The Goldwater–Nichols Act: A Ten Year Report Card

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Executive Summary

By the mid-1980s, discussions of the United States's military effectiveness had become dominated by questions concerning the organization of the Department of Defense (DOD). Whether the analysis centered on large conflicts like Vietnam or smaller engagements like the rescue of hostages from Iran (1980) or the invasion of Grenada (1983), U.S. military performance was generally criticized for ineffectiveness. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater–Nichols Act (GNA), was a piece of landmark legislation designed to restore U.S. military effectiveness by shifting power away from the individual military services toward the less parochial joint institutions within the DOD—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands.

This report assess the effects and impacts of GNA on the U.S. armed forces in the ten years since its enactment. First, the stage is set with the historical prelude to GNA, giving the overall political and inter-Service atmosphere at the time of the GNA deliberations, including pre-GNA goals and objectives of the key political and DOD stakeholders. Next, key issues of organization, strategy, and employment are outlined, along with lessons learned from some of U.S. military operations between 1960 and 1984, followed by a review of GNA itself, describing the legislative intent of GNA and its major provisions. The report then offers, from a command-and-control perspective, a ten-year report card for the GNA indicating the ways changes mandated have resulted in significant improvements in U.S. military effectiveness and flexibility, as exemplified by military operations that have taken place since the law was passed. The report concludes by identifying and discussing issues that have emerged as "unfinished business" of the reorganization of the DOD, including duplication of staff efforts within the Pentagon, the seismic effects of improvements in technology, the need for acquisition reform and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C²I) interoperability.
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Chapter One
The Significance of Goldwater–Nichols

1.1 Introduction

Debates over problems with United States military operations between 1960 and the early-1980s—Vietnam, the seizures of the USS Pueblo and Mayaguez, the aborted hostage rescue in Iran, the bombing of the Marines' barracks in Beirut, the Grenada operation—resulted in legislation that called for the most sweeping organizational changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) in nearly forty years—the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as the Goldwater–Nichols Act (GNA).¹ Now, ten years after enactment, how has GNA fared?

In an effort to answer this question, this study examines some of the key issues involved in this landmark legislation:

- Was GNA necessary?
- What issues so concerned the American people that Congress enacted GNA?
- Were those concerns alleviated by GNA?
- What was the specific legislative intent of GNA, and what, prior to passage of GNA, were the goals and objectives of the key players and stakeholders responsible for shaping the content of the Act?
- Have that intent and those goals and objectives been met?
- What was the impact of GNA, prior to and since its enactment, on inter-Service competition, overlapping mission areas, interoperability, resource allocation, and relations between civilian and military spheres?

The study uses the Gulf War—which some have called a defining moment for the nation's military strategy, employment, and organization, indeed, proof positive that U.S. military finally has its act together and that GNA is a huge success—and some "operations other than war" (OOTW) in the 1990s for an analysis of the effectiveness of the changes mandated by the GNA. These operations also serve as a foundation for exploring options for future alterations to the DOD's organization, roles, and missions.

The information used in this study was taken from library research and personal interviews. A vast body of literature covers GNA specifically and Defense reform generally—including legislative histories, Congressional hearings, government and private studies, research papers, and countless periodicals and books, much of which was reviewed, as well as transcripts from

the annual Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control, at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. In addition, the author's tours as an action officer on both the Headquarters Air Force Staff and the Joint Staff, and discussions with practitioners, scholars, and experts from within the DOD and Congressional communities all yielded valuable insight and often provided essential clues to GNA's development, implementation, impact, and to issues requiring further consideration.

1.2 Descriptions and Relevance

So, what is this landmark law all about? GNA can best be summarized as legislation designed to mandate a profound shift of power away from the individual military Services in favor of the joint institutions of the Defense establishment—primarily, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff (JS), and the Commanders In Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (CINC's). Among its major provisions were the following:

- The CINC's were given additional authority over their Service components and assured of a larger role in Defense resource planning.
- The CJCS was given additional authority over the JS, a full-time four-star deputy empowered to act in his stead, and formal designation as the principal military advisor to the president, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and the National Security Council (NSC).
- Joint service experience became a legal prerequisite for any officer advancing to flag or general officer rank, and provisions were put in place to ensure the quality and professional development of officers serving in joint billets.
- For the first time, the president was ordered to transmit to Congress an annual report detailing the national security strategy of the U.S., including not only an assessment of the nation's military capabilities, but an analysis of how its political and economic powers might be brought to bear in support of American foreign policy goals.
- Service headquarters staffs were reorganized, with the objective of functional decentralization and personnel reductions.

An analysis of the outcomes of GNA is important, appropriate, and relevant today, because, as the DOD prepares itself to enter the twenty-first century and implements the results of the Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a study of the successes

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2These seminars consist of a fifteen-year series of presentations by senior leaders from government and the private sector examining key issues touching on intelligence and the roles, mission, organization, command, and control of U.S. military forces and related topics.


4The QDR was intended as a comprehensive analysis of the DOD's strategies, force structure, and modernization programs, to set the course for the military through at least 2002. The report, which included input from the SECDEF, the JS, and the Services, as well as an assessment by an independent panel, was delivered to Congress in May of 1997.
and failures of GNA, including an examination of the effectiveness of the act’s provisions calling for DOD self-evaluation and evolution, may provide useful insights into the potential impact of future changes in the roles, missions, doctrine, and organization of U.S. armed forces as they enter the next millennium.

1.3 Scope and Organization

*Chapter Two* sets the stage for GNA, first providing a historical prelude to its enactment and then describing the overall political and inter-Service atmosphere at the time of the GNA deliberations, including the pre-GNA goals and objectives of key political and DOD stakeholders. *Chapter Three* outlines the key issues in organization, strategy, and employment and concerns, as well as lessons learned from U.S. military operations between 1960 and 1984. *Chapter Four* describes the law, its specified legislative intent, and its major provisions. *Chapter Five* presents GNA’s ten-year report card, indicating how, from a command-and-control perspective, the changes mandated by GNA panned out during some U.S. military operations since its enactment. The report concludes in *Chapter Six* by outlining some of the issues that have emerged as “unfinished business” of the DOD’s reorganization. The *Appendix* provides a timeline of major events in the development and implementation of GNA described in this report.

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The QDR was the first overall assessment of the DOD since the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993, which resulted in the DOD’s present strategy of preparedness to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.
Chapter Two
Setting the Stage

2.1 Background

What was the overall political and inter-Service atmosphere at the time of the GNA deliberations? Answering this question requires returning to the period between the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (which established the Air Force as a separate Service and formed the basis for the current organizational structure of the DOD) and the late 1950s, when there was a tendency toward centralizing the organization of the DOD on the civilian side and relatively little change on the military side. The deficiencies of the DOD up to that time—primarily domination by individual Service interests, which thwarted efforts to establish rational and effective systems of strategic planning, force development, and combat command—led President Eisenhower to initiate a major restructuring in the DOD Reorganization Act of 1958 (which increased the power of the SECDEF, in an effort to curb the independence of the Services, inter-Service rivalry, and wasteful duplication among weapons projects).¹ The early 1960s to the mid-1980s were years of relatively little change in organizational structure or relationships,² but, the polarization of public opinion against the Vietnam War and, hence, to some extent against the military itself, made the 1970s a time of severely shrinking DOD budgets, declining recruiting, and dismal retention rates.³

As a result, during the early 1980s Congress came to see the U.S. military as a “hollow force” that had difficulty conducting successful operations. Many in Congress felt that the United States had not won a war in twenty years and, at the same time, had suffered a variety of problems using military force in more limited ways, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo (1968) and of the Mayaguez (1975), Operation Desert One (the aborted attempt to rescue hostages in Iran), and the bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Beirut (1983). Given this accumulation of problems, the perception of the ability of the United States to use military force was rather low. Even the relative success of the invasion of Grenada in 1983 did not change that perception much, because the operation raised questions about the effectiveness of its planning

and about the structure of its command arrangements on the island. Compounding these difficulties, at the same time the Grenada operation was under way, similar questions were being raised about the bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Beirut. One nagging problem was pinning down responsibility for what happened. In the end, President Reagan said it was his responsibility, which really meant it was no one’s.

The perception of deficiencies focused on the parochialism of the Services and the lack of strong centralized control by the joint elements of the DOD, specifically, the difficulty the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had performing an effective planning role, the weakness of the CJCS, problems in resource allocation and weapons acquisition, and problems in the operations of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). Deficiencies were also perceived in the chain of command, in maintaining the distinction between the operational command belonging to the CINC’s and the responsibility for training and equipping the forces—i.e., administrative command—belonging to the Services.

As a result, in the summer of 1982, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) began hearings intended to strengthen the authority of the central military institutions within the DOD, particularly the powers of elements seen as divorced in some way from the Services—mainly, the CJCS, JS, and CINC’s.

2.2 The U.S. Military: All For One and One For All?

To make matters worse, compared with the vicious inter-Service rivalry of the 1940s and 1950s, what had evolved by the early 1980s was a system of inter-Service collusion and cooperation. The Services recognized that each had different interests, but they had learned to cooperate or collude, to “divvy things up,” with each Service Chief counting on his counterparts to back him up in times of need. Collusion and cooperation or intense, vicious bureaucratic battling—arguments can be made for which was better or worse, but both were manifestations of a deeply rooted problem: the power lay in the Services, and until some counter balance to it was created, neither rivalry nor collusion would make for effective joint military force planning, employment, or organization.

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5 Telephone interview with Archie D. Barrett, 18 Nov. 1996. Barrett was a HASC staffer during the GNA deliberations, and, since October 1994, has been Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

6 Interview with A. D. Barrett.

7 Huntington, 4.

8 Ibid., 6-7.
2.3 First Attempts at Legislation

By the early 1980s, a number of studies had been made of the DOD’s organization, almost all of them arguing to some degree for centralization. In September 1984, the House of Representatives passed a bill sponsored by Rep. Bill Nichols that was a modest attempt to fix the organizational problems:

- It gave the CJCS statutory authorization to speak for the CINCs.
- It gave the CJCS control of the JCS schedule, allowing him to bring potentially important issues before the JCS for a decision.
- It authorized the CJCS to select the officers of the JS from among those nominated by the Services.
- It extended the possible tour of JS officers from three to four years.
- It told the SECDEF to make sure that the JS would function as an independent staff.9

However, the bill became notable more for what it did not do:

- It did not put the CJCS in the chain of command.
- It did not give the CJCS power to manage the JS.
- It did not say that the CJCS could (independently of the JCS) provide advice to the president, SECDEF, and National Security Council (NSC).
- It did not make the CJCS the principal advisor to the president, SECDEF, and NSC.
- It did not give the CJCS a deputy.
- It did not make the CJCS a member of the NSC.
- It did not give the CJCS control over promotions of the people on the JS.10

The list of “did-nots” fueled Congressional pressure and eventually drove the hearings that led to GNA.

2.4 For and Against Reform

What were the pre-GNA goals and objectives of the key political and DOD stakeholders? By the early 1980s, for many members of Congress the issue had became not whether the DOD should be reorganized but how extensive the changes needed to be and when to implement those changes. Reorganization hearings were held in the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1985, under the leadership of Representatives Bill Nichols and Les Aspin. In the Senate, although John Tower, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), conducted hearings, he

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9Ibid., 7.
10Ibid.
expressed less interest in Defense reform than Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, who championed it. According to a report by the Defense Reorganization Task Force of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) by Philip A. Odeen (former DOD analyst, NSC advisor, and chair of the Task Force), General Andrew J. Goodpaster (former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe [SACEUR]), Melvin R. Laird (former SECDEF), General David C. Jones (former CJCS), General Edward C. Meyer (former Army Chief of Staff), and a number of key Congressmen, including Aspin and Senators Nunn and William Cohen, concurred with the view that there were serious problems in how the United States went about planning, equipping, and operating its armed forces. The report, *Towards a More Effective Defense: The Final Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project* (published in February 1985), concluded that Congress’s concern about the DOD’s effectiveness was well founded and made numerous recommendations, including the following:

- That the CJCS be the principal military advisor to the president, SECDEF, and NSC;
- That, while the JCS should advise the CJCS, it could also file dissenting opinions on any advice given by the CJCS;
- That the CJCS be allowed to use the services of the JS;
- That the CINCs have stronger control over the composition and training of their forces;
- That the CJCS have a full-time four-star deputy;
- That the CJCS have a significant role in the subsequent promotions of the JS officers; and
- That the CINCs have a role in the overall DOD budgetary process by giving them an operations budget in which they would play a role formulating and administering.

The report also offered recommendations concerning weapons acquisition and the programming, planning, and budgeting process, stating that programming and budgeting should be merged and that there should be a biennial Defense budget to be voted on by Congress only once every two years.

Another part of the key legislative groundwork for GNA was the SASC staff report, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change* (published in October 1985), also known as the Locher Report, after its principal drafter, James R. Locher III, at the time a professional SASC staffer and later Assistant SECDEF for Special Operation and Low-Intensity Conflict. Citing sixteen problem areas and suggesting ninety-one corrective actions, the Locher report offered a

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11Jenkins, 24-25.
13Tbid., 1-4.
14Huntington, 13.
lengthy (645 pages), comprehensive analysis “critical of the [then] current organizational and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense and of the Congress.”

The movement for reform of the DOD was further influenced by the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, established by President Reagan, in July 1985, and known as the Packard Commission, after its chairman, former Deputy SECDEF David Packard. The commission was spawned in May 1985 by a Senate amendment to the DOD’s budget for fiscal year 1986 calling for the establishment of a bipartisan group to look into troublesome Defense procurement practices—sparked by the infamous reports of exorbitantly priced military toilet seats, hammers, and other spare parts. The fourteen members of the commission included William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and R. James Woolsey. In addition to such obvious concerns as fraud, waste, and abuse in the DOD’s acquisitions practices, there was general agreement by both Capitol Hill and the White House that the commission would also look into overall DOD management issues. Fueled by the concerns of several of its members, many of whom in previous years had testified to the need for reorganization of the DOD and were now eager to tackle Defense management broadly, the commission agreed soon after its first meeting to examine procurement first, but then turn to broader DOD management issues. In December 1985, as the Packard Commission began drafting its report, it had already reached a consensus on calls for organizational reforms to the DOD similar to those under serious discussion at that time in both houses of Congress: acquisition organization and procedures; military organization and command; national security planning and budgeting; and government-industry accountability. In the area of command structure, it sought the following:

- To make the CJCS the principal military advisor to the president, SECDEF, and NSC;
- To give the CJCS exclusive control of the JS;
- To create a Vice-CJCS, with duties focused primarily, though not exclusively, on weapons acquisition; and
- To give the CINC’s broader authority over subordinate commanders and a direct line of access to the CJCS.
- To establish a new CINC responsible for the integration of global air, land, and sea transportation.

\[16\] McNaugher, 239.
\[17\] Schemer, 60-61.
\[18\] McNaugher, 240.
\[20\] Ibid., xx-xxi.
The CSIS report, Locher report, and the report of the Packard Commission laid the foundation for GNA and marked a significant change from “business as usual” between Congress and the Pentagon, both of which had become accustomed to having the Pentagon draft major Defense-related legislative initiatives, which Congress would then alter only slightly before passing into law.21

Countering prevailing opinions favoring reform were three general sources of opposition to reorganization of the DOD and centralization of authority:

- Liberal groups and leaders afraid of a Prussian-like “general staff” and militarism;
- Congressional groups who saw a greater concentration of power in the executive branch as limiting their ability to gain entrée into DOD matters and to influence what was going on; and
- The Navy and Marine Corps, traditionally centers of opposition to reorganization.22

From the perspective of the Services, until the mid-1980s the prevailing inclination was to retain the status quo. Like other government organizations, each Service vied for increased autonomy; each wanted to protect its budgets and expand its role. Each wanted to protect and nurture its own personnel, controlling all aspects of a Service career in order to keep its people immersed in the essence of the organization. Each claimed roles and missions that required large capabilities. They were all successful at this, because their missions were very broadly defined. All claimed to operate in conditions of uncertainty with respect to the enemy and the threat and intentions of that enemy. For example, no one could be certain how many aircraft were enough to ensure that the Air Force could accomplish its mission, because the other three Services were grappling with similar broad mission areas, in the same conditions of uncertainty, at the same time, and in an environment of scarce resources.23 The Services—at least the Army and Navy—had been independent since the mid-eighteenth century. Although the consensus that emerged following World War II was that future wars would be fought by integrated land, sea and air forces—supposedly dictating that the DOD would be organized to fight in an integrated manner—feeling strongly favored retaining the Services, and with them came their parochialism. The result was strong Services responsible for recruiting, training, and supporting their forces, and over them a very strong SBCDEF on one side and the much weaker CINCs, supposedly responsible for the employment of the forces, on the other.24

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22Huntington, 13-14.
24Barrett, 79.
By the early 1980s, however, an increasing number of senior DOD officials had come to feel that change was necessary, in particular that the joint operational control of forces, as well as the quality of JCS advice and the staff work produced by the JS, were seriously deteriorating. In March of 1982, General David C. Jones, then departing CJCS, really got reorganization of the DOD rolling by publishing an article in *Armed Forces Journal International* titled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," which criticized the JCS setup and presented several suggestions:

- That the CJCS become the principal military advisor, replacing the JCS in that role;
- That the CJCS be given a deputy, to be the person in charge when the CJCS was out of town (frequently the case), to preside over the JCS and speak, free of Service bias, for the JCS to the president, SECDEF, and NSC; and
- That the training, experience, and opportunities for promotion should be broadened and improved for personnel serving on the JS and in other joint duties.  

Incidentally, Samuel P. Huntington, NSC Coordinator for Security Planning at the time, related an interesting vignette about General Jones's decision to go public with criticism of the JCS and of how painfully long changes in organization take:

[General Jones] used to sit with his British counterpart, Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, the British Chief of Defense Staff, at NATO meetings and elsewhere, and they would compare notes. This was back in 1981. They would discuss how they wanted to change their defense or military structures, and Jones and Lewin had the same ideas about strengthening their central defense organizations in order to get control over the Services and have a more rational and effective planning system. And David Jones said Lewin went back, wrote up his plan in a memorandum and sent it to the Prime Minister. He got it back two weeks later with "Approved, Margaret Thatcher" written on it. And David Jones said, "I went back, wrote an article and published it three years ago, and today it is still being debated."  

Less than a month after General Jones's criticism was published, it was echoed by outgoing Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, and from then on the groundswell of support for reorganization of the DOD grew toward GNA.  

The Reagan Administration was caught off guard by General Jones’s criticisms. SECDEF Casper Weinberger initially declined to take a position, but after realizing that the House was

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26Huntington, 15.

going to take action, Weinberger asked the JCS to look at the issues and make recommendations. Early in 1983, the SECDEF accepted their recommendations in toto and sent them to the Hill as draft legislation which proposed that the CJCS replace the JCS as the principal advisor, that the length of tour on the JS be increased, and that the limitation on the size of the JS be removed. Complicating matters for the administration, John Lehman, then the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), publicly opposed some of the provisions proposed by the SECDEF, causing Weinberger great difficulty in presenting a consolidated position on reorganization of the DOD.

At the extreme of the pro-reform continuum was retired Army General Maxwell Taylor, former CJCS, in whose view the existing system was so flawed it needed to be restructured completely by getting rid of both the JS and JCS and starting over. Taylor wanted to create a staff that looked like the JS but would belong to the NSC. It would be controlled by the SECDEF and headed by a chief of staff. It would be responsible for force employment, operational matters, and military advice. It would also be in the chain of command. Basically, General Taylor was proposing a Prussian-like “general staff”—hardly a popular proposition evoking as it does images of the German command structure of World War II. This staff would be complemented by a group of five or six senior officers, drawn from either the retired or active ranks of each Service, which would provide long-range strategic advice to the president and SECDEF.

Thus, members of these commissions and other individuals and stakeholders—all with impeccable and relevant credentials—were called before the various Congressional committees in an effort to develop effective legislation for reorganization of the DOD—an arduous and lengthy process.

2.5 Specific Critical Perspectives

To understand the criticism of poor joint operational control of forces requires looking at the “chain of command” as it existed in the early 1980s. According to the National Security Act of 1958, the chain of command ran from the president, to the SECDEF, to the CINCs. But (prior to GNA) by a Pentagon directive, the chain of command extended through the JCS (recognized as a de facto Services committee) to the CINCs. “Through” meant that neither the CJCS nor JCS could issue an order, that is, that neither could command on its own but could only issue orders.

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McNaugher, 226, 230.
Barrett, 84.
McNaugher, 221.
Barrett, 81.
in the name of the president or the SECDEF. The result was that actual control belonged to the Services.\textsuperscript{32}

As for the poor quality of JCS recommendations to the president, SECDEF, and NSC, the JCS was supposed to provide military advice from a “joint” perspective, which meant that, on the “Service side,” each Service Chief was to attend to the concerns and interests of his Service, but, in theory at least, on the “joint side” the same Service Chiefs were supposed to put on a joint—or unified—hat, developing integrated strategic, logistical, and contingency war plans as well as ensuring that those plans integrated contributions of each Service and of the applicable CINCs.\textsuperscript{31} In other words, the Service Chiefs were to assist in the exercise of command—which was why the chain of command went \textit{through} the JCS.\textsuperscript{34} Needless to say, in practice the system did not work very well, nor did it produce many sparkling results.

Also on the “joint side” of the DOD were the Services’ component commands, which reported to the CINCs, although, in reality, the CINCs had only “operational” command, which is far more limited than full command and which allows them significant authority only in wartime. In peacetime, the components were, first and foremost, Service commands—after all, their respective Services provided each component commander’s people, pay, promotion, weapon systems, tactics, and doctrine.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, the reason the Services were in a far more powerful and influential position than the CJCS or the CINCs was clear. For example, General Jones told the HASC that as commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe he had paid far more attention to the chain of command leading to Headquarters Air Force than to the one leading to the U.S. European Command (EUCOM).\textsuperscript{36}

The reasons for the criticism of the poor quality of JS staff work were similar—the extreme Service bias of each JS member (not surprising, given that career progress and promotions were entirely in the hands of each Service), the apparent need for every piece of paper produced by the JS to be looked at on five levels, starting with O-4s and O-5s, and a similar need at each level for everyone to get a crack at every word written. The JS was criticized because its military advice was deemed inadequate, often sidestepping critical issues, and powerless because any Service could veto any word or phrase of any document originating in the JS.\textsuperscript{37} In other words, it was virtually impossible for the JS to be an effective instrument or to act as a true “joint” institution.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{32}SASC Print 99-86, 5.
\textsuperscript{33}Barrett, 70-2.
\textsuperscript{34}Sam Nunn, “DOD Reorganization: Summary of the Problems,” \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} 123 (October 1985, Extra), 35.
\textsuperscript{35}Barrett, 70-2.
\textsuperscript{36}Barry Goldwater, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Commands,” \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} 123 (October 1985, Extra), 17-18.
Rather, it served as an executive secretariat, putting the views of the Services together in some palatable, diluted form all might agree on, then pushing the agreed position to the JCS. The result was products that the SECDEF and the NSC uniformly viewed as useless.  

2.6 Summary of Criticisms

According to James Locher, the professional SASC staffer who led the bipartisan study effort that resulted in GNA, a summary of the pre-GNA criticisms of the DOD’s organization included the following:

- Imbalance between Service and joint interests;
- Inadequate joint military advice;
- Inadequate quality of joint duty military personnel;
- Imbalance between the responsibilities and command authority of the CINCs;
- Confused and cumbersome operational chains of command;
- Ineffective strategic planning;
- Confusion concerning the roles of the Service Secretaries;
- Unnecessary duplication in the top management headquarters of the military departments; and
- Congressional micromanagement of the DOD.  

The consensus was that the Services had coopted almost all the organizations below the SECDEF and that the CINC components were, in effect, little Armies, Navies, and Air Forces—they not only depended on their respective Services for equipment, personnel, and administration, but they also reported primarily to their respective Service Chiefs and headquarters. As a result, the Services negotiated, in a sort of parallel fashion, their own budgets and their own decisions directly with the SECDEF, in a vertical, stovepipe fashion—certainly not the most effective way to manage the most powerful military force in the world.  

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38Barrett, 79.


40Barrett, 72.
Chapter Three
Dark Clouds over the Battlefield

This chapter looks at some of the roots of the organizational problems of the DOD that ultimately led to GNA by briefly examining six military combat operations that were plagued by interoperability failures of the Services: the war in Vietnam; the seizure of the USS Pueblo and of the U.S.-flagged freighter Mayaguez; the failed rescue of the hostages in Iran; the bombing of the Marines' barracks in Beirut; and the U.S. military invasion of Grenada.

3.1 Vietnam

In the war in Vietnam, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, in the south, opposed both the southern-based revolutionary movement known as the Viet Cong and its sponsor, the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in the north. For the U.S., the ramifications of the communist victory in 1975 were profound—not only was it a setback to the policy of containment of communism in Asia, but it was also a shock to American self-confidence. The statistics of the war were grim: 2 to 3 million Vietnamese and 58,000 Americans dead; three times the number of U.S. bombs dropped in Vietnam as on both theaters of World War II; overwhelming devastation in southeast Asia; and a cost of over $150 billion to U.S. taxpayers. The Viet Cong proved willing to take one of the highest casualty rates in proportion to population in recorded history. That the U.S. never lost a major battle was irrelevant; concentrating on military objectives, it underestimated the political struggle in Vietnam, the nature of the enemy, and the consequences of supporting weak and unpopular regimes in the South.¹

For U.S. military forces, Vietnam was a frustrating contradiction, in that it was simultaneously a conventional war and a guerrilla insurgency. The U.S. was unfortunately so blinded by the confusion and underlying political issues of the conflict that it mistakenly chose to focus on the conventional threat posed by the North Vietnamese army.² Worse, each Service worked essentially independently of the others, and, instead of developing new strategies to combat the guerrilla insurgency, the Army employed tactics of "identify, contain, and destroy," used since the Civil War. Although the Air Force provided tactical and close air support for U.S. ground forces, preference was given to strategic bombardment and to air supremacy over North Vietnam. The Navy reluctantly supported riverine warfare but much preferred offshore power projection. Clearly, the Services did little to adopt joint tactics to engage the guerrillas.³

Without question, the impact of Vietnam on Americans' perception of war and, subsequently, on U.S. national security policy in every major conflict since 1975 has been profound. Much has been written on the trials and tribulations of this difficult period (1961–75). Any attempt to distill a single conclusion from one of the most controversial wars in American history offers great pitfalls, but, for the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to realize that Vietnam provided the foundation for increased Congressional interest in military operations and for change, including the eventual passage of GNA.\(^4\)

3.2 **USS Pueblo**

On 23 January 1968, a U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering ship, the *USS Pueblo*, was seized by the North Koreans off their coast in the Sea of Japan. U.S. claims that the vessel was in international waters were repudiated by North Korea, which declared that the *Pueblo* had intruded into its territorial waters to conduct espionage. Negotiations between U.S. and North Korean representatives failed to gain the ship's release, and the *Pueblo's* eighty-two surviving crew members, detained for eleven months, were freed only after U.S. officials signed a document in which the U.S. apologized for the alleged spying and promised it would not recur.\(^5\)

Numerous investigations afterward revealed that failures in command and control interoperability were to blame for the capture of the *Pueblo*. A special Congressional investigation indicated that the National Reconnaissance Center (NRC) at the Pentagon was aware two full days beforehand of North Korean plans to attack the *USS Pueblo*. Although the NRC informed the Naval Commander in Japan of North Korea's intent to seize the *Pueblo*, the ship was not notified; a breakdown in interagency communications had compromised the *Pueblo's* deployment schedule, and confusion among the various organizational elements involved prevented transmission of an alert message.\(^6\) This incident became a prime example of problems of communications interoperability within the U.S. Defense establishment that continued to threaten effective military operations for years to come.

3.3 **Mayaguez**

Failures of communication also plagued the mission to rescue the U.S.-flagged freighter *Mayaguez* in 1975. After Khmer Rouge communist guerrillas seized the ship off the coast of Cambodia, a small contingent of Marines was dispatched to recapture the vessel and its crew,


but, unknown to those forces, the captives had already been placed on another ship and been freed.  

The actions taken to direct the military operations were later found to have been transmitted over nonsecure systems, so that the guerrillas knew everything that was going on at the same time as commanders in the field. Although orders from the White House were issued through the secure National Military Command System, security had broken down at Clark Air Force Base, in the Philippines, where the Seventh Air Force retransmitted orders to the Navy’s Seventh Fleet over a nonsecure high-frequency voice radio system. Over the air and totally in the clear, commanders discussed the number of helicopters and men involved, where they were going, the timing of the mission, and replenishment rates. Needless to say, the U.S. forces were extremely vulnerable, and as a result, three helicopters were lost to and three more disabled by enemy ground fire. The inadequate helicopter support which then frustrated attempts to rescue the Marines resulted in a lag of several hours between retrieval efforts. Once the first wave of Marines had been evacuated the remaining forces were exceptionally vulnerable, because the guerrillas knew their strength. Casualties among these Marines were heavy, because, as it turned out, even the plans for their rescue were transmitted among the Services over nonsecure lines.

This operation, too, was flawed by a breakdown in fundamental interoperability among the Services.

3.4 Rescue of Hostages in Iran

On 4 November 1979, the U.S. embassy in Tehran was seized by militant students, who took sixty-six embassy employees hostage and demanded the return from the United States of the deposed Shah for trial in Iran. The Ayatollah Khomeini, who had taken power in Iran in February 1979, after the overthrow of the Shah, supported the students. On 14 November, President Carter froze Iranian assets in U.S. banks. The release on 19 November of thirteen hostages who were either black or female did little to alleviate the crisis, and although the Shah left the United States early in December, the militant students refused to release their hostages. On 24 April 1980, the United States made an unsuccessful attempt to rescue the hostages, Operation Desert One, which cost seven U.S. lives and plagued the DOD for many years.  

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8Tate, 28-30.
9House report, 124-126.
10Tate, 11.
aborted mission was one of the U.S.'s most widely publicized failures in joint military operations.

The mission was a recipe for disaster by virtually every military consideration—planning, training, or execution. Planning was unnecessarily complex, because the Pentagon wanted to make sure that each Service was included in the operation. In an effort to accommodate all of them, the worst possible mix of military forces was assembled—Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters with Army troops aboard and Air Force forces in support. Even with extensive joint training and exercises—which they lacked—this mixture would be difficult to support. Inter-Service rivalry and an obsession with intra-Service secrecy led each “team” to practice separately, on opposite coasts—no full joint rehearsal was ever conducted, and radio communications among the various commanders had been never tested. Once again, the failure of the operation’s could ultimately be blamed on poor Service interoperability.

3.5 Beirut

The terrorist truck-bombing of the Marines’ barracks in Beirut in October 1983 killed 231 American and 50 French soldiers. In the aftermath, confusion in the organizational chain of command was cited as a fundamental weakness of U.S. military forces, and that recognition proved a major impetus for the early calls for Congressional hearings on reorganization of the DOD.

In subsequent investigations it was difficult to determine who was responsible for the failure in security. The commander of the Marine detachment at the Beirut airport reported through Commander Sixth Fleet, to the EUCOM CINC and to the SACEUR—but, not surprisingly, senior commanders in Europe were not directly involved in day-to-day activities in Beirut. After the bombing, the report of the Marine Corps Commandant dispatched to assess the situation included the disclaimer to the effect that the bombing was not his responsibility—the Marine Corps was responsible only for organizing, training and equipping its forces, but not for the day-to-day operational command of forces in Lebanon, which was the theater commander’s responsibility. According to the report of the theater commander, in this case the EUCOM CINC, however, he, too, had little control over the Marines in Beirut, because the Marines received the most of their support and direction from the Marine Corps; this confusing and diluted chain of command made it difficult for him to assess blame or relieve the responsible commander.

13Jenkins, 15.
16Telephone interview with Archie D. Barrett.
Ultimately, an embarrassed President Reagan publicly assumed full responsibility for the failure of the mission caused by the confusing organizational structure of the DOD.\(^{17}\)

In this case, the mission had been marked by failure to take into account military organization, intelligence, and security needs—a fundamental issue of command and control that was later addressed by GNA.\(^{18}\)

### 3.6 Grenada

Although the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 was successful, it, too, was unfortunately marked by interoperability shortcomings. On 19 October, Grenada’s Marxist government, in power since 1979, was overthrown, and its leader, Maurice Bishop, was murdered.\(^{19}\) On 25 October, a U.S. task force invaded the island to protect the lives of U.S. citizens living there, restore order, and eradicate the Cuban, Soviet, and other East Bloc influences present.\(^{20}\) Planning for the operation was extremely compressed. At dawn on 25 October, Marines quickly captured the vital Pearls airstrip in order to cut Cuban defenders off from reinforcements and to enable the bulk of U.S. forces to deploy on the island. The main offensive was directed toward the Salines region, where U.S. Rangers experienced heavy resistance. The final beach assault followed, after sundown that day, and the next morning enemy forces collapsed, with only scattered sniping continuing until 2 November. When completed, the operation had secured all Americans unharmed, and friendly military losses and Grenadian civilian casualties were minimal.\(^{21}\)

One unfortunately distinguishing aspect of the mission was the inability of Army ground forces deployed on the island to communicate with Navy ships offshore to request support, which prevented naval gunfire from aiding the ground forces in the initial stages of the operation. The failure to communicate occurred largely because the Army and Navy had each purchased equipment without regard for the need for joint interoperability.\(^{22}\)

Although Operation Urgent Fury achieved its military objectives, many found it difficult to understand why an international superpower would experience any problems whatsoever in such


\(^{18}\) Coakley, 51.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., 55.

a small-scale conflict, and Congress began asking tough questions. According to Senator Sam Nunn, for example:

A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of the individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. armed forces have serious problems conducting joint operations. We were lucky in Grenada; we may not be so fortunate next time.

In Grenada, as in the other five operations described here, poor inter-Service command relationships and interoperability arose as an important problematic factor.

By 1983, the problems in Operation Urgent Fury proved merely the latest indicators of an urgent need for improved inter-Service teamwork in combat operations. Late that year, criticism was widespread—members of Congress were asking serious questions about failures of interoperability and about the confusing organizational structure of the DOD, which had led to difficulties in all the operations discussed here. As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger put it:

In the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear the United States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available for the nation.

A primary objective of GNA was to correct fundamental problems of interoperability, joint training and exercising, and the confusing organizational structures that produced these much-publicized failures.

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23Jenkins, 16.


26Telephone interview with A. D. Barrett.

Chapter Four
The Act Itself

By the early 1980s, most members of Congress were no longer questioning whether the DOD should be reorganized, but, rather, how extensive the changes needed to be and how quickly they needed to be made. Throughout 1983–85, both the Senate and House, under the leadership of Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn and Representatives Bill Nichols and Les Aspin, held numerous hearings on reorganization of the DOD.¹ Like most issues involving major legislation, a number of proposals were forwarded by well-meaning individuals and organizations on how to fix the Pentagon. Separate bills were introduced and passed by both houses of Congress—the Senate unanimously passed the Goldwater DOD Reorganization Act in May 1986 and the House passed the Nichols bill 392-17 in August.² By late in the summer, a compromise bill had been reached, and on 12 September, the Congressional Conference Committee agreed on the final version of the Defense reform legislation, the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, appropriately named after its two staunchest supporters.³ President Reagan signed GNA into law on 1 October 1986.⁴

4.1 Legislative Intent

This legislation was intended to transform the United States’s military forces into a cohesive working team by redefining organizational relationships, which Congress assessed as the fundamental reason for the operational failures in the endeavors discussed in Chapter Three. According to a Senate press release at the time,

The major purpose of the bill is to integrate more effectively the powerful capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. It seeks to overcome the weak inter-Service cooperation that has hampered our military operations from the Spanish-American War to the operations in Grenada.⁵

According to the preamble to the legislation, the purpose of GNA was:

- To reorganize the DOD and strengthen civilian authority in it;

⁴Public Law 99-433, 1.
⁵Jenkins, 37.
- To improve the military advice provided to the president, NSC, and SECDEF;
- To place clear responsibility on the CINCs for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and to ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility;
- To bring increased attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- To provide for more efficient use of Defense resources;
- To improve joint officer management policies; and
- To enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the DOD.\(^6\)

4.2 Major Provisions

To accomplish these objectives, GNA directed the DOD to change the way it did business in five major areas:

- The organization of the Services’ Secretariats and headquarters;
- The organization and role of the JCS;
- The way the Services assigned forces to combatant commands and CINCs;
- The management of “joint” personnel; and
- The way the DOD reported to Congress.\(^7\)

4.2.1 Organization of the Services’ Secretariats and Headquarters

GNA attempted to reduce waste and duplication among the Services and addressed the organizational and functional responsibilities of the various military departments’ headquarters. It mandated a reduction in overall size of the headquarters elements and attempted specifically to strengthen the Service Secretaries’ role in the policy, decisionmaking, and financial management processes of day-to-day operation. It did so by charging each Secretariat with seven specific functions: acquisition, auditing, comptroller, information management, inspector general for complaints and inquiries, legislative affairs, and public affairs. The legislation further specified that these duties could not be delegated to nor duplicated in the Service staffs. This change was especially significant in the all-important area of financial management, because the effect of GNA was to consolidate all fiscal responsibility of the military departments under the Service

\(^6\)Public Law 99-433, 1.
\(^7\)Ibid., 1-3.
Secretaries and stripped the Service Chiefs of much of that authority—this action significantly strengthened the role of the civilian Service Secretaries.⁸

4.2.2 Reorganization of the JCS

Much of the attention during the pre-GNA deliberations focused on the weakness of the office of the CJCS in the decisionmaking process (see Chapter Two). Prior to GNA, the SECDEF could have dealt directly with the CINCs, leaving the CJCS out of the decision-making process. GNA significantly strengthened the CJCS by allowing for the chain of command to run “through” the Chairman by statute, and by making the CJCS the principal military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the SECDEF. Although GNA encourages the CJCS to consult with the JCS and CINCs, the Chairman is not required to do so—the legislation clearly identifies him as the senior uniformed officer of the nation and specifies that communications between the president or the SECDEF and the CINCs should be transmitted through the Chairman and that the CJCS should assist the president and the SECDEF in performing their command functions.⁹

GNA also provided the CJCS with a four-star Vice-Chairman (VCJCS), second only to the CJCS in military rank, to serve in the Chairman’s absence. The CJCS, or when absent, the VCJCS, was given full direction and control of the JS, an authority previously shared with the JCS. Through control of the JS, Congress charged the CJCS to develop strategic plans to conform to resource levels projected by the SECDEF, develop doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces, advise the Secretary on priorities identified by the CINCs and the extent to which budgets submitted by the Services supported those priorities, and submit to the SECDEF alternative budget proposals that conform to those priorities.¹⁰

GNA clearly gave the CJCS the authority to become the dominant leader both operationally and in allocating resources among the Services.

4.2.3 Relationship Among the Services, CINCs, and Combatant Commands

To address the problems of command relationships reported in the aftermath of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, GNA specifically addressed the relationship of the CINCs to the Service Chiefs and that of the combatant commands to the individual Services. Although GNA allowed the Services to continue their missions of organizing, training, and equipping forces for the CINCs, the legislation charged the Service Secretaries to assign to the CINCs all forces that perform their assigned missions. In addition, it specified that all forces

⁸Ibid., Sec. 501–532; Jenkins, 44.
⁹Public Law 99-433, Sec. 201.153 and 163.
¹⁰Ibid., Sec. 201–204.
operating within the geographic area assigned to a CINC must be assigned to and under the command of that CINC.\textsuperscript{11}

### 4.2.4 Management of Joint Personnel

GNA also tackled problems associated with poor joint officer personnel management—correcting the perception of many members of Congress that the Services were not encouraging the most promising officers to apply for joint duty assignments, leading to relatively lower JS effectiveness, retention, and promotions.\textsuperscript{12} GNA created a new category of professional uniformed officers, the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), for officers trained in and oriented toward the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national security strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command.\textsuperscript{13} This initiative (Title IV) provided policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of JSOs:

- JSOs were to be nominated by the Service Secretaries;
- Selected by the SECDEF, with advice from the CJCS;
- To have completed a joint education program and a full joint duty tour;
- JSOs or JSO nominees were to fill one-half of all joint duty positions;
- JSOs were to fill specified critical joint duty positions; and
- Promotion rates of JSOs and JS officers must be equal or greater than the respective staff of the Service headquarters; and the promotion rate of all other joint duty officers must not be less than the respective Service-wide promotion rate.\textsuperscript{14}

### 4.2.5 Reporting Requirements

The legislation attempted to reduce the administrative burden placed on the DOD by eliminating outdated, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary reporting requirements and instead mandating new, more timely, more effective periodic reports addressing Congress’s heightened interest in the DOD’s changing roles and missions. Congress required the president to submit annually with the DOD budget a comprehensive report containing a description and discussion of the following items:

- Worldwide interest, goals, and objectives vital to the United States;

\textsuperscript{11}Don M. Snider, “DOD Reorganization: Part One, New Imperatives,” Parameters 17, 3 (September 1987), 93.
\textsuperscript{12}Jenkins, 44.
\textsuperscript{13}Public Law 99-433, Sec. 401.
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• U.S. foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national Defense capabilities;
• Proposed short- and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power to achieve national goals and objectives; and
• An evaluation of the balance of all elements of national power.\(^5\)

Congress changed the reporting requirements of the SECDEF by mandating an annual update on the DOD’s force structure and its the major missions and requiring that the report include a description of national security strategy objectives, priorities for each military mission, and force levels with projected available resources.\(^6\) By so doing, Congress enabled itself to begin every subsequent legislative hearing cycle with public debate on national military strategy, using the DOD’s vision and strategy as a benchmark for funding Defense programs.\(^7\)

Reporting requirements were levied also on the newly empowered CJCS. Every three years, the CJCS must submit to the SECDEF a report on the roles and missions of the Services, with complete latitude to recommend organizational changes to enhance the effectiveness of operational forces, reduce duplication among the Services, achieve maximum effectiveness, and report changes in technology that might be effectively applied in warfare.\(^8\)

GNA also required four separate, one-time management studies from the SECDEF, the CJCS, the three Service Secretaries acting jointly, and an independent contractor assessing the need for reorganization of the OSD and revision of the Pentagon’s PPBS.\(^9\)

4.3 Did GNA Fix All?

Although no one claimed that GNA was a panacea for all the woes of the DOD, it did take unprecedented steps toward creating a stronger Chairman, empowered CINCs, less duplication among Service staffs, and overall improvement in command and control of military forces. According to James Locher, who led the Senate’s research into reorganization of the DOD and the bipartisan staff deliberations on GNA, the law accomplished several purposes:

• Improved the quality and enhance the role of professional military advice;
• Strengthened civilian control of the military;
• Strengthened the authority of joint military officers;

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\(^5\) Public Law 99-433, Sec. 109, 602–603.
\(^6\) Jenkins, 41.
\(^7\) Snider, 91.
\(^8\) Ibid., 92–93.
\(^9\) Ibid., 91.
• Improved the preparation of, and incentives for, military officers serving in joint duty positions;
• Enhanced the effectiveness of military operations;
• Strengthened central direction and control while increasing decentralization of execution and other management authority;
• Clarified the operational chain of command;
• Reduced and streamlined the Defense bureaucracy;
• Reduced Congressional micromanagement of the DOD;
• Provided for more efficient use of resources;
• Improved the supervision and control of Defense agencies and DOD field activities; and
• Provided for continued study and significant management attention to Defense organizational issues.\textsuperscript{10}

Or, in the words of Senator Barry Goldwater, who, after passage of GNA in the Senate by a vote of 95 to 0,\textsuperscript{21} proudly proclaimed that “the reorganization of the Department of Defense may be the most important thing that Congress does in my lifetime. It will be the most important thing that I tried to do in mine.”\textsuperscript{22}

The next chapter examines just how effective GNA has been and whether Senator Goldwater’s confidence has borne fruit.

\textsuperscript{10}Locher, “Defense Reorganization: A View from the Senate,” 165.


\textsuperscript{22}Barry Goldwater, “DOD Reorganization: Summary of the Problems” \textit{Armed Forces Journal International} 123, 4 (October 1985, Extra), 37.
Chapter Five
The Ten-Year Report Card

In the decade since enactment of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, U.S. forces have been involved in more than seventy-five military operations.1 To measure the effectiveness of the law, this chapter examines some of these post-GNA military operations in order to evaluate the results as measured against some of the Act’s key legislative objectives:

• Improving the military advice provided to the president, the NSC, and the SECDEF;
• Placing clear responsibility on the CINCs for the accomplishment of missions assigned to them and ensuring that the authority of those commanders is commensurate with that responsibility;
• Increasing attention to both the formulation of strategy and contingency planning;
• Providing for more efficient use of Defense resources; and
• Enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the DOD.2

Put as a question, has GNA improved the United States’s ability to use its military forces to help achieve its national objectives, secure national interests, and, when necessary, to fight and win? Has GNA met the expectations of those who helped forge it?

5.1 Claims of Success

The overall answer to these questions is a resounding “yes”—most assessments of GNA have been positive. According to General John Shalikashvili, CJCS, not only have U.S. military forces overcome the woes described here in the previous chapters, but the role played by GNA in that transformation has also been key:

Today, we often take the post-Cold War successes of our armed forces for granted. From Haiti to Bosnia, to the Taiwan Strait, to Liberia, to the skies over Iraq, they have achieved great success at minimal cost in nearly fifty operations since Desert Storm. Quality people, superior organization, unity of command, and considerable skill in joint and combined operations have been central to that achievement. All these factors owe a great debt to the Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986....3

2 Public Law 99-433, 1.
Former SECDEF William Perry also commented on the impact of GNA:

It dramatically changed the way that American forces operate by streamlining the command process and empowering [the CJCS] and the unified commanders. These changes paid off in...Desert Storm, in Haiti, and today in Bosnia.\(^4\)

Even the press has given GNA mainly positive reviews, as, for example, in a review of the Gulf War in *Washington Monthly* in 1991:

...Goldwater–Nichols helped ensure that [the U.S. military] had less interservice infighting, less deadly bureaucracy, fewer needless casualties, and more military cohesion than any major operation in decades.... Goldwater-Nichol’s intent—and its stunning accomplishment—was to drain the military’s bureaucratic swamp. Today, the Service chiefs direct the training, organizing, and equipping of their men—the management side. When it comes to fighting, they step back and let a unified commander in the field, advised by a newly empowered JCS chair, run the show: a simple idea with critical strategic ramifications.\(^5\)

More recently, in November 1995, an article in *Defense News* heralded GNA as the single most important reform instituted in the Pentagon in the last 30 years. The act revitalized the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, enabling it today to play a much stronger role in setting joint requirements for weapons and guiding joint operations. Moreover, the act provided overseas commanders a larger voice in setting priorities and conveying military advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^6\)

Echoing praise for the enhanced role of the CJCS, in 1995 *The Boston Globe* heralded the law by saying “the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 enhanced the power of [the Chairman of the] Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and an article of March 1996 in *The Washington Times* commented that “Congress greatly enhanced the JCS chairman’s powers in the landmark Goldwater–Nichols Act.”\(^7\)

Not all reviews of GNA have been so positive. In December 1996, for example, an article in *Defense News* claimed that “some of the basic goals of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 still [have] not been met....[I]ssues such as antiterrorism policy falls

through the cracks since no one wields absolute power to make it a priority.” But on balance, the consensus has been that the changes mandated by GNA have resulted in significant advancements where they matter most: improved operational effectiveness and adaptability of the U.S. military for meeting the complex challenges of worldwide security. Assessing and specifying the impact of GNA in enhancing U.S. warfighting capability is itself a complex task which may be accomplished from a variety of perspectives. This chapter is focussed on some recent U.S. military operations—the invasion of Panama, the Gulf War, and operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—to examine the impact of GNA on the improved effectiveness and flexibility of U.S. military forces and to identify areas for further improvement.

5.2 Operation Just Cause

The first test of the post-GNA reorganized DOD came in 1989. Not surprisingly, and as is usual in the Pentagon, the changes mandated by GNA were slow to take effect. In October 1986, when GNA was enacted, Admiral William Crowe had served as CJCS for more than a year, and, accustomed to the pre-GNA environment, he was reluctant to make sweeping changes. Recognizing that both the SECDEF and other members of the JCS generally were opposed to the reforms embodied in GNA, Admiral Crowe basically stayed with the status quo. The arrival on 1 October 1989 of General Colin Powell as the new CJCS signaled the actual start of the post-GNA period. Unburdened by entrenched ways of doing JCS business, and enjoying tremendous credibility with President Bush and most of the Washington policymaking community, General Powell quickly brought to bear the reforms mandated by GNA.

Soon after assuming the Chairmanship, and while attention was focused on the demise of the cold war in Eastern Europe, the political deterioration in Panama quickly forced General Powell’s attention to the possibility of combat close to home. Operations in Panama would test the changes to the U.S. military command system brought about by GNA, as well as test the team at the head of the system, President Bush, SECDEF Richard Cheney, and General Powell. These three men, strengthened by personal relationships formed during earlier administrations, would largely determine the early operational success of the GNA reforms.

The following summary of events in the operation in Panama is based on information drawn from the report issued by the Joint Staff History Office by Ronald H. Cole, just cited, and

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from Malcolm McConnell’s book *Just Cause: The Real Story of America’s High-Tech Invasion of Panama*.\(^\text{12}\)

In 1988, as U.S. relations with Panama deteriorated, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Frederick Woerner, developed a strategy by which the number of U.S. troops in Panama was gradually increased to deter Panama’s dictator, General Manuel Noriega, from attacking U.S. citizens or interfering with traffic in the Panama Canal. Had deterrence failed, General Woerner had planned to bring in additional forces over a three-week period before taking on Noriega. But when in May 1989 General Noriega overturned the results of the Panamanian election, the new leadership team of Bush, Chaney, and Powell decided to take a stronger stance. They replaced General Woerner with General Maxwell Thurman, who, aggressive by nature, quickly changed plans to allow for a major shift in the strategy for dealing with Noriega. By accelerating the buildup to 22,000 soldiers, 3,400 airmen, 900 Marines, and 700 sailors, personally selecting a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander, and shortening the timetable for the deployment of additional forces from the U.S. to just three days, General Thurman hoped to take Noriega by surprise and overwhelm Panamanian forces before they could organize resistance or seize any U.S. hostages. In so doing, General Thurman took full advantage of the CINC combatant command authority provided by GNA\(^\text{13}\) to dictate the organization and operational employment of his forces—free of interference from the Services—which resulted in a strong fighting team with a unity of command and good interoperability that could rapidly achieve operational objectives.\(^\text{14}\)

By December 1989, the situation in Panama had worsened—the Panamanian National Assembly had declared war on the U.S., General Noriega had successfully thwarted two attempted coups, and he had pronounced himself “Maximum Leader.” Violence erupted on 16 December, when Panamanian soldiers opened fire on three U.S. officers, killing one, and then brutally harassed another officer and his wife who had witnessed the incident.\(^\text{15}\) Prompted by these events, President Bush decided to act. Operation Just Cause began early on 20 December, with U.S. forces attacking and seizing key Panamanian installations and land approaches to Panama City. U.S. forces then entered the city, quickly secured the U.S. embassy, and captured the headquarters of the Panamanian forces, bringing any organized opposition to a speedy collapse and ending hostile actions. Unfortunately, General Noriega was able to elude capture and fled to the city’s Papal Nunciatura. Although eventually dislodging and arresting him proved a complicated diplomatic challenge, U.S. forces quickly installed the legally elected government.


\(^{13}\) Public Law 99-433, Sec. 211.

\(^{14}\) McConnell, 30-31; Cole, 1-2.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 16-19, 27.
of Panama, in order to discredit any claims that General Noriega was still in control or that the country was under U.S. military rule. Operation Just Cause officially ended on 31 January 1990. In all, 26 U.S. troops were killed and 324 were wounded in the assault.

Operation Just Cause was deemed a success and a testimony to the efforts of Congress to avoid repeating pre-GNA mistakes. According to an article in Defense News a few months after the operation, “The streamlined command structure, established by the 1986 Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, is emerging as one of the most significant lessons learned from Operation Just Cause as Army planners sift through reports on the invasion.” And according to the report by the Joint Staff History Office, the success of the operation could be directly attributed to “the enhanced authority of the Chairman and CINC [as provided by GNA] combined to provide specific, readily attainable objectives and responsive and effective command and control while giving the tactical commander considerable operational freedom.”

In its assessment, the report lists the following impacts of GNA on the success of the operation in Panama:

- Improved transmission of contingency planning guidance from the National Command Authorities (NCA) to the CINC and the JTF commander: Instead of having to work with the corporate JCS, the SECDEF was able to use the CJCS, in the new role as the principal advisor to the president, to eliminate time-consuming deliberation within the JCS, which had previously been required to gain consensus on an operation of this magnitude.

- Common sense prevailed over pre-GNA concerns to equalize the level of each Service’s involvement: The large number of ground troops already in the theater dictated a predominantly Army operation. Planners did use Marine and Naval forces readily at hand (possibly to “highlight the Service’s role in a joint operation”), but no wasteful efforts were made to add more, simply to balance the roles of the Services. Because the Army depended upon the Air Force for lift, logistical support, suppression of antiaircraft fire, and interdiction, the role of the Air Force was larger than that of the maritime Services.

- The greater effectiveness of the CJCS: General Powell was active in the nontactical aspects of Just Cause, providing frequent, explicit guidance to the CINC and JTF commander when the military phase of the operation gave way to politically and

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16 Cole, 2-3.
18 Ibid.
19 Cole, p. 3.
20 Ibid., 72-74.
21 McConnell, 59.
22 Cole, 72-74.
diplomatically tense situations. Such changes reflected the ready access of the CJCS to both the president and the SECDEF as well as to agencies of the federal government other than the DOD, particularly the Department of State; and an ability to use their input to provide detailed political-military guidance to the operational commanders.

SECDEF Cheney may have offered the best summary of the effects of GNA on the Panama operation: "Just Cause showed what we're capable of.... I feel very, very good about the overall quality of the operation, the quality of the advice we got, and the professionalism with which [the joint military] carried out the operation."  

5.3 Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

The Pentagon did not rest on the laurels of Operation Just Cause for long. Less than eight months after mopping-up actions were completed in Panama, the DOD faced a far greater test of post-GNA effectiveness—the Persian Gulf War. The following account of key events of the war is based on a summary by Richard W. Murphy, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and sought to absorb the vast resources of that tiny, oil-rich country in the least possible time, using minimum effort, and with the smallest possible consequences. Although the invasion caught most by surprise, it immediately united almost the all of the western and Arab world against Iraq and its President, Saddam Hussein. President Bush had little difficulty winning domestic and international support for an armed confrontation with Iraq—the U.S. successfully forged and led a broad-based international diplomatic and military coalition of thirty-one countries.

The initial deployment, Operation Desert Shield, consisted of rapid positioning of Navy carrier battle groups, Air Force fighter and surveillance aircraft, and Army troops, outfitted with light, mostly defensive weaponry, to halt further Iraqi aggression. These forces were reinforced by large numbers of additional sea, air, and ground assets and heavy weaponry, to provide the offensive punch with which to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait—the offensive known as Operation Desert Storm. This massive buildup occurred over five months and became the largest U.S. military overseas commitment since the war in Vietnam, deploying more than 500,000 troops, 1,800 aircraft, and about 100 ships.

23 McConnell, 273-274.
24 Cole, 72-74.
25 Ibid., 72.
27 Ibid.
Desert Storm consisted of a two-phase campaign. To minimize casualties, coalition forces began offensive operations, on 16 January 1991, with five weeks of intensive air attacks, using land- and carrier-based assets, and technologically advanced weapon systems, such as precision-guided munitions, unmanned Tomahawk cruise missiles, advanced infrared targeting systems, and aircraft never before used in combat, such as British Tornadoes and U.S. F-117 stealth fighters. These high-tech assets were used with surgical precision against Iraqi air defenses, information nodes, and electrical grids.24

The air campaign was followed by a 100-hour ground war that began at 8:00 PM on 23 February 1991.25 This second phase featured the successful “left hook” movement, outflanking Iraqi forces entrenched along the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Thanks to the coalition air campaign, Iraqi front-line commanders had lost much of their command and control infrastructure and were left with greatly demoralized troops, many of whom deserted. The remaining front-line forces were killed or taken prisoner, with minimal losses to the coalition. Although the issue of the “Gulf War Syndrome” illnesses, which later affected thousands of veterans of the war remains unresolved, officially the United States suffered only 148 killed in action, 407 wounded, and 121 killed in nonhostile actions. On the other hand, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has estimated that 100,000 Iraqi soldiers died, 300,000 were wounded, 150,000 deserted, and 60,000 were taken prisoner.26

Few question the operational success of Desert Shield or Desert Storm, but caution is needed in order not to fall into the trap that has snared many post-GNA advocates of new weapons systems, personnel policies, and command arrangements, or any other new DOD initiative, with testimony arguing that “Desert Storm proved...” The Pentagon undoubtedly successfully conceived and conducted this war, yet it was a peculiar war, perhaps a unique one. The United States and its coalition partners had the good fortune to counter an opponent both unambiguously villainous and militarily inept: had Saddam Hussein taken advantage of any number of openings between 2 August and 16 January, he could have made it more difficult, if not impossible, to wage war against Iraq. The U.S. and its partners fought in a theater—a vast, empty desert—ideally suited to its military strengths. Saddam’s forces might easily have forced the coalition to fight house to house in Kuwait City, where the coalition’s reluctance to cause civilian casualties or sustain high losses would have made it much harder for it to continue the battle. The U.S. and its partners had the luxury of having nearly half a year to mass and train troops and to prepare a plan of attack. Had Saddam’s forces continued to roll south in early August, the coalition would have had to fight into parts of Saudi Arabia, not just Kuwait. It also

25Murphy.
26Ibid.
had the luxury of having one of the best port, road, and airbase networks in the world, including military facilities built by U.S. engineers and the support of a wealthy and cooperative host nation, Saudi Arabia.\footnote{Eliot A. Cohen, "After the Battle: A Defense Primer for the Next Century," The New Republic 204, 13, 19.}

All these factors must be taken into account in order to evaluate the impact of GNA on Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and while examining lessons learned from this war from a command and control perspective, such as those listed below:

- As with Operation Just Cause in Panama, the Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of the post-GNA role of the CJCS as principal military advisor to the NCA—President Bush and SECDEF Richard Cheney relied heavily on the advice of the CJCS, General Powell, and throughout the conflict the three spoke with one voice. One of the earliest lessons from the Gulf War, for example, related to GNA came five months before Operation Desert Storm even started, in the firing of General Michael Dugan, the Air Force Chief of Staff. His offense was to discuss sensitive war planning information with the press—in a classic case of inter-Service gamesmanship, he bragged about the superior effectiveness of air power. According to notes slipped to Bob Woodward of The Washington Post, what upset SECDEF Cheney and General Powell was not anything particular that General Dugan said but that he had said anything at all.\footnote{Boo, 36.} General Dugan was playing by pre-GNA rules of Service autonomy. His firing signaled the other Service chiefs that the new order really did leave them out of the operational planning picture.

- The Gulf War demonstrated the improved effectiveness post-GNA of the CINC. A crucial example occurred when General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), denied the Marines' request to mount an amphibious assault on Kuwait. The Marine commandant, General Al Gray, wanted to send hovercraft and helicopters through the Gulf's heavily mined waters and onto the beachhead. When General Schwarzkopf said no, General Gray tried an unsuccessful end-run direct to the CJCS, General Powell. Before GNA, a Service chief probably could have got his way, but no longer. According to a DOD official quoted in Washington Monthly, "This [was] the first time since 1945 that a military commander had the power to resist the Marines' desire for an amphibious assault. The result was that in this war, we had no Gallipoli. We got out without major loss of life."\footnote{Ibid., 38.}

- Another key objective of GNA was more efficient use of the DOD's resources, an improvement demonstrated in the Gulf War by the successful joint control of logistics. Unlike during previous conflicts, in Desert Shield a single transportation command center handled the job of moving 500,000 troops and 6 million tons of equipment from the United States and Europe into the theater of operations. With little warning, with a shortage of lift assets, and masses of material that proved far heavier than Pentagon officials estimates had anticipated, the joint logistics effort went forward without a single serious mishap. As
reported by Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the SASC, Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis, who organized the supply operation, unequivocally credited GNA reforms with letting him get the job done.  

- From a purely command and control perspective, one significant lesson learned from the successful air campaign was the importance of interoperable communications systems, for example the technical challenges associated with distribution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO)—the phone book-sized daily schedule of air operations. The plan was to distribute the ATO nightly electronically to each Service air component, which could then prepare for the next day’s missions. Unfortunately, because the Navy’s communications systems were incompatible with the Air Force and Army systems, instead of transmitting the ATO electronically across the Gulf, the staff of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) had to ferry information on floppy disks from Riyadh to the command aircraft carriers in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf every night of the air war. From there, copies were freighted by helicopter to the Navy’s other carriers and ships. What should have taken moments took hours and vast quantities of manpower, and in effect curbed the responsiveness of the Navy in the air war.  

On the positive side, the challenges of the ATO distribution led to some innovative uses of local area networks (LANs) and small computers. For example, to alleviate problems associated with distributing and sorting out pertinent data from the 200- to 800-page ATO, which detailed as many as 3,000 sorties, the Marine expeditionary force command element developed microcomputer applications to extract only their mission data and then used LANs to distribute that information to their units, thus pioneering a selective demand-pull, as opposed to an archaic supply-push, data distribution architecture.  

- The most important command and control lesson learned from the Gulf War, however, was the impact of information dominance. In The First Information War, Alan Campen declared that this war “differed fundamentally from any previous conflict [in that] the outcome turned as much on superior management of knowledge as upon performances of people or weapons.” The coalition’s overwhelming defeat of Iraq may be attributed to inadequacy of Saddam Hussein’s industrial-era armed forces in confrontation with a post-industrial military superpower whose ability to control the collection, dissemination, and application of information and battlefield awareness significantly affected the outcome of the war. In the words of Colonel Allard, a scholar of command and control:  

...Desert Storm may be better remembered as the first war to demonstrate the means, the methods, and the awesome lethality of combat in the information age. [O]ne of the major legacies of Desert

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35Boo, 37-38.
37Campen, vii.
38Mann, 145-147.
Storm will be a continuing by the U.S. Defense establishment to exploit the potential of advanced technology and precision weaponry in an emerging paradigm of information warfare.39

- Related to this reaffirmed importance of information dominance were lessons from intelligence dissemination, specifically, problems associated with obtaining and distributing tactical intelligence and bomb-damage assessment, in order to determine the effects of air strikes and precision-guided munitions quickly. According to the HASC's analysis of the war, "the failure of the intelligence system to keep warfighters properly supplied with information underscores the vast increase in tailored, current intelligence required by weapons with one-target, one-bomb accuracy."40 According to Colonel Allard, "the root of the problem was the lack of effective alignment between the sensors deployed by each of the Services and the communication pathways needed to deliver this information to those who need it."41

5.4 Operation Restore Hope

No sooner had the Desert Storm clouds cleared over the Persian Gulf than the post-GNA organization of the DOD was challenged again, this time in a classic OOTW, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Although many OOTWs have occurred before and after U.S. involvement in Somalia, ranging from noncombatant evacuations (NEOs) to environmental relief and cleanup operations, looking at Operation Restore Hope provides the opportunity to review the effects of GNA on the performance of the DOD and of U.S. forces in a complex, multinational, joint task-force peacemaking or peacekeeping operation in the post-cold war world. The following summary of the main events of Operation Restore Hope draws on a first-hand report by Leslie Ratliff, a U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel assigned to JTF Somalia in 1993, as well as other published accounts, here cited in the notes.

Although violence, civil war, streetfighting, poverty, and starvation had been common in Somalia for more than twenty years, little of what was going on claimed international attention until late in 1991. In November, the fighting between the two main clan factions intensified, and by February 1992 it had resulted in at least 30,000 deaths, forced more than a million Somalis to flee as refugees to neighboring countries, and brought Somalia into the focus of international media.42 In August 1992, the United States began emergency airlifts through Kenya to Somalia of


41Allard, 173.

food and other urgently needed materials (Operation Provide Relief), and the United Nations (UN) authorized the deployment of the first group of peacekeepers, a battalion of Pakistani soldiers, in what became known as United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). Given the magnitude of the task, coupled with organizational deficiencies of the UN and a lack of security in Somalia, these efforts did little to reduce the famine, disease, or fighting which had engulfed the country. By late in 1992, the civil war had led to total government collapse, which, with disease and starvation, had combined to cause nearly 500,000 deaths; more than a million Somalis were in need of food and medicine; and 800,000 more were refugees in Kenya and Ethiopia. When efforts by the UN to produce political reconciliation, deliver aid, and provide traditional peacekeeping failed, public opinion in the U.S. drove President Bush to more active U.S. involvement. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a U.S.-led, thirty-nation Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to Somalia. Five days later, Operation Restore Hope was underway, and nearly 16,000 U.S. troops began entering Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, as part of the 32,000-strong UNITAF peacekeeping force. The mission of the U.S. forces was clearly defined: end clan fighting; protect humanitarian relief operations; and be replaced by UN forces as soon as possible after order was restored.

The initial deployment was a huge success, and by late spring 1993 the situation in Somalia had greatly improved—large-scale famine and disease had been greatly diminished, virtually no clan fighting was occurring, schools had reopened, and commercial activity had resumed. On 4 May, UNITAF turned over the peacekeeping mission to a second United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM II) force, and, with the exception of a 1,200-man Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and some support logistical personnel, all U.S. personnel were redeployed. Although UNOSOM II was technically able to assume the mission, it unfortunately lacked sufficient ground forces and heavy armored vehicles to patrol Mogadishu appropriately. This shortfall allowed one of the clan leaders, Mohammed Farah Aideed, of the Somalia National Alliance (SNA), to bring many of his men and weapons back into the city. Trouble erupted on 5 June 1993, when a detail of the Pakistani troops searching Mogadishu for weapons that belonged to Aideed was ambushed by Aideed’s supporters. The attack resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers and led to a decision by the UN Security Council to punish those responsible by arresting Aideed and destroying his command center. A subsequent raid by the U.S. QRF on a suspected Aideed command post resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and more than 84 injured. Somali casualties were far worse—312 killed, 814 wounded—but Aideed was not captured. President Clinton quickly reinforced the QRF with more troops and heavy armor but,

46 Michaelson, 62.
47 Ratliff, 4-6.
in the aftermath of publicity about the American deaths, ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Somalia by 31 March 1994. The last U.S. soldier left Somalia on 25 March 1994.44

Despite these losses and the inability to capture Aideed, judged on the basis of the effectiveness of GNA, Operation Restore Hope can be regarded as a success, for the following reasons:

- Like the operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf, Restore Hope demonstrated the improved military advice provided by the CJCS to the president and SECDEF. According to Robert Oakley, the president’s Special Envoy for Somalia in 1992–93, General Powell, the CJCS, was pivotal to the successful use of U.S. forces in Somalia. He persistently advised President Bush to involve U.S. ground forces only if dispatched in sizable numbers and with a clearly defined exit strategy. After much discussion, the President decided to have the U.S. lead the international force into Somalia, but following the CJCS’s recommendation, using the strongest military option available.45

- The initial deployment of forces in Operation Restore Hope validated GNA’s positive impact on the DOD’s organizational and operational competence by demonstrating the enhanced effectiveness and flexibility of U.S. forces, even when dealing with untraditional military operations and in harsh conditions. In the words of the CENTCOM CINC, General Joseph Hoar, who was responsible for Operation Restore Hope:

  Somalia was the first major force projection in an operation other than war…. Deploying 28,000 people 8,000 miles to an austere environment was as formidable as the operational challenge. Somalia had primitive airfields, barely usable seaports, disintegrating road networks that did not link population centers, and roadways rendered impassable by fallen bridges and washouts. There was no electricity, no water, no food, no government, and no economy. Additionally, our forces had to provide security for NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] which were attempting to save millions of Somalis from starving. Deploying to Somalia was like going to the moon: everything had to be brought in and built there.46

- Restore Hope validated the importance of placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders tasked with accomplishing a mission and ensuring that their authority is fully commensurate with that responsibility. The complexity of this mission, coupled with the large number of contributing countries, presented huge military challenges, such as how best to employ varied resources, organize and maintain unity of command, and deal with varying levels of interoperability. These formidable tasks were ably managed by the

44Ibid.
45Oakley, 45.
46Hoar, 60.
CENTCOM CINC, the JTF Somalia commanders, and the effective command structure provided by GNA.\textsuperscript{51}

- In addition, the constantly changing conditions of the operation highlighted the importance of increased attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning. CENTCOM was ready and able to take on Operation Restore Hope rapidly because it had begun preparing and planning for OOTW contingencies back in 1989, in the aftermath of the search to locate Congressman Mickey Leland and his party, lost when their aircraft crashed en route to visit a refugee camp in Ethiopia. As a result of that search, CENTCOM had a designated JTF ready and trained to conduct operations in bare-base conditions in an environment that was difficult, if not outright hostile.\textsuperscript{52}

Restore Hope also pointed out numerous organizational intricacies that GNA had not addressed which would have to be taken into account in future operations. Some GNA-related command-and-control lessons gleaned from U.S. involvement in this operation are discussed in Colonel Allard's book \textit{Somalia Operation: Lessons Learned}:

- "It is a basic fact of life that the command and control of a coalition [force] must always take into account the existence of parallel lines of authority, especially when the mission of the coalition involves combat."

- "In a peace operation the inherent difficulties of command and control demand effective communications among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels."

- "Diverse coalition forces generally mean wildly different communication capabilities—a fact of life that demands effective communications management."

- "Intelligence is as vital to the success of a peace operation as it is to any other military activity. Although nonintrusive means of collecting information are especially useful for peace operations, human intelligence is usually the key."

- "An effective public information program is critical to the success of any operation, especially those involving peacemaking and peacekeeping."

- "Second only to the basic structure of command, the organization of a JTF is key because it must balance the needs of continuity with the integration of additional capabilities. Organizational methods include augmenting an existing headquarters or earmarking a standard but adaptable contingency package; but the selection of the nucleus [of the package] should be driven by standard mission essential factors such as mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available."

- "One major military responsibility in peace operations is determining and measuring success—keeping the chain of command informed as to where we are between entry and exit while avoiding the inevitable pressures of 'mission creep.'"\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., 61.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., 56.

5.5 Operation Uphold Democracy

It did not take long for such lessons to be applied. Less than six months after the last U.S. troops left Somalia in March 1994, members of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division disembarked at Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The crisis in Haiti, like those in Panama and Somalia, was defined by a protracted evolution and reflected a complex combination of U.S. domestic and international events and political considerations. The following chronology of events is based on the case study of Operation Uphold Democracy by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)\(^4\) of the National Defense University (NDU) and other published accounts of the operation, cited here in the notes.

In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president in Haiti’s first democratic election, but from the beginning he experienced difficulties in governing and after only seven months in office he was overthrown and sent into exile by officers of the Haitian army. For the next three years, from 1991 to 1993, the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States (OAS) made extensive diplomatic efforts to restore Haiti’s elected government, while Aristide was in exile. These efforts led to little, and by mid-1993 the UN Security Council began passing resolutions, first, favoring an embargo, then, by October 1993, to deploy 193 U.S. and 25 Canadian troops (primarily engineers and trainers) to Haiti aboard the **USS Harlan County**. This group was to be the advance echelon of a 1,267-man UN police and military mission to train Haitians and to help rebuild Haiti’s infrastructure.\(^5\) Upon their arrival in Port-au-Prince on 11 October, the troops met large demonstrations by hostile crowds and were refused access to the dock, making it impossible for them to unload. After a one-day stand-off, the **USS Harlan County** was ordered to depart from Haiti.

Afterward, the violence in Haiti escalated rapidly. By late December, the United States began issuing ultimatums to the Haitian military to restore Aristide. By early spring of 1994, the DOD, although publicly opposed to the use of U.S. force in Haiti, began developing plans for a possible invasion. On 22 April 1994, the Clinton administration, responding to the continuing refusal of the Haitian military leaders to give up power and a growing problem of Haitian refugees, announced its intention to seek a total economic embargo of Haiti and to use military force, if necessary, to restore Aristide to power. On 5 May, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the resignation of the Haitian military leaders, imposing a complete embargo, and threatening hostile military action. At this point, U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM), in conjunction with U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), initiated intense planning and training efforts for a military operation to use force to remove the Haitian military


\(^{5}\)Ibid., 9.
leaders and establish a secure environment so that the Aristide government could be restored.\textsuperscript{36} By July, the U.S. 24\textsuperscript{th} Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) was deployed off the coast of Haiti and elements of the Army's 10\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division, 18\textsuperscript{th} Airborne Corps, as well as Navy and Coast Guard components were trained and prepared for imminent action, if required. Despite such a show of force and despite U.S. resolve, diplomatic negotiations continued to make little progress, and on 13 September, President Clinton ordered the immediate deployment of two aircraft carriers to Haiti, the \textit{USS America} and \textit{USS Eisenhower}. On 16 September, a senior U.S. delegation, led by former President Carter and General Colin Powell, former CJCS, arrived in Port-au-Prince for a last attempt to persuade Haitian military leaders to step down.\textsuperscript{37}

These negotiations were successful in yielding the resignation and departure from Haiti of the top military leaders, but only at the last minute. With airborne, amphibious, and special operations invasion forces already in motion, the Carter agreement abruptly halted the "kick-in-the-door" forced-entry operations with a dramatic transition to an unopposed soft-landing. In a display of flexibility, light infantry forces were quickly substituted for the airborne assault troops, and on 19 September elements of the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division lifted off the \textit{USS Eisenhower} and disembarked in Port-au-Prince without meeting any resistance.\textsuperscript{38} A few armed confrontations occurred in which ten Haitians were killed, but the U.S. forces swiftly and successfully assumed responsibility for the island's security and on 15 October, President Aristide returned to Haiti. The restoration of Haiti's civil infrastructure and the gradual reduction of U.S. forces started almost immediately, and, by January 1995, the United States had successfully turned over command of the Haiti operation to the UN.\textsuperscript{39}

Operation Uphold Democracy was another post-GNA success story. Its clearly delineated objectives—to remove the Haitian military dictatorship from power, to restore President Aristide, and to turn the operation over to UN control as soon as possible—all were accomplished effectively, with very few casualties, while displaying great flexibility. Judged on the basis of the effectiveness of GNA, the assessment is equally positive, for the following reasons:

- Increased attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning was demonstrated in the way the Services and CINC\textsc{s} worked well together to develop detailed scenarios for both forceful and permissive entry, as well as plans to restore law and order and begin rebuilding Haiti's infrastructure. Although officially the Pentagon resisted using military force, the CINC\textsc{s} took the initiative early in planning and training. Lessons learned from Panama and Somalia were incorporated wherever possible, and, as a result, the planning process for Uphold Democracy proved successful. A good transition plan to turn over the

\textsuperscript{36} Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy," \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly}, 7 (Spring 1995), 55.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} INSS Case Study, 9-17.
operation to the UN, provided a reasonable framework for the disengagement and withdrawal of U.S. forces.60

- Clear mission and authority were given to the responsible commanders—the ACOM and SOCOM CINCs knew what had to be done and had the authority to plan, train, and execute the mission. The U.S. lead made it possible for the UN to organize and deploy its own force with sufficient time and knowledge of the environment. UN planners worked side by side with their U.S. counterparts to accomplish a smooth transition.61

- Efficient use of Defense resources and the enhanced effectiveness of U.S. military operations were demonstrated in Haiti. Sufficient military forces and assets were dedicated to the mission, and commanders were given the latitude to make timely and appropriate decisions in order to get the job done. Although the last-minute success of the negotiations headed by former President Carter eliminated armed resistance, thus preventing loss of lives on both sides, it required the U.S. military to deal with a huge last-minute shift in mission, force packaging, rules of engagement, and execution orders, all of which had surprisingly little impact. A participant on the ground in Haiti at the time stated:

> From the bottom-up point of view, the shift [from forceful to permissive entry force packages] was transparent. [ACOM] did a superb job of handling the shift including reconfiguring the aircraft carriers from a strike asset to a support platform.62

As in the other operations discussed in this chapter, Restore Democracy revealed several areas related to GNA that still required improvement. One pointed out by the INSS study was the need for improved interagency political-military planning:

> While the execution of the Haiti operation was generally successful, interagency planning was described by participants as slow and disjointed, and until May 1994, lacked clear political guidance. While civilian agencies were developing a ‘comprehensive political-military plan’, major players continued to disagree on the goal until the final weeks prior to launching the mission…. This process and security restrictions resulted in considerable frustration at the operational level where military planners found themselves preparing for civil-military operations without being able to talk with their civilian counterparts.63

Related to the need for better OOTW political-military planning are such issues as developing civil-military interagency doctrine and operational concepts; the resolution of organizational and operational differences; the establishment of interagency command-and-control arrangements; and the need for interagency command-and-control exercises and training.

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60Ibid., 25-28.
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63Ibid., 29-31.
to alleviate interagency differences and expose agencies to one another’s ways of doing business.64

5.6 Operations in Bosnia

As the U.S. military was relinquishing control of operations in Haiti to the UN in early 1995, the attention of the DOD was focused on the other side of the Atlantic—on the deteriorating political and military situation in the former Yugoslavia. Fighting had broken out there in 1991 over religious differences between the Serbs and Croats and their desires to live in separate religiously homogeneous countries, something nearly impossible in the cities and towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose inhabitants were 44 percent Muslim, 32 percent Serbian, and 17 percent Croatian, living side-by-side in the same neighborhoods, streets, and apartment buildings.65 The result was nearly four years of vicious fighting which had led to more than 250,000 deaths and huge international efforts to try to stop the bloodshed and restore peace. The initial U.S. involvement in July 1992 was limited to peripheral support of UN peacemaking and relief operations and consisted of the use of U.S. aircraft and personnel in Provide Promise—a joint, multinational airdrop and airland resupply operation in support of the UN humanitarian relief effort.66 In April 1993, some 76 U.S. aircraft and nearly 8,400 U.S. personnel joined allied forces in enforcing the UN-mandated no-fly zone over the area—Operation Deny Flight. Then, in December 1993, the U.S. joined Operation Sharp Guard by providing three ships and over 1,000 personnel toward the enforcement of the UN maritime sanctions in the Adriatic.67 By June 1995, after repeated violations and failures of UN-brokered cease-fires, Defense ministers from NATO and other countries decided to create a 14,000-strong, rapid deployment force of British, French, and Dutch troops to support the UN units protecting established safe areas.

U.S. political involvement escalated when on 2 June 1995 Serbian forces shot down an F-16 flown by U.S. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady, on an Operation Deny Flight mission, and in response to public outcry when a market in Sarajevo was mortar bombed on 28 August 1995, killing 38 Sarajevans and injuring many others.68 An intensified peace initiative led by the United States resulted in the Dayton Peace Agreement on 21 November 1995, and on 16 December 1995 the UN Security Council authorized deployment of a NATO-led, multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR). Under unified command and control, and composed of 60,000

64Ibid., 51.
66Ibid., 71.
ground, air, and maritime personnel from fifteen NATO and seventeen non-NATO nations (including 20,000 U.S. troops of Operation Joint Endeavor), IFOR was charged with ensuring compliance with the provisions of Dayton accords.49 The IFOR mission appeared simple enough: monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the peace accord, which provided for two separate Bosnian and Herzegovinian states, the Muslim-Croatian federation (approximately 51 percent of the territory, including all of Sarajevo) and the Serb Republic (the remaining 49 percent of the territory). 50 The real military tasks of IFOR, however, were far more complex:

- To ensure self-defense and freedom of movement for both factions and for IFOR;
- To supervise marking of boundaries and zones of separation;
- To monitor, and, if needed, enforce the withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to designated areas;
- To assume control of the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes; and
- To create a secure environment to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations and the accomplishment of nonmilitary aspects of the peace settlement, including:
  - Creating secure conditions for free and fair elections,
  - Protecting innocents from deliberate acts of violence,
  - Responding to violations of human rights,
  - Observing and preventing interference with the free movement of the civilian population, and
  - Monitoring the marking and clearing of minefields and unexploded ordnance.51

Despite these complicated and difficult tasks, by December 1996, most military requirements of the Dayton Peace Agreement had been met, and much of the credit would seem to belong to the effectiveness, flexibility, organization, and technological superiority of the U.S. armed forces reformed by GNA. The legislation's intent to improve the military advice provided to the president and SECDEF was carried out throughout this operation by the united and consistent advice provided by the CJCS, General Shalikashvili. GNA's mandate of clear responsibility and authority for the accomplishment of a mission assigned was, as in the other operations discussed in this chapter, placed on the CINC tasked to do the job, EUCOM and SACEUR commander General George Joulwan, and he and his field commanders were given the forces necessary to get the job done right, thus implementing GNA's intent to provide for more

49Curtiss, 71; Cviic, 380.
50Cviic, 379.
efficient use of Defense resources and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. This positive assessment was echoed by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, in November 1996:

IFOR has been a remarkable success. It has shown what a truly international coalition for peace can achieve if we put our minds to it. The men and women from the 33 countries that make up IFOR are getting the job done. Their performance in the field, in often difficult and trying circumstances, has been commendable.... We have also seen how vital leadership and unity of command under the SACEUR, General George Joulwan, are to the success of a military mission for peace.\(^{71}\)

In the same month, an article in Armed Forces Journal International put it this way:

At the risk of relying on a time-worn bit of mil-speak, U.S. involvement in IFOR operations in Bosnia can accurately be characterized as "seamless."... [T]here's general acknowledgment at all operational levels that all elements in America's total military team have vital roles to play in getting the job done.\(^{72}\)

Although few dispute the overall effectiveness of the U.S. military and the impressive flexibility it showed in Bosnia, as with the other operations discussed here, some valuable lessons have been learned. For example, in the area of command and control, much was learned in information operations. As in the Gulf War, huge technological innovations have affected telecommunications and information gathering, processing, and dissemination, and since the mid-1980s, NATO also made great efforts toward standardizing its communications infrastructure, leading to more effective interoperability among the coalition partners of IFOR.\(^{73}\) Although this improved information flow contributed significantly to the success of the IFOR forces, it did not reach all levels of command in a timely manner, a difficulty that highlighted some new and challenging issues in command and control to be dealt with in future operations.\(^{74}\) In "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment," Colonel Allard, who spent time on special assignment with the 1st Armored Division in Bosnia in 1996, summarized some of his findings in this area:

Because the Information Revolution [and its associated technological innovations] largely stops at division level, high technology systems support headquarters far more effectively than the soldier on the ground.... The Bosnian experience underlines the need to substitute


\(^{74}\)Ibid., 4.
commercial telecommunications, automation and services for outmoded military equipment and support structures.\textsuperscript{6}

Colonel Allard concluded, however, that “There can be no question the military mission in Bosnia has been a success and that the American soldier, supported by his Air Force, Navy and Marine counterparts, has been the primary reason why it has been so”\textsuperscript{7}—which is what GNA was all about: improving the joint effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces.

5.7 The Grade

The overall impact of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 appears positive. Room for progress remains, but arguably GNA has been a major factor in transforming U.S. military forces into an increasingly cohesive working team and most of the law’s goals (see Chapter Four) are on the way to being met. As the discussion in this chapter of several post-GNA operations has shown, military advice provided to the president and SECDEF has improved; CINCs now have clear responsibility and authority for missions assigned to them; attention to formulation of joint strategy and to contingency planning has increased; Defense resources are more efficiently used; and, most important, the effectiveness of military operations has improved.

In December 1996, during a presentation at a symposium at the National Defense University commemorating the ten-year anniversary of GNA, CJCS General John Shalikashvili similarly assessed the law’s impact, giving GNA an overall grade of B+.\textsuperscript{8} He praised its effectiveness with predominantly high marks across the spectrum of DOD measures of merit:

- Organizational effectiveness: B+
- Quality of military advice to the NCA: A
- Authority and responsibility of CINC: A
- Strategic and contingency planning: B+
- Efficient use of resources: B+
- Joint personnel management: C+/B-
- Effectiveness of military operations: A
- Joint education: B
- Joint doctrine: A

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
• Joint training: B
• Joint readiness assessment: B

The review of post-GNA military operations in this chapter has shown that, given official authority by GNA, both General Shalikashvili and his predecessor as CJCS, General Powell, served far more effectively than possible in the past as the principal military advisor to the United States's civilian leadership during international crises that occurred during their tenures. The CJCS and CINC’s decisive roles in the crises in the Panama and Persian Gulf, for example, were clear, while the operational involvement of individual Service chiefs was less visible and less influential than before GNA. Although personalities continued to play a perhaps inevitable role, GNA provided the organizational structure and empowerment that allowed the leaders to be effective. Or, as former SECDEF, William Perry, said after the Gulf War:

The leadership of the coalition was superb, and the diverse military forces operated with an unprecedented unity, which was greatly facilitated by the command authority given to General Powell and General Schwarzkopf by the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.80

In line with the GNA mandate, the CJCS has assumed greater authority also over the Joint Staff, which, in turn, functions in a more serious and effective manner than before GNA, absorbing such key functions as quantitative requirements analysis which previously were parochially performed by the individual Services. According to Robert Holzer, writing in Defense News in December 1996:

One legacy of the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is...the Joint Staff's increasing role in determining future weapons systems priorities for the four Services. Decisions about what weapons to design and buy once were the sole purview of the individual Services... Now the Joint Staff, which itself once was controlled by the military Services, assesses priorities and increasingly makes these important decisions.81

Holzer pointed out that some Pentagon officials, including former Vice-CJCS, Admiral William Owens, have felt that the requirements and program evaluation process—also known as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)—not only is effective but also has helped eliminate purchases of billions of dollars worth of unneeded military hardware and, further, has the potential to eliminate unnecessarily spending billions more.82

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79Ibid., 2-6.
80William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," Foreign Affairs 70, 4 (Fall 1991), 67-68.
82Ibid.
To see how the CINCs are more firmly in command of their respective areas of responsibility and their component forces now, one need look only at the highly effective role General Thurman played in Panama, or General Schwarzkopf in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, or General Joulwan in Bosnia. Further, CINCs can now influence, through the CJCS and the Joint Staff, the budget and acquisition processes, ensuring that their most pressing requirements will be addressed. The Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), for example, which outlines the CJCS’s budget advice to the SECDEN, incorporating the CINC’s requirements and the JROC’s evaluation of Service programs, has become such an important part of the DOD’s annual budget development that Congress has initiated steps to subpoena the CPA, even though it is meant to be a strictly internal Pentagon document.\textsuperscript{53}

GNA has also had some unexpected benefits. By enacting it, lawmakers hoped to reform the military to make it better able to meet worldwide security challenges, which, in 1986, meant threats posed by the Soviet Union and the challenges to U.S. vital interests associated with a bipolar-world. Fortunately, GNA’s focus on improved joint operations and a more effective DOD organization have proved even more beneficial in the unpredictable post-cold war environment. The operations reviewed here represent only a few engagements in which the United States has been involved since passage of GNA (more than seventy other successful responses to crises on short notice have taken place in, among other places, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zaire, Tajikistan, Kenya-Burundi, Rwanda, Northern Iraq, and Turkey).\textsuperscript{44}

Such operations have indicated that although the chances of having to commit U.S. troops to operations in either a major theater or a regional conflict may have decreased since 1986, the probability has increased that the United States will need to commit forces to many, small, often simultaneous operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to combat. The uncertain security environment, the return of U.S. troops from abroad, and sharply declining Defense budgets all have imposed a need for even increased “jointness.” Pressure to eliminate unnecessary duplication has accentuated the requirement for more flexible forces and created the need for an entirely new infrastructure for joint training, equipping, and integrating\textsuperscript{45}—all challenges the military is on its way to meeting, thanks to GNA.

Another unexpected benefit of GNA has been the DOD’s ability to manage scrutiny by the media and the public allowed by technological advancements in worldwide video- and telecommunications—the “quintessential network”\textsuperscript{46} or the “CNN effect.” Images of U.S. soldiers blasting rock music to dislodge General Noriega from the papal Nunciatura in Panama,
spectacular light-shows of Iraqi antiaircraft gunfire over the skies of Baghdad on the first night of Desert Storm, troops in camouflage going ashore at night in Mogadishu, as well as the wide coverage of the O’Grady showdown and rescue in Bosnia are etched in the public mind, clearly demonstrating the effects of the modern media on both military operations and the American public. Film footage showing a dead U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu highlighted the public’s lack of stomach when it comes to the negative effects of warfare. In the late 1990s, the DOD can no longer count on freedom to train, deploy, and employ forces without the cameras trained on it and press leaks, but even with such intense scrutiny during the past ten years, it has fared surprisingly well, again thanks to such unexpected benefits of GNA as the public perception that the military “has its act together,” free of Service parochialism, and flexible enough to handle even the most unusual of tasks. Most importantly, the U.S. public now sees its military effectively carrying out each mission assigned under the unified voice of the president, SECDEF, CJCS, and appropriate CINC.

Yet much remains to be done. The discussion of the operations reviewed in this chapter has mentioned lessons learned and areas that still need improvement just in the arena of command and control, such as the need for improved intelligence dissemination and communications interoperability. Progress needs to be made in other arenas of the DOD as well. General Shalikashvili, in his remarks to the NDU symposium on GNA in December 1996, emphasized that the implementation processes and improvements initiated by GNA were not yet complete. His “grades” clearly indicated the need for improvement in joint planning, resource management, personnel management, education, training, and readiness assessment. He also emphasized the importance of continuing progress toward using the core capabilities of each Service to create a more capable and interoperable joint fighting machine and called for improved organization of the various Pentagon staffs, particularly regarding the role of OSD and the division of responsibilities between OSD and the Service headquarters staffs—General Shalikashvili stressed the need to reduce the size of the DOD bureaucracy.87

GNA was landmark legislation and a true success story. Military operations over the past ten years reflected sounder command structure, greater flexibility, and, most important, improved effectiveness and successful mission accomplishment, all of which can be attributed, at least in part, to GNA and to the command and organizational changes envisioned by General Jones, General Myers, Senator Goldwater, Representative Nichols, and Congressional staffers Barrett and Locher, to cite only a few whose names have come to be associated with this legislation. In April 1995, in Government Executive, James Kitfield quoted Admiral William Owens, former VCJCS:

I really think Goldwater–Nichols was the watershed event for the military since the second World War. It changed significantly the culture

87Shalikashvili, 6-9.
of the U.S. military. In the last seven or eight years, we’ve progressed from a reluctant standing up to the Goldwater–Nichols reforms, to a full acceptance by the Services that this is the future of warfighting. You no longer hear anyone saying that we won’t fight wars jointly.\textsuperscript{88}

Chapter Six

The Road Ahead

No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have fingers on that team that are individual Services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of the American military power. The days of single Service warfare are gone forever.

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN
Former Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Few might disagree with Admiral Jeremiah, but the question arises, where do we go from here? GNA rightly focused on strengthening established joint military structures—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the unified commands—where significant organizational deficiencies had existed for more than forty years. Improvements in areas that go beyond those tackled by the GNA legislation would seem to be the next step: reorganization of OSD, harnessing the powers of the revolutions in information technologies and in military affairs, assessing the role of information dominance, acquisition reform, command, control, communications, and computer (C3) systems interoperability, restructuring intelligence, and institutionalizing the role of public perceptions in military operations, among other areas. From the perspective of command and control, certain questions arise. Is the vast staff supporting the pinnacle of the DOD’s organizational structure justifiable? What changes are needed to take full advantage of the supposed “revolutions” in information technology and military affairs? Is there a new role for information dominance on the modern battlefield? Is it realistic for the DOD to try to keep up with the “state-of-the-art” communications and computing technologies? Is full interoperability among the Services’ various C3 systems really achievable? Are changes in current C4 and intelligence (C4I) organization necessary? Should the “CNN effect” require formal institutionalization by the DOD of public perception operations?

As the DOD prepares for the twenty-first century and in 1997 tackles the Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review—to lay a foundation for transforming the U.S. military into an instrument capable of supporting and defending U.S. interests in the years ahead—it faces these and many other issues. This chapter focuses on the command and control questions raised in the previous paragraph, describes key issues involved in them, and suggests points for future consideration.

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6.1 Reorganization of the OSD

Officially, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) consists of 2,167 military and civilian personnel assigned to support the SECDEF and his assistants in policymaking responsibilities.\(^2\) According to an article in Defense News, however, when taken as a whole, OSD actually consists of more than 7,000 people, assigned to 11 assistant secretaries comprised of 35 organizations and directorates spread throughout the Pentagon and the Washington area.\(^3\) Regardless of what the actual size of the OSD staff really is, critics have increasingly contended that GNA made perhaps half the staff positions at OSD either obsolete or redundant to jobs already performed either on the Joint Staff or on the Services' staffs. They claim that billions of dollars might be saved simply by eliminating duplication and by subjecting OSD staff to the kind of downsizing each Service has undergone since 1991.\(^4\)

The OSD's staff began to grow rapidly in the early 1960s, when SECDEF Robert McNamara wanted his own analysts to provide advice, independent of the Services. The OSD continued to grow as successive SECDEFs dealt with parochial and conflicting advice from the Services and each felt the need to have his own specialists on virtually every military subject.\(^5\) Much of this thirst for impartial advice was driven by the lack of an effective Joint Staff (see section 2.4). GNA changed all that. Although most of Washington still craves independent counsel, budgetary constraints have brought the realization that the DOD must be smarter than its wants, and many in and outside the Pentagon regard much of the staff of the OSD bureaucracy as no longer necessary. For example, Defense News quotes retired General Robert Herres, the first VCJCS, as saying:

> There's a hell of a lot of duplication going on between OSD and the military departments.... We should take a good, hard look at OSD and get a better balance between OSD and the military departments. OSD should not be developing force structure...[OSD] should be supervising the military departments in developing force structure.... You could reduce [OSD] to 60 percent of its current size....\(^6\)

The current Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), John White (who in 1997 undertook a review of the structure of OSD and of its relationship to the Joint Staff and the Service staffs) was also quoted:

> Serving the Secretary means helping him with policy advice and

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\(^4\)Ibid.

\(^5\)Ibid.

\(^6\)Ibid.
information he needs to make decisions. There’s a lot of OSD that doesn’t do that. The Secretary doesn’t even know [some parts of OSD] exist. But from my point of view, it would be better if most of these sorts of functions, and there are exceptions, were devolved back to the Services or to the Agencies.7

Other insiders have claimed that the more influential role of the CJCS and JS post-GNA has undermined the fundamental precept of civilian authority over the U.S. military. According to James Locher, most recently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and a figure in the drafting of GNA (see section 2.4), two groups have made this argument: those genuinely concerned for the health of civil-military relations and those who wishing to regain greater influence for the Services.8 In Locher’s view, both groups are off the mark, and “[a]lthough Goldwater–Nichols increased the role of the Chairman [of the JCS], it carefully ensured that the Secretary [of Defense] could use his vast powers to control the Nation’s top officer.”9 In addition, an analysis of civil-military authority conducted at the Naval War College in 1994 concluded that no evidence exists to suggest that civilian control of the military has decayed since passage of GNA.10

An independent OSD staff may have been necessary before GNA revamped the JS, but whether in the late 1990s the Defense wallet can afford yesterday’s necessity if it no longer brings added value to the organizational equation is an issue that must be raised.

6.2 Revolutions—Fact or Fiction?

Whether they really are revolutions or not, two seismic changes have affected the infrastructure of U.S. military command and control and will continue to do so.

The first change, often called a revolution in information technologies, is certainly not unique to the DOD but cuts across U.S. society. Primarily the result of phenomenal advances in solid state electronics and the resulting explosion in information processing and transmission capabilities, it has brought about enormous increases in computing and telecommunications capacities which have altered much of the way society does business. The proliferation of personal computers, cellular phones, pagers, and monumental changes in banking, stock markets, telephone switching, electric power distribution, and air-traffic control, to name only a few industries affected, reveal the impact of change wrought by improvements in information technology over just a few years. Much of the economy has come to rely on electronic

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7Ibid.
9Ibid.
information systems for decisionmaking and efficiency in fiercely competitive private markets. Yet this new efficiency and the dependence on processed information has meant that the assets and infrastructure that provide them have become a “soft underbelly,” with significant implications for national security.\textsuperscript{11}

The second change, commonly referred to as the revolution in military affairs, has consisted of the effects of the new technologies on military forces, equipment, and strategy. This revolution, if indeed found to be one, is rooted in the accelerated development of certain military-related technologies which, when integrated, will provide the capacity to see, or sense, what is militarily significant in a large geographical area, understand better what is occurring in that area, and communicate that understanding to forces that can quickly, with precision, destroy opposing targets or forces.

The revolution in military affairs and the revolution in information technologies are clearly related. Detecting, targeting, and destroying an enemy target are steps that have been pursued by military forces for centuries. The “revolution” lies in the quantum advances in the capability the new information technologies provide, which permit the military to go through the sequence in near-real time—seconds or minutes, compared with hours or days in the not so distant past—with unprecedented accuracy. For example, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft can spot, identify, track, and assign a weapons system to attack an enemy air or ground target in seconds.\textsuperscript{12} Although technological advances continue to enhance speed—already down to fractions of a second in theater and ballistic missile defense systems research and development—such leaps in capability do not derive solely from high-tech improvements to the aircraft, tanks, and ships, usually used to gauge military strength, but also from more esoteric advances in sensors, communications, and precision weapons. These assets, when integrated, offer the “system of systems,” which is revolutionizing U.S. warfighting capabilities.\textsuperscript{13}

According to Abe Singer and Scott Rowell, writing in Strategic Forum in December 1996, the convergence of these revolutions can be traced to the understanding, voiced nearly half a century ago by Brigadier General Norman Dixon, that “war is primarily concerned with two sets of activities—the delivery of energy [i.e., weapons] and the communication of information.”\textsuperscript{14} In modern warfare, Singer and Rowell pointed out, energy comes into play primarily in its kinetic


\textsuperscript{14}Singer and Rowell, 2.
mode—precision-guided munitions (PGM), delivered at high velocity from great distances—but the information dimension enters in a variety of forms that usually fall into one of three categories or a combination of them: command and control; attacks on information systems; or leveraging of energy, all owing to enormous advances in solid state electronics and the ability to process vast amounts of information quickly, at very low cost, and to disseminate that information in seconds to any place on the planet with great reliability. These technological advancements led the study discussed in Strategic Forum to several interesting conclusions about the effect of rapid developments in information processing on future military command and control:

- The new balance between information and energy (and the extent to which they are joined) is changing the conduct of warfare.
- The changes fundamentally alter the design and development of weapons systems, and that, in turn, will lead to basic changes in strategy, tactics, and doctrine.
- Key assets of the national civilian information infrastructure may, under certain circumstances, become lucrative military centers of gravity for an adversary, an effect that may again blur the divide between combat and civilian domains.
- The analytical tools for comprehensively addressing the issues involved in the new balance between information and energy are not yet available. Nearly all existing combat simulations play primarily the energy dimensions of warfare, while other parameters, in particular, information, remain in the background as force multipliers or as factors taken for granted. Such simulations will need to be discarded and new models designed and tested that explicitly incorporate the information dimension.\(^\text{16}\)

While some may argue about whether the current revolutions in information technology and military affairs are real, a former Joint Staff Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems (J-6), Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, has said, “Although the nature of war has not changed, the conduct of war is changing dramatically.”\(^\text{17}\) The DOD has just begun to think about how new information technologies will change the battlespace; future changes to the organization of the DOD will need to take into account the conclusions from the INSS study, listed above.

### 6.3 The Relevance of Information Dominance

One of the questions raised in the introduction to this chapter was whether there was a new

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\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{17}\) As Vice Admiral Cebrowski's executive assistant from 15 March 1995 to 30 June 1996, the author was privileged to hear him use this expression in many speeches and briefings when explaining the impact on modern warfare of new information structures, technologies, and processes.
role for information dominance on the modern battlefield. Most would agree the answer is "yes": improvements in information gathering, processing, and systems integration will affect future military operations. The ability to see, prioritize, assign, and assess information will continue to increase; the fusion of all-source intelligence—integrating sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistics support centers—will increasingly allow more and more operational tasks to be accomplished faster and faster; advances in computer processing, global positioning, and worldwide personal communications will allow precise friendly and enemy force identification and constantly improving collection, processing, and distribution of data to any location. Harnessing and integrating these capabilities will provide a "dominant battlespace awareness," that is, a fully interactive picture of an area of operations.\(^{18}\)

The technological explosion has already transformed U.S. military operations by providing commanders with unprecedented amounts of information, but the increasing dependence on these systems demands that the United States invest significantly in their protection while the increasing dependence on information of potential adversaries has emphasized the need for the U.S. to develop strategic, operational, and tactical offensive information operations. According to U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman, this development of offensive and defensive information warfare (IW) will require an "aggressive effort at exploiting information resources and defending our increasingly intensive information operations [while ensuring that our information systems are] fully interoperable for seamless integrated battlespace management."\(^{19}\) Through intensive efforts by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), in conjunction with the Services and other federal agencies, the DOD has already invested significant resources in defensive information warfare to protect the U.S. information infrastructure.

But a case could be made for the U.S. military to take care not to put all its future war fighting "eggs" in the baskets of information dominance and technological superiority. It could be argued that U.S. forces enjoyed technological and information superiority in the problem-plagued operations described in Chapter Three. In *Whence and Whither Intelligence Command and Control? The Certainty of Uncertainty*, Professor Anthony G. Oettinger of Harvard University made the point that the continuing availability of technological innovations can easily lead to a false sense of security by seeing technology as itself a panacea for overcoming all known and foreseeable challenges.\(^{20}\) According to Oettinger:

> In reality, these new tools keep on triggering readjustments in numerous interlinked balancing acts, like those between operational security and


operational effectiveness or between the desire to reduce the complexity of tasks and the desire to increase adaptability to changing tasks... The endless frontier of complexity accounts for our simultaneous sensation of both progress and *deja vu.*\(^{21}\)

Instead, he advocates as more realistically attainable a modest but sufficient technological and information edge over potential adversaries so that command decisions may be made "with greater confidence than the other guy's and... based on information that is more *detailed* (not more "complete"): completeness is an impossible dream, more realistic, and more up-to-date than the other guy's."\(^{22}\)

In future conflicts, "information superiority," modest as it may be, might be as critical as "air superiority" in past operations. Getting and maintaining superiority would require hard choices to achieve tradeoffs that may bring the best balance, the most capability, and the greatest interoperability for the least cost. The sky-rocketing costs of modern weapons systems and the decreasing Defense budget are likely to require the development of tools for enhanced modeling and simulation, which, although not themselves cheap, have the potential to improve the realism of training, upgrade day-to-day readiness, and increase the capabilities for testing innovative concepts and strategies, using fewer and fewer resources. Simulations interconnected worldwide could create an Internet-like simulation superhighway among U.S. forces in every theater. Each CINC could connect into this global network to test and evaluate forces in a variety of situations and conditions and as an aid in developing strategic, operational, and tactical plans. A global simulations network could include Reserve and National Guard forces, as well as allies of the United States, as a way to increase also their readiness and interoperability.\(^{23}\)

In this era of enormous technological advances, and regardless of pragmatic advantages derived from information and technological superiority, the DOD may need to face difficult intellectual issues relevant to military competition and performance. A working paper by retired U.S. Air Force Colonel John Rothrock, a former Senior Strategy Fellow at National Defense University and Chief of Intelligence Planning for the USAF, offered the following questions:

- What are the measures of merit by which to tell how well or badly one is doing in these new, untraditional media and upon which to develop measures that can lead to credible requirements for new equipment and techniques?
- What are the operational, strategic, and political implications of having individual soldiers possess globally capable personal communications during future military operations?
- What new relationships between offense and defense are implied by information-

\(^{21}\)Ibid., Abstract [i].
\(^{22}\)Ibid., 6.
driven changes to the public awareness and perception of military operations—i.e., military losses of sizes once accepted at a tactical level as unfortunate but unavoidable but which now are geopolitically and, therefore, strategically unacceptable?

- How and to what extent should an “information age” military differ in “intellectual style” from that of a traditional military? What are the implications of the differences on the kinds of people the military recruits, as well as on how they are trained, promoted, and retained?²⁴

These issues are germane to any future changes to the organization of the DOD and further calls for heavy reliance on information technology.

6.4 The Need For Acquisition Reform

Such increases in information technology may be a two-edged sword when it comes to rapid developments in communications and computing. Commercially reliable hardware systems change approximately every six months and the shelf life of software is about twelve months, yet the DOD’s acquisition process may take many years. This difference is especially significant, because commercial vendors can offer the same rapid advances in information technologies to potential adversaries.

In 1994, Thomas P. Quinn, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C'1) acquisition, emphasized that cumbersome DOD directives designed for oversight of major systems, both weapons and automated information systems, while providing protection for the public trust, also unavoidably, in their current form, result in additional cost and schedule creep into an already lengthy acquisition process.²⁵ Unless reformed, this slow process could prevent the U.S. military from taking full advantage of the seismic improvements in information technology.

6.5 C' Interoperability

The interoperability lessons discussed in Chapter Five pose unique challenges for the years ahead. According to Senator Nunn:

Throughout history, military organizations have been confronted with a tension between consistency and change—the constant requirement to field and control effective combat forces and the changing technology to accomplish that task. Nowhere has the dynamic tension between

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constancy and change been more pressing than in the area of command, control and communications. The needs of the ground commander to control and coordinate forces have changed very little in history. Yet, today's technology offers unique opportunities and unprecedented challenges.  

One of the challenges Senator Nunn referred to is that the DOD can no longer afford duplication of C4 systems and stovepipe Service arrangements and the interoperability problems they produce.

In the post-cold war environment, the new dynamics of armed conflict imposed by the revolutions in information technology and military affairs have forced the U.S. military to look at joint interoperability as a constant requirement fundamental to future operations. As military operations have evolved into irrevocably joint, quite often multinational efforts; so, too, have the various C4 systems U.S. forces use to fight. This evolution offers challenges to those who must ensure that the varied systems of the future are interoperable. Simply ensuring electronic compatibility falls short of a total solution, one that would need to encompass, among other segments, coordinated development, planning, budgeting, procurement, training, procedures, hardware, software, and operational techniques. The CJCS's road map to the future, Joint Vision 2010, shows that, for those whose mission it is to integrate the systems each Service brings to the table, challenges to C4 interoperability abound, and therein lies the dilemma. Despite the efforts of the Services, JS, OSD, and other agencies, full interoperability may remain elusive so long as each Service manages its own C4 systems. If the Services' autonomy in this area were to remain intact, and if each Service were to continue developing and fielding its own C4 systems, full interoperability may never be achieved.

As put forth by the 1978 Defense Science Board, and described in Colonel Allard's book Command, Control, and the Common Defense, one approach to resolve disjointed acquisition, fielding, and management of C4 systems would be the creation of a Defense C4 superagency, with primary responsibility, authority, and funding to procure all C4 systems for the DOD. Such C4 systems would then be available for any Service to order for its own use, as if shopping from a common catalog. This approach might meet the interoperability needs of the combatant commands while satisfying each Service's infatuation with equipping its own forces. Unfortunately, obtaining such concessions from the Services may not yet be achievable. Allard

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27 The term "stovepipe" refers to the use by each Service or application of its own unique C4 communication system.

pointed out that for such a superagency to be successful it would need to overcome certain arguments against it:

- That it would be isolated from input by the Services and unresponsive to their requirements;
- That it would abrogate responsibility for the Services’ most critical systems;
- That the costs of establishing such a superagency would be prohibitive; and
- That adding yet another DOD agency to the management responsibility of OSD would be a step in the wrong direction.\textsuperscript{39}

Despite the concerns that engender such arguments, the idea of a C\textsuperscript{4} superagency deserves exploring, particularly because, in effect, DISA already serves the DOD as a superagency for the development, acquisition, and management of all long-haul communications and data-processing requirements. DISA might assume the additional role of orchestrating all DOD C\textsuperscript{4} systems. Or, the Joint Staff Directorate for C\textsuperscript{4} Systems (J-6) might be empowered by a creative new system of budgetary incentives to serve as judge and “honest broker” among each Service’s proposed C\textsuperscript{4} systems.\textsuperscript{40}

6.6 Intelligence Restructuring

Although few would deny that the advent of the information age has fundamentally altered the DOD, or that efforts are under way in the C\textsuperscript{4} arena to harness effects of the technological revolution, information gathering and processing in the intelligence (I) arena has changed little since the late 1980s. The evolutionary differences between C\textsuperscript{4} and I have renewed calls for the OSD to divorce the long-standing organizational marriage between C\textsuperscript{4} and I and for extraordinary efforts to reform both the DOD’s and the national intelligence infrastructures.\textsuperscript{31} In 1996, Lieutenant General James Clapper, former director of DIA, addressed this issue:

I have a problem with what I call the artificial marriage of command and control and communications and intelligence, something people like to think fuses up and works. Sometimes it does, sometimes it does not.... I guess the biggest single shortfall, if I had to pick one, is dissemination—that is the conveying of intelligence.... I would personally prefer that intelligence, per se, got out of the communications business and let somebody else do that and manage it for us.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 260.


\textsuperscript{32}James R. Clapper, Jr., “A Proposed Restructuring of the Intelligence Community,” Seminar on Intelligence,
General Clapper is not alone. Most experts agree that U.S. intelligence needs reform. Since 1994, at least a half-dozen studies have been conducted on ways to improve it, including an independent task force,\textsuperscript{33} a Congressional study,\textsuperscript{34} and a presidential commission,\textsuperscript{35} but for the most part, such proposals call for only incremental changes.\textsuperscript{36} What General Clapper was suggesting is a truly radical departure from the current organizational structure built on collection stovepipes, i.e., the signal intelligence (SIGINT) world of the National Security Agency (NSA), the imagery intelligence (IMINT) world of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the human intelligence (HUMINT) world of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); each with its own communications and dissemination systems and infrastructure. These huge bureaucracies, organizations, and structures, with their unique collection practices, have led to a loss of discipline, to competition for resources and visibility, and to an absence of accountability within the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{37} The question arises, why not organize, operate, and program according to the functions of intelligence? That is:

- **Collection:** Conduct national intelligence collection as a unitary activity by designating a single national collection “czar,” bringing all intelligence collection resources to bear operationally, regardless of stovepipe, enabling systematic, meaningful tradeoffs among collection disciplines while maintaining the unique endeavors of each discipline. This approach would allow intelligence customers, regardless of government agency (e.g., DOD, State, Commerce), to express their collection requirements to a “one-stop shop,” not to one of three agencies, each with a unique discipline, as is now the case.\textsuperscript{38}

- **Production:** Similarly, conduct production and analysis of national intelligence as a unitary activity by designating a single production “czar” as the agent for all intelligence products, which would still allow institutional integrity of production centers but would enable the collocation of resources, where appropriate. The result would be central management of a series of centers of excellence for whatever the intelligence topic may be, regional (e.g., Russia-Eurasia, Latin America, Middle East) or topical (e.g., counterproliferation, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counterdup).\textsuperscript{39}

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\textsuperscript{36}Bruce Berkowitz, “Information Age Intelligence,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, 103 (15 July 1996), 35.

\textsuperscript{37}Clapper, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 19.

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 22-23.
• **Infrastructure**: Establish an intelligence infrastructure “czar” to manage various overhead requirements of the intelligence community (e.g., security, personnel, administration, pay and finances, logistics, training, education).  

• **Oversight**: Establish a cabinet level position to oversee these three functional organizations, ensuring unity of purpose, standardization, cooperation, and interoperability.  

• **Dissemination**: Most significant from the perspective of command and control is General Clapper’s suggestion that all communication and information security missions of the intelligence community be reassigned to a national communications agency, such as DISA, freeing communications and dissemination issues from any inhibiting intelligence unique stovepipes and allowing more efficient central management of communications resources.

For such a reorganization of the intelligence community to take place, however, let alone operate successfully, several arguments against it would need to be overcome:

• Because management and oversight responsibilities for such a consolidated intelligence infrastructure would be huge, creating such a central agency might create more problems than it would solve, serving to weaken a critical tool of national security.

• Centralized control of vast, politically sensitive intelligence assets and resources might be seen as a dangerous encroachment on a desire built into the Constitution for checks and balances at all levels of government.

• The cost of establishing such an organizational structure might be prohibitive, especially in the fiscally constrained environment of the late 1990s.

Despite these concerns, the idea of such an organization has merit, especially because such restructuring might facilitate implementation of the “revolutions” in technology and military affairs mentioned earlier (see sections 6.1–6.3)—for example, the creation of links connecting users of intelligence directly to the sources of intelligence, thus creating “sensor-to-shooter” and “dominant-battlefield-awareness” environments. Commanders at the lowest levels could determine the information they need and could interact directly with intelligence systems to “pull” the data or images they want. As was true of the DOD, a reorganization of intelligence cannot occur from within the community nor could it occur quickly. In the words of General Clapper, “What I’m getting at here is that what intelligence needs is a Goldwater–Nichols Act.

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40Ibid., 24.
41Ibid., 27.
42Ibid., 19.
43CFR Report, 1.
44Berkowitz, 12.
Goldwater–Nichols was enacted in 1986. Ten years later, it is still evolving. That's what's needed for intelligence.\textsuperscript{45}

6.7 Public Perception to the Forefront

An unexpected effect of the revolution in information technologies has been the emergence of the media and their impact on public perception as a factor in the day-to-day execution of military operations. Writing in Strategic Forum, Colonel Allard commented that during his visit with the 1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division in Bosnia in 1996, the unprecedented flow of media information and images to and from the area had suffused the entire Bosnian mission, provoking ambitious efforts by U.S. and NATO public affairs offices to make full use of information as a weapon of peace. Especially in the U.S. sector—with its 12 nation contingent—the formation of a joint information bureau was an important step in using information as a means of providing timely and accurate information as well as to influence compliance with the Dayton Accord.... Because an act of deliberate or accidental "disinformation" could take on a life of its own through a tightly wired global information grid, the management of perceptions became an important and continuing mission.... The lesson learned: in peace operations, as in any other politically charged conflict, perception is the reality.\textsuperscript{46}

This example demonstrates the potential effects of the press on public perceptions of any given military operation and the impact those perceptions may have on maintaining the support of the American people.

Compounding the complexity of the issue is the new technologies that permit digital manipulation of information or "facts" through alterations to text, audio, photographic images, or video. Such techniques may permit a variety of actors to conduct sophisticated campaigns to manipulate public perception, to support or undermine domestic support for a particular military operation. The possibilities pose problems not only for the DOD and the entire government but also for the media as an institution striving for accurate coverage.\textsuperscript{47}

The possibility of widespread personal communications systems in the theater of operations also is increasing, such as individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines with cellular phones and laptop computers capable calling or e-mailing home from anywhere in the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45}Clapper, 20.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{46}Kenneth Allard, "Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment," Strategic Forum, 91 (November 1996), 3.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{47}Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson, Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War (Santa Monica, Calif.: National Defense Research Institute, RAND, 1996), 23.}
world. As cyberspace evolves, equipment and the costs of access will decrease and the boundaries of national control and sovereignty will blur, increasing the opportunity not only for adept nonstate and state actors but also for unadvent participants intentionally or unintentionally, to manipulate information important to public perceptions.  

These possibilities highlight the need for the DOD to consider formally organizing a joint “public affairs”-like infrastructure to manage the flow of public information to and from any future military area of operation.

6.8 Epilogue: The Drive to Maintain an “Edge”

How the United States responds to the dynamic technological advances and to their implications, as well as to the emerging importance of information dominance, will affect the way U.S. armed forces will perform their duties in years ahead. To maintain superiority, future commanders will have to have the information necessary to create the most effective mesh of available forces to produce immediate effects and achieve the desired results. The forces at their disposal will have to be fully interoperable—institutionally, organizationally, and technically—regardless of the Service that trained or equipped them.

In the late 1990s, the United States has been enjoying a period—probably limited—without any credible threat to its existence. Wisely spent, this could offer time for making the changes in thinking, organization, doctrine, and force structure the future dynamic and uncertain global security environment dictate. Thanks to GNA, and to the new-found organizational effectiveness and adaptability of U.S. armed forces, the DOD will most likely continue to find and implement effective solutions to the challenges of the aftermath of the cold war well into the twenty-first century. As General John Shalikashvili said at the conclusion of his ten-year assessment of GNA and with a look toward the future:

Frankly, the odds are good that ten years from now...we will be celebrating the full and complete implementation of Goldwater–Nichols, with a Chairman’s report card that reflects straight A’s across the board.... I hope the first thing that we may celebrate will be progress toward the achievement of the core capabilities and interoperability needed by all the Services and Unified Commands, that will enable our Armed Forces to be dominant across the spectrum of conflict in the year 2010 and beyond...I have no doubt that this is doable.  

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48 Molander, Riddle, and Wilson, 22.
49 Rothrock, 5.
50 “Goldwater–Nichols: Ten Years From Now.”
Appendix

Timeline of Major Events in the Development and
the Goldwater–Nichols DOD Reorganization

signed into law by President Truman.
Created Air Force as separate Service and
established baseline for current DOD org-
arizational structure.

April 1958: DOD Reorganization Act of
1958 signed into law by President Eisenhower.
Increased power of SECDEF in an effort
to curb Services' independence,
inter-Service rivalry,
and wasteful duplication of weapons projects.

May 1975: Khmer Rouge communist guerillas seized
U.S.-flagged freighter Mayaguez off coast of
Cambodia; U.S. Marines attempted rescue of crew.

ship USS Pueblo
seized by North Korea
in Sea of Japan.

Jan. 1972: Paris Accord signed,
officially ending U.S.
military involvement in
Vietnam.

CJCS = Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CSIS = Center for Strategic and International Studies
DOD = Department of Defense
SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee
SECDEF = Secretary of Defense

1975: Khmer communist guerrillas seized the U.S. freighter Mayaguez off the coast of Cambodia; U.S. was attempting to rescue a hijacked crew.


1994:


1995:

Dec. 1995: NATO-led multinational military force, including 20,000 U.S. troops, took over peacekeeping operations in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina (formerly Yugoslavia).
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>BUR</td>
<td>Bottom-Up Review of 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>C'</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>C'I</td>
<td>C' and intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>C'</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Chairman's Program Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPSECDEF</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>DISA</td>
<td>Defense Information Systems Agency</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNA</td>
<td>Goldwater–Nichols Act; the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986</td>
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<td>HASC</td>
<td>House Armed Services Committee</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (NATO)</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSS</td>
<td>Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University</td>
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<td>IW</td>
<td>information warfare</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
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<td>JS</td>
<td>Joint Staff</td>
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<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Specialty Officer</td>
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<td>JSTARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAN</td>
<td>local area network</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation order</td>
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<td>NDU</td>
<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIMA</td>
<td>National Imagery and Mapping Agency</td>
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<td>National Reconnaissance Center</td>
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<td>National Reconnaissance Office</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>operation other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGM</td>
<td>precision guided munitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review; Congressionally mandated study of the DOD</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td>SASC</td>
<td>Senate Armed Services Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECNAV</td>
<td>Secretary of the Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somalia National Alliance (of Mohammed Farah Aideed)</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>Unified Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia (also UNOSOM II)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>VCJCS</td>
<td>Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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