and the Soviets know it, and I am sure they have the same thing. But all of those are caveated by “subject to the circumstances,” “adhere to the rules of road,” “observe good seamanship,” etc. Nothing relieves the commanding officer of total responsibility for his command.

Student: I would like to ask you a question that you’re uniquely qualified to answer because of your experience with the INCSEA agreement, your experience with the Soviets, and your experience with crisis management. What about the Joint Crisis Management Center for the United States and the Soviets? What’s your view about that?

Hilton: Well, I guess I don’t think it would work. It might be worthwhile to sit down and explore it with the Soviets. They have not expressed any interest in this. There’s been one suggestion that we bring them into the National Military Command Center and we go to their Supreme Headquarters, or their General Staff or whatever it is. I don’t think that that would ever work. There are just too many problems. I don’t think you could ever work out something on that order. Some sort of agreement along the lines of the Incidents at Sea agreement might work. You might have read that article in the New York Times about General Otis and the Soviet commander sitting down to talk; I think it might be possible to formulate an “Incidents on Land” agreement. Our Army has expressed a little interest in that, and we understand the Soviet army has talked about it.

I guess it would be useful to sit down and have discussions with them and see what, if anything,
might come of this. I'm just not sure it's very practical. I've discussed this with Harriet Horn, who worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She's interested in this, and she asked me for my views, given my experience with the Soviets and Incidents at Sea. This was in answer to the Nunn-Warner amendment to the Defense Authorization Act of 1982, written with Senator Jackson. I told Harriet what I've said all along about why the INCSEA agreement works — it keeps politics out of it. I don't see how a crisis management center with the Soviet Union could keep politics out.

We've had some examples. We have an agreement right now that works very well except when the Soviets want to do something — the Joint Berlin Air Safety Center. It's actually quadrupartite, with the French and the British participating. Whenever the Soviets want to hold an exercise in some airspace they just do it. Say we're supposed to fly between 8 and 10 thousand feet. The Soviets just walk in and say, "We're flying an exercise between 8 and 10 thousand feet tomorrow." Or usually they'll have started it already. About that time we've got the first report from some airliner that he's been buzzed or something like that. And that has worked as long as they wanted it to work. So there is that type of agreement.

Student: You think that might be able to work at a higher level?

Hilton: Possibly, yes.

Student: But in a situation where Soviets and Americans are in a crisis with each other the chances of it working are pretty small. Whereas if there were a Third World crisis or a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon or something like that, where the superpowers would be involved indirectly, it might work.

Hilton: It might. There's just such a wall of suspicion about everything. We look at them, and they look at us, and we don't trust them, and they don't trust us. I think we might be more willing to trust them in certain circumstances than they would be to trust us, if you read their doctrine and philosophy and so forth. It might be worth exploring.

Now that we've discussed these different aspects of crisis management. I'm going to return to the JCS itself. This list (figure 15) answers the criticisms I addressed in the opening of this talk, grouped in the same format of military advice, strategic direction, and quality of advice. The JCS works about as well as the structure permits. I want you to think about that statement — "works as well as the structure permits." The structure of the Department of Defense has three semiautonomous service departments within the one Department of Defense. The Congress seems happy with that. As long as you have that type of arrangement, you're always going to have a problem in getting joint advice on resources.

The Chief of Naval Operations, for example, has more independent power than the Chiefs of Staff of the Army or the Air Force, because of the way the Navy is organized. Secretary Lehman, although he's certainly very active, has the basis for using a great deal of authority, because he has a separate staff in the Navy Department. And the CNO has another staff. Whereas you find that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Air Force are generally Chief of Staff for the Secretary. The Chief of Staff of the Army signs things for the Secretary of the Army, or by direction of the Secretary of the Army, whereas in practical fact, he may not have even consulted with him.

But that's their structure. That's why, I believe, we have that "through" with respect to the JCS in the chain of command. I think it came from copying the Army model where the Chief of Staff of the Army signs things for, or by the direction of, the Secretary of the Army. Whereas, again, he may not in fact even have consulted with the Secretary.

Now, as I mentioned earlier, an organization, SPRAA, the Strategic Plans Resource Analysis Agency, was formed to give the JCS the capability to make independent resource recommendations. And it is only a step moving in that direction, an evolution rather than a revolution. And so I would qualify the first subpoint (figure 15) to say the structure does not yet permit joint advice on resources. It may be possible as SPRAA evolves. They're working now with the CINC's. The idea is to put together eventually what would be the CINC's POM (Program Objective Memorandum).

On the second point, evaluating force trade-offs between services, the way the process now works, when you sit down and work out the war-fighting capabilities you could achieve with different force structures, every service can prove that if you give them more, it would be better for the United States. At present, there really is no way to evaluate trade-
• Works about as well as structure permits
  – structure does not permit joint advice on resources

• No way to evaluate force tradeoffs between services
  – almost no way to evaluate within service

• Procedures are slow, cumbersome, ponderous, etc.
  – services can hamstring Joint Staff A/O

• Few problems in operational, time – urgent planning

• Best officers do not seek Joint Staff duty
  – but are not captives of service

• Education is adequate in quality
  – but inadequate in quantity

Evaluation
Figure 15
offs, even within the service. I think if you went to the Air Force and said, "Now show us what's the best war-fighting combination of resources between TAC, MAC, and SAC — your lift aircraft, your strategic aircraft, and your fighters and tactical bombers," they would have difficulty in really breaking it down. I'm a consultant at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where they're trying to formulate some computer models for SPRAA with which to evaluate effectiveness against resources and force structure and be able to play those back and forth. Whether they're going to be able to do it or not is unclear, but I think they're making great progress. That could give the JCS, for the first time, the tool it needs.

When I said procedures are slow, cumbersome, ponderous, etc., I could have gone on with adjectives less acceptable in public. The services can hamstring a Joint Staff action officer, as you read in Admiral Moorer's article. He said that the Chairman doesn't need all these new authorities because if he's a good chairman, a strong chairman, he's got them anyway; if he's a weak chairman, he's liable to do harm. And I agree. I think a good action officer can push things through without being hamstrung by the services. Rapid processing is possible.

I always cite one example where I had to get a decision. We were having an organizational problem and the OSD, SECDEF's office, was reorganizing the Intelligence Agency. I had been appointed as the JCS representative to work with SECDEF's representative. I was going to have a meeting with him, and I needed a position. I went into the Tank, and I didn't even have a piece of paper to circulate around, but I talked to them, told them what the situation was, and what I recommended. Thirty-five minutes after I went in I had a JCS position. As I left, the Secretary of the Joint Staff, who keeps the records, said, "Please, Admiral, will you write that down, what you said and what they said?" About four days after they gave the decision we got all the paper work written up in a JCS Red Stripe, which means it was an official JCS decision. In the meantime, I had conveyed the JCS decision to OSD. It is possible to react like that if necessary.

There are few problems in operational, time-urgent planning. The longer you let something go, the more likely you are to get service problems, but if you have just a few minutes to get something done, or a few hours, everybody's going to say "Let's get on with this," and do it. If you have a little bit longer to work, somebody may say, "Now wait a minute, what's in this for me?" And then you may begin to get problems.

My experience in four Joint Staff assignments is virtually unique, especially for the Navy. One doesn't expect to rise through Joint Staff promotions. So generally, the best officers don't seek Joint Staff duty. There's no doubt about it. But staff officers are not captives of their service. There are certainly constraints on them, but there's no mechanism in any of the services to ensure that a particular officer endorses a particular position.

There is the problem, of course, that when you finish your tour, you're going to go back to your service. I followed up my first tour on the Joint Staff, in the Office of the Director of the Joint Staff, by working in the Plans and Policy arena (P-06) for the Navy. The next time in the Chairman's office, I went to sea. You don't know exactly where you're going, and there's undoubtedly a little nervousness and apprehension about whether you're going to get the right assignment or not. There may be some pressure on the Joint Staff officer to follow service policy, but generally I'd say that's not a true charge.

As for education, what is there is adequate in quality. The Armed Forces Staff College, I think, does an excellent job of turning out Joint Staff officers. There's a real effort now to have all of the graduates of the Armed Forces Staff College go directly into some joint assignment. It's getting better all the time. So it's adequate in quality but inadequate in quantity. That one college can't turn out that many people, and I don't think the service war colleges emphasize the joint aspects enough. That concludes my prepared remarks.

**Student:** The Army and Air Force seem to have taken earlier steps than the Navy to get quality officers into the joint arena, by matching the Joint Staff promotion pace to the service rate of promotion. The Navy lags way behind. Do you have any recommendations on how to change the negative perception that Navy officers have of a career in the Joint Staff?

**Hilton:** I have one recommendation — I would make it a mandatory requirement for an officer in the grade of 5 or 6 to serve in a joint organization before even being considered for 7. Now this includes the CINC's
and a lot of other places. There are a lot of billets around. I would make it mandatory to serve joint duty before anyone's name would even go before the board for promotion to brigadier general or commodore. As you probably know, the situation now is that you're supposed to be qualified. That came in the Reorganization Act in 1958, that you're supposed to have joint duty and supposed to have it stamped in your record. That's very easy to get, but even then people come up for commodore without it. I was just talking to one the other day. He was selected for commodore, and he had never had Washington duty, and he had never had joint duty. They said, "Well, we'll go ahead and let him be promoted to commodore, provided his first assignment is in a joint job." So you have a double hit there, in that the people who have had the joint duty didn't get the promotion, and you now have a joint job where you need joint experience, and you don't have a qualified person in there. So the system's being hurt in two ways: The Navy is suffering because the people who have gotten that joint experience are not getting the promotion, and then the joint system is suffering because of the unqualified people there.

So, my recommendation would be to make it mandatory, with no exception. You won't even go before the board until you've had the job. And the same thing should apply at the next level: Once you've made the grade of 7, 8, you should have to serve in the joint job before you're even considered for 9. I haven't worked out the figures, but I suspect there are enough billets around, and I think that would change the whole perception. Every officer, when coming through the service, wants to be promoted, wants to have more responsibility. And I think you would find the best officers in the Navy and other places banging on the detailer's desk for joint duty. Don't you think that if there were no way that you could get promoted without that job, you would then say, "I want to make sure. I don't know whether I'm going to get promoted or not, but I don't want to rule myself out."

Student: I basically have two perceptions on hearing that. The first is that if you made it mandatory, it would become a ticket-punching job and the best officers would end up going to the blue-suited joint staffs like CINC LANT and CINC PAC.

Hilton: Well, you'd have to have a board like for the War College. In other words, you're selected for a senior war college and you have very little say about whether you get National War College, Industrial College, Naval War College, Army War College, Air War College. The Marines give you absolutely no latitude. You're picked to get an assignment, and you go there or not at all.

Student: The second perception is that I really don't think you're going to get any sort of joint service interest in a very junior career until you start looking at things other than promotability. With lieutenant commander selection now at almost 90%, commander selection at 65%, and captain selection about the same, 65-70%, finding a promotable officer for Joint Staff duty doesn't lead to getting a top cut. But if you start requiring joint duty before people could get their DESRON or their Wing Command, and really make JCS duty — rather than just any joint duty — a requirement in terms of the oversight, then we'd be getting somewhere.

Hilton: That's a good point. I'm going to make a note of that, because, as you may have noted, I didn't have joint service mandatory in any of those grades. What I said was service on the Joint Staff would be necessary to be promoted to 7 — and I didn't talk about joint duty being a requirement for important service jobs, like command.

Student: But I could find a job on a blue-suited staff and only work for Navy people, and only in Navy jobs, and it would be considered a joint tour.

Hilton: Well, it would still be a CINC — CINC LANT, CINC PAC, CINC EUR. Now, of the unified commanders, the only one that's really Navy dominated is CINC LANT. There are a lot of people in the unified command at CINC PAC from other services. The European Command is dominated by the Army and the Air Force. So there are problems, but what I'm saying is that I think this type of problem could be worked out. The Army used to have a policy that in order to get promoted to colonel you had to have two things. You had to have a command as a lieutenant colonel, and you had to have gone to a war college. For the colonel going to brigadier general, it was necessary to have had a senior war college and a command. And in the late 1960s they used to require that you had served in the joint organization. It was General William C. Westmoreland (formerly Army Chief of Staff) who turned that around, feeling it was more important to serve on the Army Staff than to serve on the Joint Staff. And so the
Army’s perception on that changed rather dramatically. Things are better now.

**Student:** That went back to when General Wickham* became Director of the Joint Staff. He then added a policy where you would again have to have that Joint Staff time before you could be promoted. It was amazing how that permeated down to the youngest officers, and it wasn’t so much a board action that determined which joint staff they went to, but their availability. If they were in the Department of the Army Staff, they’d be trying to go to the Joint Staff. If they were in Korea, they might try to go to the U.S. Forces Staff. So it did work.

**Student:** However, there’s another problem. I look around and I have not served under a CO of either a ship or a squadron who has ever had JCS duty. I’ve served under a lot of guys who have been on 7th Fleet Staff, 6th Fleet Staff, COMNAVAILANT, AIRTAC Staff, that sort of thing. But there’s a general perception that the second rung goes to the JCS staff, and it’s a good place to go if you’re a 6 and you need three years to get established in D.C. and then retire.

**Hilton:** Yes, I agree. You’re entirely correct. People have always kind of looked at me funny: There’s something different about you, you had joint duty and made admiral.

**McLaughlin:** You make the statement that the JCS system works about as well as the structure allows, but an awful lot of people who are criticizing are saying we must change the structure.

**Hilton:** The structure that I’m talking about no one has recommended changing. The CSIS report didn’t recommend those changes. Luttvak ended up saying that the whole world can be saved if you have these joint officers, joint action officers, but I don’t see where that’s going to make much change at all. I think the fundamental issue is the overall structure of the Department of Defense, the services within the Department. I’m not advocating, for example, that you do away with those three services. I think people ought to realize that when they level the criticism, the criticism is of the *entire* structure and the way it’s created. I’m reminded of people I heard last night on television complaining about this administration and its tax policies. The administration didn’t pass the tax law. Congress did. And it wasn’t just in the last five years. It goes back to when they started the progressive income tax. So, people can rail about specific policies and things, but they ought to go back to the source. And I think the source in this case is in the fundamental structure.

Aside from that, I have made some other recommendations, like making the Chairman the military advisor and putting him in the chain of command. Admiral Moorer said that he was in it when he was Chairman. He turned to me recently and said, “Bob, when you worked for me did any CINC not do what I told him to do?” I said, “No.” He said, “See? We don’t need to put the Chairman in the chain of command — he’s there.”

*General John A. Wickham, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army.*