INCIDENTAL PAPER

Seminar on Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Strengthening the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert T. Herres

Guest Presentations, Spring 1988
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March 1989

Program on Information Resources Policy

Center for Information Policy Research
Harvard University

The Program on Information Resources Policy is jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research.

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I-89-1
Strengthening the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Robert T. Herres

General Herres is the first Vice Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a position he has held since 1987. Previously, he was the first Commander in Chief of the unified U.S. Space Command; at the same time, he served as Commander in Chief of both the North American Aerospace Defense Command and its U.S. component, Aerospace Defense Command, and as Commander of the Air Force Space Command. Prior to that, he was Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Herres has also commanded the Air Force Communications Command, Eighth Air Force, and served as Chief of the Flight Crew Division with the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program. He has held numerous other posts in the fields of intelligence, communications, and systems development and acquisition.

Oettinger: It's a pleasure to welcome General Robert Herres, who is Vice Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The last time he was with us, back in 1985, he had just left his assignment as Director of C^3 Systems in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and become CINCORAD and the first U.S. CINCSpace. He spoke to us on the CINC's point of view, harking back to his earlier tasks. It is truly a delight to have him back with us and this time to put our narrow subject not only into the context of the CINC's view but also that of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. We indicated to him that we had some interest in the whole question of defense organization and reorganization, and in problems of low intensity conflict and special forces. He is willing to have questions thrown at him whenever they occur.

Herres: Thank you, Tony. I have a few charts here that will help get across the points that I might make regarding the defense reorganization. It is interesting that you just had Jim Locher here because now you'll get my view of what happened. I think he knows what my view is because he's heard me before, and we've had some long discussions.

I had to laugh when you were talking about *The Straw Giant.* I got a note from Arthur Hadley a few weeks ago. He heard about a talk of mine and he wanted a reprint. So I wrote him a note and said I was flattered; he is a very distinguished author. I'd just finished reading his book. Although I had to be a little thick-skinned institutionally to get through it all, I did, and I complimented him on what was an interesting treatise on our problems. It was not always accurate, but he gives you his viewpoint, which is interesting.

Let me walk through these charts. After Jim's discussion some of this may be repetitious, so if I start dragging on some of these points just kind of wave your arms or something, and tell me you already know all that.

This is a series of charts I've used at the war colleges and with a number of other audiences to try to explain what I think really happened to the Pentagon in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Department of Defense has undoubtedly been the most studied institution in human history. All

my adult life — even before my adult life — I can remember debates and arguments about how the Department of Defense should be organized and, for whatever reasons, I got interested; I guess I had an intuition that it might end up being my career. I remember in junior high school the debate about how defense ought to be organized in the wake of World War II. There was a lot of discussion in those days about unifying the armed forces. The Air Force, of course, was part of the Army; it was like the Marine Corps was in the Navy. However, Hap Arnold was a five-star general, and the Air Force was treated almost as if it were a separate service.

Unification meant a little bit of a contradiction: creating a new military department called the Department of the Air Force, yet unifying the armed forces so you didn’t have great rivalries evolving like those that existed between Nimitz in the central Pacific and MacArthur in the South Pacific. A classic study of the problems of parochial military activity and all the things that go with that can be made of the relationships between Nimitz and MacArthur, and, in Washington, between Admiral King and General Marshall. In those days, the only person who was in charge of all our armed forces was the President of the United States. Nobody below his level had common authority over all of the military forces. This is what was meant by unification, and it was something that most people, after World War II, felt was really needed.

The outgrowth of that need was the National Defense Act of 1947, which created the National Defense Establishment. Two years later it was renamed the Department of Defense. Its establishment meant that there were now four Cabinet officers in the military realm: a Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Air Force evolved from what used to be a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy, and now there was a Secretary of Defense. The Service Secretaries were not reduced below the Cabinet level until the amendment of 1949.

Since then, there’s been one study after another. When I was a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces there was a study by a blue ribbon commission — they always seem to be called blue ribbon commissions. I’ve shown here (figure 1) the most recent studies leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It’s important to put it in perspective — most of these studies resulted in relatively minor incremental changes. Many were put on the shelf and lots of the things recommended in them were either too hard to do, too politically sensitive, too

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Figure 1. Management Studies of DOD
offensive, or what have you. Gradual evolution has characterized the way the Department of Defense changed over the years from 1947. When the 1986 act became law, Senator Barry Goldwater said that it was the most important defense legislation since the amendments of 1958. I would argue that it’s probably the most important since 1947. Time will tell. But that tells you that the amendments of 1958 were regarded by Senator Goldwater as being very important; they established — really institutionalized — a principle I’m going to explain in a few minutes.

These (figure 1) are the most recent studies. You heard Jim Locher, who was really sort of the recorder rather than the leader of the study; the people on his study were really brought together by the Senate Armed Services Committee. It is sometimes referred to as the Locher Study; however, it was really his report of the deliberations of a number of very distinguished people, mostly former Secretaries, Chairmen, and Chiefs of Service, who debated about how the Department of Defense ought to be reorganized. It was probably the most influential of these various studies. But you should remember that these things build on one another: the findings of one may make the revelations that lead to another’s recommendations, and so forth.

While this was going on, the Packard Commission was doing its thing, mainly in response to the political outcry that came about because of the alleged abuses of buying $400 toilet seats and $7,000 coffee pots, or whatever else we were supposed to have done. That, of course, put a lot of leverage behind the Packard Commission. David Packard is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense who literally ran the department when he was in it. The Secretary took care of things outside the Department — the State Department, Congress — while Mr. Packard really ran the Department of Defense day-to-day. He was probably the most powerful Deputy Secretary we’ve ever had, and this is really the way I think the department ought to be run.

In any case, Mr. Packard announced that he was not going to be interested just in acquisition management issues, but was going to look into the operational structure, organization, and any other aspects of the Department of Defense that affect the way it works. He said he was going to look at the whole picture. He made a number of recommendations, like those that came up during the Locher Study, that really went a bit beyond what some people thought the original charter to be.

At least two events had a lot to do with driving the way this reorganization act came out. They weren’t the only two things, because the House really got ahead of the Senate. The Senate had long been talking about reorganizing; mostly Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Senator Nunn (D-GA) had been interested in taking a serious look at how the Defense Department was functioning. But the House actually passed the first piece of legislation while the Senate was still plugging along with its study. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) got the House Armed Services Committee going, and a bill was passed by an astonishingly wide margin — something like 384 to 15 — that really got everybody’s attention. Anybody who was paying attention and saw the margin of the vote in that House legislation had to read the tea leaves and say, “There’s going to be some reorganization legislation. It’s just a question of what it’s going to be.” Anybody who was complacent beyond that point was not paying attention.*

When the House saw how this Locher report was going to come out, and recognized the influence of the Packard group, Mr. Aspin decided that the House language probably didn’t go far enough. He commissioned Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama to initiate hearings looking at some more far-reaching legislation. These hearings, under Bill Nichols’ chairmanship of the Investigations Subcommittee, had four pieces of legislation going. The idea was that they would remain separate. All of them converged when the Senate produced its proposed legislation, and we had in 1986, after some brokering between the House and the Senate over features they disagreed upon, this reorganization act.

If you had asked the people in the Congress what they thought they were voting for and what they thought the results of all this defense reorganization would mean, you’d probably get a variety of answers. Although the details are complicated and the Congress was really thinking in terms of broad issues, most would say one or both of these two things: what they thought they were voting for was (1) to increase the roles and responsibilities of the

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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (2) to increase the influence of the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (the so-called "combatant commands," as they were referred to in the legislation). Incidentally, the law does a lot of other things besides just those two, but that's its major thrust.

How did that happen? How does the law do those things? There's no place in the law where it says that the first should happen or that the second should happen. However, the law builds a number of changes into the way the Defense Department must operate; compliance with the legislation leads to these results. People argue sometimes that, "The law doesn't say those things." Of course it doesn't. I'm trying to sum up what the effect of the law is and what I think is the intended effect of the law.

It's interesting to note, at least from my viewpoint, that the intended effect of the law is going to be the actual effect of the law. It did the right thing for the right reasons if you believe that those are the things that needed to be done.

I agree, and think that they did need to be done. It was a change that probably would have taken place in a very gradual and evolutionary fashion over a number of years within the department, but would have taken much too long — obviously too long to satisfy people like Senator Goldwater and other reform advocates. It certainly could never have taken place this quickly and this decisively without the forceful interference of the Congress.

Oettinger: General Vessey* is on public record as saying he agreed with that, plus that it could have essentially been done without legislation just by the volition of the Chairman. I guess he, himself, believed in it enough to move in that direction. But I'm delighted you're telling us that the legislation is nonetheless useful or that General Vessey was right or partially right.

Herres: I agree with General Vessey based on what I just said. In fact, he initiated a number of the things — I know he did more than any previous Chairman in that regard, because the momentum was gradually picking up. He got the so-called SPRAA (Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency) established. Collaborating with Senator John Tower (R-TX), he got 40-manpower spaces in an amendment on some legislation, thus establishing this SPRAA to support the Chairman in playing a larger role in influencing resource management, re-

source allocation, and so forth — to help him be a better spokesman for the CINCs.

The institutionalization of the role of the CINCs in the proceedings of the Defense Resources Board as it develops the department's budget, and their role in defense guidance, had already begun to take place. Although not etched in stone, it had become a matter of practice. But I would argue that the approach General Vessey supported would have been much more gradual — would have had to have been because of the natural resistance to change within any bureaucracy. It would have taken 15 years of evolution to get to the kind of change that this law created.

One curious thing about this particular situation for students of public policy — and this is an important point — is that we had been going through a number of less than eight-year administrations. Change will take place as administrations turn over. That's not always good; sometimes the change is negative. You get some good things going and then you get off that good track. Good policies get established, and then along comes the next guy, and because they're not his policies, he sort of lets them die.

As an example, I would argue that one of John Kennedy's greatest initiatives, yet one for which he is least remembered, was the Alliance for Progress. That program should have been, and still should be, our number one priority in this country. It died with John Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy kept it going for a while, because he was the guy who was in charge of it. When he was assassinated, the Alliance for Progress program went down the tubes in a hurry. It was somebody else's idea, and unfortunately, it didn't exist long enough to have a life of its own.

So these changes in administration cause changes, and evolutionary change in this kind of an environment would be stimulated by more changes in administration. But we are finishing up an eight-year administration, the first one we've had in a long, long time — since President Eisenhower. There is more resistance to change in eight-year administrations. If you have a whole series of eight-year administrations, you're going to see a lot less evolutionary change in the federal government than you would if you had shorter administrations, for better or for worse.

Croke: Senator Goldwater's attitude was, "If there's a problem, let's fix it," regarding the Department of Defense. It was not only Congress trying to work their will, but also the testimony that

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*General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
came from other people such as David Jones* and others on the military side, in addition to Vessey’s. There were some people who felt the need for dramatic action. I recall some of Jones’s testimony was very pointed. I notice you only point out studies that are nonmilitary, but within the military itself, as Vessey pointed out, there were serious internal criticisms. The Congress is not forcing this on the military. The military themselves had serious questions.

Herres: I agree with that, but I also submit that most of the changes would have taken a much more mature bureaucracy than the one we’ve got right now. I haven’t thought of it in these terms before, but I would argue that it was the resistance of some very influential policymakers in the department that had as much to do with stimulating congressional determination as the positive arguments of people such as David Jones, although his arguments got it all started. A week or so after David Jones retired, there was that big article in The New York Times Book Section — a long exhaustive explanation of what was wrong with the system. Then Shy Meyer** retired and he joined in the fray. Even though some of his ideas were off the mark, he reinforced many of the things that General Jones had said. But I would argue that senior officials going to the Congress and saying, “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it,” had as much to do with really pushing this legislation as the positive things said by others. They knew that they’d struck a resonant chord and they knew that there was something wrong.

I did want to make that point about the evolution of changes and the congressional stimulant. Back in 1958, we had the same phenomenon in a different way — change coming from outside the department. The President of the United States decided he wanted to reorganize the Department of Defense. He didn’t just say, “Okay, you guys, I think you ought to look at reorganizing a few things that I see are wrong. Why don’t you work on a plan and get back to me?” He got deeply involved, and said, “Here are the problems I had and here’s what I’ve seen happening. Here’s what I saw in World War II, in my days as Chief of Staff of the Army, and as SACEUR. Here are the kinds of things we need to do.” So, change was forced on the department from the outside, albeit not from the Congress. That’s an interesting problem in public administration in itself, I guess.

Well, what is this Goldwater-Nichols Act? It’s six titles, but I’m not going to talk about all of them. I just want to make sure you understood what it really covers. This chart (figure 2) shows the breadth and scope of the activities. I’ll give you a little personal observation here. Title II, which I’m going to talk about a bit more, and Title V on military departments, are the two most significant by far. Title I doesn’t say a whole lot, and neither does Title III. They identify problems more than they prescribe solutions. We’ve always had problems in trying to figure out how the defense agencies ought to fit in terms of who supervises them and to whom they report — there was a lot of debate. Some people went from one extreme of, “We ought to do away with all the defense agencies,” to the other extreme of, “We ought to have more of them.” None of that was really solved in Title III.

Title IV is very controversial, and I’ll mention why at the end. That’s a whole lecture in itself and I don’t want to get bogged down in that unless you’re particularly interested. This is the title that creates the joint specialty officers and the joint duty assignments and that kind of stuff. The guy who had the most to do with it was Archie Barrett, who is sort of Jim Locher’s counterpart in the House.

McLaughlin: He has been a speaker here.

Herres: I understand. We got a lot of ideas on how we ought to manage personnel. Unfortunately, it’s not going to have as positive an effect as he thought, and I don’t think it’s going to achieve all the objectives. It’s going to be very difficult to administer — very complicated — and it may create more problems than it solves.

Title V and Title II are the big ones. Title V forced the military departments to restructure their staffs, integrating the civilian and the military staffs more tightly. In the past, the military departments had what most of the people in the departments called a secretariat: the secretary and his staff of politically appointed assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries, and their civilian staffs with a sprinkling of military people assigned to support them, but a very light sprinkling, plus the so-called military staff which works for the chief of each of the services. There has always been a lot of functional duplication between these two staffs. The idea was that these secretariat guys are the policymakers, providing broad guidance to the chief of the service, who has his six deputy chiefs to provide

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*General David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**General Edward C. Meyer, former Army Chief of Staff.
the basic implementing guidance to the field commanders.

The Congress felt that there was too much duplication, and wanted to weld these staffs together. "Why not have the guy who's in charge of research and development for the Air Force, for example, report to the Secretary of the Air Force, and there'd only be one of them, instead of having an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, plus a Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. Let's combine those two positions." They did just that.

A lot of the Packard Commission's recommendations also went into military department restructuring. The most important thing to remember is that this title forced the military departments to contract and blend these two staffs together. It also specified that no political appointee could work for a military person. To a certain degree — it's not as self-evident on the surface as you would think, and people don't like to talk about it much — this title does draw down some of the authority, much of it implied, of the chiefs of the services.

For example, there's an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. He is the department's senior procurement officer, currently the acquisition executive of the Air Force, something that the Packard Report had said each service should identify. What used to be the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development now technically works for him, the acquisition executive, instead of for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, but the point is, if you draw the wiring diagram, that's the way it comes out, and that's different from the way it was before. He's sort of like the Deputy Assistant Secretary in a way, but yet he's a three-star general on the Air Staff. I use this as an example to point out how some of the overlap is eliminated.

The services have normally had an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and they've also had a uniformed three-star who is the comptroller of their service. They've been forced to put those functions together. Personally, I think that's all for the good, but there has been a lot of heartburn. I think everybody's going to survive all right.

Oettinger: It seems to me that is fraught with the kinds of things that make pendulums swing back and forth — the arguments for doing what you just described, the duplications, etc., etc. Correct me if you think I'm off the wall, but it seems to me that the next argument would be that having the planning and the policymaking and the doing all under one hat will mean that useful checks and balances

| Title I  | Department of Defense generally |
| Title II | Military advice and command functions |
| Title III | Defense agencies and Department of Defense field activities |
| Title IV | Joint officer personnel policy |
| Title V  | Military departments |
| Title VI | Miscellaneous |

Figure 2. Goldwater – Nichols Act
won’t be there, and everybody will get so busy firefighting that there won’t be any real planning. And maybe a year, maybe five or ten years from now, somebody will say, “Wouldn’t it be nice to separate policy planning and long-range thinking from day-to-day responsibility and execution.”

**Herres:** What I would argue in response is that, generally speaking, at the Pentagon level people have been too much involved in execution and details; they will tend to do that if there’s enough of them. If you do something like this to reduce the numbers, they will be forced not to go far beyond the policymaking and the long-range thinking and planning. Get them out of the execution business, which I think they’re into too much. That is the positive end result, I hope, of all of this. Whether it’s a civilian organization, a big company, or a governmental bureaucracy, military or otherwise, whenever you put too many people on a staff at the executive level, those people will be doing things that ought to be done, and can be done better, at a lower level. Parkinson’s Law takes effect. There really is a Parkinson’s Law.

If you force that staff to be small enough, you force it to think in terms of policy. They’re supposed to be making policy. This was one of the great problems with the establishment of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Some have argued, “Why do we need an Under Secretary of Defense for Policy? That’s what the whole Office of the Secretary of Defense — all Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries — are supposed to be doing. They’re supposed to be policy people, not executors.” What was meant when that position was established was that you need somebody to advise the Secretary in more operational matters. We’ve got acquisition-oriented people who are worried about acquisition policy and that kind of stuff. But what about dealing with the State Department and that kind of policy? Military policy affects the whole of national security policy which is bigger than the Department of Defense. All of that has to be pulled together, and that’s the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Oettinger:** Under Dick Stilwell* wasn’t the total flavor that the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy dealt with the local theater of war, low intensity, odd things, as opposed to the nuclear, main theater of war concerns of the Joint Chiefs? Is that reasonable?

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*General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Herres:** That’s right, but there was a lot of overlap and we still have a lot of duplication, I think. Regarding the next reform or whatever it’s going to be — and I don’t think we’ll be ready for it for another 5 or 10 years — a logical next step in the evolution would be a better integration of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. But we first have to get the Chairman’s role institutionalized and then we’ll be ready.

I’ve said about as much as I’m going to say about Title V, which covers military departments. I just wanted to give you that flavor. Let me talk about Title II, which is the one that got the most attention and where there was the most public controversy.

This (figure 3) is a summary of what the title does. It establishes a different role for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most important aspect of the whole legislation, in my view, is it changes the principal military adviser for the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense from the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is very, very important. The law specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff now is the statutory adviser. It codifies his role as the military adviser. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the only two statutory advisers to the National Security Council.

Obviously, the President may invite anybody he wants to a National Security Council meeting, and he does. There are some who are routinely invited. They’re meeting right now on Panama, and our Commander in Chief of the Southern Command happens to be there. The Attorney General usually attends. The Secretary of the Treasury usually attends, for several different reasons which are not self-evident, but if you think about it a little bit they make good sense; and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget is almost always there. Every once in a while there will be an issue that’s a bit remote from what they’re working on and one of them might not be there, but typically those three will be there.

If it’s a broad issue, there’s a subgroup of the National Security Council called the National Security Planning Group — the same National Security Council members, the two statutory advisers, and those other three people. That is, in fact, what’s actually meeting this afternoon. Commerce, Energy, and several other departments usually will attend National Security Council Planning Group meetings, depending on the issue.
Figure 3 shows the Chairman’s role — previously the corporate role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the most criticized aspect of the way we were structured before. The vice chairmanship was established for a couple of reasons. He extends the influence of the Chairman who comes and goes in and out of town because of official commitments. He doesn’t have enough time to stay on top of all the issues, so there’s a Vice Chairman to help him do things, and to chair the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he’s gone. Previously, when he was out of town, he used to rotate the role of chairman amongst the other chiefs of staff, each of whom had to continue to do his regular job as chief of his service. So you had a lot of discontinuities in the role of the Chairman. Of course, there’s also the task of continually providing guidance to the Joint Staff, and there are his role and relationships with the combatant commanders. There are lots of other responsibilities. I’m giving you the very, very simplified version of this.

Student: On the first point, about the Chairman of the JCS now being the principal military adviser. Does that mean now that the JCS on these issues is expected to come to some kind of consensus within themselves and then the Chairman carries it to the NSC, where previously all four or five of them showed up and wouldn’t necessarily have a consensus position? I guess when I look at practical effects, what does saying the Chairman is the principal adviser and not the whole JCS mean?

Herris: That’s important and that’s a good question. That’s probably the most important thing I can talk about today, because you really need to understand that. You don’t need a consensus. Everybody knows this, and the practical effect is that the advice is developed a lot more promptly and is expressed a lot more crisply.

Let me see if I can explain that. It’s tough when you have to be the spokesman for a committee and the advice has to be the consensus view. Now, it didn’t have to be the consensus view before; you could go over with what was called a split view. But there were problems with that. Nobody likes to provide advice coming from two directions; similarly, nobody likes to hear advice with variations in it. The President gets advice from a lot of people, not just from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a lot of them are telling him things he may not want to hear. You want them to tell you things that are good, not bad. Advice usually involves all of that bad stuff. When you’ve got some

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<td>• Directs Joint Staff</td>
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<th>Role of the Vice Chairman, JCS:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Continuity of advice to NCA</td>
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<td>• Continuity of supervision to Joint Staff</td>
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<th>Role of the Combatant Commanders:</th>
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<td>• Increased operational authority</td>
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Figure 3. DOD Reorganization Act 1986 – Title II: Military Advice and Command Functions
They know that if he wants to depart from the Chiefs he can; they also know that he’s going to have to stand up and defend that advice. He can’t hide behind the mask of the law and say, “I’m only the spokesman for the Chiefs. That’s the way the Chiefs felt as a group,” in case it’s bad advice. Now he has to say, “That’s the way the Chiefs felt as a group and I agreed with them.” That’s a big difference, and nobody really quite realized how all that was going to fall out.

I’ve seen that situation evolve; it’s very interesting to see how that sinks in, because when the Chairman says, “This is the way the Chiefs feel,” they listen in ways they didn’t before. Also, the other side of that coin is that this really throws out frivolous disagreements, and that’s why the advice goes forward faster. If a Chief does decide he wants to disagree with the position of the Chairman, then he’s got to defend it himself. He’s got to do that in order to allow any Chief who disagrees with his advice to offer his own separate view.

Oettinger: That’s not altogether out of his goodness. I remember reading there is provision in the legislation for each of the Chiefs to go forward on his own if he desires. There is a very delicate balance.

Herres: He consults with them not only for that purpose, but also to help form his views. That’s an important distinction. By doing that, when he goes over to defend that advice, it’s quite different from defending the advice of a corporate group, because it’s pretty hard to criticize the spokesman, although people do that. It’s not quite the same when you’re the spokesman for a group as when you’re the spokesman for your own advice that you’re statutorily responsible to provide. That is really different. The word that’s not written into this law, but is implied between all the lines, is “accountability.” Now, there’s an individual — not a group, not a committee — who’s accountable for the military advice that is provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

The fact that the Chairman can say at a National Security Council meeting, as he probably is saying today on a couple of issues on Panama, that the Chiefs feel very strongly about X, Y, or Z has a much more dramatic effect, because now everyone knows the Chairman doesn’t have to say that. He’s saying it this time because he wants to say it now. Before the law was passed he said it because he almost had to say it, and there’s a big difference.

*Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.*
by starting with a briefing that the Joint Staff prepares. That's important because the guidance they get in preparation is important: it has a lot to do with the quality of the presentation they give. The Chairman, in the law now, has the authority and responsibility to supervise the Joint Staff and to issue that guidance clearly. Before, the law said that the Chairman and the Director of the Joint Staff would supervise the Joint Staff "on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," so the guidance itself represented a committee view.

The briefing will frame the discussion. It will have been reviewed a couple of levels down by the so-called operations deputies of each of the services, chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff, who try to winnow down the issues. The discussion usually follows. The dynamic has not changed quite as much as you would expect; however, what has changed is that we get the issues moving a lot faster. It particularly has an effect down at the colonel and lieutenant colonel level, the so-called planner level in the services, where they get together and start working joint issues with one another and with the Joint Staff. They know that if they drag their feet a little bit, the Chairman's the guy who is on the hook to meet a suspense date from OSD, the Secretary, or the White House. He's going to answer the mail whether they want to get on board or not. So they can't drag their feet on issues, which had been a typical tactic individual services used to stonewall an issue that they knew was going to have an outcome unfavorable to their interests. That was the classic method — the old foot-dragging technique. That's what used to drive the people in OSD up the wall, as well as the critics who thought we really needed to reform the system. That effect really has taken hold. The issues don't lie around much now; they move.

This is the heart of what I wanted to say. This chart (figure 4), which I call my "stovepipe" chart, tries to get across how the mechanics of what's in the law are going to affect the way the bureaucracy works. Back in 1947 — and that's one of the reasons I wanted to give you that background — there was a lot of argument about unifying the armed forces because it meant doing something that was very difficult for the American people to accept: having one person in charge of all our armed forces. Never in the history of our country had one person other than the President been in charge of all our armed forces. The Constitution says the President is the Commander in Chief, and it clearly was intended that there be only one Commander in Chief of all our armed forces. As I told you earlier, when I was in school we used to have debates on some of these same proposals, and that was one of the big issues. How are we ever going to accept having somebody below the President in charge of our armed forces? There was not much enthusiasm for it being a military person, as is common in a lot of other countries.

Before, we had a Secretary of War and a Secretary of the Navy, so there was always fragmentation, and then we brought in the Air Force. Then there was a question: obviously we can't have three people in charge; we've got to have somebody in charge of all three of them. So the Secretary of Defense was established, and two chains of command were established which fragmented power and influence below the level of the Secretary. What people were willing to accept in 1947 and what they strengthened in 1958 was the idea that, below the level of Secretary, we would fragment things.

The fact of the matter is, in 1947 it was much more fragmented than this. What President Eisenhower did in 1958 was to clean this up a little bit. You will recall that James Forrestal, our first Secretary of Defense, became very, very frustrated and his life ended in tragedy. You can imagine what it must have been like: three military department secretaries sitting in the Cabinet meetings along with the Secretary of Defense, all arguing with one another. It must have been real fun.

We have an operational chain of command, and this is the only chain of command through which legal orders to employ forces can be directed from the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands. The other chain of command is the resource management chain of command: the things done to train, equip, organize, and administer the forces. General Vessey, very accurately, liked to describe this as the place where force structuring takes place, where resource allocation takes place, where the budgets are built. Everybody who knows about the Golden Rule knows how that works: who hath the gold maketh the rule. That was one of the problems with the way the department worked.

There was great imbalance between influence in the two chains of command because the unified and specified commands, who are provided forces by the military departments through the vehicle of these component commands, didn't have enough influence in this resource allocation, force structuring process. There were a lot of other problems, but that was the heart of the issue, and the heart of what the Congress was trying to fix. They did fix it in a
number of different ways, none of which by itself was overpowering, but which collectively provided a critical mass needed to make a difference.

The chain of command does not really include the Chairman. If I'd drawn this chart before the reorganization it would just have said JCS, not Chairman, JCS. There was a DOD directive that said the chain of communications would run from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders in the unified and specified commands, but it did not say that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should or would be in the chain of command.

The law, both before and now after the changes, says that “the Chairman shall command no forces.” He is not a commander and cannot command forces; the command chain runs from the Secretary to the unified and specified commanders. But the law comes as close to putting the Chairman in the chain of command as you can get without actually deleting that phrase. It provides that the President and the Secretary have the authority to delegate to the Chairman the responsibility for oversight of the activities of the commanders of the unified and specified commands. It gives the President the authority to provide that the chain of communications from the Secretary to the commanders of the ten unified and specified commands run through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President has signed a piece of paper that says just that.

There were some who wanted to put all those words in the law, but Secretary Weinberger prevailed, explaining that you've got to leave the commander in chief a little bit of authority and flexibility. You shouldn’t tell him exactly how to do everything that he must do. Mr. Weinberger got that wording changed a little bit; there is still a little discomfort about actually putting the Chairman in the chain of command, because it comes a little bit too close to having one uniformed person in charge of all of our armed forces, and some people don’t think that we ought to do that. I think that where we are now is probably a pretty good balance.

McLaughlin: I was just wondering about the Chairman and the forces, going back a couple of years ago when you had agencies such as JSOC, or its predecessor during the Iranian hostage rescue mission, or you go back to SACSA and Son Tay.

*SACSA. Special Assistant (to the Chairman, JCS) for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, planned and directed the 1970 American raid to recover prisoners of war from a camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam.
Those things were run out of the Pentagon. Was that seen by someone as a contradiction of the rule that the Chairman commands no forces? As far as that goes, did they go through any unified or specified commander?

**Herres:** Oh, yes. However, in certain cases they might not. Today everything does, but there are ways you can do it without going through the CINCs — the Secretary of Defense provides the direction. In the Joint Staff, we put together all the orders, but then the Chairman deals with the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Chairman, or I when he’s gone, briefs the orders or shows him the planning order. If it’s not a big hurry, we just send them up to his executive assistant, but normally we carry them up in our hot little hands. When things were going fast last summer in the Persian Gulf, the cabling and the buoys and stuff that went on the back end of the rented tugs that we first used to sweep for mines were deployed from one CINC’s control to another’s only after we cut a deployment order for it and about six experts who went with it for the Secretary of Defense to approve. I mean, that’s the level of detail it goes to.

The Secretary doesn’t have to worry about that sort of detail because we watch it for him. If it’s very complicated, we put together a briefing; if it’s not complicated, we just tell him verbally or we have a staff summary sheet that covers it. But the point is, we get the Secretary’s approval on every single deployment and every single execution order.

Frequently it will go even higher — to the National Security Council. The decision to hit the Rashida oil platform went to the National Security Council. We had options already prepared, on the shelf, but that decision was made all the way over there, at the NSC, as it should be. Then the Secretary approved the execution order; the Chairman does not command.

Some would argue that the Chairman should have that authority over the unified and specified commanders. I think we’re probably about right the way we have it now; I kind of like it the way it is. There isn’t any question in the unified and specified commanders’ minds about how they report; it’s pretty clear.

To sum it all up, the law better balances the influences that exist in these two stovepipes (figure 4). These ten unified and specified commanders needed to have more influence in the outcome of things on the other side. They can’t control the services’ budgets, but the services buy the ammunition and allocate the force structure. The unified and specified commanders wanted more influence, and they’re getting it in a number of ways. I can help the Chairman be their spokesman because he can’t stay on top of all those icebergs at one time. I’m there to attend all the Defense Resources Board meetings that the Chairman can’t attend — and also to attend the ones that he does, so that there’s continuity. So there’s now an operational presence on the Defense Resources Board at all times.

I’m the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, which has more to do with what goes on in the services’ chains of command, but I bring the viewpoints of the unified and specified commanders to that activity where the service acquisition executive and the defense acquisition executive shape and form programs. It’s going to take time for all of this to mature because the influence will be as good as the views, opinions, arguments, and needs that are developed by the CINCs; their staffs will need to build up the capabilities and the understanding of what role they ought to play.

**Oettinger:** There’s one counter-argument to what you just presented, and I’d be interested in your reaction: that the CINCs ought to be worried about being combatant commanders and so forth and so on, and not get absorbed in all of this garbage about budgets and procurement. The view that prevailed was that in that case they had instruments that were blunt instruments. Where do you see the balance between those arguments heading?

**Herres:** I think it came out about right in that regard, Tony. There was a lot of pressure essentially to obfuscate this gap between the two chains of command shown in figure 4. There were people talking about giving the CINCs their own budgets and all that kind of stuff, and that would have emasculated the military departments, creating the utmost in disaster. There’s a reason to have military departments. When I testified on the reorganization, I tried to make the point, “Let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water. We’ve got a good structure here that exists for good reason; let’s not destroy it. We fragmented these chains of command for very good reasons.” The services have the vast logistics systems to manage. Somebody’s got to do that, and the CINCs can’t do it, for the reasons you just said and a lot of others.

We needed to get the situation changed so that they can exert more influence over the services, and I think we’ve struck a good balance now. They don’t have their own budgets. That distinction between the operational commands and the services still exists, but there is the opportunity to exert in-
fluence without controlling what the services do. What we’ve done is balance this out better. I think the result is pretty good. The CINC’s still are the operational commanders, and that is their primary purpose.

The other argument that’s heard a lot — and it’s one that you should know about because it’s an important one for consideration — is the concern that the military departments are interested in future military capabilities and future force structure. These guys were worried about how well prepared and equipped they are to fight tomorrow’s battle, while the CINC’s are worried about how many shells you’ve got in the hold of the ship today. They’re not interested in new ships; they’re interested in more shells, if the hold is not full.

In the Air Force, there are guys who are worried about what kind of fighter we’re going to build in the year 2000, and what kind of airplane we’re going to have to replace the ATB (advanced technology bomber), if you can believe that we need to be thinking that far ahead — and we do. We have to have people thinking that far ahead, because the lead time on developing and exploiting those technologies is that long. The argument is that the CINC’s aren’t going to be as worried about that institutional preservation. I argue, “How do you know that? You can’t tell me that CINCPAC isn’t worried about the posture in the Pacific in 1998.” Sure he is. He’s worried about that just as much as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is worried about the posture of the Air Force in 1998. In the past, he hasn’t been forced to think about that as much, because it didn’t matter; he couldn’t exert all that much influence anyway. But now he’s got a little more influence, a little more responsibility, and so he does worry about 1998.

We’ve got General Woerner, for example, doing a lot of worrying about 1999 in Panama. What are we going to do with his command? The point is these people will worry about those things, but they still have tomorrow’s problem to worry about too. I think the argument is usually carried to the extreme.

McLaughlin: If anything, it could be argued the opposite. CINCEUR is always more worried in war about airlift or sealift than the Navy or the Air Force.

Herres: That’s right. The stimulus of his requirements should form a basis for justification of that shaping of the future force structure. I’m glad you pointed that out, because that’s another dimension of all this. It has a lot to do with my sitting on the Defense Resources Board, because the CINC’s come in and make their pitches at the beginning of each period of development of, say, the Defense Guidance or the Program Objective Memoranda (POM), which ultimately result in the budgets. Then they leave town and I stay behind and go to all the rest of the meetings to continue to advocate the views they expressed.

Oettinger: There remains this matter of informalities versus legislation versus structure and so on. If I hear you right, if your successor someday does not come up through having been a CINC, but comes up through having been a service guy, he might then just forget about it.

Herres: It will be unfortunate. In my view, that was the single most important reason to make my position the number two position, because you would not get those kinds of people — former CINC’s — to come into the job if the Vice Chairman was going to be relegated to a position of rank below that of the Chiefs. When I leave, let’s say the next guy the Chairman wants to be the Vice Chairman is CINCPAC or CINC something else, the guy’s not going to take the job. He’s going to say, “Well, if you want me to retire, I’ll retire. If you want me to stay out here I’ll stay out here. But I’m not going to come back there and be a potted palm in Washington.” That’s kind of what he would have been had he not been given a position of influence — a nice guy to go to all the ceremonies and represent the Chairman at all the meetings he didn’t have time to go to, but with no real clout. That would have been the unfortunate thing; still, school’s not out. I don’t know how it’s going to come out, but I know for sure how it would have come out had they made the other decision.

Oettinger: The rank makes it attractive for a CINC to accept the offer if it is made, but there’s no propulsion.

Herres: I’m not sure that’s true, but the converse is certainly true. It would have been very unattractive, and that couldn’t have been tolerated.

Student: I understand the balance, and that an interesting part of your position will be, as you say, to try to keep the people in the acquisition and resource part checked....

Herres: Keep them oriented toward the requirements. Let me just say that another way, to reinforce the point, “It’s to keep these people in the

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*General Frederick F. Woerner, USA, CINCSOUTH (U.S. Southern Command).*
military departments from writing their requirements independent of any regard for what the operational commanders say they really need."

Student: What is the interest of the Office of the Secretary of Defense in that regard — on this balancing act? I would suppose theoretically that among these people, being political appointees, most often, their interest will be more on the service side than on the operational chain of command if there was a conflict of interest.

Herres: Institutionally they’re all up with the Secretary. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition presides over a pretty good sized staff and he’s pretty interested in the military departments; yet, he has to keep an ear cocked to the requirements. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is very much interested in what’s going on the operational side, because he’s got the international security policy, arms control issues — all the dealings with the State Department and so forth. There’s an Assistant Secretary for Force Management and Personnel, which is really manpower/personnel. He’s interested in both because we have a lot of joint manpower issues. He’s dealing with both sides, and there are others like that. The Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs deals primarily with the services.

Student: What you’re saying is that it is balanced and there is no vested interest of the political personnel at the top in believing that what is real defense politics in the country is acquisition.

Herres: There are plenty of vested interests, but hopefully there are checks and balances to take care of all that. There are always vested interests. But your point about defense policy is interesting — that the real defense policy is made on the acquisition side.

Student: I’m being a little bit pushy to say that the Congress and the acquisition side is very important. The balance is not in order.

Oettinger: Wouldn’t it be accurate to say that the SecDef and ultimately the President as Commander in Chief really has his bread buttered on both sides? This is inherent in his job under the Constitution, because on the one hand, as the chief of the civil government and so forth and patronage, etc., etc., the mogul on the right hand of the chart is important to the President. On the other hand, if something gets screwed up on his watch, a la Grenada, or Desert One, or whatever, he’s got hell to pay also. So it’s hard to imagine a President who is wide awake failing to worry about both of these, because they are both important.

Herres: Or a Secretary. Or the Congress. A lot of the stimulus for criticism was that Congress felt there wasn’t enough influence on the operational side; that there were too many vested interests from the military/industrial complex, even a lot of it from within their own ranks. There are contradictions all over the place, but I think now we’re better postured to deal with those contradictions and imbalances. There’s a more natural way for all that to happen which I hope I’ve made clear. But there will always be vested interests coming at this thing from all sides.

What was weak was the role that was being played by the operational side. What was too strong were all these other roles — much too strong in some cases. Most contractors are working within the service side because the contracts are let and managed there; the systems acquisitions are all done over there. The idea is to make sure that there’s a relationship between what we really need and what is bought, rather than what somebody wants to sell and what is bought. We haven’t eradicated the latter. We never will, not in a free society. We just have to do the best we can with it.

Student: But do you think the act goes in the right direction?

Herres: Exactly. Very much so. It takes a big step in that direction.

Student: As I understand from Jim Locher’s talk last week, a big concern was the failure to provide readiness. That speaks to why the act strengthens the commands, and forces them to do something other than get the big ticket items. We had Andy Marshall* here last night and he said when we asked him what was going to get cut from the new defense budget that all the things that were going to get cut were from the unified and specified commands. Obviously, he’s not in charge, but it seems to me that we’re in the same boat that we were in before the 1986 reorganization act. In terms of the output, the flow charts are changing, but what can the United States do in the world?

Herres: Time will tell. I think we did pretty well with the first test. It was also serendipitous we had this first test. It was only a $32 billion test, but it was an interesting dry run to get ready for what’s going to be the big test: our next two-year budget.

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*Dr. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
that the services are just tidying up to submit to OSD right now. However, you hit on a good point. There is no natural constituency for what we refer to as readiness and sustainability. There isn’t any good clean definition as to what readiness and sustainability really are, but they are the resources you set aside so you can do realistic exercises in the field: buy ammunition so that you’ve got the rounds in the hold of the ship, gasoline to do the flying, the oil to do the steaming, and so forth. Unless an armed force does those kinds of things, it’s not ready to go to war. You’ve got to get them out there and have them doing things instead of sitting around a garrison playing cards. They’ve got to have ammunition and other supplies so they’ll last more than a day or two in combat. We classify all the things that have to do with that as readiness and sustainability.

We have a hard time measuring it. It’s hard to quantify readiness and sustainability. It’s a little easier in the Air Force and the Navy than in the Army, but still we’ve come up with a few rules of thumb. We’ve set standards on how many hours a month a fighter pilot must fly in his primary aircraft. We assume that the supervisory structure is going to provide realistic training requirements that use that time fruitfully; we can measure the number of flying hours and have a pretty good idea of how combat-ready a pilot is. There are steaming hours in the Navy — how much we can keep the ships at sea doing exercises; we have battalion training days in the Army, and so forth.

There is no natural constituency for such things as ammunition and spare parts. There’s a tendency on the service side to get the ships, tanks, and airplanes out in the field because they’re visible forms of deterrence and force structure. You’ve got a few rounds of ammunition for all of them, and that’s okay, but nobody knows if you’ve got two weeks’, or two months’, or two years’ supply. In part, we measure our sustainability in terms of how many years’ or months’ supply we have. The operational commanders worry a lot about that, because if we go to war, they’re the ones who are going to have to take that force structure and keep throwing it into combat. They worry about that a great deal. It’s difficult, though. If you push for another $100 million worth of spare parts, you can turn things around and get them fixed faster and don’t have to wait for spare parts from the factory; therefore, you have a higher level of readiness. But if you have $100 million more and the unified and specified commanders don’t know how it is going to get distributed, it gets to be a problem. The point is, no one can really know that if he doesn’t support that $100 million requirement, he’s going to be in real trouble. CINCEUR may assume that he’s going to get his fair share, but he doesn’t know what that is, or what the other CINCs really need.

What I think Jim Locher was saying is a form of what I’m describing here — that by increasing the influence of the CINCs we will create a more critical and natural constituency for operational readiness and sustainability rather than for force structure, which has natural constituencies in the Boeings, the General Dynamics, and the McDonnell Douglas of the world. When their program gets cut, you can be assured that nobody in the Pentagon has to do a thing before lobbyists are over there on the Hill buttonholing the staffers to get them to put the money back. A rumor surfaced that we were going to cut the SR-71. I hadn’t been back in the office 15 minutes before some guy from industry was calling and wanted to know what he could do to help.

**Student:** That’s my question. I’m fully aware of what the intention was, and I appreciate how that was. But if Andy Marshall is correct....

**Herres:** I’m not sure he’s correct. If he’s correct then the system will have failed, and we will have to do better and work harder. The Chairman and I, I in particular, will probably have to answer for that, or at least answer for whatever efforts we exerted to prevent that from being correct. If you take the $33 billion amended budget supplement we just went through, he’s not correct. We did satisfy the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands. We cut things that they didn’t want to see cut, but they recognized that you don’t take a $33 billion cut without affecting everybody. It’s a question of doing it in a balanced way.

We measure our budget in terms of four groupings: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and force structure. We put money in each of those four categories. Readiness and sustainability are the things in which the CINCs are traditionally most interested. They have the most to do with whether or not you’re going to win a war tomorrow. Modernization has a lot to do with next year and the year after, because you’ve got some old stuff out there that you need to improve and modernize. Force structure is how much of what you’ve got. If you cut back F-15 production from 150 a year to 120 a year, you’re going to reduce the size of your force structure to man those planes. The idea is to
do all four in a balanced fashion. Andy's telling you that he doesn't think that's going to happen in a balanced fashion. I hope he's wrong. I'm sure he hopes he's wrong too.

Croke: It's more complicated than that. If you look at the people who are likely to respond to force readiness, you look at General Creech, just after he took over as Commander of the Tactical Air Command (TAC). He's not a CINC in the sense of going up the left side of that stovepipe. Nevertheless...

Herres: What he was working on was training and logistics.

Croke: When he was going to Langley Air Force Base, his chief priority, all he ever talked about, was his new program that improves maintenance at the sergeant level because of what that would mean to the sortie generation capability of the services. He had assembled a whole site. In his role as commander of TAC he was much better equipped to address the question of readiness. But he actually was on the right hand side of the stovepipe or down below. The same is true for the Navy. The CINC's, since you're using your left-hand stovepipe, have a lot to say about requirements, and to say that they don't interact with the right-hand side....

Herres: Oh, sure. Absolutely. Please understand that these guys are not enemies. They're all trying to work together. But we've got a structure that fragments their role, and hopefully they will work together. General Creech is doing exactly what he should be doing — train, equip, organize, and administer forces and provide them to the unified and specified commanders as ready to go to war. The trouble is, when we debate budgets, we start making tradeoffs. The question that we just addressed has to do with decisions about, "Well, shall we cut back the production rate of F-15s from 150 a year to 120 a year to pay for more Maverick air-to-surface missiles, or more ammunition for the guns or something like that, or shall we keep up the force structure production rate, the 150 F-15s a year, and take the reduction that we're going to have to take somewhere else — out of fuel, spare parts, and so forth?" That's the balancing. General Creech was optimizing the outcome of those decisions in a very effective way. In doing so, he frees up money to do other things.

Oettinger: Nothing in the legislation guards against incompetence, or being asleep, and so on. The intent was to tweak the balance, not so much in the Creech situation, or the unified command where the right-hand side and the left-hand side are pretty much the same. It seems to me it's in those instances where the CINC in need has multiservice components and needs to enter into the kind of debate you're talking about to make sure that an interservice argument gets resolved in a fashion that creates for him some combatant forces that are workable. There's a flaw, but it seems to me a sense of the unknown that can't be guarded against except by electing good people and realizing that every CINC does not only care about tomorrow. If he doesn't worry about a year or two down the road, he's not going to be influential. If somebody who is the procurement type and doesn't care about the CINC's role is put in the position of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then nothing is going to work. I don't know of any way that legislation can take care of those things.

Herres: The area where this is most dramatically felt is in the unglamorous systems that don't find a lot of support. I used F-15s as an example, but some force structuring things need to be done that are not terribly popular with the services, but are important on the operational side. We've got one coming up before too long. Over-the-horizon radars have always been a problem; they're big and expensive and nobody's in love with them since they take away from force structure in other areas. But the CINCs need them, and we're going to have a shootout here before long; the services are probably going to want to cut back on their deployment. The East Coast radar is in place, right up the road here in Maine. The West Coast is going in now in Oregon, and then we need to put one in Alaska. If we don't put the one in Alaska, CINCPAC and CINCNORAD both are going to be very upset and very concerned, and so we'll have a natural clashing and I will be in there fighting hard for the CINCs.

However, the CINCs are not always right. Sometimes they have their little pet rocks. To give you an example, the Air Force wanted to take down the C-130 weather reconnaissance aircraft last spring. We've had these old models of the C-130s flying around in the Pacific. We've taken them out of the other theaters, but kept them in the Pacific because they're typhoon hunters — they go out and find the typhoons, fly through them, and get a lot of very important data. If a typhoon were to hit Clark Air Force Base without proper warning, it could do several million dollars' worth of damage. But we've spent a lot of money on weather satellites and other things to track typhoons; these C-130s were just
getting some fine tuning of the data. The Air Force said, "Look, you can’t just keep adding more and more structure to track typhoons without taking some of the old structure out, and these dogs cost us a lot of money to maintain and operate." And for this six-aircraft detachment, the Joint Staff and CINCPAC’s staff were willing to fall on their spears and threaten that it was the end of western civilization if we took those C-130s out of the inventory. So I had to send the Joint Staff back to the drawing board two or three times and tell them to be objective. They were spring-loaded to defend the CINC’s position and use up $30 million a year of Air Force funding. To make a long story short, the CINC and I sat down and agreed we really ought to take these C-130s out. So we did that. Those are variations of both extremes that take place.

**Student:** Jim Locher spent quite a bit of time last week talking about the Special Operations Command and the events leading up to it and some of the good points and bad points. I know you’ve got other things planned here, but could you just spend a couple of minutes talking about some of the problems you see with the 1986 legislation and its organization? You spoke of some problems with that structure there and how it kind of messes things up.

**Herres:** The problems I see are in Title IV, in the personnel management end of it. In this kind of thing I’m describing now, I don’t see any new problems. I see a lot of old problems going away, but I don’t see any really big new problems.

**Oettinger:** I think what he’s referring to is that the CINCSOC blurred these stovepipes, which might create some problems, and I think he’s asking you to elaborate.

**McLaughlin:** Jim had talked last week about the 1986 legislation and how it tends to come from special operations....

**Herres:** While Goldwater-Nichols was going on, we had another bunch of reorganizers who thought that the Department of Defense had not paid enough attention and spent enough time worrying about forces designed to deal with terrorism and low-intensity conflict. One problem is that everybody’s got his own idea of what low intensity conflict is. We have a lot of special forces developed for different reasons. Unconventional war, for example, is an integral part of what these guys do. But what these reorganizers wanted was some centralized control and management of all these unconventional warfare assets. They attributed all the problems in the Desert One operation, and other things, to our lack of centralized control.

A lot of their arguments were justified. While the Department of Defense was trying to solve that problem, Congress took the bull by the horns and enacted legislation that established a Special Operations Command and specified that its commander in chief should have his own budget for SOF-unique items. None of the other CINCs have separate budgets, and they don’t really want or need them for reasons we talked about earlier. The law even established a position on the Secretary’s staff — the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

**Oettinger:** Their argument, as I understand it, is that they need it because the real military departments and the CINCs don’t pay enough attention to it. It’s a stepchild umpteen times removed. That argument is not absurd, so the question is, why do you feel so strongly that the balance is okay now, and that they are trying to unbalance something which is pretty good?

**Herres:** I’m not sure, first of all, that the problem was nearly as severe as they characterized it. By that I mean, sure, you can point to failures of actions, and they pointed to a lot of isolated cases to make their point. But you don’t reorganize every time somebody screws up. That was really the kind of attitude for a while there in Washington as you got into this reorganization fever; some people just wanted to reorganize whether they knew what they were doing or not.

**McLaughlin:** There are a whole bunch of people out there who have been convinced for a long time that there needs to be some kind of organizational focus on special operations and low intensity conflict. A simple argument is that the Fulda Gap, and the central nuclear exchange, while the two most important scenarios for war, are in fact the two least likely scenarios in the next 20 years, as they have been for the last 40. The problems are apt to be Vietnam or Central America, and all sorts of other things like that, and one of the services should see that as its central mission, or a mission of great importance.

**Herres:** I think that criticism is overstated. The services had been doing a substantial number of things. General Vessey formed a special operations agency in the Joint Staff, and that was a good way of getting more emphasis. The Chiefs — even before the 1986 law — were in the process of expanding that. They were going to put a three-star in charge of a broader agency, with more people, that
could coordinate the activities, standardize training, develop doctrine, and so forth across service lines and across unified command lines as well, because you’ve got a two-dimensional problem. All that was ongoing.

Oettinger: Something doesn’t ring true. Some say that the problem is creation of a shadow service and yet what you describe as a complaint is less creation of a shadow service than an overt CINC. These guys are complaining because their forces now belong to another CINC and need to be chopped over to them if they want, or maybe all training is not in the theater but somewhere else. But that strikes me as more of a complaint about having another CINC rather than the shadow service. And if I heard Locher correctly....

Herrus: They’re not complaining because there’s another CINC necessarily, but because forces that were assigned to them to do a legitimate part of the spectrum of their mission were taken away and were assigned to another CINC who’s responsible not for employing forces, but for training and equipping them — more of a service function.

Oettinger: If it were merely a shadow service or a real service that was in charge of the procurement and training and so on, and the guys were assigned to the CINC, then there wouldn’t be a problem. The problem as you described it is the CINC facet of what is going on, not the service facet.

Herrus: The problem is he’s a CINC, but in effect, he has the force structuring and training missions normally assigned to a service.

Oettinger: It’s the services’ functions that are being performed. There are four services — you don’t need a fifth.

Herrus: Let me just make one other point and then I’ll do nothing but questions. This is the last chart (figure 5). The one point I want to make is that this is a different organizational structure, more of a classic one. The Department of Defense has the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries and the special staff and the three military departments, the four services, and then the Chairman. The point of the chart is that in the stovepipe structure you saw before, the Chairman and I are only in the left-hand side. We exert influence through a variety of mechanisms, such as the Defense Resources Board, the Defense Acquisition Board, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and other things. We are not in that right-hand stovepipe, not in any way, shape, or form.
The chiefs of the services are the Chairman’s most trusted advisers, I assure you. They sign off on all the important joint documents, such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which is one of the most important documents we produce every year in the Joint Staff. Their staffs influence all of that development very, very heavily. They are also, of course, in the other chain of command with both hands and feet because they’re the chiefs of their services. The point is, only the chiefs of the four services have a foot in both camps. There isn’t anybody else in the Pentagon below the level of the Secretary who has a foot in both camps. That’s an important relationship.

I think it was General Walter Bedell Smith who, when asked in his older age about war, reflected and said that any damn fool can shove tanks, and ships, and airplanes around a map, but the real business of war is getting the beans, the bullets, the gas, and the ammunition where it’s needed at the right time. That’s what the military departments, and nobody else, can really do. They are the logistics infrastructure in the broadest context and the backbone — building the force structure of the future and supporting the force structure of today. You can build the most beautiful force structure in the world, but if you don’t have the gas, and the ammunition, and the spare parts, as Bedell Smith said, it doesn’t make any difference what happens over there in that operational chain of command for very long. You cannot emasculate the role of the military departments. They’re the backbone of what matters: building and supporting force structure. And the service chiefs play this very critical role.

I point this out because some felt that the big problem with the legislation was that it would emasculate the roles of the chiefs of the services. I assure you it doesn’t, and one of the reasons is that the Chairman depends so heavily on their advice. He’s not going to tell the Secretary to make some commitment without talking to these guys and seeing whether or not it’s supportable. The fastest way to get in trouble in this business of military employment is to make some decision that can’t be supported. More dumb decisions are made in military force employment by people who forget what it takes to support forces than anything else. That’s why Bedell Smith said what he did. One of the things that makes our armed forces, in my view, better than any in the world is that we support logistically better than any other. We’ve proven that time, and time, and time again. It’s not easy, but there’s no military establishment in the world that has the capacity to do that as ours does. However, we also spend a lot of money on that capability.

What we’ve been able to do in the Persian Gulf over the last year or so has been pretty dramatic when you consider the amount of basic structure we need to support it. It’s sort of a miraculous achievement. One of the most impressive things I’ve ever seen in my life was the decision after the Tet Offensive to deploy the best part of the Strategic Air Command to the Pacific and start bombing, which, of course, whether you like it or not, is really what brought the North Vietnamese to the table and convinced them they ought to give our prisoners back. Strategic Air Command deployed B-52s and went from 1,000 sorties a month to 3,000 sorties a month, literally overnight. The order went out from the Pentagon, and in three days the sortie rate went from 1,000 to 3,000 and it never stopped until about two months after the prisoners came home.

That is something, and that’s what this whole structure is trying to do: to make ours the most supportable, sustainable, combat-ready armed force in the world. And that’s what makes deterrence credible.

Croke: Reading the law as it relates to the new special forces, I asked Jim Locher, and he said there’s no contracting authority. I don’t know whether that’s true or not, but that was his response to my question.

Herres: That’s right.

Croke: The law says that only with the exception when the President dictates will this new command be allowed to plan and conduct exercises. So there are a number of safeguards in both your stovepipes about this new command.

Herres: Let me say it this way — he does have some limited procurement authority. But he has the budgeting authority, which kind of obviates the procuring authority.

Croke: It’s lurking in the weeds, but it’s not there at the moment. How much of the actual authority...

Herres: He has no authority for force employment, but he does have the authority to exercise.

Oettinger: We have run out of time. Thank you very, very much.