Incidental Paper

Early Warning Systems and the American Peacekeeping Mission: The Case of the Sinai II Agreement Between Egypt and Israel
Barry Cherniavsky
An incidental paper of the Program on Information Resources Policy.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND THE AMERICAN PEACEKEEPING MISSION: THE CASE OF THE SINAI II AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL
Barry Cherniavsky
Incidental paper I-81-6
July 1981

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"Our experience in the Middle East has demonstrated that technical assistance with monitoring systems, such as aerial photography and ground detection devices, can help create the confidence necessary to make disengagement and stabilizing agreements work.

Building on the experience, we are prepared to consider joint requests for these 'eyes and ears of peace' from countries that want such monitoring services."

Vice President Mondale
May 24, 1978

"... U.S. President Ford agreed to sell this (early warning) station to me to be a witness between us and Israel."

Egyptian President Sadat,
September 1, 1975

"Russian influence in the Mideast is at the lowest point in the last 20 years, partially thanks to the Sinai Pact."

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin,
September, 1976

"A rapid and dependable communications network is the heart of an early warning system."

Watch in the Sinai, 1980
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My special thanks go to Dr. Oswald H. Ganley, Executive Director, International and Allied Arenas of the Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, who gave me the opportunity to deal with such an interesting subject and who guided me clearly and effectively in this work.

I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Gladys Ganley in putting this paper into proper English and thank her for her many helpful substantive suggestions.

For their kind assistance, suggestions and time devoted to interviews, I would also like to thank the following people:

Mr. Herman Eilts, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, now University Professor of International Relations and Research Professor of History and Political Science, Boston University.

Professor Anthony G. Oettinger, Chairman, Harvard Program on Information Resources Policy.

Mr. Mordechai Gazit, former Israeli Ambassador to France and Head of Israel's Delegation to the Geneva (Sinai II) Peace Negotiations, and Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1980-81.

Brigadier General Haim Teitelbaum, Deputy Chief of Planning Branch, General Staff, Israeli Armed Forces.

Dr. Michael I. Handel, Research Associate, Center for International Studies, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, on leave from Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Thanks go also to Ms. Carol Weinhaus, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard, who aided me with information retrieval.

None of the above, however, are responsible for, nor do they necessarily agree with, the views expressed in this paper. Any factual errors or misinterpretations are solely mine.
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Executive Summary

This paper examines the role played in the 1975 Sinai II Agreement between Egypt and Israel by the American Sinai Field Mission staff and by the use of advanced communications systems for early warning purposes. The main points of the Agreement, the political and military objectives of the strategic and tactical early warning systems, the unwritten reasons for the American presence, and the attitudes of the Egyptians, the Israelis, and the Americans toward these peacekeeping activities are set forth. The political process by which the Agreement and the appended American proposal came to be accepted by the various parties is discussed, the technical equipment used is described and the overall results of the mission examined.

It is concluded that the mutual willingness of Egypt and Israel to reduce the possibility of war, and their trust in the United States led to an American presence in the Sinai. This was found to be compatible with overall U.S. foreign and defense policy.

The specialized peacekeeping tasks were very successfully carried out by the American Sinai Support Mission and the Sinai Field Mission. The use of modern communications and detection devices provided a sense of security under these specific conditions, and the American presence itself served to reduce tensions.

All three parties gained by the peacekeeping mission: Israel attained political reassurance by the American commitment, Egypt achieved a breakthrough in its relations with the United States, and the United States acquired a stronger position in the Middle East vis a vis the Russians.

While the basic concepts and elements employed in the Sinai could be applied elsewhere in the world, a necessary condition for success would be the willingness of the parties to work toward peace.
Introduction

"In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement."(5)

The second interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel following the October 1973 "Yom Kippur" war -- the Sinai II Agreement -- was initialed in Alexandria and Jerusalem on September 1st, and signed in Geneva on September 4th, 1975. This Agreement, devised as a first step toward a just and durable peace between the two countries, is unique in several aspects and includes some special elements. Among these are provisions for strategic early warning systems to be operated separately by both Egypt and Israel, for special manned and advanced electronic monitoring systems to be under American control, and for an American presence in the Sinai.

Most of the materials related to the Sinai II Agreement are classified, but examination of unclassified documents and other published materials has generated a number of questions:

... What were the goals of the different parties in having these early warning systems?

... Were these systems needed equally by both Egypt and Israel?
... Why was an American presence in the Sinai necessary?

... Who first suggested this American presence?

... What were the unwritten objectives of an American presence?

... Through what process was this American presence approved by the U.S. Congress?

... What was the role of communications and detection devices in the Sinai Field Mission?

... What are the implications of the Sinai success? Could this system be applied elsewhere?

These and other questions will be examined and an attempt made by interpretation and assumption to fill the void created by a lack of relevant unclassified materials.

The Main Points of the Sinai II Agreement

The most important points included in the Sinai II Agreement are as follows:

... Provision was made for Israeli and Egyptian forces to be redeployed by February 22, 1976, with Israel to withdraw beyond the Giddi and Mitla passes and Egypt to control a narrow strip in the West Sinai, to include the Abu-Rudeis oil fields.

... Buffer zones were created under the control of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEP).

... Egypt and Israel were to each separately operate early warning systems under terms specified by the Agreement.

... Limited arms and forces zones were designated on either side of the buffer zone.

... The U.S. was to make photo reconnaissance flights over the areas to supply information to both Israel and Egypt and to the United Nations Emergency Forces.
A joint commission of Egyptian and Israeli representatives, with coordination by the U.N., was set up to periodically consider problems arising under the Agreement.

An American tactical early warning system was established within the buffer zone to monitor the execution of the Agreement.

The Agreement is a first step toward a just and durable peace between the sides.

There will be no use of force or military blockade against each other.

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

The Objectives of the Early Warning Systems

a. The Strategic Early Warning System

The U.S. Proposal, appended to the Sinai II Agreement, provided that two surveillance stations, one operated by Egypt and one by Israel, give strategic early warning to the two sides.

Israel already had a surveillance station at Um Khashayb (within the proposed buffer zone) for such strategic early warning. A considerable portion of the Israeli Defense Army "Tzahal" is composed of reservists who must be called up following an alert. That is, Israeli defenses relied on this type of early warning before the advent of the Agreement. It is therefore assumed that no interim agreement which required the Israelis to give up the Giddi and Mitla passes could have been accomplished without enabling Israel to continue to maintain such a station in the buffer zone. Israeli attempts to have the American watch station sensor fields placed farther
west than the U.S. suggested reflected the importance to Israel
of strategic early warning of Egyptian activities.\(^7\) The Israelis
argued that moving the Sinai Field Mission sensor fields
westward to the nearest road junctions would provide tactical
symmetry and give a somewhat earlier warning, which would be
important to Israel in the event of a UNEF withdrawal (which
had happened in 1967). The American response, however, was
that this would alter:

"... the U.S. role in the EWS from a tactical to
a strategic one."\(^8\)

Prior to the Sinai II Agreement, Egypt had had no similar
surveillance station, and in fact had no military need for
one. Egypt's army consisted of regular troops that were said to be
prepared at any time to meet an attack. However, Sadat concluded
that Egypt should also maintain such a station. It would seem
that this decision was based on political considerations rather
than military ones. (General El Gamasy, then Egyptian Deputy
Prime Minister, at one time suggested that Egypt operate four
monitoring military posts, but this suggestion was rejected by
the United States.)\(^9\)

At a news conference following the initialing of the
Agreement in Alexandria, President Sadat had this to say:

"... We discussed -- that is myself and the U.S.
President Ford -- we discussed the early warning
positions or bases at Salzburg. And the idea
behind the early warning is that the U.S. is a
witness to test ... It started like this. I asked
first the U.S. President to be witness between me
and Israel. This is before raising the whole
question of the stations. ... To be witness between
us. Israel has an early warning station, but we
do not have or did not have, and I do not even have or did not have a place to find someone to sell me a base. I previously asked for it but I did not get it. ... No. I was denied. I asked something on a very low level, but I was denied this... I asked for something much less than that but I was denied that... U.S. President Ford agreed to sell me a station like the one Israel has. And the one that we have, if I may point out, is at the highest technological level, and it is very costly. But the U.S. President Ford agreed to sell this station to me to be a witness between us and Israel."(10) [Emphasis added]

It seems, therefore, that a prime reason for Sadat to want to establish the early warning system was to have the U.S. "be a witness between us." That is, to establish an American presence in the Sinai.

A second reason why Sadat appeared to want an early warning system was because:

"Israel has an early warning station but we do not..."

For appearances, it was apparently important to have what the other side had.

The third, and perhaps the most important reason why Sadat wanted an early warning system was that:

"... I asked for something much less than that but I was denied that."

Quite possibly, an important outcome of the Sinai II Agreement for Sadat was that it brought about a breakthrough in the U.S. response to his requests for military equipment. Until 1975, there had been no U.S. military aid at all to Egypt. In addition, U.S. economic aid to Egypt was increased from $20 million in 1974 to $400 million in 1975.
In sum, it appears that Israel needed the early warning system militarily for strategic purposes, already relied on such a system before this pact, and probably insisted on maintaining such a system in the buffer zone as a condition for the Agreement. Egypt, on the other hand, had no military need for strategic early warning, but needed it politically for the purpose of bringing the Americans into the Sinai area and for deepening relations with the U.S. to gain military and economic aid, as well as for internal political considerations.

b. The Tactical Early Warning System

The U.S. Proposal also provided for the establishment of systems to give tactical early warning and to verify access to the two strategic early warning stations. Thus, three watch stations manned by U.S. civilian personnel were established in the Mitla and Giddi passes, in addition to three stations composed of unmanned electronic sensor fields. Verification that operations by Egypt and Israel were those agreed to was to be accomplished by U.S. personnel at these watch stations. Here, any movements of armed forces or other divergencies would be observed and reported.

The tangible peacekeeping role of the United States in the Sinai Field Mission was the maintenance of these watch stations. But there were also intangibles. Both Israel and Egypt had requested the American presence because each trusted the United States. Israel also had other reasons:

... Since its 1967 experience, when Egypt's President Nasser asked the U.N. forces in Sharm-a-Sheikh to leave the Sinai and the U.N. forces immediately complied, Israel felt it could not completely rely on UNEF forces.
... Israel needed the presence of a third party, not only for tactical but for strategic reasons. If Egypt asked the third party to leave the area, that in itself would act as an early warning.

Item 8 of the American Proposal is perfectly clear regarding the matter of dismissal of U.S. personnel:

"... If both parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive." (11)
(Emphasis added)

Nevertheless, President Sadat answered a question at the Alexandria news conference by saying:

"... It is stipulated in the agreement that should Egypt wish to withdraw the civilian American technicians, then it can do so." (Emphasis added) (12)

Then he further said:

"My agreement is with the U.S. I have nothing to do in this matter with Israel."

This was not a matter of misunderstanding. It rather reflected the fact that Sadat politically, for home consumption, could not publicly admit that he had reached a separate agreement with Israel. This was understood by the U.S. and by Israel, who preferred not to respond.

The Unwritten Purpose of the American Presence

During his efforts to obtain U.S. approval of the American Proposal, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the following statement:

"The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited -- but crucial -- American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the U.S." (13)
a. The Egyptian Attitude

The Egyptian request for an American presence reflected a new policy for Sadat, who now apparently felt that he could trust the U.S. to play a "just role" in the Middle East. He had been convinced by Kissinger's performance on October 22, 1973, when Kissinger prevented the Israeli army from capturing the Third Egyptian Army and stopped Israeli movement 101 kilometers from Cairo.

Kissinger's record was summed up by the *U.S. News and World Report* in January 1977:

"... First, he acted to save the Arabs from another humiliating defeat. Then, in an unprecedented feat of "shuttle diplomacy" he demonstrated to the Arabs that he could succeed where the Russians had failed in recovering occupied Arab territory from Israel." (14)

This had led to a developing policy by Egypt, which eventually permitted a peace treaty with Israel and made possible a new Egyptian relationship with the United States.

President Sadat seems to have had a consistently pro-American-presence policy in the Middle East and especially in Egypt as far back as 1974. Nevertheless, *Haaretz*, the major Israeli daily newspaper, noted in August 1975 that the Egyptian position with regard to an American presence in the Sinai was unclear and that there:

"... even is an opposition to that proposal." (15)

But since this had been Sadat's proposal in May of that year, and Sadat's voice is the one that counts in Egypt, it
can be concluded that this was the result of a very successful Egyptian diplomatic effort to present a foggy position regarding this question.

According to Watch in the Sinai, there would seem to have been some Egyptian opposition:

"... (then) Foreign Minister Fahmy, who had initially been opposed to and was skeptical of the early warning system and the presence of Americans in the Sinai ..." (16)

But former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Herman Eilts, said in a private interview that:

"Fahmy was never against it." (17)

b. The Israeli Attitude

The Israeli government apparently favored an American presence as a guarantee to the Agreement and as an indirect U.S. commitment to Israel. But there is some argument about who in Israel suggested the placement of Americans in the Sinai. Then Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin told the press that it was not his idea. The Defense Minister, Shimon Peres (now leader of the Labor party and the opposition in the Israeli Parliament) took credit for it with the press, and called the American presence:

"... an extension of the expected life of the Agreement." (18)

But it could be that Moshe Dayan was actually the father of the idea. In late 1970, Dayan suggested that Israel examine with the United States the possibility of an American presence in the Sinai, since this would give Israel certain
guarantees should she decide to withdraw a short distance from the Suez Canal. (19)

But how was it possible for a pro-American-presence stance to develop in Israel when the historical consensus of opinion against any involvement in Israel of a foreign army was still valid? The answer is that the American presence was not conceived to be a military one by any of the parties involved. It was seen by Israel only to provide a tangible American participation in the Agreement and perhaps even to symbolize an American political guarantee for Israel. It is interesting that some of the same considerations may have guided Sadat in his decision to seek an American presence -- especially that he could thereby obtain a U.S. political guarantee for Egypt.

In fact, Egypt probably gained more in the way of political guarantees than did Israel, since for Egypt the American presence was a major breakthrough in U.S.-Egyptian relationships, while for Israel it was more a matter of reassurance.

In a Yediot Aharonot* poll on August 1, 1976, 44 percent of the responses were against the U.S. presence, while 39 percent favored it. (This was one of several polls, and the figures tended to fluctuate). Opposition to the U.S. presence in this poll was based on an unwillingness to allow foreigners, even civilian foreigners, to be placed in the Sinai. And there were other reasons for opposition:

* One of the two Israeli evening newspapers
... Since the American commitment to Israel and its involvement already existed, why should Israel push for more?

... It might be very easy for Egypt to remove the Americans, even by a small hint.

... There could be a Russian response to "balance" the situation, and the overall outcome could thus be negative.

... If the U.S. Congress believed Israel was responsible for this idea, its response could be anticipated to be negative.

Abraham Schweitzer, one of the Haaretz editors, suggested that an American presence could lead to a defense treaty between the U.S. and Israel and that this might give Israel a strategic defense in place of the operative defense territories. On the same page, his colleague, Yoel Marcus said that an American presence would damage Israel in the American public opinion and that Golda Meir understood that the Americans were "very afraid" of this kind of presence. Marcus also expressed surprise at Kissinger's acceptance of the proposal. Another Haaretz article claimed that Senator Javits had warned Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Simha Dinitz, that the Congressional response would be against such a U.S. presence. Haaretz' Washington reporter, Dan Margalit, said that Senator Henry Jackson opposed this presence because it could be dangerous for Israel. Jackson, he noted, said the real aim was to bring Israel back to the 1967 borders with American guarantees, and that for Israel this was the first step into a trap.
The relevant debate in the Knesset* took place on September 29, 1975, when Shmuel Tamir raised the question in the name of the Likud Party, at that time the main opposition. Tamir objected to the Sinai II Agreement and to the American presence, saying that Israel had a lot to lose in American public opinion. The average U.S. citizen, he said, was still involved in the "Vietnam trauma" and he questioned why Israel should quarrel with U.S. citizens. (According to Louis Harris' testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the majority of Americans actually favored a U.S. presence in the Sinai at that time.)

Tamir also quoted Senator Jackson as saying:

"The Administration proposal to place American personnel in the strategic Sinai passes is the most troublesome element in the new accord. Despite Administration claims that this arrangement was essential to the negotiation I remain unpersuaded that no alternative could be found. The Israelis and Egyptians are now to conduct virtually all the necessary surveillance by themselves in any case; the marginal contribution of American personnel to this purpose raises more problems than it solves. I have simply not seen sufficient evidence that all other approaches were exhausted before we agreed to go into the passes." (24)

---

* Israeli Parliament

** The Likud is Begin's party.
In response, then Defense Minister Shimon Peres described the process of negotiations:

"We believe that Sadat's proposal to President Ford (in Salzburg, May, 1975) was an attempt to meet the Israeli requirement for maintaining a strategic warning system beyond the passes by manning this station by Americans instead of Israelis. That was rejected both by the U.S. and Israel. Then Israel brought a parallel proposal which was a strategic-political-geographic one.

The proposal said: Israel would rule the Mitla and Giddi passes by forces deployed on the mountains which rule those passes. And, within the valleys between those mountains and the passes, there will be an American presence as an addition to the UN forces in the buffer zone. It will be neither an addition to the Israeli forces nor to the Egyptian ones." (Author's translation). (25)

In other arguments, Peres justified the proposal for a U.S. presence, saying he was certain that U.S. congressmen could tell the difference between a U.S. presence in the Sinai and the former U.S. presence in Vietnam, and that the two were not comparable.

c. The American Attitude

Senator Mike Mansfield, then Senate Majority Leader, commented in September 1975 that:

"... the presence of the technicians (in the Sinai) could drag the U.S. into a new shooting war, a la Vietnam." (26)

This objection was both reasonable and anticipated. But by recalling some statements made by Kissinger, it may be asked whether the Vietnam experience was the only reason for U.S. opposition to the U.S. presence there. Kissinger himself did not want to be associated with the conception of the idea and insisted that:

"It was not a role we sought." (27)
Why then did Kissinger seek approval for the proposal? Was it indeed because he could think of no better solution for the two sides? Was this a key factor for both Israel and Egypt without which there could be no Agreement? While there is no available evidence which is strictly supportive, the answer to the above questions might well have been "yes".

However, it should be said that an American presence in the Sinai was consistent with Kissinger's global policy. Globally, it was in the U.S. interest to be present in the Middle East.

In January 1981, Kissinger made a statement in Jerusalem which was reported by the New York Times.

"... Kissinger urged today (January 6th) that the U.S. enhance its military presence in the Middle East to counter growing Soviet activity there." (28)

Thus it would seem that under the guise of the Sinai II Agreement, what Kissinger succeeded in doing was to obtain an American presence in the Middle East for the purpose of countering Soviet activity. This was a major feat to achieve so shortly following the Vietnam war. And this achievement, it could be said, was at least partly based on Kissinger's insistence that Egypt and Israel, not the United States, were responsible for such a U.S. presence. A 1977 article put it this way:

"Eight years ago the Soviet Union occupied a dominant position in the Arab world with military bases and 20,000 troops in Egypt. Today the situation has been transformed. The Russians
are out of Egypt.... The U.S. has restored
relations with most of these (Arab) countries
and is now accepted as "honest broker" in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. ... Kissinger is leaving
the Carter Administration in a position that
offers greater influence and flexibility in
the Mideast than the U.S. has enjoyed in a
quarter of a century." (29)

A year after the Sinai Pact Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
made the comment:

"Russian influence in the Mideast is at the lowest
point in the last 20 years, partially thanks to
the Sinai Pact." (30)

And Israeli Foreign Minister Yizhak Allon had summarized the
advantages of an American presence for Americans in a September
1975 interview:

"I don't see why Americans should be concerned
about the growing role of the U.S. in the Middle
East. On the contrary, I think they should be
pleased with the fact that, after many years of
Soviet progress in the area, the U.S. is again
becoming the major power in the Mediterranean
and in the Middle East." (31)

In December 1980, U.S. News and World Report had a story
which said:

"Out of Operation Bright Star* came valuable
military lessons. The political implication of
the exercise may be even more important.

The message: The U.S. and Egypt are determined
to provide a protective umbrella for the vulnerable
oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf.

The joint maneuver in the Egyptian desert involving
1400 American troops marked a modest move in forging
a new kind of alliance between Washington and Cairo to
provide that umbrella." (32)

* A joint U.S.-Egyptian quasi-military exercise
The Sinai II Agreement had paved the way for this sort of cooperative activity with global implications.

But despite any global advantages to be gained by an American presence in the Sinai, Kissinger was concerned with the significance of this commitment:

"One lesson we must surely learn from Vietnam is that new commitments of our nation's honor and prestige must be carefully weighed. But after our recent experiences we have a special obligation to make certain that commitments we have made will be rigorously kept and that this is understood by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe again that it can tear up with impunity a solemn agreement with the United States." (33)

d) The Importance to the United States of the Sinai II Agreement

Dr. Oswald Ganley has described four facets of U.S. diplomatic concerns in international science and technology cooperation: political, economic, military, and overall global considerations. (34) The Sinai II Agreement appears to have had positive elements for the United States in each of these areas:

1) Political: It fulfilled the U.S. desire to have good relationships not only with historic U.S. partners (Israel) but also with new ones (Egypt).

2) Economic: The prevention of another Middle East war has given the U.S. a high rate of return (on oil prices, etc.) on the relatively small necessary investment (additional aid, etc.).

3) Military: The small amount of American equipment and personnel in the Middle East could serve as the focus of future bases, if necessary. The U.S. is also gaining experience
in the use of modern technology under desert conditions. There is evidence that operation of the various types of equipment in the Sinai has led to advanced research and development and to the production of better detection equipment.

4) Global: The Agreement "... (calms) the propensity of peoples to go to war or to resort to internal strife." One might suspect that this statement was an attempt by Kissinger to facilitate persuading the US Congress to approve the proposal as can be seen below.

The Debate in the United States Congress

In his prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement, Secretary of State Kissinger wrote:

"The United States' diplomatic role in the Middle East is a matter of vital national importance: We have an historic and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel. We have important interests in the Arab world with its 150 million people and the world's largest oil reserves. We know that the world's hopes, and our own, for economic recovery and progress could be dashed by another upheaval in the Middle East.

Hailed by both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat as a possible turning point, the Sinai Agreement represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace -- political, military, and psychological -- in the long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thus what we are proposing to the Congress -- as we seek approval for the stationing of no more than 200 technicians in the Sinai -- is an investment in peace.

The proposed American presence is a limited but crucial American responsibility. It is not a role we sought; it is a role we accepted reluctantly at the request of both sides -- and only when it was clear that there would be no agreement without it. The American personnel will be volunteers, and they will be civilian. Their function is to assist in an early warning system in the small areas of the Sinai
passes in the UN buffer zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers for one side: they will serve both sides at their request. They will complement the UN military contingents already there from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria and Finland whose responsibility it is to protect the buffer zone.

The proposal we ask you to approve provides that the President may withdraw these volunteer technicians if we believe them to be in jeopardy or are no longer necessary. We are prepared, as well, to accept the Congressional proposal to make withdrawal mandatory in the event of hostilities.

I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that there are no other assurances or undertakings, beyond those already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon the U.S. We will make no contrary claim in the future: nor can any other government."(35)

The ensuing debate resulted in the House Joint Resolution 683-P.L. 94-110 on October 9, 1975, which implemented the U.S. Proposal for an Early Warning System in the Sinai. After a number of restrictive amendments had been rejected, this Resolution passed by 70 to 18. Following consideration for more than a month, it was overwhelmingly adopted by both the House and the Senate. The issues which had prevented an easy approval were:

1) That the U.S. might be dragged into a new war, like Vietnam, where the starting point had also been technicians and advisors. George Ball called this decision as hard as that on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

2) That the Congress considered nothing would be achieved by the Sinai Pact except to gain time.
3) That Americans in the Sinai could become political hostages.

4) That Americans in the Sinai would be in a very dangerous situation, located between two hostile armies.

5) That approval of the American monitors, thereby committing the U.S. to a role -- however inactive -- in the Middle East, might imply support for secret promises Kissinger could have made to Egypt and Israel.

Various maneuvers and countermaneuvers were conducted in the Senate, depending on who was for or against a U.S. presence. Senator Abourezk proposed an amendment to bar the use of U.S. troops to rescue U.S. civilian monitors to be stationed in the Sinai. This was rejected by 16-75. Senator Humphrey made a motion to table, and thus to kill the McClure amendment, which was a substitute for a Humphrey amendment, and would have barred the use of U.S. troops to rescue U.S. civilian monitors in the Sinai in a combat situation. This was agreed to by 68-25. Senator Abourezk made a motion to resubmit the Joint Resolution to the Foreign Relations Committee with instructions to report the Resolution out as a treaty, which was rejected by 9-85. Humphrey made a motion to table, and thus kill the Clark amendment which stated that it was the sense of the Senate that the confidential status of a legal memorandum sent to the Foreign Relations Committee by the State Department on the nature of U.S. agreements with Israel and Egypt
be removed. This was agreed to by 59-32. Then Humphrey made a motion to table, and thus kill the Biden amendment to provide that any agreement made by a U.S. official in connection with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement be only a statement of Executive branch intentions and thus not be considered binding under domestic or international law. This was agreed to by 51-32.

The Resolution was then passed by 341-69, but not before rejecting a proposed amendment by Findley to limit the President's authority to assign American monitors to the Sinai to two years.

The Role of the Observer and of Advanced Communications Equipment in the Sinai

a. Surveillance Station Monitoring

The Israeli "J-1" and Egyptian "E-1" surveillance stations (Map 1) which were used for strategic early warning each had a personnel ceiling of 250 people and occupied areas of about two square miles. They were also limited by the operative capabilities of their visual and electronic equipment.

Under the terms of the Agreement, these stations were monitored by the American Sinai Field Mission staff, which verified access to the Israeli and Egyptian stations and the nature of their operations. The staff also occasionally conducted inspections of the stations. Any divergencies from the specified limits or roles were immediately reported to both sides, to the U.N., and to the U.S. government. Sinai Field Mission officials
occupied liaison buildings at the entrance to the Egyptian and Israeli stations, and each liaison building was equipped with radio and teletype communications, giving continuous and direct access to the main Sinai Field Mission operations center. The Field Mission officials inspected vehicles, personnel and arms as they entered and left the surveillance stations, while traffic entering and leaving the buffer zone was inspected by the United Nations Emergency Forces at its checkpoints.

b. The U.S. Early Warning System

Since the Mitla and Giddi passes are traditional invasion routes protected by the surrounding sands of the Sinai desert, a major function of the Early Warning System was to observe and report any movement or preparation for movement of troops or equipment into the passes. The Sinai Field Mission was equipped with a system for this purpose consisting of four unattended ground sensors and three manned visual coverage watch stations. Each watch station also contained sensor monitoring equipment, visual detection devices, power supplies, and radio and teletype communications equipment by which it was linked to the base camp.

The ground sensors used operated on a variety of detection principles: seismic, acoustic, infrared, magnetic, electromagnetic, pressure, and electrical (to measure earth strain disturbances), as well as optical and electro-optical for night detection. Four types of sensors had been selected:

1) A strain-sensitive cable sensor (SSCS), which, buried in the soil, senses any movement crossing it and thus
acts as an invisible fence; 2) A miniature seismic intrusion detector (MINISID III), that senses earth vibration caused by people from 50 meters and by vehicles from 500 meters; 3) An acoustic Add-on Unit (AAU), which is a communications device that transmits sounds picked up within the sensor field back to the watch station, and 4) A directional infrared intrusion detector (DIRID), which is an optical device that senses the temperature difference between the normal background and an intruder.

Any movement detected by any of the sensors activated a signal which was radioed to a watch station and displayed on a scaled map. An operator was thus able to determine the location, direction and speed of travel, numbers, and weight of the intruder.

Besides these detection and communications devices, visual detection devices were also employed which could identify vehicles up to 20 kilometers away during the daytime and up to 5 kilometers at night.

Following two years of experience and with the consequent feedback, an improved system was introduced which could relay signals directly from the sensor fields to the operations center of the Sinai Field Mission as well as to the watch stations. Shortly thereafter, a remotely controlled night and day television camera was introduced to monitor the West Giddi sensor field, where no direct visual detection was possible.
A significant research and development effort was also mounted to give the sensors an added ability to classify data which had been collected. This required a memory capability. These classifying sensors have now become cost effective due to advances in chip technology. Improved effectiveness and reduced cost of peacekeeping surveillance has also been made possible by advances in other devices, such as radar and imaging sensors.

c. The Communications Network

To minimize the risk of misunderstandings in a multinational operation, the Sinai Field Mission needed an elaborate communications network. This network included:
1) A high frequency single sideband radioteletype circuit to the U.S. government telecommunications network and direct lines to the U.S. State Department and Sinai Support Mission headquarters; 2) links between the Sinai Field Mission base camp and the watch stations, the surveillance stations, and the UNEF checkpoints, which were achieved by two way voice circuits using VHF radio doubling as a data reporting network and by teletype facilities; 3) teletype circuits which linked the Sinai Field Mission with the Israeli Defense Ministry, the Egyptian Ministry of War, the U.N. chief coordinator and the UNEF headquarters in Ismailia, to be used for alerts; 4) internal networks which connected Sinai Field Mission vehicles
and personnel, and 5) links to the commercial telephone systems of Egypt and Israel.

The communications network also served as a conduit for the exchange of messages between Egypt and Israel, since both sides had shown a willingness to advise each other when training exercises, firing, or artillery practice were scheduled.

This elaborate communications and information system of the Sinai Field Mission was successful in reducing tensions between the parties and in preventing confrontations from occurring.

Both Egypt and Israel have praised the American performance in the Sinai. Defense Minister Peres is quoted as saying that in his view:

"... no other single element of the Sinai II Agreement had done as much as the Sinai Field Mission to reduce tensions in the Sinai." (37)

Peres added that he had been viewed by his colleagues, during the negotiations prior to the Agreement, as having become the father of a very unwelcome baby, but that:

"... most critics have since changed their opinions and now appreciate the value of the Sinai Field Mission." (38)

Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister General El-Gamasy also praised the high degree of impartiality and credibility achieved by the Field Mission, as well as the professionalism with which the operation had been conducted.

The importance of the American role in the Sinai was re-emphasized in April 1977. The feasibility of employing
third country nationals in certain Sinai Field Mission support positions was at that time discussed with Egyptian and Israeli officials by the Sinai Support Mission Director. But the two parties answered that the success of the Sinai Mission was due in no small part to its wholly American composition, and the staffing patterns remained unchanged.

Expansion of the American Presence in the Sinai

On March 26, 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a Peace Treaty, and at that time an extension of the American presence in the Sinai was asked for by both parties:

"... Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal (from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla passes).

... Both Parties request the U.S. operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla passes. Thereafter the Mission will be terminated. (Emphasis added)" (39)

However, the Mission did not terminate! On the contrary, due to problems of placement of U.N. personnel, the American Mission's task was expanded and the Sinai Field Mission is now responsible for 15,000 square miles of territory rather than the 250 square miles stipulated in the Sinai II Agreement. The Mission has meanwhile added three Bell-212 helicopters and one Stol aircraft to supplement its ground detection equipment.

When the final stage of Israel's withdrawal from the
Sinai is completed in 1982:

"Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in zones A and D respectively." (40)

What will happen when Egypt controls the whole Sinai Peninsula in 1982? Will one party or the other ask the U.S. to continue its presence? If normal relations exist between the two countries, there would seem to be no need for such a presence. Indeed, a request for a continued U.S. presence might be interpreted to mean that normal relations do not exist. Nevertheless, one or both sides might request a continued U.S. presence in the Sinai, if only as a sign of a continued U.S. commitment to the Middle East as a whole.

The Key Success Factors

There were five main reasons for the success of the Sinai Mission:

First, the American Sinai Support Mission and the Sinai Field Mission operated by the highest standards of professionalism. They were very efficient and effective and gained the cooperation of other U.S. agencies. Their role was clearly defined and their functions well understood and welcomed by all participants.

Second, the Sinai Field Mission staff was reliable and just in its relationships with both Israel and Egypt and thereby gained the support and confidence of both parties.

Third, the geographic conditions of the Sinai area contributed to the Sinai Field Mission's success, because of the relatively unpopulated desert. In the absence of such
favorable geographic conditions, even with high motivation, incidents could have occurred.

Fourth, both Egypt and Israel kept the Agreement and all their activities were in favor of each other and of the Sinai Field Mission and the UNEP. Both Egypt and Israel, as well as the United States, had vested interests in the Mission's success. Cooperative behavior was dictated by the respective governments and adhered to by the local commands.

While the communications networks and early warning systems gave confidence which relieved tensions, their effectiveness as war preventers was never put to the test. It can be concluded that, as events developed, the value of the American presence was due mainly to political and psychological support. This provided confidence rather than actual security.

The most important reason of all for the success of the Mission was that both Egypt and Israel wished to be kept from hurting each other. The Sinai Field Mission could not have stopped hostile activities once they had begun.

Applicability to Other Zones

Based on the success in the Sinai, Vice President Mondale announced that the U.S. would like to help other countries seek peace through "eyes and ears of peace." But this offer has as yet received no response. While this sort of arrangement could, of course, be implemented in other countries, it is difficult to imagine an analogous situation. Just as the
analogy of the American presence in Vietnam and in the Sinai has proved to be false, one cannot expect to copy the Sinai success elsewhere. Iran and Iraq, for instance, could not benefit from this kind of arrangement unless both parties chose to stop fighting. Similarly, in the Golan Heights or on the Jordanian border, an arrangement like the Sinai Field Mission would have little chance of success unless all parties determined to follow a peaceful course.

Summary and Conclusions

The mutual willingness of Egypt and Israel to reduce the possibility of war between them, and their trust in the United States, led to an American presence in the Sinai. This American presence was highly compatible with overall U.S. foreign and defense policy interests.

The specialized early warning and peacekeeping tasks designated under the Sinai II Agreement and the attached U.S. Proposal were executed very successfully by the Sinai Support Mission and its executive branch, the Sinai Field Mission.

Modern cost effective communications and detection devices proved useful and satisfactory in this particular situation, and the American presence, in itself, served as a political and psychological means of reducing tension. The installation of modern monitoring and communications networks implemented the Pact to the advantage of both sides, and Israel's own strategic surveillance stations continued to serve an important role in the Israeli defense system.
The level of success of the Mission was attested to when both Egypt and Israel requested an expanded role for the U.S. Sinai Field Mission after signing a mutual Peace Treaty in March 1979.

Israel gained political reassurance by the American commitment in the Sinai, and Egypt achieved a breakthrough in its relationships with the United States. The U.S., meanwhile, gained a stronger position, vis-à-vis Russia, in the Middle East.

The basic operational concepts employed in the Sinai could be applied to other areas, provided the contending parties are willing to work toward peace. Unfortunately, this is a necessary and possibly even a sufficient condition for the reduction of the probability of war or of hostile activities between opposing parties.
Notes


6. Ibid., Articles I - VIII.

7. U.S. Department of State, Watch in the Sinai, pp. 10 & 11.

8. Ibid., p. 11.

9. Elts, Herman, University Professor of International Relations, Boston University. Personal communication, Jan. 6, 1981.


17. Herman Eilts, supra note 9.
22. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., pp. 4165 & 4166.
27. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 13.
33. Los Angeles Times, "We Must Rediscover Belief in Ourselves", April 21, 1976.
35. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, supra note 13.

37. U.S. Department of State, supra note 16.

38. Ibid.


40. Ibid, Annex 1, Article V.
Sources of Appendices


2. Map 1 from "Watch in the Sinai", p. 10 (Note 4 above).


Appendix I: From the Agreement Between Egypt and Israel, Sept. 29, 1975

Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973. They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and the timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement.

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*The agreement and annex were initialed on Sept. 1 at Jerusalem by representatives of Israel and at Alexandria by representatives of Egypt and signed at Geneva on Sept. 4.
ment and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

**ARTICLE V**

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

**ARTICLE VI**

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

**ARTICLE VII**

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

**ARTICLE VIII**

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

**ARTICLE IX**

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

Done at _________ on the _________ 1975, in four original copies.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Government of
Israel

________________________

WITNESS

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Annex to Egypt-Israel Agreement

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. **Definitions of Lines and Areas**

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

2. **Buffer Zones**

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone, between line E and J there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. **Area South of Line E and West of Line M**

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posta. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by air or by sea, shall be only through United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.
(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between lines J and K and lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

1. Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
2. Seventy-five (75) tanks
3. Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e. with caliber larger than 120 mm), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
4. The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
5. Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
6. Both Parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

1. Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
2. The Parties will not place antiaircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.
3. The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

Proposal

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1.a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of
the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1 b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force agreement of February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

Accepted by: ____________________________
Map I

LAYOUT OF THE U.S. EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: Mitla and Giddi Pass Area

- Surfacd road
- Unsurfaced road
- Landing strip
- Type of vehicle track

- Mitla West
- Mitla East
- Giddi West
- Giddi East
- 16 Kilometers
- 10 Miles
- 20 Kilometers
- 12.5 Miles
- 32 Kilometers
- 20 Miles
- 33 Kilometers
- 20 Miles
- 2212 feet
- 2559 feet
- 2546 feet

- Jabel umr
- Jabel al Juddi
- Jabel Umra

- Camp
- Line K
- Line L
Egyptian and Israeli Limited Force Zones

Map 2
Article IV
Joint Commission and Liaison

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.

3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:
   a. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
   b. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
   c. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verifications when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and this Appendix;
   d. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
   e. supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
   f. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
   g. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Muhammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
   h. conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;
   i. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
   j. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.

4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party or the Command of the United Nations Force requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

5. The Joint Commission will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article V
Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.

3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate
military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 59331527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:

a. The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:
   T1—up to 150 personnel
   T2 and T3—up to 350 personnel
   T4—up to 200 personnel

b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.

c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation’s visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.

d. Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.

e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.

f. As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:
   (1) Maintain in its installations firefighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.
   (2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the sites. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.

g. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:
   (1) T1: through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigita and the intersection of the Abu Aweigita road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.
   (2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
   (3) T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.

h. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.

i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.

-4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.
5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the Parties.

**Article VI**

**Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers**

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.

2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructure, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of these facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.

3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.

4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:

   a. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads, and major installations and utilities.

b. For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.

c. Egyptian military engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

**Article VII**

**Surveillance Activities**

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:

   a. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.

   b. Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.

   c. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.

2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated.

**Article VIII**

**Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty**

Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.
Lines and zones effective for the period Jan. 25, 1980-Apr. 25, 1982 when Israeli forces are on the El Arish-Ras Mohammed line and the U.S. Sinai Field Mission is conducting verification operations in Zones A and B and at four Israeli T-sites in the Interim Buffer Zone.

U.S. Sinai Field Mission area of verification operations.