INCIDENTAL PAPER

Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control

A Proposed Restructuring of the Intelligence Community
James R. Clapper, Jr.

Guest Presentations, Spring 1996
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January 1997

Program on Information Resources Policy

Center for Information Policy Research
Harvard University

The Program on Information Resources Policy is jointly sponsored by Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research.

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A Proposed Restructuring of the Intelligence Community

James R. Clapper, Jr.

Prior to assuming his current position as Vice President of Vredenburgs, Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., was Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a position he assumed in 1991. Gen. Clapper graduated from the University of Maryland with a B.S. in political science in 1963, and was then commissioned in the U.S. Air Force. In 1964, after completing the Signal Intelligence Officers Course, he served as an analytic branch chief at the Air Force Special Communications Center at Kelly AFB, TX. In 1965, he was assigned to the 2nd Air Division (later the 7th Air Force) in Vietnam as a warning center watch officer and later as an air defense analyst. His subsequent assignments include serving as Commander of Detachment 3, 6994th Security Squadron, in Thailand, where he flew 73 combat support missions over Laos and Cambodia; military assistant to the Director of the National Security Agency; and aide to the Commander and later intelligence staff officer, Air Force Systems Command. His assignments after he graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1975 include serving as Chief, Signal Intelligence Branch, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); Director for Intelligence Plans and Systems, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), Headquarters, USAF; Commander of the Air Force Technical Applications Center; and ACSI, Republic of Korea and U.S. Combined Forces Command. Gen. Clapper became Director for Intelligence, Headquarters, PACOM, in 1987, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, in 1989. In 1990, he was named ACSI, Headquarters, USAF. Gen. Clapper holds many military awards and decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, and Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters.

Oettinger: This introduction, fortunately, will be very brief because you’ve all had a chance to look at General Clapper’s biography, so you know a good deal about the milestones in his career. I merely want to add that it is a great personal delight and privilege to have him with us today. I’ve gotten to know him in some collaborative efforts over the last two or three years, and think of him as one of the most remarkable and delightful people to work with. I’m so happy that he was able to take some time to join us here today. He has declared himself to be interruptible with questions from the start. So I urge you to ask him questions so I don’t have to be too obnoxious myself. It’s all yours, Jim.

Clapper: Thank you, Tony. It’s a great pleasure to be up here. A few of you were asking me how was I adjusting since I retired from the Air Force last September after 32 years of service. All of it’s been in the intelligence field. I’ve heard all the jokes about “military intelligence is a contradiction in terms,” or “the second oldest profession,” or “it’s a self-licking ice cream cone,” and all that, all of which are not true. It’s the oldest profession, since ... well, I won’t go into that.

Anyway, one of the benefits of all this is that I’ve been having a good bit of discourse with the media (they got my phone number from somebody), and I found that I can speak with a lot less inhibition now that I’m out from under than I could when I was still on active duty.

What I’ve done here is jotted down a list of topics, and based on your feedback and what you’d like to explore or go into, I’ll try to respond. This is probably not the right place in the course for you to take this up, but I do have a series of foils here, vugraphs about my thesis on how I think the intelligence community should be rather profoundly reorganized—far more than it’s going to be, I would point out, based on what I understand all the groups in Washington, inside the Beltway, that are now looking at the intelligence community
(which is something of a cottage industry) think about how the intelligence community ought to be reformed. I might impose that on you, because I think it would raise some issues and hopefully would stimulate some dialogue. I hope this will be a dialogue, not a monologue.

What I propose to cover is maybe a little discourse on why a government should do intelligence: my construct, at least, on what the missions of intelligence and the intelligence community are. I might then go into the current structure and what my proposal would be for restructuring, which I have briefed far and wide in Washington, to the Aspin-Brown Commission, to the House Intelligence Committee, and to Mr. Deutch (who doesn’t like it particularly). So I will be happy to share that with you. Maybe I’ll also give you some useful vignettes or war stories on the politicization of intelligence. Pressures to politicize for a particular point of view are always an issue in the intelligence community, and I’ve got, I think, two illustrative war stories involving General Powell when he was the Chairman of the JCS and General Peay, who was CENTCOM commander. Maybe I’ll say a little bit on the Gulf War legacy: lessons learned, fixes, some of which I think is kind of phony—a three-dollar bill. We can talk about that, and about the business of supporting two major regional conflicts. My basic thesis is that the U.S. government does not have sufficient intelligence wherewithal to support two major regional conflicts, even if we had such an unlikely event occur. I’ll mention some of the current challenges: the transition of the intelligence community as we get over the Cold War and the sort of world we face now. I’ll also talk about why I have a problem with what I would call the artificial marriage of command and control and communications and intelligence, something that people like to think fuses up and works. Sometimes it does, and sometimes it doesn’t. Maybe I’ll digress on information warfare. So if any of that piques your interest, or that seems to be a reasonably logical flow, I hope that’s responsive to what your needs might be.

It would seem to me that any group that’s seriously contemplating intelligence as it’s practiced today by the United States probably would start with at least contemplating the question, “Why do you do it?” The thing that’s irritated me a lot is that too often the onus for defending intelligence—why we do it and why we spend all the money on it—falls on the intelligence community, when, in fact, that’s not the right institution to do that. If the United States is going to continue its role as the world’s 911 and be the major power, or the world’s policeman, or whatever you want to call it, that inherently requires a robust intelligence capability. If, on the other hand, we’re going to revert to a post-World War I sort of environment, very insular, just North America only, then okay, you don’t need a lot of intelligence.

So the decision hinges on somebody, in a position of authority, deciding what the role of the United States is going to be. If it’s going to be what it seems to be today, that inherently requires a robust intelligence capability. In fact, I would argue (and have, with varying degrees of success) that even as we draw down the military establishment—the force structure of the United States military—intelligence should at least not be reduced at the same rate proportionally, because as we have less force structure we become a little less responsive militarily. That, inherently, in my view, requires a greater appreciation, greater sensitivity, greater warning time, so that should we need to reconstitute the military at the magnitude that we had during the Cold War, we would have sufficient warning so that you could generate the industrial base, the manpower, et cetera, to reconstitute the force structure.

But why do we do it? I would suggest to you that the penultimate reason why you do intelligence, or why you want to gain information, has to do with the simple need to reduce or, if you can, eliminate uncertainty for the decision maker. For the decision maker who sits in the White House, in the cockpit, in the foxhole, or a ship at sea, when it really comes down to it, the ultimate purpose of intelligence is to reduce uncertainty. Because if he contemplates some course of action, whether it’s some very cosmic thing that the President might do with a foreign country, or a guy in the
foxhole knowing who is on the other side of the next hill, basically, the purpose is to have that information available to that decision maker to reduce or, if you can, eliminate uncertainty. If you say “eliminate,” that’s the sort of the God’s eye, God’s ear view of the battlefield, the so-called information dominance, all that sort of thing. If you had perfect God’s eye vision of all events at all times, obviously that’s the ultimate. Equally obviously, you’re not going to get that. So the best that you can hope for is to help reduce or attenuate the uncertainty if you can’t eliminate it.

The missions of intelligence I would describe in two contexts. One involves those instances in which there is a threat or jeopardy to the very existence of the United States as a nation state. In these days, that’s kind of a short list. It’s anybody with strategic weapons, weapons of mass destruction—Russia, China, and maybe a few others, but that’s about it. In other words, it’s either some capability or a nation state that actually poses a mortal threat to the United States. That’s the short list.

Then the very long list derives from the pursuit of U.S. national interests, whatever they may be, wherever they may be. It may be restoring democracy in Haiti, or doing whatever we’re doing in Bosnia, or feeding the starving masses in Somalia or Burundi, maintaining or helping to support enforcement of the U.N. Security Council resolutions in Iraq, whatever it turns out to be. None of those situations involves a mortal threat to the United States, obviously, but they are all derived from this role that we have and we’ve assumed (by default, I guess) as the world’s policeman.

So I would organize this into two contexts. This was brought home to me in a dialogue I had one of the times I appeared to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee. Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NB) was trying to engage me in projecting what the threats would be for the next 10 or 15 years, because that’s what ought to drive the size and shape of the intelligence budget. In other words, “Tell me what the threats are and we’ll size intelligence accordingly,” which to me misses the point, because if we are also going to pursue national interests in cases where there is no threat, which also entails voracious use of intelligence, then that too has to be a part of this question of how you figure out what resources to allocate to intelligence.

Oettinger: Jim, on that point, and stop me if you’re going to get to this anyway, the question of intelligence as gathering or dealing with secrets—you know, prying into other people’s secrets versus open source—it would seem to me that on that spectrum from the short list to the long list, there would be some difference in the degree to which you might find one or the other useful.

Clapper: There obviously will be, and, of course, ideally you would want to draw on the whole spectrum of potential information, and I use that term in its most generic sense. A subset of information, I suppose, is intelligence, which involves some form of spying, be it technical or human.

Oettinger: But in terms of the mission of an intelligence agency, do you see it as covering the whole spectrum or do you mean it to ... ?

Clapper: I think intelligence needs to focus on what it’s there to do and what it’s best at, which is (and that’s why I always try to inject the phrase) “governmentally sanctioned information gathering,” from which derives intelligence. Basically what you are trying to get at is information on a denied area or a denied topic that is not otherwise available to you in open sources. The trick for the intelligence community at large or the individual analyst who is contemplating a given problem is knowledge of what is in the open literature, what’s openly available, and then supplementing or augmenting that with information which can be derived only from governmentally sanctioned intelligence methods. I’m not sure I responded to your point. So, in terms of emphasis, and that’s clearly where the resources are, the money is spent on those things where you’re getting at a denied target that’s not otherwise available. Now clearly, the intelligence community has awakened to the potential benefits and advantages of capitalizing on what’s available
in the open source literature, and there’s money being spent on how to extract from those databases and have them available.

Oettinger: But there’s also a line of argument that says that because there’s so much open stuff available there’s no need for intelligence. It’s a somewhat extreme argument, but it’s out there.

Clapper: I disagree with that. It presupposes that what’s available openly is accurate. Some of it is not. Some of it is misinformation. So you need some independent way of verifying that. There are some things that are not visible, literally and figuratively, to the media or to other open sources.

I meant to comment on the point about citing references that you derive from the Internet. Intelligence has its own classified version of Internet, called InteLink. One of the policy issues that the community is wrestling with right now (it had started when I was still on active duty) is still not resolved. It has to do with the issue of deciding on the validity or veracity of what appears on the InteLink. If Sergeant Smith at Fort Lewis comes up with a grand analysis of what’s going to happen in North Korea and puts it out on the InteLink, well, who validates that? Is that the ultimate word or not? What is the authority that comes with the stuff that just appears on the InteLink as if by magic? Everybody thinks it’s wonderful, and it is, because it really revolutionizes the dissemination of intelligence. It overcomes this traditional communications constipation that intelligence has had. We get a lot of information, but how do we get it someplace? With that revolution and the rapidity with which you can move information around comes the challenge or the policy issue of deciding on the veracity or the validity of the information when it appears. You’d have somewhat the same problem, even in an academic sense, if you were drawing on the Internet the same way. What is the veracity, authenticity, validity of this information?

Another thing in intelligence—this is unique to intelligence, of course—is that right away you have violated a fundamental, holy tenet of intelligence, which is protection of sources and methods and the need-to-know principle, where you don’t disseminate intelligence to those who don’t necessarily need it. If you put it on InteLink, even though it is in a classified context, it’s going to people all over the place who don’t necessarily have a need-to-know for that particular information. In fact, when we set up the initial InteLink experiment, I demanded from the DCI a letter saying that it was okay to violate his own sacred tenet about disseminating information to those who don’t need to know. So, some interesting challenges are posed by the wonderful technology that’s inherent in the Internet or, in our intelligence case, the InteLink. That’s a parenthetical comment.

Anyway, are there any other questions or comments? Please pipe up and take issue or argue with me.

Oettinger: I’ve advertised you guys as not being shy, so don’t let me down.

Clapper: Before I get to the reform notion, which is, of course, a big thing around the Beltway these days, let me talk a little about politicization of intelligence. That’s one of the hazards of being a practitioner of it, where you’re pressured to espouse a particular point of view—how do you interpret the information or assess it in such a way that it comes out with a particular bias?

I’ll give you a case in point, and this shows the importance of ensuring that seniors in the government understand the sensitivity connected to it. I’d been director of DIA for I guess a year or two, I don’t know exactly. But anyway, there is a process in the government, and there’s a whole body of law and regulation, pertaining to import/export controls and trying to protect American technology and all this sort of thing. An American missile company was going to be bought out by a French concern, which will necessarily have to remain nameless, and there is an interagency process whereby the State Department and the intelligence community and others involved have to assess the merits of this buy, and whether it poses any particular challenge or danger to America or American technology. DIA, the agency I was director of, was a
part of this process, and we wrote up a rather scathing indictment of this company, which had some dealings with some nefarious people like Libya and North Korea. Basically, our bottom line was that no way should this purchase be allowed to go forth. This found its way across the river to Congress, and as is the Congress' wont, it was just a question of time before it found its way into the media, and the next thing I know is the New York Times and the Washington Post have a big blurb there about how the DIA put the finger on this nefarious French company, by name.

So the day that appeared in the Early Bird—the compilation of all the doom and gloom in the media that's the first thing everybody reads in the Pentagon when they come to work—I got a call from General Powell, the Chairman. Normally those are not good deals, because normally he does not call you to say something nice or pass the time of day. So he summoned me down. He had just gotten a call from his French counterpart, who was taking him to task for "How could this dastardly agency that you run, DIA, put in this terrible stuff about France, and, you know, we're blood brothers in Desert Storm," and, oh, he really laid it on heavy. So General Powell was laying this out to me, and I'm thinking, "This is going to be bad." At the end of it he just said, "Look, I took care of [his French counterpart], so don't worry about it. You just keep reporting, you know, just call them as you see them."

That's a very important thing in intelligence. I came to realize after four hard years at DIA that an important aspect of intelligence, or of running an intelligence institution (it sounds a little idealistic or altruistic perhaps), is the institutional integrity of intelligence as it's practiced nationally and in any part of it. If you don't have integrity, you've lost everything. It's like real estate—location, location, location. In intelligence, it's integrity, integrity, integrity. Integrity.

Another example is perhaps more illustrative of the internal forces at work here. We did a National Intelligence Estimate, which was ordered up by the DCI, that was sort of a national appraisal of Iraqi military capabilities post-Desert Storm. This was after the October 1994 foray in which Sad-dam moved parts of two or three Republican Guard divisions towards Kuwait, which caused a lot of angst in the community, and we were charged up to reassess a previous estimate on what the residual military capabilities of Iraq were in this post-Desert Storm environment. My approach was to involve the command in question. In our case, the operational commander was Central Command, who had oversight over that area of responsibility. Of course, there was a tendency, and understandably so, on Central Command's part to sort of magnify the threat, perhaps make it 10 feet tall when in our view, inside the Washington area with all the intelligence expertise there, that maybe it was only six or seven feet tall.

So we had an argument back and forth, and ultimately resolved it by basically including in the estimate a high-impact but low-probability scenario in which CENTCOM was postulating that the Iraqi army could somehow find its way all the way down into the innards of Saudi Arabia, which we felt, given the poor state of maintenance and logistics and morale and everything else in the Iraqi army, would be quite a hard row to hoe. So I thought I'd basically resolved that issue, although there was a lot of bitterness about it—hot tempers and all this sort of thing. But, to his great credit, I thought, General Peay, the four-star commander of Central Command, called me after all the dust settled and said basically the same thing: "You've got to call them as you see them. We can agree or disagree professionally, but it's important from the standpoint of institutional integrity that you have to call them as you see them."

So I just cite those as two war stories that I think illustrate something whose importance I didn't realize when I first became director of DIA. Certainly after four years of it, I came away with a very strong conviction about the importance of integrity in the business, and I think even if you are a practitioner, a professional, or just an interested citizen, this is something that you should always look at or gauge when you're considering any action that the intelligence community takes or doesn't take: have they met the test of essentially telling the truth and standing up to the flak that may result politically by telling it?
Oettinger: Perhaps under the heading of integrity, but the details of its practice, in this illustration, you said, “low-probability scenario” and so on. At what point do you decide between a range of possibilities and a “this is it” kind of thing? Jack Leide described in his relationship with General Schwarzkopf a certain pressure: a “You tell me what you think it is, and don’t give me ifs, ands, or buts. You’ve got to be thinking for me” kind of thing, versus perhaps the difference in taste or difference in outlook that says, “Give me the range and I consider that you’re preempting my operational prerogative if you give me only the one point.” That’s less a matter of integrity, perhaps, than a matter of detailed professional practice.

Clapper: The way I try to sort that out in my own mind is to abide by something that General Powell used to say when looking at his intel staff, which would be, “Tell me what you know. Tell me what you think when I ask you for it, and be sure you distinguish between the two.” Now in the case of the Iraqi capability, the intelligence community is always good at bean counting. We can count how many vehicles, how many tanks, how many artillery pieces, how many infantry fighting vehicles, and how many HETs (heavy equipment trailers) the Iraqis had available, what were their aircraft and their operational ready rates, and all that sort of stuff. So the tangibles, the tell-me-what-you-knows, we do a pretty good job at. It’s when you get into the intangibles, things like morale and willingness to fight, or things that are not totally visible, in the broadest sense of the term, to intelligence that you get into this ethereal assessing of things. What is it that you think? You’re calling on your experience, your instinct, your intuition, or whatever, and that’s when you get into the ranges or likely probabilities and this sort of thing. The important issue for an intelligence person is to make sure that you distinguish between that which is empirical fact, which you can demonstrate, prove, show a picture or an incontrovertible report that’s corroborated, versus “Here’s what I think.” Again, all of this, I think, falls under this general rubric of the integrity issue.

Student: Excuse me, General, I spent some this year over at MIT with Steve Meyer, who has done some work in the intelligence field, and he does not paint as rosy a picture with regard to the integrity and the lack of politicization inside the individual service intelligence branches. For instance, he cites Naval Intelligence building up the threat to sell Seawolf, and the Air Force doing it to buy ATF (the Advanced Tactical Fighter) or the F-22. I was wondering if you’d comment.

Clapper: This is an issue, and you’ve hit upon something that does happen. Having been a service intelligence chief—the other side of the coin, so to speak—for 19 months before I was director of DIA, this is a pressure that’s hard to withstand for a service intelligence chief if the service in question is pushing something, in this case a particular weapon system. You’re quite right that the Seawolf issue was one that came up where in the view of the rest of the community, Naval Intelligence was kind of a little bit out in left field on this issue. Now, in fairness, there are a certain number of imponderables here, in that what we were really arguing about is what the size of the Russian general-purpose submarine fleet would be in the year 2005 to the year 2010. Well, you’re getting into the area of secrets—something you can know—versus mysteries, which are somewhat heavily dependent on clairvoyance.

I was talking earlier at lunch about how I did my two-year enlistment in the Army, when I was the J-2 in Korea, and the Army staff convention lumps together intelligence and weather. I thought, “That’s kind of strange.” I soon figured out why they did

that: because there’s a great premium placed on clairvoyance for intelligence people and the weatherman, so they just sort of lumped us all together.

So what we were really debating here was a range of possibilities of how many general-purpose submarines the Russians would be able to field and support in the year 2005 to the year 2010. This is something the Russians don’t even know, let alone us. So it’s unavoidable that you get into these debates about: How many submarines can they run through their yards? How many can they recore? Will they have the crews available who are operationally ready? If you equate this to a mathematical formula, you’ve got a lot of variables here to multiply together. So there is, in fairness, room for debate here. Obviously, the Navy chose to take the high end of the range. They assumed they could recore a lot of power plants; they assumed money available; they assumed crews; they assumed et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So we’re going to have this high range, which then, of course, coincidentally helps buttress the case for Seawolf, whereas the whole rest of the community, myself included, given the real state of affairs in Russia today, were postulating the low end, which didn’t exactly support the case of the Seawolf. But again, in fairness, there is some subjectivity here.

The problem is that over time, the services sort of fall into the stereotypical role. If they’re pushing a weapon system, they’re sort of getting caught up in the enthusiasm, particularly when you’re projecting the future and taking advantage of the abstractions of clairvoyance and sort of go with the maximum threat as opposed to the more likely minimum. That’s the kind of issue we’re talking about. Most things in intelligence, although you never get that impression from reading the media, are not clear-cut black or white, this or that, bad guy versus good guy, kinds of situations. But you raise a good point.

Now, the safeguard against that is the system of checks and balances that have been instituted by law and directive, which require, in the case of systems acquisition, threat depiction check and balance, where DIA is required to validate service-generated threats for weapons systems. Of course, that puts pressure on DIA and specifically its director. In my case it was okay with subs, but if it comes to the F-22, you’d better be careful. Again, I just try to remember the principles of integrity.

Oettinger: I think, if I might add, it’s useful to distinguish between integrity and objectivity, and the question of objectivity is one for which the customer is responsible, it seems to me. There can be full integrity, but inherent biases or lack of objectivity because of where you sit. Some of those are there because they’re unconscious, and therefore it’s not a lack of integrity. The guy doesn’t even know he’s doing that. It’s then incumbent on the consumer of intelligence to take the kind of precaution that says, “I’d better get me a couple of sources, so that their lack of objectivity, even though it’s with full integrity, is something I can compensate for.” Good consumers of intelligence do that, both in the manner that you illustrated with the General Powell thing, “Tell me what you know, and tell me what you think,” which is one distinction, and the other one, which is, “No matter how good he is or how high his integrity, where he stands depends on where he sits, and I’d better have me a couple of institutions or whatever that have different biases.” So don’t pin it all on the supplier.

Clapper: Let’s see: Gulf War problems and fixes. I guess there were all kinds of critiques done as a result of our last great war, Desert Storm. One of the things I, frankly, worry about is that we’ll fall into the traditional historical pattern of studying to death the last war, which may or may not—and probably won’t—have any particular applicability to what we are going to confront in the future. The first thing is that I think it’s very unlikely that we will ever confront, really, a contingency of that magnitude again, at least in the near term. I could certainly be wrong on that, but I just think it’s very unlikely. So, we’ve studied to death, and gone to school, and spent a lot of money on fixing things that we may never, necessarily, have to rely on again.
Now, there are all kinds of critiques. I know, for example, that the JCS came up with 101 things that had to be fixed. It just happened to match the number of Dalmatians, that’s why I remember that. I guess the biggest single shortfall, if I had to pick one, was dissemination—that is, the conveying of intelligence. That’s the thing, I suppose, that we in intelligence got critiqued for, and that’s getting back to my assertion earlier about my less-than-total enthusiasm for being married up with command and control, which I guess is sort of the way this course is built—command, control, communications and intelligence, as though it’s all one unitary glob. What I particularly took umbrage at, I guess, was being critiqued for the inability of the communication system that was then supporting us to convey the intelligence that we had out to every last brigade or wing, wherever it was. That’s something where I think the community, the government, and the DOD have made substantial improvements, and we’re much better able now than we were then to convey intelligence electronically—move it around, as opposed to cutting down whole forests of trees in Oregon and doing everything in hard copy. The secret here is to move it electronically.

It gets me to another assertion I would make. I would personally prefer that intelligence, per se, got out of the communications business and let somebody else do that and manage that for us. Given the technology where you get these big conduits or pipes of intelligence, if you manage it right, you can move a lot of data around very quickly, as opposed to everybody building their own individual stovepipes, which has been our history. We’ve got to get away from that. Of course, the reason intelligence did that is because of its dissatisfaction with the way the larger communications community purportedly reacted to intelligence’s voracious need to move data around, particularly if you’re going to move pictures. That is inherently a voracious user of bandwidth. I don’t want to get too far out of my technical expertise on this, which is basically zero, so I won’t say too much more about it. But, suffice it to say, I think on a number of fronts the departments of the intelligence community have reacted to fixing problems and issues that arose in Desert Storm.

Another one had to do with the competition within the intelligence community. You may remember, because it came out in some of the public critiques, about CIA running to the President just as we were about to embark on the ground war and saying, “We’ve got these pictures that don’t quite add up to the command’s assessment of what proportion of the Iraqi army divisions and infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, and artillery pieces had been taken down.”

There was, of course, a great amount of angst about that, because of the preparation before we actually embarked on the ground war. The Defense Department, the command out in the desert, General Schwarzkopf and his staff, and those of us in the military intelligence community had pretty much come to agreement on the basic assessment of the war-fighting capability that was then residual after the pounding that the Iraqis had taken from air power versus a single dimension that CIA ran to the President with, which was pictures only, that did not account for more intangibles like the will to fight, morale, and all this sort of thing.

So, right away, we had this rather embarrassing dichotomy within the intelligence community right at the last minute. I think there have been organizational and procedural contrivances that have been instituted since then that will preclude that sort of thing in the future. At least I certainly hope so.

**Oettinger:** Before you move on, don’t these precautions risk putting in the other horn of the dilemma: that it becomes a collusive force to come to a negotiated agreement, which may or may not bear on reality—perversion of integrity?

**Clapper:** You run that risk. I think, though, that the nation and the particular decision makers are much better served if you let the intel crowd get in one room at one table and hammer it out between and among themselves, and reach, if not the exact answer, then what the range might be, and do that beforehand rather than have it aired out in public where you have the im-
agency proponents arguing with the SIGINT proponents arguing with some other proponents, this sort of thing. If you bring together all the tools in your kit, so to speak, you'll end up with a much better picture than you will by having individual zealots beating their own drums for a particular point of view. Yes, there's a risk there in that you'll go for the lowest common denominator, which, of course, the intelligence community has traditionally been criticized for. The NIELs, National Intelligence Estimates, have historically been criticized over that, although I think again we've gotten away from that by just introducing the question of, if there isn't one right answer (and normally there isn't), what is the range of options and what are the implications of those options, which to me is a much more enlightened way to do it. Then you give the decision maker, “Here's the range of uncertainty.” We might posit a most likely probability or most likely option, but there we might also give him, as in the Iraqi case, the potential for high-impact, low-probability eventualities that he needs to consider. Then we should let the decision maker decide for himself, rather than us in intelligence sort of patronizing him: “We'll tell you what the answer is.”

Oettinger: If I may, what that leads to—the other side of that coin, it seems to me—is that the intelligence community indulges, as has been part of the history of the NIELs, in an orgy of footnoting. Then the customer says, “You guys are snowing me, and I am forced now to create my own staff to figure out what the footnotes are.” Then, instead of getting out of the dilemma, you just moved it to someplace else.

Clapper: I well recall NIE 11-3-8, which is a famous number because that was Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces: a huge, Encyclopedia Britannica kind of thing. The most interesting reading in the whole NIE was the footnotes, because that's where all the arguments appeared. So all we've gone through now is, rather than “Read the fine print of the footnotes,” air the argument out—if there is one. If there's a range of how many SS-18s they have, and this office thinks this, then let them put it in the main body of the text and also, by the way, defend their rationale. To me, that's much better than all these little bitty footnotes, whereas in the main body of the text you're coming up with pablum, which is the lowest common denominator—something that everybody can agree with, which as you do it, as a matter of course, makes it meaningless. To me it's much sharper, and you do a greater service to the policy maker. In those cases where you don't know that answer (again, you're in the realm of mysteries versus secrets), and you're assessing, or imputing, what might occur in the future, or that sort of thing, it's better to say, “We'll lay out the range; here's the debate; here's the argument,” and in the clearest and most succinct manner we can, lay that out for the policy maker.

Student: Sir, isn't there then a dilemma that the policy maker picks a scenario out that fits his objectives?

Clapper: All the time, absolutely. That's a problem where you have policy makers who say, “The hell with you, I'm doing my own analysis.” You'll run into that. Again, there's no perfect answer. But I really think, having been through both schools, so to speak, that the current one of laying out the dilemmas, particularly if you lay out the likelihood and the probabilities—again, explain that this is a high-impact but low-probability scenario in the view of the intelligence community, but here it is, and here's what it would take for this to happen—is the best course. Implicitly and maybe not so subtly, you've spun a web here that makes it really hard for the policy maker to conveniently select the option that he or she likes. If you take the time to think it through and say, “Well, yeah, this could happen maybe, but there's a whole string of circumstances that would have to transpire first,” which in their very iteration, I think, reflect the unlikelihood that they would happen, it to me is better and it causes the intelligence community to think through the problem, not just summarily wave it off. Why is it that this won't work? Or why is it this would? Then, if you've done this, and you've been intellectually
honest about it, you make it actually more difficult for the policy maker to dwell on, or focus on, or seize what is indeed not the most likely probability. That's why I think it's better, rather than for a policy maker to conveniently seize on a footnote that has no real discussion or substantiation other than, "We don't like that," which is kind of the way it used to work.

**Student:** General Leide, in his presentations to the seminar,* raised the issue that having all those footnotes or caveats, or whatever they were, could also just be self-serving. So I wonder what your reaction is: whether you think that was a conscious motivation, as opposed to saying, "We want to give you all of the alternatives because, of course, they exist."

**Clapper:** Yes. That's the other side of this, and that was always my problem with footnotes because of this CYA syndrome: cover yourself, look at the fine print. I address that eventuality. Again, I think the more intellectually honest and direct approach is to figure out what the likely scenarios are, and if there are two or three that could happen, then discuss those scenarios fully and also what their implications are. I think that's being a lot more up front and a lot more honest, and it forces the proponents of a particular scenario to defend their case, not just to state it and then let it drop; rather, to develop and articulate it. To me, it's just intellectually a much better way to go. It's harder. It engenders controversy, but that's all the better.

I saw a lot more cases where NIEs got remanded not once, not twice, but three or four times where the DCI wasn't happy with them or wouldn't sign up to them. He's the approving authority. He's the senior intelligence officer for the government, and he's working for the President. That's a pretty good test, I think.

**Oettinger:** By the way, for those of you who might want to pursue some details of NIEs, the current dean of this school, Joe Nye, was, until recently, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which is responsible for the production of NIEs. So you have a source right nearby if you want to pursue that topic further.

**Clapper:** I might comment that Joe instituted—and this is a good case in point—a system where he basically brought somebody from outside the intelligence community into a position where he had profound influence on the way we did business at the National Intelligence Estimate level by instituting these very things I'm talking about: this business of airing out various options and scenarios and then just saying, in bold black and white, who is it that believes or agrees or disagrees, by agency and element. To me, when you have to sign up in that fashion, you think very hard about what you want to say.

I wanted to discuss the issue of two major regional conflicts, which is basically the strategy that drives the military today, and allegedly is what determines force sizing and all that sort of thing. Again, this is a little vignette, illustrative of the way things work in the Pentagon, perhaps. You may recall when the Clinton Administration came in, Les Aspin was Secretary of Defense and had launched a bottom-up review of the military as a sort of an intellectual rationalization of how to downsize the military—the force structure. Look at the brave new world, post Cold War. We don't have the legions of motorized rifle divisions pouring through the Fulda Gap any longer, so what are we going to do? So this was the intellectual process, if you will: to look at the force structure as a blank piece of paper sort of stuff. From this process was derived the two major regional conflicts, whereby we deduced that we would be able to respond to two near-simultaneous (interesting wording) major regional conflicts: presumably something in the Middle East—Iraq invading somebody—and the other, of course, is North Korea invading the South.

There was then launched a readiness study that was done under the auspices of General Shy [Edward C.] Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the Army, and all the combat support agency directors, of which

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* See General Leide's presentations referenced previously.
I was one, were sort of trotted up in the twilight of this study to brief on what our agency capabilities were to respond to the two major regional conflicts. At the conclusion of this pitch before a distinguished retired four-star group, I just sort of made a casual dance-off, where I said I didn’t see any way in hell that the military intelligence community should support two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts. It’s just sort of common sense. Here we turned ourselves inside out to support one during Desert Storm, and now we’re going to cut ourselves by 25 percent, but yet we’re going to be able to support two of the magnitude of the one we had. It just felt peculiar to me.

There were a couple of civilians from the OSD staff who were sitting in the back of the room, whom I didn’t recognize, who got very energized over this. Apparently, Dr. Perry, who was then the Deputy Secretary of Defense, had a staff meeting that very afternoon. I went to the gym, came back to the office, and was working late doing a paper, and all of a sudden I got a call from Emmett Paige, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; I sort of got summoned to the “vice principal’s office.” He said to me, “Hey, what did you say?” I said, “Here’s what I said, and here’s why.” So I was then given an immediate homework assignment to write a paper and get it up to Dr. Perry first thing the next day, which I did. Apparently, they took it reasonably well, and didn’t fire me at the outset. But what they did then was launch a study of intelligence capabilities to support two major regional conflicts. To me, that was a fundamental flaw in the first place, because the basic study that devolved the two major regional conflict strategy assumed intelligence would be there, which is a huge assumption to make. We assume we’re going to have all the intelligence. Well, where is it, when you’re just in the process of cutting us by 25 or 30 percent? Oh, well. That’s it. Just a little story.

I mentioned the motorized rifle division, this sort of templated threat that we grew to know and love. We lost the ability to do it and then we lost the Soviet Union. The templates are very, very different. I’ll never forget when we were going to do something in Somalia. Of course, you can imagine that on all the lists of important countries in the world that the DIA is going to worry about, Somalia fell out somewhere about 160. First, our attachés had been kicked out in 1991, so we had no eyes and ears on the ground. Somalis don’t transmit a whole lot, so there wasn’t a lot of SIGINT on them. There wasn’t much there to take pictures of. So, the bottom line is—you get the picture, so to speak—that we had sort of zero intelligence on Somalia. Now we’re confronted with 25,000 troops about to unload in the brightness of the CNN lights on the shores of Mogadishu, and it’s up to us to figure out the order of battle of the 47+ clans and subclans that were then thought to exist in Somalia. It’s a very, very different problem and a very, very different challenge than figuring out the exercise pattern which typically occurs the same way, every year for 20 years, in the group of Soviet forces in Germany.

That’s cartooning it a bit, but simplistically, I think it illustrates the tremendous contrast in the kind of world we used to face in the Cold War and what we now face. The whole nature of combat and the whole notion of regular warfare have changed. You basically have a very low-tech threat, which can, nevertheless, be both lethal and, as we saw in Somalia, politically devastating. If we’re not attentive to the threat that’s posed, which sometimes happens in cases where we looked down our noses at it or patronized it because it’s just a bunch of clans, it suddenly now becomes a problem for us.

**Student:** For those kinds of threats, aren’t there other ways of getting that information that are open? We still have embassy officials there. We have NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) there. Within academia we have specialists in those areas. It’s not a national threat.

**Clapper:** We called upon all those sources. Again, it’s not something we had been used to doing. When you go to intel school, they don’t teach you about, “How do we get with the nongovernmental people?” That’s exactly what we did. We called
on our good old FAOs (Foreign Area Officers—area specialists) in the Army and others from academia and whatever else we could do to counter a threat. But still, this goes back to an earlier discussion about the contribution of intelligence. There are certain denied things that can only be gleaned from nonopen sources, and that’s what we had to try to get to work in Somalia.

It raises another issue about the threshold by which intelligence is judged whenever we’re putting forces in harm’s way. Increasingly, the expectation of intelligence is that it has to be perfect, and perfection is measured by casualties. If you have a casualty, that’s an intelligence failure. In fact, even in the case of Scott O’Grady,* when you lose equipment, it’s an intelligence failure. We got the guy back, there was nobody killed or wounded, but we lost an airplane. So now we had an intelligence failure, which is baloney, incidentally. There was no intelligence failure, in my view.

**Student:** I’d just like to raise the point that you did. In Somalia, even with open sources, it wouldn’t have made a difference because that kind of thing just isn’t on the Internet. No one’s talking about it. It just doesn’t exist.

**Student:** On the Somalia thing, the serious point to me is just the whole notion of putting together the exact sort of information—how many, where are they, how do they fight, what are their tactics, what are their weapons, what are they going to do and all that sort of stuff—misses the most important thing: what’s their intent?

**Clapper:** That’s really hard.

**Student:** You can’t call in your local international committee of the Red Cross and expect that they know this sort of thing.

**Student:** That’s not my point. My point is that I don’t care how much money you pour into intel; you are not going to know what every tribal unit around Somalia is doing or planning to do.

**Student:** Oh, gee, yes. You’re absolutely right.

**Clapper:** That was my point about this rising expectation. “Oh, we spend millions and billions on intelligence, so we should be omniscient.” Well, you’re not.

**Student:** Just to follow up for a second, in a lot of the research we did on Somalia with the NGOs, there are a lot of the people who worked with these elements who could have told the military at any point in time where Aidid was.

**Student:** All this is a 20-20 hindsight kind of thing.

**Clapper:** Also, by the by, that wasn’t the mission, incidentally, when we first went in there. All we were going to do was create a secure environment to convey food to the starving masses. That was the mission. As time wore on the mission sort of changed.

**Oettinger:** Mission creep?

**Clapper:** Yes, mission creep, I guess it’s called. Similarly, the mission for intelligence apparently changed. Now we’re policemen. We’re seeing the same thing in Bosnia. To what extent is it the responsibility of the military to go out and search and find and arrest war criminals, see? It’s a little different role than the kind of things we’ve done before. That’s my point here: how profoundly different the intelligence mission is, given the era of the Soviet Union versus what we confront today.

**Student:** Do you think the way to go about gaining and gathering information about these clans is someone on the ground? What’s the role of human intelligence in DIA as opposed to other systems?

**Clapper:** It’s extremely important, but the problem is, you see, both the Agency [CIA] and DIA, which runs the attaché systems, were out. Now the problem, in

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the case of the technical intelligence capabilities, is that the overhead satellites, which take pictures and collect communications, are faucet-like in that if you need to collect SIGINT, you can turn them on right now, or turn them off. If you need to take pictures, turn them on, turn them off. It's a mechanical process, almost. I'm simplifying it a little bit. Not so with HUMINT. You don't just go in and the next day you've got all these contacts—sources that you have faith in and they have faith in you. That takes time, lots of time. That was one of the problems we had in Iraq. General Schwarzkopf, for his part, was adamantly opposed to having HUMINT operations going on in his theater, because he didn't feel that he owned and controlled them and knew what they were doing. So, we ain't going to have any HUMINT. Well, that came back to haunt us. Then, of course, who's the first one to complain, "Where's the HUMINT here?" I rest my case.

Anyway, you're quite right. So what we had to do, basically, was to start from scratch. What we did was dredge up people who had served there previously, both military and in the Agency. We really forged, in my opinion, a tremendous team effort. It's a little-known success story, I think, at least in the initial phases, how they worked together, and they did exactly what you suggested. The first place they went was to the people who were already there, the NGOs, and asked: "What's going on here?" As the force moved from village to village, that's precisely what was done.

It was a great success story in the initial phases. Now, when the mission crept, so to speak, it changed, and then it got a little more difficult. Plus there was the fact that after the initial phases, we had drastically drawn down the actual resources we had available in the country, when, actually, the intelligence task was a lot more difficult in terms of troop protection. Now we're looking for Alldid, and all this sort of thing, and we actually had fewer resources to do that than we did initially.

**Student:** I'd like to take you back to the idea of the short list and the long list. You've talked a little bit now about the hopelessness of the long list. What implications does that have for how you cut the resource pie for the intelligence community? Does the length of the list determine the amount of resources?

**Clapper:** That's a great question. It's the question that the government, the intelligence community, the Congress, and everybody else wrestles with. How do you equate what your needs are for intelligence to the resources that should be allocated to fulfill those requirements? The problem is that, in my considered opinion, there's really no way to do that. How much is a pound of intelligence worth? That's kind of what it boils down to. In point of fact, you'll hear a lot of rhetoric about this, and you'll hear all kinds of new mousetraps that people will build to reiterate requirements and how that will translate to resources. The fact of the matter is, it boils down to a subjective judgment. It really does.

The other problem you have, I found, is that there's a tendency on the part of a lot of people, particularly Congress, to want to equate a given intelligence capability to one output, which you can't do, particularly in the case of the overhead resources. They are technological marvels, and they serve a lot of masters and mistresses in terms of intelligence needs. They support military operations, they support negotiations, they support the State Department, they support the Department of Commerce. So, how do you equate, how do you figure out, how do you parse out the cost of a billion dollars for a satellite, let's say? You figure out what its output is in terms of fulfilling all these different needs. This is an accountant's nightmare: to try to slice and dice resources in such a way that you can do that.

In fact, it can be a disservice. I had a case where somebody, some senior official in the intelligence community, went over to talk about the contributions of various resources in the intelligence community to the proliferation problem, some of which were in my program. (I'll talk a little bit about the programmatics of intelligence in the spiel I'll give you.) Some of the capabilities that are in my program, the General Defense Intelligence Program, which is basically to serve military intelligence, graded out rather
low for purposes of counterproliferation. So, it didn’t serve this official’s purpose, but it does other things that in his equation didn’t count for anything. That’s the danger you have and also the problem you have, but that’s a very insightful question and it’s one for which we don’t have a good answer. What it all really boils down to is judgment.

When Mr. Deutch was the Deputy Secretary of Defense, he and Mr. Woolsey, who was then the DCI, initiated a series of joint intelligence program reviews. Actually it was symbolically very important. For the first time the two would get together and act as partners as opposed to adversaries, which has normally been the case between the Department of Defense and the DCI. So they would review all these programs, and I would go to them (we must have had 20 or 30 of them). What would happen is that we’d pick an issue, and let’s say the issue of the day that the two people sitting on Olympus are going to review is proliferation. Okay? So we reviewed that. The last thing, the conclusion of the briefing is, “We’ve got to do more for proliferation. Yup. Got to do more for that.” The next meeting we have is on drugs. “Well, got to do more for drugs. Yup. More for drugs.” The next meeting is on counterintelligence. “Hey, Ames case? Gee, we’ve got to do more for counterintelligence. Yessiree.” Support to military operations, big subject. “How can we possibly say we’re going to do less for support to military ops?” It goes on and on and on. So, you have this series of single-issue zealots who get up and say, “We’ve got to do this about that.”

So, what happens at the end of the day? The Congress ain’t going to give you a number. There’s a finite number, there’s so much money you’re going to get, and so much manpower. So then it is left to folks like me, in the role I was then playing as program manager within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, to figure out, “Well, how do I fit these 20 pounds of requirements in this 5-pound bag I’ve got?” That process, to this day, ain’t rational, and I’ll show you why that’s so. One reason is that the basic programmatic structure of the National Foreign Intelligence Program is fundamentally flawed. Unless it is fundamentally changed, we will never be able to address the very question that you just asked, and I’ll show you that.

**Student:** I just read an article in *U.S. News and World Report* last week about the CIA doing a study for the Vice President on “What makes countries fall apart?” They looked at 630-some factors that they thought potentially were critical hot things they should watch and they came up with about 30 or 40 different factors that they thought were key indicators of a country’s having significant problems. Are you familiar with the report at all? I’m sure you have critical things you’re watching for and I just wondered if that was in any way an insightful way to perhaps try and prioritize?

**Clapper:** No. I’m not in that world anymore. I left town. I left Dodge City on the first of September. That’s interesting, I suppose, in an academic sense, but which countries are you talking about here? The issue you have is that of the 160+ nations basically we have in the world today, we obviously can’t watch all of them with equal intensity and with an equal number of resources. So, that’s all very interesting, and it would be interesting to do the checklist when somebody collapses, but it’s an indicator list for failing states. It’s not the first time that subject has been addressed.

**Student:** I’m sure it’s not. I guess, sir, what I’m trying to say is that if you can’t watch everything, then let’s say we try and pick out three indicators that we’re going to watch and use them to make up a checklist.

**Clapper:** The first question to ask yourself is: Where do we care? Does it matter if the Republic of Fiji collapses? So what? Do we have some interest there? Is something going to happen? Is the stock market going to drop?

**Student:** Somalia was 100 on the list.

**Clapper:** Yes. If North Korea implodes (and there’s a lot of concern about that), then that’s a different proposition. We’ve got a lot of national interests at stake there. We’ve got troops in harm’s way, where
there will be no luxury of making a decision or debating it in the halls of Congress. We are involved now if something happens in North Korea or if they invade. The trick is, where are you going to apply the checklist? You know the bad guys. You worry about North Korea. You worry about Cuba, which has political implications in this country. You worry about Libya, maybe, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, China, Taiwan. You have to focus on those. And the other lesser ones, so what?

Oettinger: There's another whole category of answers to this, it seems to me, which you haven't mentioned and which I think deserves mention, and then I'll let you go on to your chosen topic. It carries with it another kind of price. I'll use the biological analogy of what happens when your body builds antibodies for some viral infection. All of us are familiar with the fact that it takes about a week to recover from the common cold, and that's because the system works in a way where it doesn't have a supply of antibodies. The immune system works for everything that's foreseeable. It manufactures them when it figures out what the hell is involved. The good news is that usually within a week or so it's got it figured out, pumped out enough antibodies to kill it, and you're feeling fine. The bad news is that occasionally it fails and you're dead.

Now the analogy to that is, for example, the situation at the beginning of World War II, which then led to the creation, ad hoc, of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and all the other good things that ultimately provided intelligence structure, which got transmogrified into the CIA and what have you through the National Security Act of 1947. The obvious retort to that is, yes, but in the meantime you've got all those ships sunk at Pearl Harbor, number one. Second, it could have been much worse. You could have been dead before you got the OSS pulled together, ad hoc. But one shouldn't neglect that somewhat serendipitous, after-the-fact kind of a mechanism, which I think also addresses the issue when you say there's no way of solving the problem. There isn't, a priori, but the question of providing enough flexibilities that when you know what's happening, you can react even though you don't know, a priori, exactly what your reacting to, is not an entirely inane way to proceed.

Clapper: The President, the Congress, somebody, has got to make a judgment, and it's subjective. In spite of all the effort to reduce it to mathematical, empirical terms, it really boils down to a subjective judgment on the magnitude of the intelligence community. What is it we want it to do, so that it has enough resilience and nimbleness and agility, if you want to call it that, that it can react to a situation around the world? The fact of the matter is there's not enough money in the national treasury to ensure that we cover the earth, like Sherwin Williams paint, at equal depth, at all times, and at all places. We just can't do that. What you do need, though, is the capability to react, so that we've got enough basic coverage. Some places are more in depth than others, obviously.

Again, I go back to the notion of mortal threats to the United States and those places where we're going to pursue interests. In the case of military intelligence, the arena that I was in, that's those places most likely to engage the sons and daughters of the American people and putting them in harm's way. That's, in my own mind, again subjective, but it's what drove me in whatever decisions I made as Director of DIA and as a program manager within the National Foreign Intelligence Program. Again, it's very subjective. That's what it boils down to.

With that sort of general commentary, and that useful discussion about the intelligence community, what I thought I'd do is run through a sort of dionized version of a pitch that I've been trotting around town—as you'll see, unsuccessfully—on what I would suggest to you is perhaps a more radical approach to structuring the intelligence community. As you know, there's been a presidentially appointed commission that's looking at that very issue right now. They have a paper due out by law by the end of March on the shape and composition of the organization of the intelligence
community,* and I’ve briefed this group a couple of times.

Oettinger: That was the Aspin Commission?

Clapper: That’s the Aspin, now the Harold Brown, Commission. The House Intelligence Committee on its own, under an effort called IC-21 (Intelligence Community 21), is doing its own separate study along the same lines.

Oettinger: You’ll be able to ask Mark Lowenthal a bit about that next week.

Clapper: Mark is very much in the midst of this, and he will be able to talk to it authoritatively. Incidentally, I need to give credit to Mark. If you come across any of his writings in course of your studies, I commend them to you highly. He’s got some of the best I’ve seen in an unclassified context on intelligence issues and relationships between intelligence policy makers and all that. In fact, I need to credit him with the definition of “What’s the purpose of intelligence? To reduce uncertainty,” which is a Mark Lowenthalism.

Anyway, there was a Herblock cartoon that appeared in the Washington Post about July of 1994, which shows a sort of labyrinthine, Byzantine structure made up of examples of every architectural style—a Greek temple, a log cabin, a medieval turret, a watchtower, and several others—jumbled together. Imagine each section labeled with one part of the intelligence alphabet soup—CIA, NRO, DIA, CIO, INR. Imagine this very irregular structure with a sign in front of it saying “intelligence reform” and with two forlorn characters confronting this. These two characters could either be Congressmen or Senators or the American public, because, in my own opinion, that is the way the intelligence community looks to the layman. In fact, it’s the way it looks to at least one person who used to be in it.

So, my rhetorical question here was, “What’s wrong with this picture?” I would suggest to you that, because of the history that Tony was just alluding to—what happened to us in World War II, the formation of OSS, and the other intelligence aggregations and things that emerged, basically, prompted by the failure at Pearl Harbor—we evolved this structure in the intelligence community very much as a legacy of the Cold War. I don’t mean this pejoratively, because I think that the intelligence community was a major reason why we won the Cold War.

The question, though, is: “Is that structure, which served us long and well against the enemy we grew to love and lost, what we need as we confront the next century and the kind of world that we’re going to have then?” I would suggest to you that the answer to that question is, “No,” because, basically, what we’ve devolved to is the romance of the collection stovepipes (figure 1). You have the SIGINT world, and its own religious mythology and ideology. You now have imagery. We’re about


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- Collection stovepipes
- Increasing bureaucracy
- Lack of discipline
- No accountability

Figure 1
What’s Wrong With U.S. Intelligence?

to stand up an imagery agency, which I have a lot of problems with. Then we have the HUMINT world, and they do things their own way, and they speak their own language. We have a discipline called MASINT (measurement and signatures intelligence) that you may never have heard of, which is, basically, capitalizing on the properties of a potential target—does it emit heat or light or sound in such a way that
you can capitalize on it for intelligence or, more often, tactical military purposes?

We’ve built these huge bureaucracies and organizations and structures around these collection disciplines, which has led, in this bureaucracy, to a lack of discipline. Everybody is competing with one another for resources and visibility, and that in turn leads, in my view, to a lack of accountability in the intelligence community.

I put this spiel together originally in January 1995 at an intelligence community offsite. Admiral Studeman, who was then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, asked me to put this together, knowing that I had been talking about it, and he regarded me as sort of on the radical lunatic fringe of the intelligence community because nobody else, none of my intelligence compadres, liked this because it basically attacks current rice bowls.

My suggestion to the Commission, when they started, was that what they ought to do is go back to basics (figure 2).

- What are the missions of Intelligence?
- What are the functions of Intelligence?
- Why not organize, operate, and program congruent with the functions?

Figure 2
Some Fundamental Questions

If we had a clean sheet of paper, how would we design the intelligence community today? Not post-World War II, OSS, National Security Act of 1947; how would we do it today? The way to start that is, first, ask yourself what the missions of intelligence are. I talked to that, at least one man’s answer to that, previously. Then, what are the functions of intelligence? What does it take to perform those missions? I would suggest to you they can be broken down into three major areas or segments: collection—the acquisition of the information; then the analysis, exploitation and production of it; and finally its depiction to a consumer or whoever it is. Then I’d ask the question, “Why not organize, operate, and, most importantly, program and build the intelligence community congruent with those functions?”

Oettinger: Take the collection function. Let’s say that you do, in an ideal way, organize and operate the program congruent with the collection function, and now somebody says, “That’s too big, and we’ve got to carve it up.” And I say, “Well, one way to carve it up is by image collection and SIGINT collection, et cetera.” Maybe I’m anticipating where you’re going.

Clapper: First of all, I’m not suggesting that you do them all the same way. Obviously, the way that you collect signals, collect messages in the ether, is much, much different than the way you take pictures. The laws of physics tell you that. What’s different, though, is the fact that rather than going to three or four or whatever stovepipes, three different places to get your customer’s satisfaction, you go to one place. You’d have one institution that would be responsible for collection. In other words, you would state, as a user, an information need. You don’t have to or express it in SIGINTese or IMINTese or HUMINTese. You just say, “This is what I need to know.” Then it’s left to the experts to figure out how to marshal the collection resources, from whatever discipline it may be, to address that particular problem or, more likely, series of problems.

This is sort of a graphical depiction of what I’m talking about (figure 3). This is collection, production, and infrastructure. Now I need to define this. “Collection” would mean whatever means you would use to gain information, be it by collecting messages or signals in the air, by taking pictures, by collecting from HUMINT sources, from open sources, from technical sources, or whatever it is. The notion would be, as I’ll get to later, that you’d have one guy or girl, a czar or czarina, who would be in charge of collecting all that.

The dotted lines are supposed to acknowledge the point that these are not
surgically distinct activities. Obviously one spills into the other. There are many cases where you collect directly and that goes directly, at the speed of light, untouched by human hands, to a consumer. There’s no need for anybody to massage it or analyze it or anything like that. So I’m trying to acknowledge that potential possibility.

DeMarines*: I’m back where Tony was. It would almost say that you would create yet another organization to deal with the collection agencies to do the single point of interface. That would be a problem.

Clapper: I’m going to answer that question. I need to define the terms for somebody who’s sort of on the same sheet of music. By “infrastructure,” what I mean is what it takes in the way of resources to run these two major endeavors of collection and production. Again I want you to forget about CIA, DIA, NRO, and the rest of the alphabet soup of institutions and organizations that most people don’t understand. (Remember the cartoon I asked you to imagine.) Let’s go back to basics here. What we’re talking about is the way intelligence is conducted. I would submit to you that it could basically be thought of in these major segments of collection and production. By infrastructure I mean what it takes to do those two major endeavors: that is, the people, the resources, the communications, the automation, the security, and all the other stuff it takes to run an intelligence organization of the magnitude of the intelligence enterprise that the United States runs.

So what I would suggest is to conduct all national collection as a unitary activity, and designate a single national collection czar or czarina to bring all these resources to bear under one hat, so you have one place to go (figure 4). Then you have a capability that we do not now have, which gets back to your question, because right now the community, despite propaganda to the contrary, cannot and does not make meaningful trades between and among these collection disciplines, because we’re not structured to do that. It’s not immediately visible to anybody.

Oettinger: But wait a minute. You’re supposed to be doing that. The Intelligence Community Staff (now the Community Management Staff) for decades has been supposed to do that.

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* Victor A. DeMarines, president of The MITRE Corporation.
Premise:
- Conduct all national collection as a coherent, unitary activity
- Designate/empower a single national collection “czar”
  - Bring all intelligence resources to bear operationally, regardless of stovepipe “INTs”
  - Enable systematic, meaningful trade-off between/among collection disciplines
  - Don’t end individual/unique endeavors of “INTs”

Approximately 70% of NFIP is collection/collection-related

Figure 4
Radical Ruminations: Collection – 1

Clapper: Tony, we’re not structured to do that. I will get to that, and I’ll explain to you why that is, and why it’s impossible.

Oettinger: I mean it’s sort of the old mystery.

Clapper: I can say, from experience, it ain’t possible, because I was one of them. So whenever you have one of these resource debates with the DCI—and I worked in my last two capacities for seven DCIs, either those who were confirmed or unconfirmed, and they all tried their hand at it—when it comes time to cut the budget, and all the heavies are sitting around at the table bumping antlers, it all boils down to, “We all give at the office.” There’s no way you can make meaningful trades, because you’re trying to trade apples and oranges. So, I was just like the rest of the little piggies who came up to the trough, and I squealed just as loud if I didn’t get my fair share or if I was cut disproportionately. That’s the way the community operates. That’s the way it has always operated, and it’s the way it always will operate unless it dramatically changes the way it’s structured, and I’ll get to that later.

Anyway, when you think of the investment that the country makes in collection alone, about 70 percent of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, give or take a billion or two, is devoted to collection in its broadest context. I’m talking about the SIGINT mission, the NRO, and all that sort of thing. That’s a lot of money. So, even if we just policed up our act here, it would be a major contribution to truth, justice, and the American way. What I would do, in answer to your question, is reinvent DIRNSA as a collection czar; that is, the director of the National Security Agency (figure 5). Why DIRNSA? By far the most robust communications, worldwide perspective, global reach, all that kind of stuff, of any intelligence institution in the American government is vested in

Structure/organization:
- “Re-invent” DIRNSA as collection czar
- Transition gradually
  - Technical/open source collection first
  - HUMINT later
- Reassign INFOSEC missions
  - Free “protective IW” role of “spy baggage”
  - Let NSA focus on homogeneous intelligence mission

Reform acquisition with a single R&D/acquisition authority for all collection endeavors, regardless of regime/medium

Figure 5
Radical Ruminations: Collection – 2

NSA, which right now has a dual mission that includes both signals collection (it is the national SIGINT authority and manager for the government) and an information security mission, the other side of the coin. You wouldn’t have to move a soul, you don’t have to close up buildings, don’t do any of that stuff, just say to the DIRNSA, “You’re in charge.”

Now, what I’m proposing here is fairly radical. This is hopefully not just rearranging deck chairs on the intelligence Titanic, and it’s not something you’re going to get
done by the close of business next Friday. This is something that's going to take a period of years.

I'll get to the bottom line now. What I'm getting at here is that what intelligence needs is a Goldwater-Nichols Act. Goldwater-Nichols was enacted in 1986. Ten years later, it is still evolving. That's what's needed for intelligence. What I've tried to suggest is that we need a National Security Act of 1947 revisited 50 years hence, along the same lines as Goldwater-Nichols.

I remember, in the early 1980s, when I was in the Pentagon, there were whole legions of action officers from all the services who spent their tours in the Pentagon writing discourses, master's theses, on why, if Goldwater-Nichols were enacted, the end of civilization as we know it would occur. Now, 10 years after the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, jointness is the greatest thing since sliced bread. So what we need is an analogous act and evolution, which would take place over a period of years, not days or weeks, to change the intelligence community.

**Oettinger:** For those of you who are still searching for a term paper topic, here is the richest goldmine ever invented. If I may presume for a moment, I imagine from Jim's enthusiasm that if one of you got seized by his notion of exploring some of this stuff, he might be available, as he has already talked to you. Second, we have in the record of this seminar a history of the Goldwater-Nichols agonies and post-Goldwater-Nichols jubilations, so if somebody wanted to draw parallels and extend the line of thinking that Jim has just opened up, what a swell topic for one or more of you.

**Student:** I'm not an intel guy, so this may be a dumb question. Is this above and beyond the individual service intelligence networks?

**Clapper:** It is. I'm talking about that separately, but I will put in context where the services fit and what the services should do. I'll get to that a little later. That's a good question, and it's very germane. There are no dumb questions, believe me. I worry, frankly, about unavoidable jargon that slips in just because it's something I've lived with all my life.

It is about the time I get to this part of the briefing that Admiral Mike McConnell, who is just about to retire as director of NSA, starts sucking in his breath. He doesn't say anything, because it's real hard to talk when you're sucking in your breath. It's when I say to him that what we ought to do is, if we're going to assign NSA as the collection czar for the country, then we ought to free up the protective information warfare, or whatever they call it, the security role, and give that to somebody else so that you don't have that distraction now. Boy, the NSA purists just about have apoplexy at this point, because the argument they make is, "We make 'em and we break 'em, and you've got to have one to do the other," which I would argue, having spent a good bit of time at NSA myself, is fallacious. You could also say that's the "fox guarding the chicken coop." What I would do is take that mission and give it to DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency), for example, or somebody ... now wait, don't laugh, let me explain: the communications czar for the Department of Defense.

**Oettinger:** General Edmonds will be here. You could try that out on him.

**Clapper:** He wouldn't like it either—or maybe he would. But what the country needs, I would suggest, is an organization committed to the management and protection of our communications infrastructure, much as NSA was invented as a response to Pearl Harbor and the failures there.

Now, if the threat that we confront as a country to our communications and computer infrastructure is of such magnitude, and I guess it is, we need to have an institutional commitment to addressing that. I would argue we need an NSA-like organization to focus only on that issue. Right

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*See, in particular, the seminar proceedings in 1987, 1988, and 1989.*
now we are fragmented. We do not have a single policy or operational focus for protecting our infrastructure.

We've seen some unfortunate examples of mysterious stoppages on local scales. Suppose the whole communications-computer infrastructure just froze up? That would probably get the American people's attention. Anyway, I think institutionally the government needs to think about how to configure itself to confront such a potential threat. Given where we've gone in technology, while we're at it (again, in the breath-sucking context) we ought as well to have a single acquisition element within intelligence. Now this is a little arcane to the insiders of the intelligence business. My point here is that I've sat as a member of some of these senior governing boards that oversee the acquisition of satellites, of airplanes, of maritime reconnaissance things, or terrestrial reconnaissance. None of these governing bodies or the processes they use are the same. In fact, I'm convinced that the only person who really understands how we buy and acquire things in intelligence is God, because nobody below God has sufficient vantage or view to understand that.

**Student:** I'd like you to back up half a step. I guess this goes back to your earlier point, that a lot of that seems to be a thing that the IC is supposed to do, but doesn't.

**Clapper:** I'm glad you asked that question. I haven't given this pitch in a long time, so I forgot to say that my basic premise is that the intelligence community in and of itself is incapable of fundamental reform. It cannot reform itself. I say that being a veteran of it, because what you're doing here, if you want a fundamental reform and do things like that, is you're basically attacking rice bowls. In fact, the reason I did this was because the only way the community will reform is from without. So, somebody like a presidential commission or, I think more aptly, the Congress, is going to have to enact laws to make changes of this magnitude if, in fact, you judge that this is what's needed. Now, there are lots of people who will tell you, "This is crazy," because it will cause too much turbulence and upheaval. I say, "Au contraire." It doesn't have to be that way at all. But for the community in and of itself to reinvent itself like this ... it just isn't going to happen.

**DeMarines:** How do you handle the question about the checks and balances? The one thing you get out of this crazy system is a chance to air differences of opinion.

**Clapper:** I'll talk to that later on when I talk about production. But to answer your question, you're exactly right. The problem, though, is that there should be conscious decisions made as to when you're going to do duplicative or (depending on your point of view or how charitable you are) competitive analysis. Right now, it shouldn't be done by whimsy or whoever feels like coming up with a competitive analytic cell. We should make conscious judgments about that. I would suggest, as a starting point, that you go back to the way I tried to define, perhaps simplistically, the threat. If you take the first category, those threats that involve the very existence of the United States as a nation state, in all those cases there should be more than one center of analytic production, excellence that looks at those problems for exactly that reason. It's too important for the country to rely on one place to do the analysis. But I would also suggest that in a whole bunch of other places where there is currently duplication, there doesn't need to be.

**Oettinger:** I guess what this presupposes is a customer who is seriously engaged and gives a damn.

**Clapper:** Yes. I guess I have made that assumption.

**Oettinger:** But it's a major assumption, because it's almost never true.

**Clapper:** To structure it, first of all, requires the engagement of Congress. They should actually think about it. Again, if you want to bring this about, the President, the White House, and people like that would have to sign up to it as well because it does make you articulate what your needs are.
Student: Is it going to require a significant event or failure to actually make us do this?

Clapper: I don’t know. I’m not sure if we had one that it would automatically lead you to this conclusion.

Student: It’s more likely to. It’s almost a Catch-22: that you need to try to prevent a failure by fixing it in advance because you can’t fix it until it happens.

Clapper: If you go back and read the analysis of Pearl Harbor, particularly in the SIGINT context, the information was there. We had it around. The Navy and the Army were sort of competitively doing their own thing in SIGINT, literally, and never the twain shall meet. That really, when you came down to it, was the historical evolution of why we ended up with an Armed Forces Security Agency and ultimately a National Security Agency: so you’d have one single manager of SIGINT for the government. What I’m suggesting is that we need to extrapolate that to all collection disciplines. We’ve done it with SIGINT, so why not have one institution in charge of all of our collection, whether it’s signals in the ether, or pictures, or HUMINT, or whatever it is, so you’d have one orchestrator?

It always amused me when I’d visit an embassy. I’d trot around to visit the defense attachés who work for DIA, so that gave me a great excuse to travel. When I’d check up on the attachés, they were responsible for collecting military intelligence. Then I’d go see others and they’d be doing their thing, stovepiped back to different institutions inside the Beltway in Washington, D.C. Now, if they got together and did things, it was great. But it was by whoops!, because they talked to one another, and they figured out stuff they could do, but it was not because of central direction they were getting from Washington, D.C. You see countless examples of that where everybody’s out competing. “We want to look good. We want to get our name in lights in the Congress or whatever, because that means resources.” Increasingly, I found that dysfunctional and counterproductive.

Anyway, from the standpoint of the user, the policy maker, the guy sitting in the foxhole, or the brigade G-2, N-2, or whoever it is, instead of having to translate his intelligence needs into four or five different languages, he can just say, “Here’s my information need or set of needs,” and then leave it up to this organization (figure 6). You pin down responsibility. When you have a collection failure, you know just whom to go to, whereas right now we can’t do that.

Processes:

- “One-stop shopping” for collection requirements
- Customers express one intelligence need—not in four discipline-unique languages

If we didn’t do anything else, this would save resources and promote efficiencies

Figure 6
Radical Ruminations: Collection – 3

Again, I think production—the analysis and the assessment and all that sort of stuff—also needs to be a coherent unitary national activity, but more as a confederation, as opposed to a more central direction (figure 7). There should be a national production czar, and that should probably be the DCL. or, as I would retitle the position, the DNI—the Director of National Intelligence—and I’ll talk to that in a moment. The notion is to designate who is in charge of a series of centers of excellence for whatever the intelligence topic is—be it a regional production problem or a topical one. So, it would look something like this graphic (figure 8). This is not anything new or original, but whether it’s by area—we’re looking at Russia, or the Middle East, or East Europe, wherever it is—or topical or functional, the point is you’d have crew chiefs, if you will, who would be the designated orchestrators for that particular problem. That doesn’t mean that he has to have all the analysts, all the experts, sitting
- Conduct all national production as a coherent, unitary activity
- Designate/empower a single national production "czar"
  - Maintain institutional integrity of production centers, but collocate resources where appropriate
  - Designate authoritative executive agents

Figure 7
Radical Ruminations: Production

in one room doing it; they can be decentralized. It’s just the notion of having one person in charge at the national level whom you can point to and say, “If I want to go to the analytic center of excellence for Russia or Eurasia, I’ve got one guy or girl to go to, who then knows where all the resources are that you can bring to bear.” This is nothing more than what we actually did during Desert Storm. That’s precisely the evolution we went through in Desert Storm. You can array it any way you want, regionally or topically.

Oettinger: But what gives this guy or gal teeth, as contrasted to a eunuch like an NIO (National Intelligence Officer)?

Clapper: I would still keep NIOs, but the difference is that this would be the level at which you would marry resource accountability with substantive output.

Oettinger: So, this person has budgetary clout?

Clapper: Exactly. That’s the difference.

Infrastructure, of course, is a rather large, amorphous area (figure 9). Here what I’m suggesting, again, is the appointment or designation of a czar or

Figure 8
U.S. Intelligence Production Confederation

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You talked about budgetary and technical authorities.

**Clapper:** Right. In other words, the way I would like to have it happen is that you would imbue a senior analytic authority for whatever the problem is—whether it’s drugs or Russia, it doesn’t matter, a functional or regional topic—who would then sort of have command over all the analytic resources in the community wherever they reside (again, for the moment, forget about CIA, DIA, and all that stuff): the body of people who are devoted to a given analytic problem. This person would essentially have authority over directing who would do what to whom, who would put out what report and to whom, and with what priority, which we don’t have right now. So, it’s basically again this notion of trying to pin down accountability and responsibility. I don’t know if I answered your question.

**Student:** Okay, so let us say in terms of budgets and costs and all those kinds of things, how do you make your decision on national-type assets that are across those categories?

**Clapper:** At this regional level, and I’m talking about, say, the GS-15, O-6, colonel/captain level, you’ve got to create a bunch of people who, first, are in charge of these areas, and who are also programmatic advocates. Everybody is going to be competing for resources to justify their case, and, of course, the production czar is the one who, on behalf of the DCI or Director of National Intelligence, will be making judgments about, “Will I have 10 fewer analysts on Russia because I need them to focus on the Middle East?” You have somebody who can look at something that’s structured similarly so you can better make trades and adjustments from each of these areas or across from a regional to a topical area, which we can’t do right now because we’re just not structured systematically enough across the community to make those kind of trades.

Now let me get to intelligence programs (figure 10). We’ve sort of hit on that. This is the current structure programmatically.
This is important, because this is a measure of where resources are allocated and where money is spent. Currently, the National Foreign Intelligence Program is structured so you have the General Defense Intelligence Program, which is the one I managed, basically military intelligence resources. It includes all the money and manpower in DIA, and the three service production centers, and the joint intelligence centers that are collocated with each of the unified warfighting commands. You’ve got the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, which is the NSA program, the signals intelligence program. The National Reconnaissance Program covers the satellites, etc.

The problem here is that there is no consistent framework. You’ve got one program devoted to satellites. You’ve got another program devoted to a collection discipline, SIGINT. You’ve got another program devoted to an agency, the Central Intelligence Agency Program, but there is no common framework. This is apples and oranges. So that’s why we have this difficulty in making meaningful trades. The problem is that you’re fundamentally flawed to start with because of the way the thing is structured.

Then we have this thing in Defense called the Joint Military Intelligence Program, which is intended to be those things that straddle more than one military department. I won’t go into the details here. You have this amorphous aggregation called TIARA, Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, which is sort of a miscellaneous aggregation of cats and dogs, basically built by the Congress, which has no programmatic sense whatsoever. It includes such things as the tankers that refuel reconnaissance airplanes. This is a political thing on the part of the Congress to make the intelligence budget as big as you possibly can. It has to do with congressional committee jurisdictions and all that sort of thing.

But as far as this aggregation having any functional meaning, it has none. In fact, to cartoon this a little bit, I would liken intelligence programming to the Balkans (figure 11). You’ll notice I have (this is just a joke) CIAplia, which sort of equates to...
Serbia: what’s mine is mine, and what’s yours is negotiable; that’s kind of the way CIA acts sometimes, or so it seems.

So what would I do to police that up (figure 12)? Well, what I would do is sort of make it simple. Again, we talked about collection, production, and infrastructure. Those are the three main aggregations within intelligence. I think they need to be perceived or carved up in three levels. The national level is those intelligence resources that truly support more than one department of the government. If the case can be made that something supports both the Department of Defense and the Department of State, then it should go at that level. Then there’s a Defense-wide aggregation, which involves those resources that straddle more than one military department in the Department of Defense. What’s an example of it? Well, the U-2 is an Air Force plane, but it serves a variety of masters. It serves the Army, it serves the Navy, it serves everybody. That is an example of a Defense-wide resource. And then there are the tactical resources, and this gets to somebody’s question over here: What is it that you have at the service levels? I would suggest that we be very specific about that, and say that those intelligence resources that are at the corps level and below in the Army, the MEF (the Marine Expeditionary Force) level and below in the Marine Corps, battle group level and below in the Navy, and numbered Air Force and below in the Air Force, would be tactical resources. They would be advocated by the service intelligence chief, not the way they are now, which is a mixture of ops and intel defending and advocating those things. Those would be bought and paid for and defended by the services.

If you went to this sort of programmatic structure, then you could look across east and west, or laterally, and say, “What are we investing at the national level in collection, production, and infrastructure?” Or you could look north and south, that is, vertically, and say, “What are we spending
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**Figure 12**
A Suggested Programming Construct

on collection at all levels, be it at the national, Defense-wide, or tactical level? Then you can see the apples to apples and oranges to oranges, not the way we do it now. The current programmatic structure is simply a product of history, technology, politics, or whatever. It has no real rational basis. What I’m suggesting is that, given the world we’re going to face and that the Cold War is over, now is the time to reform ourselves, particularly at the national level, even if we police this up, institutional changes aside.

At the top, I believe we should establish a Director of National Intelligence to replace or supplant the DCI (figure 13); that is, separate him from the CIA charter. As you know, the DCI, John Deutch, is now both director of the Central Intelligence Agency and also the Director of Central Intelligence. So he has two hats. He runs an agency and he’s also supposed to preside over the community. It works just fine until you have an Ames case. I saw this happen with Jim Woolsey when he was the DCI: he was consumed with an agency issue, Aldrich Ames, leaving him precious little time for his other major duty, which is to preside over and lead the entire community.

So I came to believe, after living through that, that we should have a separate Director of National Intelligence who would not be the CIA director. We would still have a CIA, and the director would report to this individual, but he or she would be insulated

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**At the top...**
- Establish DNI
- Separate from CIA director
- Designate as cabinet-level officer
- Set fixed term
- Establish qualifications
- Strengthen management arms
  - substantive: stronger NIC
  - functional: empowered Community Management Staff
- Formally designate DNI
  - Senior uniformed officer in DOD
  - Accountable to DNI

**Figure 13**
What’s Needed?
when there is an all-consuming agency issue so that he or she could continue the position of leadership of the community, and also perform with less distraction as the President's senior intelligence officer—the President's J-2, if you will.

He should be designated a cabinet-level officer. I don't say a cabinet officer, because that gets into this issue of intelligence interfering or engaging in policy. The purpose here—and this should be embodied in legislation—is to ensure access to the President, so this isn't a whim of personality or chemistry between the DCI and the President. It should be a fixed term. The FBI director serves for five years, I think. Again, in the interest of insulating intelligence from political pressures, the DCI should also have a fixed term, obviously with provisions for renewal—or removal, if required.

Then the two what I would call management arms of the DCI (or DNI, as I would call him) should be strengthened. On the substantive side, the National Intelligence Council, which should continue, should be the body that includes the premier or elite analysts for the country, and would directly serve the DNI in his role in supporting the President. His functional management responsibilities for oversight of the community should be strengthened as well. I also believe there should be a Director of Military Intelligence, a role I tried hard to play ex officio for my four years as director of the DIA, which now is a dead letter, I might add.

So, how to do it (figure 14)? The argument here is that this is too turbulent. It will upset people. Oh, the pain!, and all that sort of thing. Obviously, the intelligence community could not stop the train for two or three years while we rearrange all the chairs. That's clearly out of the question. We have to keep performing our mission. What I would suggest, though, as an easy way to do it, is simply to reissue three checkbooks, so to speak. (Again, I'm being a little simplistic.) So you'd issue a checkbook to the collection czar or czarina, the production czar or czarina, and the infrastructure czar or czarina, and then the economies and efficiencies will accrue over a period of time—again, harking back to the example set by Goldwater-Nichols. Enacted in 1986, it is still evolving. That is what I suggest would happen here, just as the National Security Act, and what ensued after that in 1947, evolved. So, again, and I've said this already, what we need is a Goldwater-Nichols Act (figure 15).

We should push towards a
"Goldwater-Nichols for Intelligence"

The challenge I tried to pose to the Aspin Commission was that at the outset they had a choice to make (figure 16). They could either "change the oil on the same old used cars," or they could try to draw a new road map. I fervently was pushing that what we really need is a new road map, not just an oil change, although I suspect they won't do it.

That's the end of the spiel. Any questions or rebuttals to this?

Oettinger: A quick comment. Those of you in the class will remember my talking about the difference between a kid's lemonade stand and the real world. You've gotten one remarkable dose here of what that transition from lemonade stand to real world is, because this presentation is all about this question of when you have everything writ large, how do you organize it so it makes sense and works properly—and it comes from a master who has lived through it.
He has now given you the benefit of his hindsight. This has got to be one of the more remarkable presentations here, matched only, and I say it again because of the analogy he brought up with Goldwater-Nichols, by some of the statements by Bob Herres and by Admiral Owens as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,* where they got stuck with the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. So you have here an interesting interplay between what Jim proposes and what it took in the parallel situation he maintains, of which we have a record in the seminar proceedings.** both of how it got to the point where Goldwater-Nichols was adopted, and also how it got implemented. So I really recommend that one or more of you pursue this line of thinking as a term paper. Anyway, we have another five minutes in which to address further questions about it to our speaker.


** As previously noted, the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a recurring theme in the seminar proceedings in 1987, 1988, and 1989.
this, if you could share something specifically. Then do you think, as I do, that there is a window of opportunity to implement something like this, in light of the NRO “losing” $2 billion? It would seem to be a climate where maybe somebody could champion something like this.

**Clapper:** That is a question I’m frequently asked. The reaction is invariably generational. The younger the audience, the more favorable the response, and the older—the more senior—the audience, the more negative the response. So, invariably, if I brief a bunch of majors or lieutenant colonels, they ask, “Why didn’t we do this years ago? It makes sense to me.” But then you get up to the elders, those with the antlers, who sit around the table and bump them, who are all basically heads of the institutions that I’m attacking, and they say, “Well, I’m not sure about this sort of thing.”

The first time I gave this pitch, at least an earlier form of it, was down at Camp Perry at Bill Studeman’s behest, and it was a gathering of the intelligence elders, I’ll call them: the first two tiers of the intelligence community. This was before the Aspin Commission got started and all that. The message I was trying to convey was, “If we don’t do something ourselves, folks, it’s going to get done to us,” and at the end of this pitch, I got a standing ovation. So, they loved it intellectually, but emotionally, no way.

Now, your other question: What are the chances? My hope is that, first of all, in all these reform studies going on in Washington right now, to me the important one, and the group I’ve been sort of targeting, is the House Intelligence Committee, because, as I said earlier, the only way this is going to come about is through legislation. You ought to talk to Mark Lowenthal. I’m consulting with the committee, and my sense is that Larry Combest (R-TX), the chairman, and I are sort of soul brothers in all this, so to speak. You’ll have to ask Mark what they intend to do. But that, to me, is the focus because what has to happen here is legislation. The Senate, frankly, has been largely dormant in all this.

**Oettinger:** Except that when Pat Moynihan (D-NY), who has a great sense of humor, but also is very familiar with a lot of these issues, talks about abolishing it all and starting it from scratch, my sense is that he’s reached the level of exasperation where he’d be a serious ally.

**Clapper:** Perhaps. I guess he acknowledges the need for having an intelligence apparatus in the government. That’s the first thing to ask him, I think.

**DeMarines:** You raised a question earlier, and I was just wondering about your remark about the operations separation from intelligence.

**Clapper:** About command and control?

**DeMarines:** Yes.

**Clapper:** At least the way it’s organized at the bureaucratic level of the Department of Defense is that we have an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, which sort of implies that there is somehow a marriage or connection between command, control, and communications on one hand, and intelligence on the other. I challenge you to cite one example where there was ever a resource trade between “C” and “I.” History will reflect that that never happened. It turns out that what you have normally, as I look at it as an intelligence weenie, is that command and control or communications is one means by which intelligence is conveyed. It is not, in my lexicon, or the way I look at it, an end unto itself.

There is a portion of intelligence in which it’s important that it be conveyed electronically and that you have the proper communications to convey intelligence, but that’s not all there is to intelligence. There’s a whole range of a rather subjective area, having to do with assessing things, and analytic processes, and all that, that normally communicators don’t bother with. Of course, the history of the way it’s been managed, at least in the Department of Defense, is that you’ll either get someone who has a strong background in intelligence or
someone with a background in C³. I went through this in two administrations with Duane Andrews, a good friend of mine, who was steeped in an intelligence background, so he was in my knickers constantly when I was director of DIA. Then Emmett Paige comes along, who has a very strong command, control, and communications background. So, although there is the rhetoric and all this that the two are together, I suggest to you they really aren’t. The real test of this, at least in the government, comes down to the bucks. The day there is a meaningful trade-off in a resource context between intelligence and command and control, then I’ll believe they’re married. But until that happens, they aren’t.

Oettinger: If I may echo again the cartoon you asked us to imagine when you began, there’s a nice account by Ruth Davis in one of the years of this seminar of the history of how this got clumped together, and it’s like the mixed-up composite building—unintelligible on any basis other than the historical aggregation of the structure.*

It’s four o’clock. We need to release you and to thank our speaker for a fantastic session.

Clapper: Those were great questions, and I appreciate nobody going to sleep.

Oettinger: We were all wide awake, and this is a small token of our appreciation.

Clapper: Thank you, Tony, it was great to be here.
