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The Role of the Joint Chiefs after the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act
Robert T. Herres

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The Role of the Joint Chiefs After the 1986 Defense Reorganization Act

Robert T. Herres

General Herres is the first Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he has held since 1987. Previously, he was the first Commander in Chief of the unified U.S. Space Command; at the same time, he served as Commander in Chief of both the North American Aerospace Defense Command and its U.S. component, Aerospace Defense Command, and as Commander of the Air Force Space Command. Prior to that, he was Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Herres has also commanded the Air Force Communications Command, Eighth Air Force, and served as Chief of the Flight Crew Division with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program. He has held numerous other posts in the fields of intelligence, communications, and systems development and acquisition.

Oettinger: I have particularly great pleasure in introducing today’s speaker, who first met with us some years ago when he was what is now the J-6 in the Pentagon. From there he went to being CINCSPACE and CINCNORAD and he is now, as you know, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. In the letter that I wrote him, I said that I’d count on his focusing on whatever facet of the world is uppermost in his mind from his vantage points at the Pentagon, the new National Security Council structures that this administration has established, and his past responsibilities, as I always find it particularly fascinating to get views from the different perspectives that a particular friend of these seminars has gone through. As usual, the session is very informal — as much give and take as General Herres might be willing to tolerate — and he tells me he is willing to have questions as he goes along, so you need not wait till he’s finished his prepared remarks.

With that, it’s a pleasure to welcome you back.

Herres: Thank you very much, Tony. It’s fun to come up here and I appreciate the opportunity to have a little dialogue with your students. I need to be in Boston every once in a while, and coming over here, answering your call, is useful to me because I find out about what’s on people’s minds outside the Beltway. We can get tunnel vision inside the Beltw from time to time, especially inside the Pentagon. Any questions we get when we’re away from there and I don’t get away as much as I would like to, do help us keep things in perspective.

I thought I’d talk a little bit about the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and try to put it in a larger scheme of things for you. If I spend more than about 20 minutes on this, outside of questions, then it’s probably too long.

I’m not going to talk about Title IV at all. You all know a lot about Title IV and you can easily get bogged down on that subject. I’d like to talk about the law in its broader context, to put it in a context how this country has chosen to organize itself over the years for national defense, and maybe in that way put the new law into perspective.

Goldwater-Nichols is having a profound effect on how the Department of Defense and our national security structured organization functions. It affects how we deal with the White House, how we deal with the State Department, and with other agencies around town. A lot of these are effects that one might not have predicted, or perhaps serendipitous results depending on your viewpoint, but they are effects that I think are important for everyone to
understand, certainly students of your stature and caliber.

Please feel free to interrupt me if there is something I’m talking about that you don’t understand. If you have broader questions, however, then it would be a good idea to hold them up until we get through with this little discussion of Goldwater-Nichols and we’ll deal with your concerns along with the other questions. Then I thought after that we’d just talk about whatever’s on your minds, as the questions you ask might focus my attention.

Let me start talking about organization for national defense. It’s been a subject of great debate for a long time; it always is. Here (figure 1) are recent studies that got a lot of publicity and led to Goldwater-Nichols in one way or another. Each made its contribution: the Steadman and the Rice studies; Don Rice led RAND for a number of years and is the new Secretary of the Air Force designate. Jim Locher is on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Of course, David Packard’s commission had a major influence because of his influence with the President. What all this led to was a reorganization act which increased the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and increased the influence of the Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands. There were a lot of other things, but those are the most important things the law did. If you ask members of Congress who voted for the law, but who were not deeply involved in drafting it, what they thought Goldwater-Nichols did, they’d probably give one of those two answers and maybe if you were lucky you might get both.

As I say, it did a lot of other things. There are a lot of spinoffs from all this. Increasing the influence of the CINC’s is not something you just write into a law and it happens. You have to make some changes in the system. The same thing is true about increasing the roles and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Again, you can’t just say, all right, we’ll write a law and it will say that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have more influence than he did before. You’ve got to make some real structural changes in the bureaucracy in order for these two things actually to happen. That’s what Goldwater-Nichols is all about and that’s what Goldwater-Nichols did. Title IV, which I promised not to talk about, created joint specialty officers and joint duty assignments and a complex system of joint personnel management for the simple purpose of contributing toward those two ends. Even Title IV is not an end unto itself; it is a means of getting to these objectives. So that’s a little bit of background.

I think it would be useful to take Goldwater-Nichols and put it against the background of history. In this country, we’ve always thought that fragmentation of military control of our armed forces was a good idea. The country grew out of a political environment that was largely influenced, of course, by European experience, and autocratic control of the

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**DOD Management Studies**

- Steadman – 1978
- Rice – 1979
- Locher – 1985
- Packard – 1986

**Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986**

- Increased roles/responsibilities of the Chairman, JCS
- Increased influence of the CINCs

*Figure 1. Management Studies of DOD*
military led to autocratic governments and all of the things I don’t need to give a lecture on. But the important thing is that there’s always been in this country an instinctive rejection of the idea that there ought to be any single individual with total and complete control of the armed forces in the United States, other than the person that the Constitution says should be the Commander in Chief, and that of course is the President, who has to go before the electorate every four years and get a renewal, and he can only do that once.

So even in the earliest of times, you had a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy; we had fragmentation of our armed forces. In the early times, leading up to World War II, it was recognized that there had to be some coordination between the Army and the Navy other than between the two Secretaries and these two departments had to talk to each other about a number of things (figure 2). As the technologies changed over the years the need for a Joint Board became evident, and that was probably the first bureaucratic step toward jointness, but the fragmentation was always preserved.

But things got hard to manage in World War II and the British recognized this; they’d been in the war a little bit longer than we had. And so, with British influence and because we were working so closely with the British in the war, we fashioned together an informal system which was never prescribed in statute (figure 3). There are some interesting facets to that that you could talk about also. As we research this, and some interesting books have recently been written, it’s very clear that the President jealously guarded his role as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces during World War II, and he wasn’t interested in having his chiefs of the services, Admiral King and General Marshall, report to him through someone else. He really wanted them to report directly to him.

Presidents have tended in wartime or in times of crisis to want to deal directly with military commanders. During the Civil War, Lincoln had a little bit of a problem with Stanton and Stanton tried to get in the middle a lot. Lincoln didn’t always want that; he was a politician too, and politicians tend to

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Figure 2. National Defense Prior to World War II
Joint Chiefs of Staff

President

Prime Minister

Combined Chiefs of Staff

Secretary of War

Secretary of the Navy

Army Forces

Naval Forces

Figure 3. The National Defense Establishment During World War II (Ad Hoc)

As the war drew to a close it became clear that we were going to win and that joint and combined operations were the way wars would be fought in the future. So there was massive interest in making some changes in how we were organized; the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy setup wasn’t going to work any more.

Student: Is it also fair, General, to say that there were also some joint commands established in World War II that were very effective?

Herres: Exactly right. In fact, the best of our leadership, General Eisenhower in particular, had said we’re never going to be able to fight wars effectively in the future without joint operations, joint task forces, and in fact joint commands. Probably the single most exacerbating situation in the war was the campaign in the Pacific, where you had Admiral Nimitz running the Central Pacific campaign and General MacArthur running the Southern Pacific campaign, and from the viewpoint of a lot of people you had a lot of unnecessary competition for resources between the two, and the objectives of one might not necessarily be coordinated with the objectives of the other. There are lots of stories about all

competes with one another sometimes, so he tried to deal directly with McClellan and that was frustrating. There were all kinds of interesting stories. The point is that this special role that the President has enjoyed because of the Constitution has had an interesting influence.

Jointness was strengthened by the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was first put together so we could work better with the British joint structure which preceded ours. In order to work in this Combined Chiefs of Staff environment we had to have something within our own government and with our own structure that was joint so we could deal with them jointly. We couldn’t have our Naval staffs and Army staffs deal directly with this combined environment; all kinds of problems would have been created there, and I suppose some of them actually took place. So the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an institution that grew out of the necessity to figure out how to deal in the Combined Chiefs of Staff world more than anything else. You can maybe say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were a serendipitous result of this structure here. So that’s how things operated in World War II. Again, as I said, that was not codified.
that too. But under both commands, there were joint organizations and joint forces. MacArthur had his fleet, and Nimitz had, of course, predominantly the Naval forces and the Marine Corps. He had very little Army under him at the time, I guess.

So all of that stirred up the debate and people said we need to unify our armed forces, but there was always a note of caution in the background. If you unify the armed forces, that means somebody’s going to be in charge. Well, do we want anybody in charge of all of our armed forces other than the President? And is it practical? You obviously can’t unify them under the President himself; he’s got the rest of the government to run too. So how do you do that?

Oettinger: Before you go on, you have taken the argument against unification as being principally that sort of constitutional or anti-Prussian argument. What about the notion that the argument for separateness is not just a constitutional or political one, but one of effectiveness that says that the environments and the missions are sufficiently different that you need to have separate and distinct things because if you make it all one thing you get succoash. Did that have force in your mind, or does it still?

Herris: Let me come to that. It does very much in my mind. I’m glad you brought that up because I’ll emphasize that at the appropriate time. I tried to emphasize that a little bit but I didn’t get a chance to expand on it this morning when I was talking to those guys over at the editorial board because of the time. I think it’s very relevant to a major issue that’s in front of us right now. That is this stampede for a single defense procurement agency to create “acquisition reform” which is a bankrupt, dumb idea, and the country will pay dearly for it in the long run if we ever try to do that. I’m tired of hearing people tell us about how wonderful the French experience is, because the French don’t build anything any better than we do and most things not nearly as well. Yet people use them as a model. But that’s a good point to discuss.

Here we are at this convergence of these issues. While the Constitution doesn’t say we’ve got to have fragmentation of military power, this is an instinctive American tradition and we’re never going to let there be an autonomous military authority in this country. It’s the rejection of royalty and that form of government and so forth.

In 1947 the outcome of the great debate which led up to the National Security Act of 1947 was the creation of a National Military Establishment (figure 4).
It wasn’t called the Department of Defense right away. It did create the Secretary of Defense and, as we do so often, we had to get someone to move over to give somebody authority so that we were not walking into a power vacuum. It’s hard to get somebody to move over, so we had four members of the Cabinet involved in national defense. There were three Service Secretaries, because now we’d created the Air Force as a separate branch from the Army air forces, and we created the Secretary of Defense who’s supposed to coordinate all this. We didn’t have quite enough courage to say in 1947 that we ought to put one guy in charge and have the other guys report through him.

But a couple of years later, it was pretty clear that that wasn’t going to work and that you can’t do everything all at once. So the amendments of 1949 brought us the Department of Defense (figure 5) in place of the National Military Establishment. The three Service Secretaries, with a lot of heartburn and bleeding and so forth, were taken out of the Cabinet. They still get 19 gun salutes, they still are accorded certain recognition that no other people of their level throughout the government like the Under Secretaries or Secretaries in any other department are accorded, but they are not Cabinet members. They are the heads of these three military departments. Note that: you take it for granted, but they are still called departments, and none of the other suborganizations in the government are called departments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established as a formal institution in Title 10 and roles were assigned to them. They became the principal military advisers, statutorily, of the Secretary of Defense and the President, principally the President.

That was the structure in 1949 and that was the way it was until 1958. Now if I were to give a different slant on this lecture, it would be an interesting thing to put the President up here and talk in each case about his relationship with the commanders out in the field and his Commander in Chief’s role. I think some interesting papers have been done on the subject of the President as the Commander in Chief. Here (figure 5) you have the forces reporting through the Service Secretaries. Now we’re getting closer to what Goldwater-Nichols is all about. You don’t have this direct relationship between the Secretaries, who are still operationally and otherwise in control of the forces. In the Korean conflict, you had a funny relationship because the President was out here, and what was his relationship, say, with a guy...
like MacArthur in Korea? Harry Truman did exercise his authority as Commander in Chief, as you know. But behind all that there’s this complication here. Each Service Secretary is a politician, remember. They’re political appointees, yes, but they’re also politicians. That’s why they got appointed. So they’re people who are competing for the limelight and a role in government, and influence, and a larger career, etc., etc.

So you’ve got that situation till 1958. When Barry Goldwater talked about the importance of Goldwater-Nichols he said that Goldwater-Nichols is the single most important piece of defense legislation since 1958. Well, I would argue that before the dust settles maybe it is the single most important of all of them, but maybe not. When you put all this in context even the 1949 change is pretty significant: it took the Service Secretaries out of the Cabinet, and that wasn’t an easy thing to do.

But here we are in 1958. In 1958 the law created the Commanders in Chief. Now, President Eisenhower pretty much was the architect conceptually of the 1958 amendments. I think that’s why Barry Goldwater refers to it the way he does. But what it did is, it formalized, and literally codified, that there are two chains of command (figure 6). Now a lot of people might ignore that, but Goldwater-Nichols has reinforced it. One chain of command is an operational chain of command; the other chain of command is a resource management chain. They don’t come together till you get out in the field and the military department component commands, which had the responsibility as military department commands, provide forces which are trained, equipped, organized, administered, and acquired by the military departments to the commander in chief of a combatant command for employment. The only legal chain of command for employment of forces is from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, through a chain of communication from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

There are 10 combatant commands. To review them quickly, because it has been a little bit of a moving train in the last 3 or 4 years, there are five area commands, or the commands which have areas of responsibility. They are all unified commands. The largest of course is European Command, the next largest is Atlantic Command, and the third in size is Pacific Command. Then there’s Southern Command, and the fifth one is Central Command. Then you have another unified command which is sort of a functional command, Transportation Com-

mand — a new unified command. Then you have another sort of functional command, Special Operations Command. Another functional command is unique because it does worry about an area in a sense — Space Command. But space is a place and not a mission, and there’s this little problem of relationship between functions. Space is certainly not an area of responsibility. Then you have two specified commands: Forces Command, the commander of which dual-hats as the Army military component commander, and SAC, Strategic Air Command, the other functional command whose commander also dual-hats as his military department component.

Each of those unified commanders has military department components, some of which are dual-hatted at lesser levels than major commands in their own military departments. For example, Southern Command’s Air Force component is the Twelfth Air Force Commander in Tactical Air Command, Central Command’s Air Force component is Ninth Air Force Command, and there are other examples around. These component commanders have the responsibility of providing those forces, but they’re in the operational chain of command because they also wear an operational hat and direct those forces under the direction of their unified commander.

Now, this was kind of fuzzy over the years. There was not as clean a gap as this chart (figure 6) would indicate from 1958 until Goldwater-Nichols, and Congress was unhappy with some of those relationships. There was a great tendency for the military departments actually to do operational things with these forces. All of the forces were not always assigned to one of the combatant commanders, and so occasionally they would be operationally controlled by the military departments. In some cases it was even organized that way. Military Airlift Command was not made a specified command in this structure until some years after the 1958 amendments, yet Military Airlift Command was a very operational command. So what we had, in effect, was a military department with an operational responsibility because there was no chain of operational direction in Military Airlift Command from the President through the SECDEF down through a CINC to the forces in the field. The chain had to be this way because that commander only had one boss, the Secretary of the Air Force through the Chief of Staff. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that Military Airlift Command ought to do something, this would be the route that they would use. I just use that as one example; there are a lot of them.
One of the things that Goldwater-Nichols did that people don’t notice very much, but is a very important feature of Goldwater-Nichols, is it said that all forces — not some or most or predominantly — but all forces must be assigned to a combatant commander, and “assigned” means that combatant commander has sole operational command — not just control, but command — of those forces. It also forced us to define clearly what “operational command” means. So we have now a much clearer definition of operational command and operational control. Incidentally, those definitions are written in JCS publications which we are required to submit to the Congress for review. They’re watching us very closely over there and exercising their constitutional authority diligently.

Oettinger: If I may just underscore one point, these definitions of command and control in the sense that General Herres has just used them are a different usage from the more technical usages, such as when folks talk about command and control systems. It’s like almost two different languages using the same words, and it’s the source of an enormous amount of confusion in writing — public, private, military, and civilian — on this subject. It’s important to keep them crystal clear and distinct.

Herres: That’s unfortunate, I might add, having spent a number of years in the command and control business, because we allowed the command and control business to stray away from the discipline. They ought not to be separate definitions. There ought not to be these deviations.

A little aside in that regard: some years ago, when I was on the Air Staff in the late 1970s, there was an effort to try to define the term “C3” and put the definition into JCS Pub 2. When that was being coordinated the definition had been drafted and was being floated amongst the services for JCS action. I was the Director of Command and Control for the Air Force and I wouldn’t coordinate on it. I said, “This is ridiculous, we have a definition for command and control and it’s a good definition; it’s in JCS Pub 2 and it’s withstood the test of time. Why do we need the definition for a separate term when we add the word communications to it?” I mean, pretty soon we’re going to have to have definitions for every permutation or combination of two or three words in the English language.” Really what we had was peo-
ple who wanted to write a definition which would serve their own functional and bureaucratic purposes, and those kinds of things can happen.

As it turned out, and I couldn’t believe that a lowly two-star could do anything like that, we did stop trying, and people thought better of the whole idea. We had some allies in the Navy, which we didn’t always have on all those kinds of issues, and they thought it was a bad idea too. So we killed the whole idea. I just used that as an example of how definitions can really become important. In the command and control world, unfortunately, people have had opportunities to go off and define things outside a broader context. There are some efforts to get things back on track and I hope we get some discipline into that business. Frank Snyder is doing some good work in that regard.

Note again (in figure 6) there’s this dual chain of command, the fragmentation of military authority. There’s only one person who commands all aspects of military forces. Here, on the right of the chart, is where the money is and where force structuring is, and on the left is where the programming and the operational control are. The Secretary of Defense and his staff, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1958 through 1986, made the decisions that pulled all of this together. But, as I said, things weren’t working as well as the Congress would have liked, and there were some exceptions that would allow people to end run the basic principles of this system. I used Military Airlift Command as one example; I could use a number of examples in all these services.

The Congress was also unhappy because they felt that there was far too much authority over here with the services, far more than there was on the other side, and that the CINCs didn’t have enough influence on operational requirements or on resource allocations in particular. They also felt that the best quality people were making their careers over on the service side of the house, and the operational side was not doing as well in that regard, and that’s where Title IV came from. These commanders in the field were more beholden to the services than to the operational side, and the people who worked in the operational community knew that their careers were going to be made in the services. So there were these kinds of problems too. Congress wanted to get this whole thing balanced up again and that’s what Goldwater-Nichols is all about.

There are others that would go further. I would argue that we have a good balance. It’ll be at least two or three years before we’ll really know for sure, but I think I have as good and as unbiased a look at the whole thing as anybody. I went to the Naval Academy, my brother spent 30 years in the Army (he went to West Point), and of course I’ve spent a career in the Air Force, and I’ve had a fair amount of joint duty. My first joint duty was as a captain. So I think I can be pretty objective. I’m not going back to the Air Force any more, so I don’t owe them any more allegiance.

Let me talk specifically about some of the things that Goldwater-Nichols did to balance these things, and then I’ll see what your questions are. That (figure 6) is my stovepipe chart, and that’s really the most important thing I can tell you about. That chart describes how we work, and it’s important.

One of the things that people worried about when Goldwater-Nichols was structured is what’s going to happen to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For obvious reasons, the Chiefs, corporatly to a man, opposed Goldwater-Nichols, particularly the features that would take them out of being the principal military advisers. Many argued that the Chiefs and the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were going to be emasculated. Pretty soon they’d just be sending their Vice Chiefs to the JCS meetings; they wouldn’t even bother to go themselves because they wouldn’t have any influence anyway, and they couldn’t be wasting their time down there when they had more important things to do. So they said the Congress was really making a big mistake. That, among other things, was the essence of their argument.

I argue that the role of the JCS has not been emasculated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the only people in the Pentagon who have a foot on both sides of those camps that I showed you in the chart. They’re the only people who are in both stovepipes. I’m not in both stovepipes; the Chairman is not in both stovepipes; we’re on the left side of that chart. But the Chief is the Chief of Staff of his service, and he is extraordinarily influential, especially right now when they don’t have any really working Secretaries. All the commanders report through them to their Secretaries, and on the operational side they are the Chairman’s most important advisers. The law still protects their role to provide separate advice; in fact, they have a responsibility to provide separate advice when they disagree with the advice that the Chairman provides the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President. We’ll talk about the Chairman’s role in that regard. So their advisory role is not completely emasculated; it certainly was diminished, but they still play this big role.
This chart (figure 7) simply shows that they have a foot in both camps and shows how things are organized in the Pentagon. What’s also different here is that the Joint Staff now works for the Chairman; they don’t work for the corporate JCS. Previously, the law said that the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff direct and manage the Joint Staff on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I can tell you as a former director on the Joint Staff during that era that working for a committee is not a lot of fun. One of the most onerous things about being on the Joint Staff was you were working for a committee. You do a staff action in a controversial issue, you take it in there, you brief it, and there are these five guys sitting around the table giving you guidance, and they don’t all see eye-to-eye on this controversial issue. Obviously, if it’s a simple issue, it’s a piece of cake, but you wouldn’t need Lieutenant Generals to be your directors if they were all simple issues. So you have these guys giving you guidance, and you walk out of the room and you say “What the hell am I supposed to do now?” because now you’ve got five different versions of what you ought to do. The most difficult job in the whole building was that of the Director, because he had to pull the stuff all together. Now it’s a lot simpler. You get your guidance from one guy. You get a lot of advice, but that’s okay; we want their advice.

With its 1600 people, the Joint Staff can’t do all of the things it has to do, and should do, for the Secretary of Defense. We’re in too complicated a business. There’s too much expertise out there required to do the job, and we need to draw on the services and the service staffs. Our vehicle for doing that is the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So we still have joint actions, but really the joint action is more procedural for getting advice from the services than it is for getting service approval, although we still have a lot of procedures left over from the old days where people think they’re working in the approval/non-approval environment. I can tell you, however, we’ve not had a paper purpled since Goldwater-Nichols. We have never had a Chief who had to go offer his advice separately or offer a dissenting memorandum. We had a couple of close calls, but the fact that the Chairman has the final say causes people to think twice about offering a dissenting opinion because they know they’re going to be
out there on their own. It’s not like the old days where you could hide under the corporate umbrella. So much for emasculation of the Chiefs. It hasn’t happened, whatever people might say.

We thought we’d throw in this quotation from the law (figure 8) just so you can read it. Among other things that’s what Goldwater-Nichols is. It is other things besides that. So you can see that Title IV, Joint Personnel Management, is just one of many different aspects of Goldwater-Nichols.

**Oettinger:** Is my memory correct that the CINCs now have the authority to ask for a court-martial for somebody who is under their command, and this was not possible before?

**Herres:** I think it would have been possible, only now they have the authority to make it happen, whereas before they had to ask for it to happen. In most cases they’ll transfer the jurisdiction to their component, but they don’t have to. What Congress is really after is to make sure the CINC has court-martial authority over his component commanders. Their argument was, how can the CINC really be a commander in chief if he can’t court-martial the people reporting to him? It is hard to answer that question, so they fixed it so he could. Not that anybody wanted to do that, but there were some times in World War II when probably some CINCs would have liked to have court-martialed a couple of guys, and I know there were some times in the Civil War when some generals would have liked to court-martial some people who worked for them, but that was a different story.

Let me turn briefly to some other provisions of the legislation. Title I is general, and doesn’t say much that has any great long range significance. Title II (figure 9) is the part of the act that covers military commanders’ advice. I’ve alluded to these but I thought I’d put these up and summarize it. Regarding the role of the Chairman: he’s now the principal military adviser to the President, to the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Now the Secretary of State, interestingly enough, draws on this. George Shultz used to draw on it heavily. He used to say, “You are my principal military adviser because I am one of the four principals on the National Security Council, and if I want to talk to you I should be able to do that.” Now Caspar Weinberger didn’t always think that was a good idea, but he felt he could invite the Chairman over for lunch and ask about a few things. And when there were differences between the Defense Department and the State Department on arms controls issues, which was not infrequent, both during the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty) development and particularly during some of the development of START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), he would do that. I get calls all the time from Paul Nitze and Max Kampelman to come over and have lunch, breakfast, whatever, and we trade ideas. It made a lot of people nervous in OSD because they felt we ought to be working through the Secretary all the time. Every once in a while I had to remind them that the Chairman has a statutory role and responsibility, and the Secretary of State is part of the National Security Council. We used to have breakfast with Secretary Shultz. Breakfast got to be the easiest way to do it. At least we always had some session with him before each one of the ministerials when he and Shevardnadze would announce they were meeting each other once a month during his latter days at the State Department.

**Oettinger:** The Vice President is in the same position, is he not? Has he exercised his prerogative?

*An Act to reorganize the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning, to provide for...*

**Figure 8. DOD Reorganization Act, Goldwater-Nichols**

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Role of the Chairman, JCS:
- Principal military adviser to NCA
- Oversees activities of the CINC's, spokesman for and channel of communication to the CINC's
- Directs Joint Staff

Role of the Vice Chairman, JCS:
- Extends the influence of the Chairman and the JCS
- Continuity

Role of the Combatant Commanders:
- Increased operational authority
- Resource allocation influence

Figure 9.
DOD Reorganization Act, 1986 — Title II: Military Advice and Command Functions

Herres: Not yet, but he probably will. George Bush did. He would invite somebody over to ask some questions, probably more in a context of getting himself up to speed on some issue than as a member of the National Security Council, but he had a right to do that. Remember the National Security Council is the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense, only those four people. It's not Ollie North. The National Security Adviser organizes the agenda and is the executive secretary of the National Security Council. He's not on the National Security Council as a member. The Chairman and the Director of Central Intelligence are the statutory advisers. So you have six people who are at all the meetings by law — seven because the National Security Adviser is the executive secretary. Then the President can invite such other participants as he might wish whose duties are relevant to the issue. The Attorney General is almost always there; he's got the FBI, and national security is a lot bigger than just the Department of Defense. Frequently Commerce is involved in the issue. ACDA (the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) frequently participates, and the Secretary of the Treasury is almost always there because economic policies are very important to national security.

Student: Are you equating in some sense the National Security Council with the National Command Authority?

Herres: We built this chart (figure 9) this way to make it simple. Actually the National Command Authority is defined only by the Department of Defense. It's not defined in any statute.

Student: There is no statutory basis for defining the NCA?

Herres: That's right. It's a Department of Defense Directive which Tom Reed put together back in the days where there was a lot of confusion and he tried to bring some order out of chaos. It's been in existence ever since. The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary in case of his absence are the National Command Authority. But that is in the DOD Directive. It's not codified in law.

Student: Can the President, in his role as Commander in Chief, unilaterally modify the makeup of the NCA?

Herres: Yes, because he's defined what it is, and it's used only within the administration, and in the department, to establish procedures and delegate responsibilities and authorities and so forth. He can't do anything that he's not allowed to do by law.

Student: The NCA has direct command authority over the CINC's, am I correct?

Herres: That's right, because the Secretary of Defense is the chain of command. He is statutorily in the chain of command.
Student: He has statutory authority as Secretary of Defense, and not as an element of the NCA?

Herres: What we’ve done is defined the NCA to conform with the law.

Student: I guess what I’m getting at is that the President could not unilaterally decide that he wanted someone other than the Secretary of Defense to issue operational commands to the CINCs.

Herres: Exactly, because the law would not allow that. We use this term “National Command Authority” to simplify things so people won’t get confused. We had people referring to the National Command Authority, before we had the term, as “the Commander in Chief or the President, or the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary in the absence of the Secretary,” and people became confused. So it became simpler in all our directives to refer to the statutory authority to direct and control the forces as the National Command Authority. We really would be in violation of that concept if we did it any other way. The Deputy Secretary is by DOD definition part of the National Command Authority in the absence of the Secretary, as is the Vice President in the disability or inability of the President.

Student: But he does not have independent authority except for the incapacitation of the Secretary?

Student: It was my impression that the NCA was defined as the Secretary of Defense and the President, but I understand what you’re saying is that the principals who would act in those roles are also included.

Herres: It’s a little bit different in the case of the relationship between the Vice President and President, because in that case the Vice President would have no authority unless there were disability to the President. But it’s not the Secretary of State, contrary to the views of some Secretaries of State; it’s only the Vice President.

A deputy is a little different than a vice. A deputy can be in the chain of command. The Deputy Secretary of Defense can send directives out within the scope of whatever responsibilities and authorities are delegated to him by the Secretary. The Secretary can delegate authority to him, and he does send out directives. But normally, we almost never send out operational directives over his signature. Actually, the Secretary doesn’t send them out. The Chairman and I send them out. We say “The Secretary of Defense has approved.” We carry them up there, tell him about it, he reads them if he wants to, we brief him on anything significant that we care about, and we meet with him every day and collect those things. If they’re complicated we run them through the staff action and so forth. So we actually send them out under provisions that I’ll show you in the next chart.

Oettinger: What happened to the pre-Goldwater-Nichols DOD Directive language that said, “the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs...”?

Herres: That was not in the law. That was in the Directive.

These roles (figure 10) are all self-explanatory. For all practical purposes, this is statutory, but the law does assign that the Joint Staff is the Chairman’s staff. This is an enabling feature in the law. The law allows the President and the Secretary to delegate to the Chairman the authority to oversee the activity of the CINCs. A President could withdraw that authority and he and the Secretary could reserve that to themselves. It also allows the President and the Secretary to designate the Chairman as being in the chain of communication to the Commanders in Chief. It does say that the Chairman must be the spokesperson for the CINCs, represent the CINCs, and so forth, and so on. It establishes other relationships between the Chairman and the CINCs. Two important features that are enabling features of the law, but not required by the law, are the oversight function and the chain of communications function.

My role under the law is to perform the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman, participate in JCS meetings (of course, I chair them when he’s gone because that’s part of performing the functions of the Chairman in the absence or disability of the Chairman), and perform such other duties as the Chairman and Secretary of Defense shall prescribe. That’s it, which is good because the law doesn’t say that I shall be the guy that’s doing acquisition management matters for the Chairman and this, that, and the other thing. It allows the Chairman and the Vice Chairman to work out which things each one is going to look at and review, and it depends on their personalities and experiences and interests. The chemistry will help things out.
As I tried to explain, I tried for a long time to find some simple way of saying “What is it I really do?” The Chairman’s got such broad responsibilities. I’ve just summarized them: when we started to draft the JCS Pub that lists his responsibilities, there were 58 paragraphs with different responsibilities that the Chairman has. You go through all the DOD Directives, and there’s a stack of charts that outline what the responsibilities are which we show to some audiences to try and dazzle them and make sure that they know we aren’t kidding when we say he really does have these responsibilities. If you look at the list, they’re not trivial. Some of them are only things that have to be done maybe once a year or once every two years or something like that, but they’re not trivial. It’s a heterogeneous assortment of responsibilities.

The point is, the Chairman is up to his ears in things to do. This makes a big difference. He’s not just chairman of a committee. It’s a lot different when it sounds like “Gee, you’re going to be the principal military adviser. You don’t have to worry about those other guys anymore. You can provide your own good advice.” That’s a two-edged sword. It’s great when it’s good advice, but when it’s bad advice, you’re out there all by yourself and you know you’re going to be out there all by yourself. So you think a lot about that advice, and you think about every issue and every National Security Council meeting very, very carefully. So there’s the double edge.

There are a lot of things the Chairman needs to do that he just doesn’t have time to do. Representing the CINC’s in defining requirements to keep the acquisition process going in the right direction is one of the most important roles he has. He represents the CINC’s at the Defense Resources Board (DRB) meetings to make sure that the CINC’s’ priorities are being observed in the allocation of resources. The Chairman doesn’t have time to do it. He goes to some Defense Resources Board meetings, but only when the really huge decisions are being made. I go to all of them. Somebody’s got to go who has four stars. Someone close to him has got to represent him. Before my position was established we didn’t really have anybody at those meetings. We’d have to send one of the directors, but he always had a narrow focus that he had to broaden quickly and temporarily, and it really didn’t work. So I go to all of those.

That’s what I mean when I say I extend the influence of the Chairman out in all those areas where time doesn’t allow him to participate. He’s tied up just chairing JCS meetings, and attending the NSC meetings, and doing the formal things that he can’t avoid. Today he’s hosting Sir David Craig, the Chief of the Defense Staff from the United Kingdom. Last week he was over at NATO with the Secretary at the meeting of the Defense Council Nuclear Planning Group.
All day Tuesday he was over on the Hill with Secretary Cheney. You don’t have to cite many examples like that to figure out how many meetings there are of boards and councils and other activities where he should be officially represented, but which he can’t attend, before you realize that somebody has to extend his influence.

Oettinger: Let me use your comment, if I may, about the Defense Resources Board. During the debate over the Goldwater-Nichols Act, General Vessey, if I recollect correctly, asserted rather strongly that the legislation was unnecessary because the Chairman had enough authority to do all the things that made the legislation necessary. You’ve pointed out that in something like the Defense Resources Board a four-star who doesn’t have to go back to the Air Force had more clout than a two-star director who might be going back to his service. So was Vessey wrong?

Herres: You ought to get General Vessey up here. I worked for General Vessey when he was Chairman, I was one of his directors, and we’ve always gotten along just great. I worked for him as a CINC, too. We worked very closely in putting U.S. Space Command together. I think if you got General Vessey to let his hair down, he’d admit that he was wrong in some of those arguments. It would have been hard at that time to foresee how the world was going to change. I see him all the time; we chat quite often. It’s helpful to chat with him because General Vessey is a very practical guy, and very, very perceptive. He gave me good advice, but I think he would admit that he was not right. I have disagreed with him at times and I still disagree with those arguments to this day. He was wedded to the idea that a good Chairman doesn’t need the law, and a bad Chairman isn’t going to do any better with a law than he would without it. I say a good Chairman is going to do a lot better with the law. We need the law.

Student: Would you agree that one of the unstated roles of the Chairman, rather than the collective Chiefs, is to be responsible for strategic and contingency planning? The planning is really done by the CINCs and this establishes a continuing relationship between the Chairman and the CINCs. It’s not command.

Herres: That’s a major part of this responsibility here. I will admit to you if you promise you won’t tell anybody on the Hill, because they’re always looking for something that we haven’t done, that if there is one single area where we’ve made the least progress under Goldwater-Nichols where we have more authority and the tools to do it, it’s in better and closer surveillance and oversight of the conscious war planning. We’ve improved our systems and we’ve gotten a lot better at contingency planning and so forth. We just flat haven’t had time for more. We just have been too busy. You can only do so much in 12-hour days. You can make those 12-hour days longer, but you can only do that for so long. If we hadn’t had the Persian Gulf and some other things come along...

This time last year, we were spending probably 20 or 30 percent of our time on arms control. When you build that arms control agreement there are a lot of i’s to dot and a lot of t’s to cross. We need to weigh in on every one of those issues to make sure the State Department negotiators don’t do something dumb. They want us to. We had to take an independent position. There were lots of NSC meetings on the hard issues, because we had both the wrapping up of INF and continuation of START. There was that much. All I’m trying to say is we’ve got a lot of work to do here. That’s my fault. That’s one of the things I’m supposed to be doing. I just haven’t gotten to it.

What I’d like to do is structure a way for us to review the plans with two objectives. The first and most important is to identify materiel deficiencies, either new systems or readiness or sustainment issues, so that we can do a better job here. It’s the right vehicle for getting the CINC to influence resource management and resource allocation better. It’s the right way to develop the right kinds of requirements documentation to send to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to get new programs started. It’s the right way to find out if the plan makes sense. We’re going through a lot of changes in the planning structure, and we’re building the joint operational planning system, and a lot of things are going on there. It will probably be another year before we start doing this.

Oettinger: I think perhaps you’ve been too modest in underscoring the enormous significance of those last lines, because that whole notion that the Chairman or Vice Chairman should be doing this is mind boggling in the context of pre-Goldwater-Nichols where that would not have been written down. You had the Service Chiefs arguing for things having to do with the services and you couldn’t get anybody even sort of to admit that that existed at that level. So the very notion that a four-star general could stand in this classroom and articulate those, in one sense, almost self-evident things which were never
articulated to me is an enormous indication of the significance of why that legislation was necessary.

**Herres:** That’s right. It’s hard for us to get across to people on the Hill how many unthinkable things we’re doing now. Four or five years ago, in General Vessey’s day, you couldn’t get a Joint Staff proposed strategic force structure into the Tank on a crane. The services would stonewall that and stop it at the operations deputies and just not let something like that go in there. It was the old Navy vs. Air Force piece of the strategic force structure. Well, we’ve done that. We’ve floated several force structures. Nobody liked any of them. They ridiculed them and they still say we said different things, but the point is, we got them in. We put them up on the board and we talked about them. We have good healthy conversations. There wasn’t any blood on the floor when we got through. The thing is, the Chiefs have to look at the world through different eyeglasses because either they get on the train or the train leaves without them. They know that. They know that if they are going to exert influence they have to do it in a different way. They have to do it with good sound arguments.

**Student:** A GAO (General Accounting Office) report released on 3 April this year, and you’re probably familiar with it, says the reorganization law requires the JCS Chairman to have the role of programming and budgeting plus giving advice to the Defense Secretary on the requirements and priorities of the operational Commanders in Chief. This has not occurred.

**Herres:** That is absolutely flat wrong. I just signed a letter the day before yesterday to tell GAO that is really wrong. From the day I walked into the Building two-and-a-half years ago, I have gone to every single Defense Resources Board meeting that’s been held. The Chairman has gone, as I said, to the ones where the CINCs and the Secretaries are involved, to many of them, not all of them, but I’ve gone to every single one of them. In fact, last year people used to say “God, you really had a good batting average on the issues that you weighed in on.” I didn’t really think it was quite as good as a lot of other people thought. It was gratifying that other people thought it, but unfortunately people over on the Hill haven’t seen that or understood that, and I don’t know why. I guess it’s because they want to see the world a bit differently. I know who wrote those words and I think they’re people who want more legislation, they want to make it look like things that are happening are not happening. But we are exerting a great deal of influence.

Secretary Cheney chaired all of the DRB meetings through this last chain. We’ve been through three iterations on this particular budget submission. First, building it under the previous administration. Second, modifying it, when President Bush decided that we should have no growth because we weren’t going to close the deficit gap enough, so we did that iteration, basically with the last administration because we didn’t have a new Secretary. Then Secretary Cheney came in and sort of on the fly he’s working the DRB over in the Building and he’s talking to Congress about some kind of top line which he knew would have to be lower than the zero percent growth that President Bush announced in the budget submission. So that was our third trip through. We were involved in every single one of those deliberations. After every DRB meeting, the Chairman and I would go in the Secretary’s office with a controller and the Director of PA&E (Program Acquisition and Evaluation). Even the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Under Secretary for Policy were not there. But the four of us were there with the Secretary when he made his final decisions on every issue. He agreed with us on some of them, and disagreed and ruled differently on others. Generally speaking, on every single issue that was really important, a real heartburn issue, he listened to the Chairman’s advice.

**Student:** I have a question about the power of the Chairman, in an instance such as the JPAN, which is the joint program assessment of the service POMs (Program Objective Memoranda). I was a Navy action officer on the last JPAN. At the time, in my opinion, it got watered down because we had to make all the Service Chiefs agree to it, and at that time there was a debate over whether that should be a Chairman’s memorandum.

**Herres:** Unquestionably, it should be. We’re going to have to change that. We’re going to have to, because actually the JPAN doesn’t have an influence anyway. I know. It’s very disheartening for the guys who did all the work on that JPAN, but it’s it’s never really had much influence because it arrives too late.

Going to the two-year budget cycle gives us an opportunity to do that whole process better. But I will tell you that is the single biggest problem we have, and the single biggest area of vulnerability to justifiable criticism from people on the Hill. The Brown-Schlesinger report pointed it out, and the GAO to some degree, though not quite as well. It has always been a problem in the Department of Defense that when you start with a national strategy, then go
to the national security strategy, then on to the national military strategy, each one of which is a subset of the preceding, and you work your way into the joint strategic planning system and lead up to the guidance that goes to the services to build the service POMs submissions for their budget proposals and the new five-year plan, you go through the area where we have the biggest weakness. The linkage between those critical guidance documents and the guidance is very, very weak. Now, the linkage is supposed to be the joint strategic planning system of which the JPAN of course is the final product. But that linkage is poor. We need to do a better job of getting a commander’s influence there. We’ve done a number of things, but basically we need to restructure. We need to do that ourselves.

We’ve got some things going. We’re going to change the name of the Joint Strategic Planning Document. It’s going to be a new document, more a name change than anything else, but what we’re going to try to do is develop a document that is resource constrained, as the Congress is always harping on us about, and gives the drafters of the defense guidance, the people up in the office of USD Policy, something really to sink their teeth into. Something like: how important is Indian Ocean presence to our national military strategy? Seven months out of the year versus 12 months out of the year, for example? From these broad sweeping areas that are in the national security strategy document that comes out of the White House, you have to get down to some specifics, like, “We want the Navy to have 13 carrier battle groups.” We just haven’t yet mastered how you get from one to the other. The Chairman and I talk about this. It’s a frustrating problem and we’re not going to solve it in the near term. Congress wants to see us just do that overnight. Every administration that I’ve ever had any work with has tried. They all changed the name of the guidance. They used to have two different guidance documents; the fiscal guidance was different from the other one. Harold Brown made it a consolidated guidance. Then they made it the defense guidance and that’s what we’ve got now.

Everybody badmouths the defense guidance. One thing you should remember about the CINCs, and people on the Hill forget this too, is that we can’t do everything every CINC wants us to do. There’s not enough money in the pot to do that, any more than there is to do everything that the services want us to do. You give CINCs all the authority they want and you have parochialism amongst ten guys, not four guys. Parochialism is always going to exist, so one of our jobs is to try and balance their legitimate needs with the legitimate needs of the services, and there are plenty on both sides.

I caught the Chairman one day when he was getting all upset because he gets these messages from the CINCs. He was fussing away because the CINCs are always saying the DG says XYZ, therefore I want you to support this program with vigor, etc., and here are all the good reasons, and so on and so on. If we keep doing everything the CINCs want to do with those hair-on-fire messages, we’ll never have any money. But we do have to listen. So he was all upset, he’d just gotten another one of these messages, and he was starting to get mad about it. I didn’t have any sympathy for him because I had read them all, he only reads part of them. I said, “Well, one thing you’ve got to remember, if you don’t think you’re going to like the answer, don’t ask the question. We asked them what their priorities were, we asked them what their deficiencies were, and they’re telling us. And the second thing you’ve got to remember is you can’t badmouth the defense guidance because your name is on it. You coordinate on it just like everybody else. You signed off on it, and we told you to sign off on it even though we didn’t like it.” It’s an imperfect document. That’s our single biggest weakness.

**Student:** You were talking about how busy the Chairman was. The Brown-Schlesinger report, *Making Defense Reform Work*, just came out recently, I think it was in November, and it talked about your position and the danger of it becoming too overburdened. Can you explain why they saw it as being that way?

**Herres:** There is a danger, because there’s always some guy cooking down the road who’s got a new problem. I can tell you an interesting story about what went on for about a week in the Pentagon when the drug thing became a big deal about a year ago and we thought we were going to get some really bad legislation. We got two bad pieces of legislation separately through each house, but fortunately what came out in the law was quite different and cooler heads prevailed. But there was a lot of talk about a drug czar. At some meeting held about 5:30 or 6:00 in the evening that the Secretary convened, the Chairman was gone somewhere and the three Service Secretaries were there, the four Chiefs were there, I was there, and three or four other guys from the OSD staff. They were just meditating on the working over we’d gotten that day on the Hill, about why we weren’t doing more in the drug interdiction
effort. This was a very unfriendly day, with two separate hearings: one the Chairman, the Secretary and I had had together, and the other one in the House with some other people. He turned to me and said, “Why don’t you become the drug czar?” It was just sort of a brainstorming session, about what are we going to do and how are we going to do it and so on and so on. I only use that as an example. In fact in the news media about two or three weeks after that they were referring to me. I was going to be the drug czar in the Department of Defense. Well, I could have been consumed overnight by that whole problem.

Something else will come up and somebody says, “Well, the Chairman can’t get into that, what about the Vice Chairman?” There’s a statute that says I should be on the Nuclear Weapons Council, which I am, and I can do that very well and it fits into these roles. But the Nuclear Weapons Council takes a lot of my time, especially since we’ve had two or three different faces in each of the other two positions. I’m the only guy who’s been on that Nuclear Weapons Council since it was born two years ago, believe it or not. It puts a little continuity there. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs has changed twice and the DDR&E (Deputy Director for Research and Engineering) had changed. I just use those as examples and I could go on. I’m already by directive the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, the Nuclear Weapons Council, and a number of other things.

So you can get consumed by that. There are some who think that we’d better be careful because we want the Vice Chairman to be able to be the Chairman when the Chairman’s gone, and not be so bogged down by these other things that he can’t be that too.

Participating in JCS meetings is a statutory responsibility. I interpret that broadly and the Chairman interprets that broadly. There were a lot of people anxious to see how that would work when I first walked in and sat down. What’s he really going to do? Sit there and shut up and wait for the Secretary or the Chairman to say something? Or is he going to participate just like the other four Chiefs? Well, I participated. I didn’t keep my mouth shut. When it was my turn to speak I spoke. I asked questions and I participated. The way I read it, if the law had meant for me to sit in there and observe so that I could be the Chairman when the Chairman was gone, it would have said “attend JCS meetings.” The Chairman read it the same way. So I participate as actively as, and in some issues more actively than, the other Chiefs if they are issues where I have a lot of background and experience, resource management issues, for example.

The big problem I have with my job is balancing these special responsibilities so that when I’m trying to extend the Chairman’s influence and relieve him of the workload, he doesn’t really get involved at all. He only wants to hear from me when there’s a big time problem he needs to weigh in on. Otherwise he expects me to weigh in with the Deputy Secretary, etc., etc., so he doesn’t even want to hear about it.

So I’ve got all those things to worry about, but I’ve got to keep track of what he’s doing, too, because he might be gone and then I’ve got to go to the National Security Council meeting to represent his views at a meeting when he was chairing the JCS and got his advice from the Chiefs on what position he was going to take. So you see the need for constant interaction, constant participation in the Chairman’s activities. I think some were fearful that the Vice Chairman can get bogged down if you’re not careful. I agree with that personally. We do have to be careful. The Chairman and I have been careful. I don’t know what’s going to happen when we’re gone and other guys are in there. They are really going to have to watch it. It’s a great temptation, if there’s not a whole lot going on right now, to say, “Have the Vice Chairman go.” He might be eager and willing to do that. Then all of a sudden some damn Iraqi airplane hits one of your ships in the Persian Gulf with a missile and you’ve got a big problem on your hands — 37 guys killed and the Chairman’s over in Europe, so if you have not been in tune with what’s going on in the rest of the world, suddenly you’re totally occupied with the things the Chairman would be doing. That’s exactly what happened; the Chairman was in Europe when the Stark got hit. So everything I was doing in other areas just stopped.

Now that can’t happen either. What we need to do is strengthen some of our joint positions. We need three-stars in every director’s position on the Joint Staff so that when I can’t do some of these things I can send a director to do them. The J-7 and the J-8 are the two who are most involved in the areas where I extend the influence of the Chairman exclusively, and both are two-stars, with a one-star deputy. I need a three-star J-7, a three-star J-8, when I can’t go to a Defense Acquisition Board meeting. Those other Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries up there don’t want a two-star or a one-star coming up there to represent me. They want at least a three-star. I remember when Gerry Dimenc was the Assistant Secretary for C3I he had a meeting one time where one
of the services was going to send a one-star to a
meeting and he wouldn’t let him in. “If service XYZ
is not interested enough in these issues to send a
three-star to this meeting, then we’ll proceed without
him” was his response. We were mad as hell, but I
think he did the right thing.

This is the last chart (figure 10) and this sort
of summarizes principal responsibilities of the Chair-
man. The other thing I mentioned is that the Chair-
man is the communication link to the National Com-
mand Authority and the combatant commanders. He
is responsible for oversight of the combatant com-
manders. He’s the spokesman for the CINCs, espe-
cially on operational issues, requirements issues, and
so forth. That’s a tall, tall order.

OK, I am ready for other questions.

**Oettinger:** One of the luxuries or obligations from
where I sit, since I have no responsibility at all, is to
keep poking ahead. And having thought about per-
versions of the excessive role of the services and
applauding what’s going on here, my sense is that,
given our propensity toward pendulum swings that
go too far, the seeds are already there for all these
good things to go too far in the direction of succo-
tash. I think in some of our conversations earlier you
corroborated that some of this procurement stuff that
says everything is homogenized may in fact go too
far, given that the air or the sea is not land, and be-
sides the constitutional issues there are some good
reasons for differentiating armed services because
the fighting environments are not the same. So I’m
wondering: is this make work on my part — the dis-
eased academic mind looking for things to do — or
is there some truth to it?

**Herrera:** I’m glad you brought that up for two rea-
sons. One of them is when we left, the guy said, “Do
you want to write a little piece for and do you
think it will be interesting for people to read?” This
would be a good subject to do that.

There are a lot of people who are still not through.
They want to destroy the military departments. They
think that the military departments are no longer
needed, they’ve outlived their usefulness. Some of
these people have thought that for a long time. Just
to illustrate how serious this thinking is, one of the
people who felt that way when he retired and during
that period of time was Bernie Rogers. *3 I don’t
know if he still feels this way; I’d like to chat with
him about it again. He even gave some pretty strong
testimony over on the Hill. He would do away with

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*General Bernard W. Rogers, USA (ret.), former U.S. Commander in
Chief, Europe.*

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the Secretaries of the military departments. What he
would actually do starts getting thin after he does
away with the Secretaries.

That’s where I have problems. I am on the exact
opposite end of that pole — exactly 180º away from
that. We need the military departments. The military
departments play a very, very important, useful role.
And that’s why I say that the stovepipe chart (figure
6) is the most important chart I brought here today.
Everybody just remember what that chart means.

Somebody’s got to do resource management. Some-
body’s got to do research and development, systems
acquisition, training, and logistics. You’ve got to go
out there and recruit people and train them, and
when you field the F-14, the logistics system that
supports that F-14 is not a trivial matter. I don’t care
what anybody says: it’s different in the Navy for
F-14s than for F-15s in the Air Force because they
operate in different environments. In the simplistic
critics’ mind an airplane is an airplane is an airplane.
An airplane in the Navy is a part of the damn aircraft
carrier. It really is. The logistics support structure
and the training structure that make that airplane
work, the way you manage the munitions, even the
way you design the munitions, to a large degree are
functions of the fact that it is a maritime piece of
equipment and has to operate in a maritime
environment.

I only say that to point out that if you didn’t have
those three military departments, you would have to
break up this huge infrastructure into some parts.
You could not manage it from the top without doing
that. There would have to be some work breakdown
structure. If you were starting with a clean sheet of
paper and you were thinking about what you were
doing, you’d probably say, “Well, we probably ought
to have maritime forces, and we probably ought to
have land-based air and space forces, and then we
probably ought to have somebody who worries
about tanks and trucks and armored personnel carri-
ers and artillery and helicopters,” and you might
come up with some variations along the way. You
might say “Well, maybe we ought to have airplanes
all under one guy.” Now you do that and you might
find you have some real problems, but the point I’m
trying to make is that any other structure, if you di-
vide this whole thing into three parts, would still be
flawed. You’d just have flaws in different places. So
let’s not worry about these flaws on the margin, be-
cause you’re going to have flaws on the margin with
any other idea too. Let’s just make sure that the mili-
tary departments do what they ought to do.
These CINCs over here are going to write requirements to fix what their deficiencies are right now. The CINC here is worried about what he's going to do if the Soviets come across the border tomorrow, or next week, or next year. Now he's worried about ten years from now too, but he's worried about ten years from now in a different way than the guy who's worried about what kind of Soviet fighter our air-to-air capabilities or our air superiority forces are going to have to deal with 10 years from now. The institutional responsibility to do that is in the military departments. Somebody's got to be looking at the intelligence estimates and the trends and so forth and decide what kind of advanced fighter aircraft this country needs that can operate off aircraft carriers and off airfields 10 or 15 or 20 years from now. What kind of space capabilities and lift vehicles do we need? The Army's worried about the future Soviet tank, so when do we go to a new design beyond the M1A1? The CINC here is interested in these problems, but he figures the Army's going to take care of most of that and he depends on the Army to take care of that.

I'm trying to make an impassioned argument that if you didn't have the military departments you would invent something just like them and you would put different names on all the titles and when you got through looking at it you would come back and say "How is that really different from what we had before?" Think about all the personnel actions. When we had so many drug addicted people or drug influenced people in the services and mounted that campaign, somebody had to administer all that. That's a big job. The services did a very good job. The services do a pretty good job in a lot of respects — a lot more than they get credit for. They run difficult, demanding organizations, and the military departments and military Secretaries are needed, believe me. The myriad things that they do you can't dump on some Assistant Secretary of XYZ. If you want to have chaos in the Department of Defense, just say we're going to have an Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Personnel, all personnel management for all three military departments. All the assignments are going to come from this guy? You've got to manage the guys on the nuclear submarines, and the guys out there in U.S. Space Command and the Marines over there in Okinawa? They're all going to get managed under this one Assistant Secretary? That's crazy. We've got maritime forces, land forces, and air forces, and a logical way to divide things up, so let's keep on managing them that way.

But the other side of that coin is, let's keep these guys doing management and keep them out of the operational business. That's where the problem has been in the past. They came from a role in which they were in the operational business. That was the whole point of my going through this explanation. They once were, sort of, in the operational world, and the operational commanders reported to them, certainly all the time in peacetime, and to some degree in wartime. So they had a hard time getting their feet out of all that. It's been difficult. But Goldwater-Nichols has gone a long way. That's why the requirement that all forces be assigned to a unified or specified command is such an important feature of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

McLaughlin: Given acceptance of balancing the two stovepipes, how about things which I might call perpetual boundary conditions? There are 46 years of who should do maritime surveillance with land-based aircraft, and we had a memorandum two years ago, or presumably it would boil over again, over an A-16 which would fly close air support. Whether we limit the Army to rotary-wing aircraft when there's a lot of evidence these days that the technology is not the best for close air support. These things haven't gone away from us since 1947, at least since the Key West Agreements.

Herres: Let me take one of them on as an example. That's an excellent question. It's a very important question. I'm going to do one part of it really quickly and then we can come back to it if we still need to.

Let's take the example of maritime surveillance. The B-52 is a good example. When one of those maritime CINCs writes a requirement, for B-52s or for a long-range land-based aircraft to supplement the capability of his maritime forces, we'll get some things done. Now we've tippy-toed into that already somewhat, mainly because the Air Force and the Navy have gotten together and at least done some cosmetic things. B-52s can carry Harpoons if you decide you need to do that. We've qualified them and the weapons have been qualified and so forth. My personal view is the B-52 could be an absolutely formidable maritime system. I think if you put the right weapons on a B-52 you could go out there and sink the Soviet surface fleet in about three days because you can build the weapons that would do that now. (Three days might be an exaggeration. You've got to make a point anyway.) But you could do a lot, especially with our refueling capability.

Just to remind you what a modern H model B-52 can do for you, in an exercise. B-52s took off from

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Grand Forks, North Dakota, and did a bomb run over an airfield in Egypt. They missed their time on the target by 30 seconds and flew all the way back to Grand Forks and never landed and carried a reasonable load. Now there are lots of scenarios in which that is impractical because tankers did have to be based in other locations. But I simply point that out to say that there is a power projection capability there.

What we've got to do is get the CINCs used to writing requirements and identifying deficiencies that will draw on the capabilities of the other military departments more. The increased authority they have to do that is the first step. The second step is building up staffs who are more imaginative, more creative, who are going to look beyond all that, and who are less tied to their own service doctrinal attitudes. And time will fix that problem. But it will take time and there's no single instant one way or any of us can solve that problem.

Let me talk about the close air support, because it's another facet and this is important. I was talking about this problem as recently as this morning with Bob Costello. We have launched ourselves off into a mine field. I chair a very important body which we call the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The JROC consists of the Vice Chiefs of each of the services. It was created by a recommendation by the Defense Science Board back in about 1983, which General Vessey picked up on right away and institutionalized. Here's one where I'm sure you would agree that he was wrong about what he said because we didn't have any joint person to chair this: the highest ranked joint person we had to put on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council was the Director of the Joint Staff. So until I came to the building, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council was not about to take on an issue that the services didn't want taken on. When I got in there we got the charter changed, and that took about six months because we had to nurse it along a little bit. Now the agenda for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is established by me and the services don't have any choice. I establish the agenda based on what the CINCs need. That's always a good foundation. The Air Force didn't want us to, but we threw the close air support aircraft requirement into the JROC.

When I say Air Force, I mean at the working level. I don't think Larry Welsh had any big problems with it himself, although he was wary.

We wrote a mission needs statement. We tried to make that mission needs statement as generic as we could, but we said we need a replacement for the A-10 aircraft, we need a fixed-wing close air support aircraft. We also need other close air support capabilities, and close fire support capabilities, not all of which of course are going to be provided by fixed-wing aircraft. But we have other programs going. We have the Apache in production now. It's the world's best close air support rotary-wing vehicle. So we don't need a requirement for that. We have the LHX which is still surviving — the Army's light attack helicopter program. We have the multiple launch rocket system which is a healthy program, moving with lots of high priority; the CINCs and everybody are happy with that. We have extended range artillery programs being supported, but what we do have a problem with is that the A-10 is getting more and more vulnerable and by 1995 we're going to have very limited fixed-wing close air support capabilities, so we wrote a mission needs statement for that. We sent it up to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and said "Let's have a milestone zero review, and task the appropriate service, obviously the Air Force because this will be land-based air, to initiate a concept exploration phase."

Now the Air Force already knows what it wants for close air support aircraft. But we can write a task, which the Deputy Secretary of Defense will sign, that tasks them to look at all of the concepts that we want to list and to come back to a milestone one review with a system concept definition and justify why that system concept definition is better than all the others that we tasked them to look at. If they make a good case for it, and we believe it, it will be the A-16 because they've done about 32 studies on this subject and that's the conclusion they've come to. If they can justify that at the Defense Acquisition Board meeting then we'll tell them to go ahead and do the demonstration validation phase, just like 5,000 or 5,100 series directives say. In that concept demonstration validation phase, we can do the fly-off that Congress insists we should do if we still think we need to do that, and so on down the line.

So we're trying to make it all fit together and we can do that. That's an example of how Goldwater-Nichols has given us the tools, and some of them have come together serendipitously. For example, the JROC was in existence before, but the Vice Chairman wasn't. So the two have come together and we're now making that one of the tools that forces an extension of the influence of the CINCs, and an extension of the influence of the Chairman, and a real honest to goodness purple-suited influence over the requirements.

*Dr. Robert Costello, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition).
Now that joint mission needs statement, like every single one of the 12 we have validated over the past year, is fully coordinated with all the CINCs, so when I send that document to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, it is a document that represents the needs of the CINCs in an unassailable form; we’ve got everyone on board. Frequently we will task the CINC staff to do the initial draft for us. That is happening right now with the follow-on requirement for the SDI, the ballistic missile defense system, and for the more detailed requirement for the phase one system. The initial requirement we drafted in the Pentagon.

Does that answer your question, John? You raised a good point, you gave me an opportunity.

McLaughlin: I guess I’m less optimistic about happy resolution for the same reasons — it’s been about 40 years and the Army is already convinced that no A-16 will ever meet their needs.

Herres: That’s not true. There are people in the Army who are convinced of that, and there are a lot of people in the Army who think that the A-16 is the right answer.

Oettinger: But isn’t that specific irrelevant in the sense that it seems to me that one of the profound and important things that I heard Bob say is that those arguments at the margin are inevitable and unavoidable? If you have a thing that’s too large, or you have to look at it a couple of ways, you always have to cut it up, and no matter how you cut it up, there will be fights at the borders.

McLaughlin: What I’m saying is, where you have fights at the same borders for 40 or 50 years, it’s somehow significant, as opposed to the ones that are transitory.

Herres: But you see here you’ve got a battle between guys who have their idea of what the solution should be. They are no more broad-minded than the Air Force is about the A-16. The Air Force’s views on the A-16 are pretty straightforward. They don’t think that the mudfighter is going to survive. They’ve got the mudfighter guys who have an ulterior motive; their idea is that if we don’t force the Air Force to build a mudfighter, then they won’t support the close air support mission. Well, there’s no way you can structure anything to make those guys happy. They’ve got their minds made up. Their objective is not a close support aircraft; their objective is to get the close air support mission into the Army. Does the Army want to run all those bases? Does the Army want to take on that logistics infrastructure? Does it make sense for the Army to have that kind of fixed-wing aircraft capability and training and support capability? If they’re going to have duplication among services, how do you then draw the line between the close air support and interdiction? How do we handle the overlap? What happens when, for example, you have a situation like the Persian Gulf? If we were going to send one aircraft, and we probably only would have been able to send one land-based tactical aircraft over to the Persian Gulf, our contingency plan was to send F-16s. The F-16 would be the ideal airplane because in that environment it can carry out the two missions that we wanted to do better than any other single aircraft, both air-to-air and air-to-ground.

McLaughlin: I thought we made a real breakthrough by sending Apaches to operate all through the area.

Herres: We didn’t send Apaches; the Apache was too big. We sent AHIPs and it made a big difference. It was a great breakthrough, and it worked very well. As a matter of fact, I saw a message this morning that NATO was trying to get some out of there, and the CINC didn’t want to let them go. Those are not really relevant to this particular case. What we’ve got in the close air support is everybody’s trying to make something different out of this thing, but we’ve got a good process, and if we allow it to, it’s going to bring us to a decision. There are going to be a lot of people who are not going to like that decision no matter how it comes out, and everybody who doesn’t like the decision is going to criticize the process because that’s their only recourse.

Student: Can I change the subject a little bit? You mentioned the Stark earlier. In the wake of the Stark incident and Vincennes and in the wake of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and of all of the peacetime rules of engagement studies that followed those incidents, how happy and satisfied are you right now as to the adequacy of peacetime rules of engagement — both the JCS generic peacetime ROE, and also the Persian Gulf crisis or theater-specific ROE? How happy are you with the process by which those peacetime ROE can be rapidly amended as the scenario evolves?

Herres: It was tough. One of the reasons it was tough in the Persian Gulf thing is we had 535 guys looking over our shoulders and they all wanted to know what the ROE were. Every time something happened we were really up to our ears in dealing with Congress. Rules of engagement are very difficult to define, and I know you know that, otherwise you wouldn’t have asked the question, especially the way you did. I think we do that as well as it can be
done. Our allies are a lot looser, although one of the interesting things about the Persian Gulf situation was that none of the allies would expose its rules of engagement to its other allies. The British would never show us, although we knew pretty much what their rules of engagement were; we knew what the Italians’ rules were, what the French rules were, but they never showed us a piece of paper where it was all written down in black and white. We accommodated by not showing them ours. They knew pretty much what ours were too, and our people got together out there. But I point that out to show how delicate and how important those things are. But you can write rules of engagement till you’re blue in the face and in the end it’s the commander out in the field who’s got to use good judgment, and there’s just no substitute. The trick in writing rules of engagement is to give him good guidance without putting him in a straitjacket and substituting guidance for the on-the-spot commander’s judgment.

I think our peacetime rules of engagement are pretty good, but we’ve got battle groups out there that have Soviet aircraft flying over them all the time, a lot closer than that Iraqi airplane ever flew to the Stark. But we have people who wanted that skipper’s head because he didn’t shoot down that Iraqi airplane. We knew it was an Iraqi airplane, he knew it was an Iraqi airplane, he had no reason to think that Iraqi aircraft was going to fire at him. But it did, and of course we know that was a big mistake, although a lot of people had a hard time coming to grips with that too. But no amount of rules of engagement in writing would have prevented the Stark incident from happening, any more than any amount of writing the rules of the road would prevent certain collisions from taking place, although we always go back and look at rules of the road when we have those collisions. It was just an unfortunate event.

Similarly we have the other end of the spectrum, when the Iranian airliner was shot down. We had guys leaning forward pretty far in the harness by that time, and we have to remember that they fired a Stinger at the Bridgeport when she was in port and they put a lot of mines out there. Mine warfare is probably the worst, dirtiest kind of warfare, because you can’t see anybody shooting at you, you justoodle along wondering what you’re going to hit next. It was a different world by the time that Iranian airliner was shot down.

We pumped a lot of rules of engagement out and we spent a lot of late hours at night arguing, debating, and we would think we had it perfect and one more guy would take a look at it and say, “What about so and so…?” and we’d go back and change a phrase and a sentence and so forth. Marzluff* back there was an exec on the Kidd when it started, and I think he would probably underline the idea that you can write them till you’re blue in the face; the more complicated you make them, the more difficult you make it for the field commander.

Student: Would you agree that there’s a kind of dichotomous mindset: that there’s either a Stark mindset or there’s a Vincennes mindset? That is, any skipper going over there in the wake of the Stark incident has to have been told, “You ain’t going to take the first hit.”

Oettinger: One of the central messages we keep getting from General Herres, which I’d like to underscore — you may or may not buy my generalization — is this need I read in his remarks for the notion of balance as opposed to the extremist polarization. What he has outlined, I think, is true of any organization. Talk about these two stovepipes. It’s the same problem in schools and departments and universities, or geographic versus functional desks in other places, and the rules of engagement. Before the 1960s this university had very thin rule books, rules of engagement of faculty vs. students and so on, which had a couple of lines about most things, and each one would ordinarily contain the equivalent in the ROE of the subject of self-defense, etc., etc. In the 1960s all of those things became enormous tomes because everybody said it was too vague. Nobody by the 1970s could understand what the hell any of it meant. There’s a movement back again, mercifully, toward being less explicit and more “ordinarily.” It seems to me that polarized arguments tend to get in the way of articulating the problems as they should be, namely that there is a certain measure of perennial character to them, like no matter how the hell you organize it, you’re going to have fights at the margin.

Herres: We may think maritime rules of engagement are tough, but aerial rules of engagement are going to get tougher and tougher as beyond-line-of-sight weapons become more of a reality. The AMRAAM (advanced medium range air-to-air missile) brings that on; the Phoenix already brought it on, but fortunately, or unfortunately as the case may be, the Phoenix is so expensive there aren’t that many of them. But the AMRAAM is going to be everywhere. It’s going to make aerial rules of engagement very, very tough. Already there are a lot of

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*Commander Peter W. Marzluff, USN, Aide-de-Camp to General Herres.
arguments about the last shootdown, when the Iranians came out after those two aircraft flying combat air patrol in the Mediterranean in January or February. George Wilson criticized us on that in his articles.

But where rules of engagement are really going to be tough, and it may happen pretty soon in Panama, is in land warfare. You don’t think much about that, telling those troops on the ground what their ROE are. They’ve got a certain amount of that going right now in Panama where we’ve got these guys that keep trying to sneak into the tank farm down there and you’ve been reading about it in the paper and it really is happening. It hasn’t happened in quite a while now, but we don’t know what the hell is going on there, whether it’s just plain harassment or if it’s a training exercise or what, but they have these organized little excursions which are constantly testing the Marines who are guarding the tank farm down there. The first efforts were to try to get them to shoot at one another. They’d get in between where they knew we had two patrols so they’d try to get the patrols to shoot at one another, things like that. But the ROE are really tough in that environment, and we had one guy get shot in the face with a shotgun and he died. How should he have handled that? It would have been tough. Should he have shot first? I don’t know if he could have in this particular case, but ROE are always tough, and it’s going to be tougher and tougher in the future because our world’s going to be full of all those arguments. But you can’t automate it. Then you have your hands tied.

**Student:** I have a question that deals with the allocation of resources between concrete things like troops and tanks and weapon systems on one hand, and less tangible, or more difficult to pin down things with respect to the military values such as C³ in the J-6 sense. You, of course, have the unique background, having argued the issue probably on both sides. With the reorganization act and the increased role of the CINC and the operational commanders, do you think that that will change somehow the balance of how C³ in particular, perhaps other intangibles and less easy to measure aspects, get weighted in the DRB and that allocation process?

**Herres:** I think so. Let me touch just for a moment on how the CINC’s do weigh in on our current structure. The CINC’s are inserted in the resource allocation process, which incidentally is executed by the DRB. A lot of people have said that JCS or the JROC or the CINC’s should establish priorities. The Defense Resources Board establishes priorities in the Department of Defense, and that’s the resource allocation and prioritization vehicle in the department. Now the CINC’s try to influence that process, or do influence that process, in several places as the budget is developed. First, when the defense guidance is drafted the CINC’s have an opportunity to comment on it. They were in a transition period, but now, if things settle down, and this will take place soon, the CINC’s will be invited in to comment. They will have already read the draft and they will be invited to the Defense Resources Board to comment on the defense guidance, and they’ll say what they think the defense guidance ought to be telling the services that they ought to be doing, what their priorities ought to be, and what their emphasis ought to be. Then when the POM’s are prepared by the services and submitted to OSD the CINC’s are given an opportunity again to comment on where they think the POM’s are deficient. They’ll come in and brief the DRB, they each get about 30 minutes altogether with questions, and of course they can leave all the written material they want. They’re also required to provide an integrated priority list in the process and change and update that integrated priority list as we go along.

Again, after the budget is completed, when we get into the program budget decisions (PBD’s), the CINC’s are given another opportunity to comment after the DRB finishes its work and before the budgeting adjustments are made. One of the things that’s most difficult is that the C³ and any common user commodity or resource fall into the same category. Munitions are like it, C³, and so forth, where there isn’t any single obvious spokesman or advocate for that particular type of resource. Take very common user munitions, such as Sidewinder missiles. Almost all CINC’s have Sidewinder missiles in their inventory, both maritime forces and land-based air. You can look at what the services budget for Sidewinders but you don’t know who’s going to get what. You don’t know whether you’re going to be short or not. You don’t know how much advocacy you ought to exert for munitions, for example, because you don’t know what the distribution is going to be. You don’t know where you’re going to come out on it because the actual distribution of the asset after it’s acquired is a separate process.

One of the classic examples right from its birth of a very important system that I think has far-reaching implications for the effectiveness of our forces in the future is the GPS (Global Positioning System) Navstar satellite. We’re really not even scratching the surface of what it can do for us. Guid-
ance systems for missiles with accuracies of 40 feet, and that’s certainly going to come down in the future. We’re really only into the second generation of this technology. Nobody can jam it, nobody can interfere with it, it works day and night, it doesn’t make any difference where you are in the world; it gives you worldwide coverage. I just use that as one example. There are many, many benefits from the GPS, but who’s going to be the advocate for the GPS? All the CINCs are going to benefit. Clearly if a CINC thought he wasn’t going to have it, he’d fuss, but it’s not going to be the thing where his plans guy’s going to say, “Hey boss, you ought to really fall on your spear,” as opposed to CINCEUR saying, “I don’t have enough combat service support to get the munitions from the ports to the troops in the field.” That’s something he knows he’s got to weigh in on. With the GPS he figures, “Somebody ought to weigh in on that, but can I afford to fall on my spear on that issue when I don’t have enough combat service support to get munitions to the troops in the field?” I just use that as an example.

So it’s those common commodity, common user things where the Chairman and I and our staffs — our J-4, J-7, J-8, in this case J-4 and J-8 — need to be alert and make sure that we’re weighing in and that we understand the implications for those kinds of things, and there’s a big role for the J-6 for C³ in that regard. We’ve reorganized the Joint Staff to deal with this new world. We added two more directorates (figure 11). The Force Structure Resource and Assessment Directorate is the old SPRAA (Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency) that General Vessey formed with the help of Senator Tower who was the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, and it was put together with the Joint Analysis Directorate. Remember the time we had both of them, they used to be Studies and Analysis Gaming Agency (SAGA), but eventually the Joint Analysis Directorate came together with SPRAA and now that’s J-8. That directorate is our analyst, sort of the PA & E of the Joint Staff, but we don’t like to use that term. These guys look after all programs after milestone one.

The initiation of requirements for new things, when we start a mission needs statement, from pre-concept definition through the concept definition phase, is looked at by the J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate. We do that because here are the guys who are supposed to be doing what I said we need to do a lot more of, and that’s oversee the CINCs’ war planning efforts. They see what deficiencies there are in their war plans, and write requirements and nursemaid those requirements up to the milestone one point to alleviate those deficiencies. They’re the guys who plan and oversee the exercises and, most important, the lessons learned from the exercises, because that’s another source of identification of deficiencies. So that’s the whole concept behind putting all this stuff into J-7.

The J-7 is our newest directorate. It was formed from scratch just two years ago when Major General (then Brigadier General) Fred Franks came in and formed it up. I might add he’s done well; he went from there to being Commander of the First Armored Division over in Europe, and he was just announced as the Seventh Corps Commander. So there’s a guy with joint duty who came into the Joint Staff and did well, and he went in two or three years from being a one-star to being a corps commander.

How’s that for success? And he’s a hell of a guy too, I might add, with a wooden leg. He shoots in the 80s in golf and gets some of my money.

But that’s what these guys are trying to do. So between these folks and J-6 looking at C³ systems, the ops guys should notice some deficiencies, particularly in strategic reconnaissance and so forth. We should be identifying those things that the CINCs will want but there isn’t any obvious single advocate amongst the CINCs who can jump over and defend a program, the way CINCSAC would defend the SR-71 or the tanker force on behalf of all the CINCs. Now we’ve got Space Command out there, who ought to be picking up the ball on things like the GPS; one of the ideas of forming Space Command was to have an advocate out there to argue for those things. He should be the advocate for the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) and for the Milstar, and when DSCS is no longer able to do its job he should be arguing for a replacement for DSCS just like the CINCTRANS should be arguing for the C-17 or, when the time comes, for replacement of the C-17. We’ve got a lot of cultural work to do to get them around to realizing that is what they ought to do, because there’s a tendency for them to think that the communications community ought to be the advocates for a new DSCS, but I argue that’s like saying the Army ought to be the guys out front on a replacement for the C-17 when the time comes. TRANS has the responsibility to provide transportation support, and the CINC ought to be advocating the tools of his trade. CINSPACE is going to have to operate space assets in support of all the CINCs, so he ought to be the advocate. When you get down to munitions and things like that it gets tougher and tougher.
This has given me the opportunity to show that chart (figure 11), so that's how we're now organized and it's working pretty well. There are still guys who would like to change it. J-3 doesn't like not having exercises, but they only don't like not having exercises when they don't have a war going on — when they don't have a Persian Gulf or Panama flaring up in their faces, or something like that. When they've got big action going somewhere, they don't have time for exercises. That's why I want to keep exercises in J-7. I've been the lonely guy who's been making that case. So far I've won, but I'm afraid when I go out the door they're going to run right down to the Chairman's office and say, "OK, boss, it's time to move exercises back to J-3." And I'm going to leave a note saying "Just remember, as soon as you have a big war someplace your exercises program is going to go down the tubes until it's over."

Oettinger: We're out of time. Thank you so much.