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Politics and the Military – The Climate for Reform
Archibald Barrett

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Politics and the Military: The Climate for Reform

Archibald Barrett

Dr. Barrett is a Member of the Professional Staff, House Armed Services Committee, where his responsibilities have included participation in the 1982-1983 hearings and legislative proposals on the reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A retired Air Force officer, he was formerly military staff assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Defense Organization Study. Dr. Barrett has extensive experience in NATO general defense, nuclear, and logistics plans and policies; Air Staff long-range planning and concept and doctrine development; and strategic and tactical flight operations. Before assuming his present duties, Dr. Barrett was a Senior Research Fellow, National Defense University. He is the author of Reappraising Defense Organization, published in 1983 by the National Defense University Press.

In any discussion of the merits of military reform, one must look at the political conditions surrounding the issue. That is what I would like to do today: to put the debate in the context of the forces for and against reform.

I would like to begin by discussing the characteristics of the services and Department of Defense (DOD) as organizations. Then I will talk about the DOD structure “in law” as opposed to “in practice.” Finally, I will cover the reform debate as it shapes up in Washington today. It’s the latter subject I think you’re most interested in, so I will try to get to it quickly.

The characteristics of the services must be taken into consideration when looking at reform of the way the Department of Defense is organized. Like all organizations, the services want to protect their significant interests and to exert influence. That’s any organization’s reason for being. The services are no different in that respect, but they are stronger organizations than most.

Services, like other organizations, vie for autonomy. They want to protect their budgets and expand them, for example. They want to protect and nurture their personnel, to control all aspects of a service career to keep their personnel imbued with the essence of their own organization.

This essence is the distinctive mode of warfare each service represents. The Air Force has considered itself historically the organization that fights and wins wars by sending men in airplanes to accomplish long-range strategic bombing and tactical air operations. The Army, through organized units, prosecutes land warfare. The Navy, through large capital ships, maintains control of the sea. That’s the essence. The Army has other responsibilities, such as air defense, but that is not the essence of its role.

Pursuant to its essence, each service has a purpose that can be called its objective or mission. It is the preparation for that service’s distinctive style of warfare. For example, the Navy’s mission is to prepare naval forces for the effective prosecution of war at sea.

These purposes require large capabilities. How much is enough? From the perspective of the services, there is never enough. Why is this so? Because
their missions are so broad. They operate in conditions of uncertainty with respect to their enemy, the threat he poses, and his intentions. No one can know for certain how many ships will be enough to ensure that the Navy can accomplish its mission. Because there are four services grappling with broad missions in conditions of uncertainty and, at the same time, operating in an environment of scarce resources, there is built-in conflict between the services. This conflict will always exist, no matter how you organize the Department of Defense.

Another aspect of this discussion is the tendency to identify service interests with national interests, because it is difficult to translate national objectives or national interests into operational terms. For example, deterrence. What does it take to deter the Soviet Union? Who can say? Because national objectives are difficult to "operationalize," one finds the opposite tendency. The services evolve an agreement in terms of operational weapons, and agree that deterrence requires a triad of land- and sea-based missiles and strategic bombers. The triad becomes not only a service interest, not only an Air Force interest in missiles and bombers, but a national interest. That is, in the Air Force's view the triad becomes a national interest and a national objective. Moreover, it's a short logical step from that reasoning to the conclusion that the service's well-being itself is in the national interest. After all, if the Air Force or the Navy is providing deterrence, then that service itself is of instrumental value to the nation. To paraphrase Charlie Wilson,* what's good for the Air Force, or the Navy, is good for the country.

Now let me talk about two characteristics of the Department of Defense as a whole. I've already mentioned one, conflict. There's always conflict in the Department, as in any organization.

There is also coordination. If you examine Max Weber's model, he didn't recognize conflict. His idea was that if a task was too large for one or two individuals, you should divide it up into separate subtasks or functions. If it's a very large task you subdivide those functions into more functions and you achieve a hierarchical organization. From Weber one gets the idea that moving boxes around on an organizational chart leads to solutions for structural problems. If we could just get the boxes right, we could improve the organization's efficiency. The problem with that idea is that Weber assumed everybody in the organization was cooperating. If everyone did cooperate for the larger good of the organization, maybe Weber's model would be completely valid.

In fact, once you set out functions, you encounter conflict as each of those organizations or suborganizations demonstrates some of the characteristics I mentioned earlier. They want to influence, they want to protect their domain, roles, and missions. They have an essential nature that they developed internally. They seek independence, they seek a budget of their own, and they want to maintain the morale of their members to cement their loyalty. So, there's a valid perspective of the Pentagon as a large organization in which the subelements conflict.

Yet I don't want to slight the cooperative aspect. As members of the overall Department of Defense, the constituent organizations respond to, or can be made to respond to, the national interest as well as the interest of the Army and the Air Force and the Navy. Although contradictory, conflict and cooperation are going on at the same time. So if you're studying organization, you have to consider both aspects.

Now, if all this is going on at the same time, the trick for higher managers, or for people attempting to organize a defense establishment, is to do three things. First, they must ensure that all important interests are mobilized. By mobilized I mean that every interest is represented by an organization. For example, Department of Defense critics today claim that the joint interest is too weak and not organized. Yet it's a legitimate interest that should be considered when the civilian leadership makes decisions about resource allocation. Joint military organizations will employ U.S. forces in any war. On the other hand, the interests of the services are considered by critics to be too strong, relatively. So you want the organization to ensure that all valid interests are mobilized. Second, high-level officials should ensure that those interests are adequately represented in decision-making bodies. Finally, the decision-making bodies must be structured to resolve conflicts, so that ultimately cooperation emerges from conflict resolution.

Oettinger: What strikes one is that in this inherent conflict the definition of the pieces is fuzzy. Regardless of who the people are in the organization, the roles defined for each piece will invariably overlap.

*Former Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson.
That’s another element that contributes to conflict. And if one were infinitely wise and the world were infinitely arrangeable, then maybe you could define totally non-overlapping subresponsibilities. But in the real world that strikes me as impossible, and, therefore, even if angels were in the organization they would end up fighting over ill-defined turf. It seems that folks tend to overlook that fact and believe that it requires either malice or stupidity or both for people to fight, and that it’s inherently impossible to define non-overlapping responsibilities.

**Barrett:** I certainly agree, and I would go further to say that even if a divine presence could give us a perfect organization today, it wouldn’t be perfect a year from now because changing circumstances — weapons systems developments and those sorts of things — would blur those boundaries and you’d have to redefine them. That means that service roles and missions need constant reexamination and redefinition. Yet we haven’t done that, formally at least, since the 1940s.

**Student:** There seems to be an assumption here that conflict is bad. Is that true?

**Barrett:** That’s an interesting point. In my book I indicate that James Madison in *Federalist* 10 seemed to think factions were bad, that we’ve got to overcome factions, therefore we’re going to have separation of powers, and so on. I prefer to look at conflict as something that exists and that an organizer should try to use it as a positive force. There are of course bad and good aspects. Conflict that results because someone has some personal disagreement with someone else may well be bad. But if you ask the Navy to develop the best way to ensure that it can win at sea, and that results in conflict over resources with the other two services — I can’t think of a better thing to happen. You know you’re getting the best thinking on the subject. Civilian leaders don’t have to take just one set of advice — either the Navy’s or the other services’. I’m perfectly willing to accept the conflict so long as there is an effective mechanism for conflict resolution. I’m an apologist for the services, really; I think they’re very dynamic and do their job well. It’s just unfortunate that we don’t have effective joint organizations in the Department of Defense to challenge them. So my answer is that conflict, whether good or bad, exists. We must channel it into a constructive outcome.

**Student:** I’d like to ask about your point that all interests should be mobilized as a whole, and that in decision-making bodies the interests also have to be represented. I’d like to know what keeps those interests from developing into what I’d call pachydermal problems: The guy with the biggest elephant is going to get it pushed through. In any hierarchical organization that’s a big problem, and that’s one thing I see with this interest group representation in decision-making bodies, especially in the services.

**Barrett:** Are you worried about an interest becoming overbearing and....

**Student:** Well, no, an interest group, or particular single interest in a decision-making body coming to represent the entire character of that body. Cooptation, you might say.

**Barrett:** I’m going to argue in a few minutes that that’s exactly what’s happening in the Department of Defense with the services. My own answer is that, with regard to the Department of Defense, a Secretary who knows his business will reserve 10 to 15 percent of his time to detach himself from the issues of the day — to get above his organization, figuratively, and look down on it — and attempt to perceive what is or has happened organizationally. He will continually reshape the organization because there will always be some interests that are stronger than others, growing and tending to coopt. As I recall, Simon* dwells on this: It’s a dynamic thing. The higher-level manager has to spend time shaping and reshaping his organization so that it funnels to him the perspective of the various interests as he makes decisions. In a way I think this is what the reform movement is trying to set up in the Department of Defense.

**Student:** You talked about the positive and negative effects of conflict. From your experience, are the negative effects usually a problem of bad organization or more of poor leadership?

**Barrett:** I think organization. It seems to me any interest group, whether you’re talking about a military service or the AFL-CIO, will push its interest as far as it can go. It will just continue to expand its desires into “interests” and will then pursue those interests. The services have a perfect reason, as I described to you. You can’t get enough ships to ensure absolutely that you can win at sea in every hostile situation. So the Navy, without some sort of

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resistance, would just expand ad infinitum. I think every interest group is that way. That being the case, there must be in society as a whole, and within the Pentagon, offsetting interests.

Let’s look at the present Department of Defense organization (figure 1). This is my interpretation of the law, the de jure organization. Remember that the services, at least the Army and Navy, were independent for a century and a half. They pursued their own interests, almost oblivious of each other. World War II changed that. I judge that a national consensus developed during or shortly after World War II that future wars would be fought by integrated land, sea, and air forces. There was also a consensus that the defense establishment would be organized to fight in an integrated manner, but at the same time there was strong sentiment that we would retain the services, which now included the Air Force. What we got out of the World War II consensus about defense, after four tries in 1947, 1949, 1953, and 1958, was our present structure.

The services are over on one side of the figure, possessing all the motives and traits that I’ve described. Superimposed over the services is a very strong Secretary of Defense. Successive secretaries in the 1940s and 1950s continued to go to Congress to complain about how weak they were. So in 1958 Congress said, you have overall “authority, direction and control” of the department. In the report Congress said, in effect, we can’t think of any stronger words. If anybody can think of a stronger formulation, we’ll take it. We’re telling you, Mr. Secretary, that you’ve got the whole ballgame. So we have a very strong Secretary of Defense, according to the law.

Now, on the other side of the figure — juxtaposed opposite the services who are supposed to recruit, train, and support the armed forces, what I termed “maintain” — is the employment side of the organization. It is composed of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commands. This is the joint part of the Department of Defense. If you read the introductory policy statement to the National Security Act, you will find the elements of this organization set out in one paragraph — separate services but an integrated land, sea, and air team when the United States goes to war. The unified and specified commands are created to fight — to employ forces.

Above the nine field commanders, I have drawn a line to the JCS. I meant that to indicate not only the employment chain, but also command and control. It’s somewhat of a distortion because the law establishes the chain of command from the President to the Secretary to the unified and specified commanders. In fact, by Pentagon directive, as I’m sure you know, the chain of command extends from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to the unified and specified commanders. “Through” means that the JCS cannot issue an order, cannot command, on its own. It issues orders in the name of the Secretary or the President.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are supposed to provide military advice from a joint perspective. That is, on the service side, each chief attends to single-service concerns and interests but, in theory at least, when the chiefs go over to the joint side and act as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff they are supposed to put on a joint or unified hat. They are supposed to assist in the exercise of command. That’s the reason the chain of command goes through the JCS. They’re supposed to develop integrated strategic, logistic, and contingency war plans. And they’re supposed to ensure that the plans integrate the contributions of the services and the unified and specified commanders.

Also on the joint side of the organization are component commands that report to the unified and specified commanders. As things have worked out, the unified and specified commanders only have operational command — a much more limited concept than full command. Although you cannot prove it by researching the law, I think that Congress, in giving operational command to the unified and specified commanders, meant that they should have a great deal more authority. In fact, as you know from General John H. Cushman’s* research, the way that term has been circumscribed, unified and specified commanders would have significant authority in wartime, but they have much less authority and influence in peacetime.

I once served, for example, in the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE), a component command of the unified U.S. European Command. There wasn’t any question that, first and foremost,

Legislative Organization Model of the Department of Defense

Figure 1

President
Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Joint Staff
Unified and Specified Commands
Component Commands
Military Departments

Maintain
Employ
USAFE was a U.S. Air Force command. I was assigned by the Air Force there, I would be promoted by the Air Force, I received my pay from the Air Force, and I would receive my next assignment from the Air Force. General David C. Jones, who was commander of U.S. Air Forces, Europe, received his personnel, their pay, their promotions, their weapons systems, everything from the U.S. Air Force. You can understand that General Jones paid more attention to this line in the figure leading to the military departments, to the Air Force, than he did to the one leading up to the unified commander in the European theater. He said so himself in testimony before the House Armed Services Investigation Subcommittee.

That’s the organization de jure. (Although I digressed a bit in describing how the components work in practice.) I think the de jure organization fits somewhat what I said earlier about mobilizing interests and having all the relevant interests figure in the structure. The joint interests seem to have a strong voice de jure, headed by the JCS with links to the CINCs. The services would be equally strong, but no stronger. General Eisenhower, as President, tried to make that ideal come true in 1958. He said, “Let’s have the vice-chiefs in each service attend primarily to the service business, while the chiefs devote their principal attention to their role as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, looking at things from a joint perspective.”

Now, I want to talk about what critics and reformers say the organization is like de facto (figure 2). As you can see, the critics would tell us that the legislative ideal has not happened at all. This is my depiction of what the present organization is according to the critics. The services have coopted almost all the organizations below the Secretary of Defense. The components are, in effect, as I just explained, little Armies, Navies, and Air Forces. Not only do they depend on their services for equipment, personnel, and administration, but they report to unified and specified commanders who are chosen essentially from the services and by the services.

Just as the members of the Air Forces in Europe focus on their individual service, the members of the Joint Staff, which was created to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as officers assigned by the services know that they are going back to their services. When I was in the Air Force we talked about bringing an officer in and “blue-ing” him before he went to the Joint Staff to become “purple.” And by that we meant sending him to the Air War College, bringing him to the Air Staff, and then letting him be assigned to the Joint Staff. But even if these things didn’t happen to indoctrinate officers, the procedures under which the Joint Staff works, which have been woven by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are such that any service has a veto over almost any word or phrase of any document that might originate in the Joint Staff. So it is very difficult for the Joint Staff to be a dynamic institution and to act as a true joint institution. It serves, I think, more as an executive secretariat, putting the views of the services together in some palatable form that all four can agree to and then pushing the agreed position up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is dominated by service interests and it’s difficult for the chiefs to put aside the service hat. The JCS is criticized because its military advice is inadequate, often sidestepping critical issues. I might comment here that the present Joint Chiefs of Staff under General Vessey is reputed, and I think probably rightly so, to operate just about as well as the system can work, principally because of Vessey’s leadership and the chiefs of staff we have. But even now I would maintain that the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot, and does not, address some of the most critical defense issues. It is very difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff even to look at issues such as resource allocation, roles and missions, the unified command plan — how the world is divided up into unified and specified commands — or the cross-service missions the Air Force is supposed to provide for the Army, such as airlift, sealift, and close air support. The Chiefs don’t even want to open the unified command book because it becomes a bloodletting when they do. The result is that the services fight out, in a sort of parallel fashion, their own budgets, and in a vertical fashion, with respect to the handout, their own decisions with the Secretary of Defense. I think that’s what the reform debate is about and now I’m going to turn to that.

I think General Jones was talking about these things when he came to the Armed Services Committee in 1982 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He indicated that there were fundamental flaws
The Present DOD Structure as Portrayed by Critics

Figure 2
and that he was going to work the remaining five months or so that he was to be in uniform, and thereafter, to identify those flaws and seek resolution of the problems. That was unprecedented, yet two weeks later General Meyer, who was not to retire for a year and a half as Chief of Staff of the Army, indicated that Jones was right in his criticisms but that Jones' prescriptions did not go far enough. So here are two out of five members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, completely unprecedented, saying that the organization is fundamentally flawed.

As a result the House Investigations Subcommittee held hearings. I eventually became the staff person responsible for this issue in the House Armed Services Committee. The House passed a bill in 1982 after all of the hearings, despite an absence of support or, indeed, active opposition from the Administration. That bill was not acted on by the Senate. In 1983 the Investigations Subcommittee held a few hearings, revamped the bill somewhat, and reported to the full committee. The JCS bill again passed the House.

If you'll bear with me, I'm going to cover the main points of this bill.** We will use it as a vehicle to help you to understand what General Jones is proposing, what the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is proposing,*** and what the Administration is proposing. This table can be the framework for most of the various positions on JCS reform (see figure 3). They cover three main areas: the national military chain of command, military advice, and the Joint Staff. First of all, the House bill would "streamline the chain of command." I indicated earlier that this chain presently extends by Pentagon directive through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The House bill would have the chain of command go through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Concern has been expressed in the hearings that the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a committee could disagree on what forces to employ at what time to carry out an order from the President or Secretary of Defense. In a crisis this could be disastrous. CSIS recommended streamlining the chain of command and so did the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And that is the position taken in the House bill.

Critics have said this would put one man in the chain of command. I think John Kester* makes this point. Let me clarify that. This language in the House bill is precisely the phraseology used for the Joint Chiefs of Staff at present in the Pentagon directive.** The Chairman would only be able to issue orders as the JCS can today, in the name of the Secretary and the President. The bill does no more than shift this responsibility from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to one individual, the Chairman. And, by the way, that's exactly how the system works on a day-to-day basis at present.

The House bill would also attempt to increase the status of the unified and specified commanders by providing a stronger link from the joint arena to those commanders. It provides that the Chairman will supervise the CINCs and act as their spokesman on operational requirements.

In terms of military advice, the House would make the Chairman responsible for determining when issues shall be decided. The Chairman controls the agenda now, so that may not be a very significant change. On the other hand, a lot of the critics of the JCS claimed that its advice was not timely. The criticism was aimed at the JCS as a committee. Who is responsible? This provision makes the Chairman responsible. If advice is not timely he can do what is done in Congress, "call the previous question." The Chairman might decide, for example, that next Wednesday will be the last time the JCS will discuss an issue. After that, he would go to the Secretary with the JCS position, whether it's 4–1, or 3–2, or whatever. With that mechanism, from now on you can hold the Chairman responsible for timeliness.

As for the status of JCS advice, we'll talk later about making the Chairman a full member of the National Security Council, which is a very controversial provision. Another delicate issue is the provision regarding sources of advice. Do you make him the principal military advisor and demote the JCS, or do you make him an advisor in his own right and keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advi-

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**H.R. 3718, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983, also known as the Nichols Bill.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Provisions of HR 3718, JCS Reorganization Act of 1983</strong></th>
<th><strong>Administration proposal, 1983</strong></th>
<th><strong>Passed, 1984</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Military Chain of Command</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Streamline:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Places JCS Chairman in the chain of command. Chain would extend from PRES to SECDEF through Chairman to unified and specified commanders (CINCs).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase CINC status:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(spokesman)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides that JCS Chairman would supervise CINCs and act as their spokesman on operational requirements.</td>
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<td><strong>Military Advice</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Timeliness:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Makes JCS Chairman responsible for determining when the issues being considered by JCS shall be decided.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Status:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Makes JCS Chairman a full member of National Security Council.</td>
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<td>Sources:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Makes JCS Chairman responsible for providing military advice in his own right.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Retains JCS as principal military advisor.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Staff</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Talent:</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides for nominations to Joint Staff from among most outstanding officers of each service and for selection by JCS Chairman.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Size:</td>
<td></td>
<td>√</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Removes existing 400 - officer limit on Joint Staff.</td>
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</table>
Continuity and experience:
- Increases current 3-year limit on length of Joint Staff assignments to 4 years and allows reassignment after 2 years instead of 3 years.
- Authorizes SECDEF to approve exceptions to the new limitations.

Management:
- Gives JCS Chairman greater management authority over Joint Staff and authorizes him to use Joint Staff to assist him in carrying out his responsibilities.

Promotion:
- Requires SECDEF to ensure that service policies on promotion, retention, and assignment give appropriate consideration to performance of an officer as a member of the Joint Staff.
- Requires JCS Chairman to evaluate all nominees for 3- and 4-star positions on basis of their performance in joint military assignments.

Independence and charter:
- Requires SECDEF to ensure Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support Chairman and JCS in providing for unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an effective team of land, naval, and air forces.

Dissent:
- Establishes a procedure, based on SECDEF—established guidelines, authorizing each chief of service and CINC to provide comments on any report or recommendation of the Joint Staff before it is submitted to the JCS.

Figure 3
ors? The House bill opts for making him an advisor in his own right and retaining the JCS as the body of principal military advisors.

With respect to the Joint Staff, the House bill attempts to make it more independent. It does that by having the Chairman hire the members of the Joint Staff. It is not the services, but the Chairman who will determine how many nominees are submitted by services for each position. And those nominees must be from among the most outstanding service officers. The Navy has opposed this. It says, "We have a lot of positions for our most outstanding to fill, we will give the Joint Staff its share, but we don't want to nominate for the Joint Staff just from among the most outstanding." The Committee position is that the Joint Staff is 400 officers of which the Navy has 100, and if the Navy can't provide 100 officers to support the principal military staff in this country, then perhaps we need more Navy officers. The Committee insists that the choice be made from among the most outstanding.

The House bill also increased the tour limit for the Joint Staff. The law prescribed a three-year limitation, 36 months, for a Joint Staff assignment. To fulfill that limitation the rotation average was 29½ months. That meant the average experience level in the Joint Staff was half of that, around 14 or 15 months. Most officers were coming to that staff completely unprepared for the assignment, having neither served in previous joint or service staff assignments nor attended schools that would prepare them. So while it may seem mundane to increase the continuity and the experience level of the Joint Staff, it should have many beneficial effects.

Oetinger: In a place like OSD, some of that inexperience would be offset because the OSD staff is mixed military and civilian. There's some continuity on the civilian side.

Barrett: Good point. The Joint Staff is entirely military.

Oetinger: So there is not the continuity that the civilians provide elsewhere.

Barrett: You have to remember, of course, there's an Organization of the JCS which is about three times as large, something like 1200 to 1300. That organization can have civilians, though I'm not certain how many it has. But the problem of organizational continuity and memory in the Joint Staff is a real one.

Student: I know from being in the Army that in the typical three-year tour, you're allowed one year to learn the job, one year to do something, and the final year you're getting short. When you consider tours of that maximum length of three years, you're getting a very small return on the investment. So there's a great deal to say about increasing tours and allowing for more institutional knowledge, to acquire the expertise mentioned with regard to civilians.

Barrett: That's true, I think.

Student: I'm going to respond to the comment about the Naval staff. I'm a career Naval officer and will try to explain in this seminar context why the top-notch, front-running, going-places Naval officers are not predisposed to go to the Joint Staff. It is simply because there is a bias in the Navy that if you're not performing a job that relates fundamentally and immediately to the prompt and sustained combat operations of the Navy at sea, you're not, in fact, preparing yourself for command at sea. All Navy line structures are geared toward preparing officers for command at sea. That is not particularly true of the Army or the Air Force. In the Army and the Air Force, it's quite possible for an officer to check into the five-sided building as a second lieutenant, and leave there 20 years later as a lieutenant colonel. You're never going to see that in the Navy. Additionally, there's an idea that these Navy staffs tend to work more directly and intimately with the operational staffs at sea. Therefore, if you're going to prepare someone for an operational command, and he's going to work on the staff at sea, you want him to work with the blue-suited staff and not with the purple-suited staff doing jobs that, frankly, are perceived as not important in the Navy context.

Student: I'm also a Naval officer and I'm in a very select submarine force. There's been a lot of talk that the first 18 years of a Naval officer's career are spent preparing him for command at sea, preparing him to take command of a submarine. But he is finished at that point and is unable to go to a staff and do as well as a contemporary, because commanding a submarine is all he knows how to do. So, agreed, we do need to train officers to have a command at sea, but what next?

Student: Well, I'm an aviator and we figure that a guy can do that after he does his command at sea. That's frankly the way that the system's lined up. I know a lot of people who, after their squadron com-
mand, would leave for a staff tour, and usually it’s a Navy staff where the captains and commodores can nurse him along before he goes to the Joint Staff. But in my experience most of the lieutenants who go to the I-2 or I-3 jobs tend not to go anywhere at command screen time.

**Oettinger:** One could argue that this is the same kind of mentality that produced the long delay before the Navy got self-leveling gun platforms, as Elting Morison* has described.

**Student:** As a former Naval officer I’d like to make a couple of comments. I remember how the Naval War College used to be looked at inside the Navy. It was regarded in much the same way that you have described the Joint Staff. And in the last several years the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has changed by fiat the way that the tour of the War College was looked at. It seems to me that with the right people in the right places supporting this and giving incentives you can change the theoretical biases against the staff. It also seems that it would be in the Navy’s interest to have some of its best people on the staff. Especially if things are moving as they appear to be toward a stronger and more centralized staff. If the Navy doesn’t have some of its best people there it seems it is going to get left out of important things.

**Barrett:** It’s interesting to hear your comment that the Joint Staff is an assignment that’s still not considered career-enhancing. The testimony that we received three years ago indicated that it’s changing in the Navy to a significant degree, and the implication was that by this time, anyway, that would have happened. In fact, Admiral Holloway, the former CNO, even testified that in the mid-1970s he had instituted reforms that would cause this to happen. Yet every time I talk to Naval officers like yourself that comment comes up. The word hasn’t reached the troop level, if it has really changed in the Navy. But I am assured that the current CNO, Admiral Watkins, has also done a great deal to change the perspective of the Joint Staff assignment.

There are reasons, as you articulated so well, for a different policy. But the Investigations Subcommittee heard those reasons and decided that because the other services didn’t share those concerns and were providing outstanding officers — selecting only from among that group of officers — the subcommittee decided to make it policy that that’s the group from which Joint Staff officers would be chosen. I’ll get back to this in a little while when we talk about the law that was passed last September. Those selections will be made from among the most outstanding service officers, and under the leadership of the Chairman, rather than any particular service.

**McLaughlin:** Well, let me interject there for a minute. Arch mentioned before that you recognize interests by giving them an organizational representation. The problem you’re describing can be addressed in other ways. There is a newly created organization in the Army called the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Information Management. It was set up last August and the thing that impressed me in the first meeting was that they were all wearing combat infantry badges, jump wings, and that considering the ages of the officers involved, they wore a considerable chestful of combat decorations. Now that says to me that the Army has decided to make this a serious activity as opposed to a technical staff sort of thing. And apparently other commands suddenly decided, yes, this is a serious activity because they’ve put soldiers in there. How long that will last, and how long they can convey that image, I don’t know. And how useful it is filling staff positions with line officers, I don’t know. I suspect for what they are trying to do it makes a great deal of sense. So as I say, there are ways of addressing that problem.

**Barrett:** I think you have to remember also that I’m talking about the law. You must have to have, I think, a great deal of modesty when you come to writing words in the law. I think in this provision here, we’ve come very close to going over the border. That is, we’ve come close to describing a procedure for hiring Joint Staff officers in the law. We’re certainly getting back to what I talked about earlier in a theoretical sense, trying to strengthen the joint

side. So, I would respond to your point by saying we're giving that problem to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't think we can go any further in the law, I think we'd be ill-advised to say, here's the way you define outstanding officers, and here is the percentage of this kind to select — logistics officers, communicators, and so on. What the Congress can do, once it has made the Chairman responsible, is to ask him, "How are you implementing the law?" He can then tell Congress the problems. Congress can review his approach and then decide if it is legitimate. And in fact I hope we're going to do that this spring.

In a way, I'm dodging your question. But you always have to consider how far you want the Congress to go in legislating the inner workings of the Pentagon. The House would give the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff. At present the Chairman manages the Joint Staff, but on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, you have the procedures I told you about where any Joint Staff paper is looked at on five levels, starting with major and lieutenant colonel, and at each level everyone gets a crack at every word that's written. So you can imagine what comes out of that process. It's been uniformly criticized by Secretaries of Defense and people in the National Security Council, no matter the party or the administration. Harold Brown says it's worse than useless, which is the strongest castigation. But others are similar. This is the flimsy-buff-green process as described by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You can see how cumbersome it is. The direction from the House, if this provision were to become law, is that the Chairman get rid of that process, rationalize it, make the Joint Staff an independent source of joint military advice.

With regard to Joint Staff promotions, there are two provisions. I think the first one is very important: It requires a Secretary of Defense to "ensure that service policies concerning promotion, reassignment, and retention" are fair to officers who serve on the Joint Staff. You might say that's "motherhood," and this bill has been castigated for that. But what that does is give Congress a hook, again, in the oversight area. The Subcommittee fully intends to call upon the Secretary or his representative and ask, "How are you implementing this? Lay out the number of officers promoted in each service and peer group, and the number of Joint Staff officers, and show us that they're getting promoted at the same rate as officers who haven't served on the Joint Staff." As a matter of fact, the Armed Services Committee included in its report a policy statement that the Committee believes that as a group, Joint Staff service officers should advance somewhat faster than officers who haven't served. So, the provision is motherhood, but it also gives Congress a very good oversight hook.

The same sort of reasoning applies to the issues of independence and charter. The bill just said that the Joint Staff should be independent and it should work for integrated land, sea, and air operations. And finally, the last provision would allow services and CINCs who are interested in a particular issue to append their views as addenda to Joint Staff papers. That's the House bill.

Now I can lay out the spectrum of views on reform, starting with the Administration. In 1982 I think the Administration was caught off guard by General Jones' initiative. Secretary Weinberger declined to take a position. After he saw that the House was going to go ahead, he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look at the issues and make recommendations. They did. Secretary Weinberger accepted those recommendations in toto and sent them over as a legislative proposal in early 1983. The Administration's proposal in 1983 was much more modest than the House bill. It would have the Chairman replace the JCS in the chain of command. It would increase the length of Joint Staff tours, and it would remove the existing limit of 400 on the size of the Joint Staff. That was the Administration's proposal from the JCS. If you look at the JCS reform spectrum of positions you've got the Administration moving from sort of opposition in 1982 to this very modest proposal in 1983.

Now I want to go to General Jones who started the whole thing and who wanted more than the House gave him. Jones would differ from the House bill here in, I think, three significant ways. In terms of sources of military advice, he would have the Chairman become the principal military advisor. The Chairman would thus replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor. The way I see that, and the way I think that's going to be seen politically, is as a demotion for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in such ill repute with the Congress that Congress will see fit to demote it, in effect, and make the Chairman the
principal military advisor. That’s why you don’t find that provision in the 1982 or 1983 versions of the House bill. There was almost no discussion of making the Chairman the principal military advisor. Now, as you know, Jones’ view has prevailed with the CSIS study, and that is a recommendation. I think the political boundaries on this issue are moving, and it’s certainly feasible. But my own view is they have not moved far enough yet to have that provision accepted.

Oettinger: Arch, one cynical view of this issue would be consistent with a pork barrel view of Congress, that the Congress figures it’s better off maintaining servicism, in the interest of maintaining the status quo when it comes to contracts, military bases, manufacturers, and so on. What kind of credence should one give to that cynicism?

Barrett: I make the same point in my book: Congress has tended to keep the Department fragmented for its own purposes, which you’ve described well. I have not seen any manifestation of this thinking, however, in the three years I have worked on the bill in the House. I believe that it would be manifested more if one of the proposals were to unify the military departments, or somehow clouded the service boundaries. The Congress does seem to agree with the Secretary of the Navy and with General Barrow* that it would be dangerous to have one man in charge: congressmen don’t want an Air Force Chairman advising on what the Navy or the Marine Corps should be doing without allowing the Navy and Marine Corps to influence that advice. That to me has been a persuasive argument.

With respect to management of the Joint Staff, Jones would give the Joint Staff entirely to the Chairman. His control would not be diluted as the House bill has it. If the Chairman is going to be responsible for military advice he has to have a staff to support him, and that will be the Joint Staff. Jones would also give the Chairman a deputy. The Chairman is the only senior official in the Department of Defense, military or civilian, who does not have a deputy. The service secretaries, the chiefs of staff, and the Secretary of Defense have deputies, but the Chairman does not. This is a big issue in the Pentagon. There is a lot of opposition to a Deputy Chairman.

Oettinger: Can you spell that out? It’s not clear from the outside what the stakes are in that controversy.

Barrett: Well, there would be a continual joint presence with a Deputy Chairman. The Chairman, with his links to the unified and specified commands, especially if we strengthen those links, should visit those commands a good deal, should be out of Washington often. When he’s out of town at present, one of the Chiefs moves into the Chairman’s position. That would never happen again if there were a Deputy Chairman. The Deputy Chairman, whether or not he were designated the second ranking military man in the country (and that’s a subissue), would at least be the second ranking military man when the Chairman is out of town. He would sit at the head of the table, preside, and be the spokesman for the JCS to the Secretary of Defense and the President. So, among those who do not want reform and who seek to avert harm for the service positions, this is a big issue.

Oettinger: Can you give us a little more detail? I’m hazy on both the DOD regulations and the law. What prevents the Chairman from deputizing somebody and saying, “While I’m out of town you’re acting for me?” Is that a Secretary of Defense regulation, or the law?

Barrett: The Chairman has no one to appoint except the other four-star service chiefs. And he does appoint one of them. That is the present system. The Chairman’s personal staff consists of a three-star general who serves as his assistant and four or five officers at the Brigadier General and Colonel level. I believe, in his immediate office. That’s all the Chairman has.

One of the major criticisms even today is that the Chairman doesn’t have a staff. He can’t use the Joint Staff, that’s the criticism. Some say he can and does use the Joint Staff, but others say he doesn’t.

Thor Hanson, a Navy Admiral who was director of the Joint Staff, indicated that because of the way the law is written, he was reminded every week that the staff belongs to the JCS and not to the Chairman. Others say that General Vessey uses it all the time. Present law does not provide a clear-cut authority for the Chairman to use the staff to assist him in developing his own positions.

Turning back to your question, then, he couldn’t appoint a three-star general, so what he has is the

*General Robert H. Barrow, Ret., former Commandant of the Marine Corps.
chiefs of services. They’re the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and they rotate the responsibility every three months.

**McLaughlin:** Let me elaborate on that, Arch. Correct me if I’m wrong. For a long time the practice was to rotate the deputyship among the four, I think, three plus the commandant, every time there was a meeting with the Chairman absent. Finally they worked out a procedure where each one would fill in for three months as deputy so you didn’t always have a different chairman when the Chairman was out of town. The other service concern about having a deputy, besides continuity and presence, is the volumes written about where a deputy would fall in protocol and command vis-a-vis the other four-stars at the table. You know, do you get knocked down one place at the dinner table, is about what it comes down to.

**Oettinger:** Yes, but when one looks at that from the outside, it’s hard to tell whether it is a genuine concern or a surrogate for some other unspeakable quarrel over money or whatever. That’s why I’m interested in your perceptions of the underlying reality.

**Barrett:** Well, I think General Barrow just didn’t want a continual joint presence. He wanted that face-to-face contact with the Secretary and the President even though it was periodic. At least he got to know them and they got to know him. He wanted to be able to express his views through that joint channel, and felt that if a deputy were established, he would be faced with a continual joint presence above him. He would lose contacts with political leaders he valued.

To return to the explanation of the various positions, there is one more way station along the spectrum. I think you can almost put Jones and the CSIS study in the same place on the spectrum. And I’ll just say that Meyer, in the CSIS study, apparently retreated back to the Jones position. I will now go beyond them to the extreme end of the spectrum. There you find the position of Maxwell Taylor,* who says that the system is so flawed that we need to restructure completely, to get rid of the joint side as it exists today. Abolish the JCS and start again. He would create a staff that looks very much like the Joint Staff, but would be the staff to the national command authorities. It would be the Secretary’s military staff, in effect, headed by a Chief of Staff. And this staff, with a Chief of Staff, would be responsible for employment, operational matters, and military advice. It would be in the chain of command. Taylor, then, is proposing something very close to what I would call a general staff. It would be complemented by another group of five or six officers, drawn either from the retired ranks or the active ranks from each service. They would provide long-range strategic advice to the President or the Secretary of Defense.

I will close by saying I hope you can appreciate the problem that any Congressional committee faces in examining this issue. All of these people come before us with impeccable credentials, people like Stuart Symington,* who goes back to World War II and the original establishment of the Department of Defense, Maxwell Taylor, Curtis LeMay,** and on and on. A good portion of them agree that there are fundamental problems. But they disagree on what to do about them. So, to develop a bill, always considering the political realities of what is possible, is a very difficult process. I maintain that the House bill adheres more closely to reasserting the model that I showed you, the de jure model, than the other proposals. The structure stays intact in the House bill — the JCS, the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commanders. Even the moderate Jones proposals go a little further than the House, and in doing so start to revamp the system. That is, Jones makes the Chairman the principal military advisor.

**Oettinger:** What actually became law?

**Barrett:** The Chairman became spokesman for the CINCs on operational requirements, but not their supervisor as the House proposed. The word “supervisor” did not survive the conference. On the timeliness issue, the Chairman became “responsible for determining when issues will be decided,” once again a relatively minor provision. Probably most significant is the provision regarding the Joint Staff officers. The services will now nominate Joint Staff officers, and the Chairman, through the mechanism of a Joint Staff personnel process, will choose them. So Joint Staff officers now will work for the Chairman, and

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*General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**General Curtis E. LeMay, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

*Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force.
not for the services. They will know they weren’t just sent to the Joint Staff by the Navy or the Air Force or the Army, rather they were chosen by the Chairman. I hope that provision straightens out the loyalty issue somewhat. There is also a provision that changes the limitation on the length of a Joint Staff assignment from three years to four years. As a further spur to continuity, Joint Staff officers can also be reassigned to the Joint Staff after only two years now, rather than three. Finally, there is this oversight hook that I talked about earlier, requiring the Secretary of Defense to ensure that promotion and retention and career opportunities are protected for Joint Staff officers.

That concludes my prepared remarks. I’ll be glad to answer questions.

**Student:** I didn’t understand the proposal by the House that requires the Chairman to evaluate all nominees for three- and four-star positions. Does that say that all nominations for three- and four-star positions must go through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

**Barrett:** No, not through him, but it gives him a voice in these matters. To be promoted even to a one-star, there’s a 25-year-old Pentagon directive that requires an officer to have had a joint assignment. What this provision requires is that when a service nominates someone for a three-star position, the incumbent Chairman will pull those parts of his service record that have to do with his joint assignments, make an independent judgment, and write a letter to the President about this appointment. It’s asking the Chairman to do this with respect to an officer’s joint assignments. It’s just one more attempt to change the perspective of joint officers.

There’s a point I didn’t make earlier about these personnel matters. Concerning the requirement for the Secretary of Defense to safeguard the careers of joint officers, there is an ulterior motive in Congress’ interest in those statistics revealing how many are getting promoted. We know that if a certain portion of joint officers must be promoted, and that portion must be comparable statistically to the service promotion rates, the services are going to place officers in joint positions that they want to promote. They will not want to be caught in the position of having to promote officers they would not otherwise promote. So we’re after the assignment process; not the output, but the input.

**Student:** I’d like to ask about where the legislation stands and where it might be going. In particular, you mentioned that you’re considering now whether a bill will be introduced in Nichols’ Investigations Subcommittee. What’s the likelihood of something coming out of the Senate, what could pass this term, and who would lead opposition to what types of initiatives? Also, what is the relationship of the CSIS initiative to the whole process? It’s unusual that you have a so-called independent nonprofit think tank that seems so critical to mobilizing the support of this initiative.

**Barrett:** I guess I’ll say the nice things about Congress now. You know Congress really hasn’t been the legislator since the 1930s, with the tariff legislation, as Arthur Maass points out.* The chief legislator is the President. But Congress is demonstrating in this issue that it can legislate. It has taken the lead in the face of opposition from the executive branch. I think Congress is playing a very constructive and useful role and it’s not getting the credit it deserves. I don’t know another area of national policy right now where Congress is leading the way. The Senate, however, has been sort of the water anchor in this whole thing. The House has led the way, I think, until recently.

The only reason I can give for the House leadership on the issue is that when Jones made his critical statements, the Chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee was Congressman Richard White from El Paso, Texas. At first, neither he nor the subsequent Chairman, Bill Nichols of Alabama, could trace the organization of the DOD. And, as I indicated earlier, I couldn’t either when I was first assigned to the Pentagon as a lieutenant colonel. White had been in Congress for 18 years, on the Armed Services Committee. But the organization of the Department of Defense is so complicated that it is just not something you examine routinely.

But White became convinced as his subcommittee hearings went on that: 1) there were real problems, and 2) he was responsible, as chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction, for correcting them. Once he got those two things in his mind, you couldn’t stop him. He commanded a great deal of respect from pro-defense advocates, not only outside Congress but on the Armed Services Committee — a

senior member who had always supported defense. Now, here he comes criticizing the organization, saying it needs to be changed. His influence extended to the succeeding subcommittee chairman. White did not run for reelection. His successor is Bill Nichols (D-AL). The JCS legislation is called the Nichols Bill. When Nichols came in he said, "Dick White left me some unfinished business," and he became hooked, too. He believes, like White, "There are problems, and I'm responsible for correcting them." He has told me that he does not particularly like organizational issues — they're just not his cup of tea. But he feels he has a responsibility and just holds on like a bulldog until he makes progress.

I can't give you any better explanation than a high sense of responsibility on the part of two Congressmen for this thing getting started on the Hill.

After the ball got rolling, the Roosevelt Center* began a study, later merged with the CSIS study. I don't have a theoretical framework for explaining the role of think tanks in organizational reform of public institutions. CSIS is certainly playing a unique role in the Department of Defense organizational debate. Maybe you could develop the hypothesis that in the absence of leadership from the executive branch on an important issue, one role of think tanks is to focus ex-executive branch officials and other experts on the problem. In any case, CSIS is performing a service that the executive branch should be performing. It certainly is playing a very constructive role. That is evident from the fact that six ex-secretaries endorse the study.

Chairman Les Aspin (D-WI) has not been a strong supporter of this bill. He introduced the provision in 1982 concerning promotions to three- and four-stars. He has not, I think, focused on the issue until the last year or so. He does not believe that this bill goes far enough, so he has not been strongly associated with it. If he's going to do something, he would like to be sure that we do it right the first time. He participated in all of the CSIS panels. You can infer that he would probably want to do what Jones wants to do, make the Chairman the principal military advisor, give him control over the Joint Staff, and provide a deputy. If the Investigations Subcommittee has hearings, now that Representative Aspin is full committee chairman, he may make his views known and the bill may be strengthened.

Why has the Senate been the stumbling block? The Senate Armed Services Committee contains Senators who are proponents of the opposing views on the JCS issue. Several have strong lasting ties to the Navy and are persuaded that those who want to maintain the status quo are correct. I believe the divisions extend to the Senate staff also.

Oettinger: One small point about independent think tanks. The fact that Representative Aspin participated in all of those things highlights a difference between the CSIS process and what we do in this seminar and in its associated research program. At CSIS, the emphasis is less on the question of independence, where the money comes from, than on this question of whether there's participation by folks who currently hold power, and whether the process ends up with recommendations that then become part of an agenda of folks who are in power as opposed to being purely in the knowledge business. In the CSIS process, for better or worse, the participants wear two hats: one as participants in that study, the other as wielders of power. This is distinct from something like this seminar activity and the research components, where there is absolutely no participation by those with legislative or policy-making power. And both approaches have some assets and some liabilities.

McLaughlin: Arch, when I was in the Post Office, our unholy triangle for getting legislation was if you could get postal management, the unions, and big mailers lined up, which was not always easy, you could get legislation through. If anyone fell out there was no legislation. It seems to me that one of the problems in substantial reorganization of the JCS or the Pentagon is that constituencies with some kind of vested interest will change. It seems to me that if you think reorganization would be economical, traditionally the only people willing to argue that were over at OMB. And the proliferation of weapons systems and bases that would tend to come from services planning to fight wars seems to have great appeal to a lot of local constituencies and defense contractors. In the absence of a strong administration effort to reform la Eisenhower, it's hard to find other constituencies to line up. Do you have a sense of other people who can make this a reality?

Barrett: It's interesting that you bring that up. I believe that this will result, if it results at all, almost entirely from an act of Congress, from internal persuasion. The CSIS report leadership does not agree

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*Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.
with me. They think you can mobilize a constituency for reform. Their effort is in that stage now. They have their study out and they actually have a plan to meet with Administration officials, influential people, and organizations in Washington, and even around the country to mobilize support. Certainly that will be helpful. I’m very gratified every time someone from the VFW, or the American Legion, calls me and wants me to speak to them about this issue.

I think it would be very helpful if significant outside support were to materialize. I don’t think it’s going to happen, though. I don’t think defense-related organizations are going to play a significant role. They’re more concerned with personnel issues and those sorts of things. I could be wrong.

**Student:** Where does the DOD stand? From what you said at first they were very reluctant to do anything about the reform and now they seem to have given in on a few issues. Are they just in a stalling action?

**Barrett:** That’s a good question and there’s absolutely no answer to it right now. We have, of course, the 1983 Department of Defense proposal. The House Armed Services Committee Report* contains a letter contrasting the DOD position to the Subcommittee position, written by Deputy Defense Secretary William Taft when he was General Counsel of the Department of Defense. The reason we don’t know what the Department position is now is that since 1983 the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, has become involved and he has opposed vociferously some of the provisions that the Administration proposed. I’m not at all sure what Secretary Weinberger may propose during this Congress, if anything.

**Student:** What about the appropriation process? It seems the one thing that might have something to do with that is making the Chairman of the JCS the spokesman for the CINCs.

**Barrett:** Your question is about resource allocation, if and how the Chairman would become involved in that. That’s one of our major criticisms, that the joint side does not become involved in resource allocation. You see, the Armed Services Committee does make resource allocations. So the Armed Services Committee would be very interested in the Chairman’s advice, or the joint side advice on resource allocation, and the Appropriations Committee would too. One thing we would expect the Chairman to get into, if he is made an advisor in his own right, is resource allocation. The Subcommittee report points out all the things that the JCS can’t do today — unified command plan, cross-service issues, resource allocation — and stresses that we need joint advice in the government, but don’t get it. The Chairman should provide joint advice on resource allocation by taking recommendations of the CINCs — not their entire wish list, however, which will be as voracious as the services’ desired programs. The Chairman should take the CINCs’ recommendations, integrate them, and give them priorities. Then that in itself would be one version of a defense budget. The Chairman should play that off against the service program objective memoranda (POMs), and be prepared to defend it before the Defense Resources Board or in whatever OSD form. The services would continue to defend their proposals, too.

What we’ve got now is a military/civilian confrontation — civilians in OSD tilting with each of the four services — which finally results in a resolution. But with this bill the politically accountable civilians would have a legitimate military position from the Chairman on the joint side, and they’d have a legitimate military position from the service, or input side, and they could choose. Either way they go they choose a legitimate military course. All the relevant interests participate. It would not be an easy job for the civilians, choosing among them. But it would be better, it seems to me, than the way things work now.

**Oetinger:** Let me come at this from a slightly different point of view. Supposing all of this passes, structural changes are made, and the Armed Services Committee of the House and counterparts in the Senate are happy as clams, and so on and so forth, what would be the attitudes of the appropriations committees?

**Barrett:** Well, as you know, the authorization and appropriations committees operate in independent spheres much of the time. In this the House Armed Services Committee has operated independently.

The only indications I have are that the appropriations people are very supportive. And I say that because they stole a march a couple of years ago; it was the Appropriations Committee in the House that championed, and successfully legislated, a little

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organization called SPRAA — Strategic Plans and Resources Analysis Agency. It is supposed to be a 40-man group dedicated to the Chairman to do the types of analyses that I described and that you were referring to. So, that suggests that the Appropriations Committee supports the process.

Interestingly enough, in view of what I told you about the Joint Staff procedures, the first draft of the SPRAA charter followed what the appropriations committee directed — a 40-man group reporting to the Chairman, doing the types of analyses he wants it to do. When the charter finally got through the joint process, with every service taking a crack at it, the organization became, in effect, an addition almost to the Joint Staff. It’s a 40-man group that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and does what the JCS, not the Chairman, directs. So the purpose, in my view, has been diluted severely. Until we get the Joint Staff operating procedures straightened out, neither SPRAA nor anything else is going to be of any help.

Oettinger: Yes, but it’s fascinating because you’re saying that a money initiative coming out of Appropriations can get sidetracked through the organization absorbing it, while my point of view says an organizational initiative can get absorbed by having the money go the wrong way. So really in order to get anything done you’ve got to get the two of them, the money and the organization, both sort of moving together. That’s a tall order. It really requires a major consensus, which may be why some of these things don’t really happen except during a war. If one looks at the really successful ones they’ve been after you lost a few in Pearl Harbor or something like that.

Barrett: During a war is where cooperation comes into play. I am referring back to what I first talked about, the larger interests of the organization. Everybody focuses on the war effort, and not on these interservice conflicts.

Student: One of the other CSIS proposals is a two-year military budget. Can you give us a little perspective on that?

Barrett: Well, as to whether I think it would be a good idea or not, personally, I do. I would favor that.

That judgment is tempered by the experience in Congress of the Foreign Affairs Committee, a very different committee from Armed Services with a very different function. Foreign Affairs tried two-year authorizations. The Committee found that in the second year it was faced with so many reprogrammings that it was actually doing its budget again without the structured process that had been used in the past. So the Committee went back to one-year authorizations.

Nevertheless, I think it’s worth a try for the reasons that CSIS puts forth. Will it pass? I doubt it. A number of senators such as William Cohen* have said they think it’s an idea whose time has come. But to get the appropriations and authorization committees in both Houses to agree to this seems to me an insuperable task at present.

Student: It just seems that representatives who are elected for two years are going to want to have two shots at the budget as opposed to just one during their time on the Hill. And that seems hard to overcome.

Barrett: Yes, I agree.

Oettinger: The fact that the point of reckoning in these military affairs does not come in a daily way the way it does in a business matter is an important element in this equation. The consequences, good or bad, of making or not making these decisions may not be evident until, you know, the next Grenada, to be charitable, or the next Beirut, or the last incineration. That’s what lends these problems a very different character from any analog in the civilian budgeting and organizational structure, where the reckoning is much more continuous and therefore the incentives for change are greater. Do you have any thoughts on what might be done to focus attention more on matters on which there’s more continuous feedback in the civilian sphere than there is in this sphere, so as to get decisions made?

Barrett: Well, it seems to me to be logical — and critical — to do everything possible to develop quality military advice and to ensure that civilian leaders are exposed to that advice. We have not talked about possibly the most controversial provision of the House bill. If you improve the quality of military advice, make it more timely, have it address issues while they still are issues, so that you’re getting something besides a watered-down unusable product from the joint side, then the next step is to ensure

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*William S. Cohen (R-ME), Chairman of the Governmental Affairs Oversight Subcommittee.
that advice is heard at the right level of government. That is why the Nichols bill places the Chairman on the National Security Council. That is the reasoning. If you’re going to get good advice, then insert it at a level where the military component will have the proper influence.

Oettinger: Why don’t we just stick to that for a moment. You know, a lot of folks in all realms want to inject the thing at the NSC level, or the executive office of the President (EOP) level in general. The NSC is a statutory body, but EOP bodies vary all over in terms of the usefulness, organization, etc., depending upon the incumbent. Why would this be any different? I mean, why is that an important provision? If the President liked it, he might use it, but he could anyway; he could invite the Chairman. If the President didn’t like it, he would circumvent it like anything else that gets put against his wishes into the EOP.

Barrett: My answer is I don’t think it is an important provision. The Chairman is always there anyway; he serves as an advisor to the NSC. The provision is controversial. It has become a lightning rod.

Oettinger: So, you’re saying it’s controversial but not important.

Barrett: In my view, yes. It’s much less important than the other provisions, and as you say, the President can take advice from whomever he sees fit, and he will do so. But nevertheless it could have a symbolic value, and the House chose to include it. I doubt very seriously that that provision will remain in the bill, at least in its present form.